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PREFACE

Law is often defined as the rules by which courts will de-

cide controversies. If this be correct, the art of practice is in

forecasting how courts will decide particular cases. Decisions

are no longer, even in theory, mere repetitions of precedent,

nor even purely logical development of precedent to fit new

PREFACE

circumstance. The practical effect of one decision or another

has openly, or, more often, covertly, drawn many a judge from

the straight path of abstract logic. Primarily, of course, a

practitioner must be familiar with precedent and must be

trained so to analyze it as to perceive to the uttermost thread

that web of ever fining principles which constitute the rules of

law. But beyond this, in order to prognosticate the future

pattern which his threads will weave, he must observe, in addi-

tion to the pattern of the past, the extraneous factors which

influence judicial decisions; he must know to what extent de-

clared principles have been deduced through logic and how far

merely supported by it. He must comprehend the ideas of

policy and the pragmatic reasoning which permeate all the

modern law. It is partly because it can at least suggest this
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background that a proper text-book has an informational value

greater than that of either digest or encyclopedia. But more

particularly does the text book serve a special purpose in so

showing the derivation of a rule, in expounding and explaining

it in relation to other rules, as to indicate its probable direction

and application. I have endeavored to do this so far as pos-

sible without getting into either speculation or philosophic dis-

coursiveness, but, partly in consequence thereof, some proposi-

tions of law are not so categorically stated as one might like.

Since law is what will be developed from what has been de-

termined, one can be quite positive and define only as to the

past and, in regaid to some matters, even that can not be

formulated into a rule. In occasional instances I have not

hesitated to state what I believe ought to be the rule, where the

437189

Law is often defined as the rules by which courts will decide controversies. If this be correct; the art of practice is in
forecasting how courts will decide particular cases. Decisions
are no longer, even in theory, mere repetitions .of precedent,
nor even purely logical development of precedent to fit new.
circumstance. The practical effect of one decision or another
has openly, or, more often, covertly, drawn many a judge from
the straight path of abstract logic. Primarily, of course, a
practitioner must be familiar with precedent and must be
trained so to analyze it as to perceive to th-e uttermost thread
that web of ever fining principles which constitute the rules of
law. But beyond this, in order to prognosticate the future
pattern which his. threads will weave, he must observe, in addition to the p~ttern of the past, the extraneous factors which
influence judicial decisions; he must know to what extent declared _principles have been deduced through logic and how far
merely supported by it. -He must comprehend the ideas of
policy and the pragmatic reasoning which permeate all the
modern law. It ·is partly because it can at least suggest this
background that a proper text-book has an informational value
greater th~ that of either digest or encyclopedia. But more
particularly does the text book serve a special. purpose in so
showing the derivation of a rule, in expounding and explaining
it in relation to other rules, as to indicate its probable direction
and application. I have endeavored to do this so far as possible without getting into either speculation or philosophic discoursiv~ness, but, partly in consequence thereof, some propositions of law are not so categorically stated as one might like.
Since law is what will be developed from what has been determined, one can be quite positive and define only as to the
past and, in rega1d to some· matters, e'ven that can not be
formulated into a rule. In o"ccasional instances I have not
hesitated to state what I believe ought to be the rule, where the
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Vl
actual decisions leave it uncertain, or where there are not de-

cisions upon the matter at all, but in no case have I knowingly

done so without pointing out the lack of actual authority.

The comparatively small size of the book is not due to any

conscious superficiality of treatment nor omission of pertinent

subject matter. It purports to cover only the substantive law

,of patents, their nature, validity, effect and their characteristics

as property. Matters of procedure in securing patents or suing

on them, and the difficult subject of the amount of compensa-

tion recoverable by suit, would require a volume for them-

selves and are not included herein. But of the matter which

is included, it has been my desire to present every issue \vhich

has come before the courts. Of course I have in no degree

cited all the cases, but to the extent that I have accomplished

my intention, some part of the discussion will be found ap-

plicable to every case. I have sought brevity in such a co-

ordination of propositions and so carefully worked out a

sequence of topics as would eliminate duplication of discussion.

But for this reason some propositions will not be found under
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customary headings and reference to the index will be conse-

quently more necessary than is usual.

Although the book is as complete in its field and as thorough

as I could make it, it is written primarily for others than patent

practitioners. They, presumably, being already trained special-

ists in this subject, have no longer any need for discussion

and exposition of principles. . The digests, showing particular

applications of the various rules, should be their tools. This

book is intended more particularly for the use of inventors,

business men, engineers, lawyers in general practice and all

that class of laymen who from time to time want information

concerning their rights in respect to inventions and patents.

JOHN BARKER WAITE.

Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF PATENT RIGHTS

THE COMMON LAW does not recognize any right of owner-

ship in an invention. If one has conceived a new means of

accomplishing a given result his only right to the exclusive use

and enjoyment of that new means is by virtue of statutes ; he

has no such right in the "unwritten law." So long as an in-

CHAPTER I

ventor can practically keep his idea a secret it remams his

prqperty^to be exclusively enjoyed by him, because the law

does not compel him to reveal it. Furthermore, if an inventor

ORIGIN OF
has revealed his new idea of means to some other person un-

p ATENT

RIGHTS

der an ...express or implied pledge of secrecy, or through a

confidential relationship, the law (equity) will enjoin that

person under pain of punishment .from breaking his pledge of

secrecy. 1 If an inventor embodies his new idea in tangible

form, that corporeal embodiment itself is his property just as

would be any other tangible thing that he might make, or have

made, for himself. The mistaken, but not infrequent, as-

sumption that the corporeal embodiment of the new idea is

itself the invention, has given rise to occasional statement that
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the Common Law, because it recognized the maker's ownership

of the corporeal chattel, recognized ownership in an invention.

The distinction between the "invention," which is an intangi-

ble concept, and the wheels, levers, substances and other tangi-

ble things by which the idea is given visible form must be kept

clearly in mind. Invention is a mental operation, not a physi-

cal .act, and an invention is an idea, expressed. in some form,

visible or audible, and not the tangible thing in which it may

happen to be demonstrated. Of this, more will be said later.

The idea itself, so soon as it becomes known to others,

ceases, so far as the unwritten law is concerned, to be the in-

ventor's property. It is at once open to the use and enjoyment

!O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149.

THE COMM.ON LAW does not recognize any righ~ of ownership in an invention. If one has conceived a new means of
accomplishing a given result his only right to the exclusive use
and enjoym_ent of that new means is by virtue of statutes; he
has no such right in the "unwritten law." So long as an inventor can practically keep his idea a secret it remains hi~
propert to be exclusively enjoyed by him, because the law
does not compel Furn to reveal it. Furthermore if an inventor
has revealea his new idea of m~nsto some other person under an
~ss or implied pledge of secrecy, or through a
confidential relationship, the law (equity) will enJom that
person unoer ain f punishment from breaking i le ge of
secrecy. 1 If an inventor embodies his new idea in tangible
form, that corpo e.a.Lemoodiment itself is his property just as
wou d be any other tangible thing that he might make, or have
made, for himself. The mistaken, but not infrequent, assumption that the corporeal embodiment of the new idea is
itself the invention, has given rise to occasional statement that
the Common Law, because it recognized the maker's ownership
of the corporeal chattel, recognized ownership in an invention.
The distinction between the "invention," which is an intangible concept, and the wheels, levers, substances and other tangible things by which the idea is given visible form must be kept
clearly in mind. Invention ·s a mental operation, not a physi ..
cal act, and an invention is an idea expressed . ii:i some form,
visible or audible, and not the tangible thing in -which it may happen to be demonstr.ated. Of this, more will be said later.
The idea itself, so soon a it becomes known to others,
ceases, so far as the unwritten law is concerned, to be the in..:
Vf!! or's prop~rty. It is at once open to the use and enjoyment
1

0 . & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski n4 Mich. 149.
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Patents and Inventions

of any one. As one judge expressed it, "So long as the origi-

nator of the naked idea keeps it to himself ... it is his ex-

clusive property, but it ceases to be his own when he permits it

to pass from him. Ideas of this sort, in their relation to prop-

erty may be likened to the interest which a person may obtain

in bees and birds, and fish in running streams, which are con-

spicuous instances of (animals) ferae naturae. If the claimant

keeps them on his own premises they become his qualified

property, and absolutely his so long as they do not escape.

But if he permits them to go he can not follow them." 2

The whole matter of ownership of inventions, therefore,

depends uponjwritten law; and the statutes of the country are

the beginning and the end of an inventor's exclusive right to

the use and enjoyment of his invention.

ROYAL GRANTS. The right of sole en joymenL-of a4nven-

tion originated, in England, from grants made by the sovereign

to particulajMrDientors. These grants were evidenced by open

letter s,~wHIch were technically called letters patent or merely

patents, and by a sort of metonymy the rights themselves
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thereby evidenced have come to be commonly known as pat-

2 Bristol v. E. L. A. Society, 52 Hun. 161, 5 N. Y. S. 131 ; To the same

effect are, Stein v. Morris, Va. (1917), 91 S. E. 177; Wilson v. Rousseau,

4 How. 646, 673 ; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477 ; Morton v. N. Y. Eye

Infirmary, 5 Blatch. 116; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 Comstock (N. Y.) 9;

Comstock v. White, 18 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 421.

As a matter of fact, the idea of "possession" has been so fundamental

in the English concept of "property" that the Common Law has been

loath to recognize property rights in anything that is not capable of ex-

clusive physical possession. But while it never recognized an exclusive

right to an invention, it has conceded property rights in some intangible

ideas. An interesting discussion of an author's exclusive right to the sub-

ject matter of his compositions as distinct from his tangible manuscript,

is found in the early case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 2303, esp. 2336 ff.

"The present claim is founded upon the original right to this work, as

being the mental labour of the author; and that the effect and produce of

the labour is his. It is a personal incorporeal property, saleable and

profitable; it has indicia certa: for though the sentiments and doctrine

may be called ideal, yet when the same are communicated to the sight and

understanding of every man, by the medium of printing, the work becomes

a distinguishable subject of property, and not totally destitute of corporeal

properties."

of any one.
one judge expre ed it ' So long as the originator of the naked idea keeps it to himself . . . it i his exclu ive property but it ceases to be his own when he permits it
to pa from him. Ideas of this sort, in their relation to property may be likened to the interest which a person may obtain
in bee and bird , and fish i_n running streams, which are conpicuous in tances of (animals) f erae natz~ra.e. If the claimant
keeps them on his own premises they become his qualified
property and absolutely _his so 1ong as they do not escape.
But if he permit them to go he can not follow them.' 2
The whole matter of ownership of inventions, therefore,
depends upon written law; .· and the statutes of the country are
the beginning and the end o"f an inventor's exclusiye right to
the use and enjoyment of his invention.
RovAL GRANTS. The right of sole enjoyment 0£ an inven. R Englanc!z.. from grants made by the sovereign
rs. These grants were evidenced by open
to articular i
letter , " ich were technically called letters patent or merely
ratents, and by a sort of metonymy the rights_ themselves
thereby ev:denced have come to be commonly known as pat2 Bristol v. E. L. A. Society, 52 Hun. 161, 5 N. Y. S. 131; To the same
effect are, Stein v. Morris, Va. (1917), 91 S. E. 177; Wilson v. Rousseau,
4 How. 646, 673; Gayler v. Wilder, IO · ow. 477; Morton v. N. Y. Eye
Infirmary, S Blatch. l 16; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 Comstock (N. Y.) 9;
Comstock v. White, 18 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 42r.
As a matter of fact, the idea of "possession" has been so fundamental
in the Engli h concept of ''property" that the Common Law has been
loath to recognize property rights in anything that is pot capable of exclusive physical pos ession. But while it never recognized an exclusive
right to an invention, it has conceded property rights in some intangible
ideas. An interesting discu ion of an author' exclusive right to the ubj ect matter of his com po itions as distinct from his tangible manuscript,
is found in the early <ease of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr, 2303, esp. 2336 ff.
"The present claim i founded upon the original right to this work, a
being the 'mental labour of the author· and that the effect and produce of
tqe labour i his. It is a personal incorporeal property, saleable and
profitable; it has indicia certa: for though the entiments and doctrine
may be called ideal, yet when the same are communicated to the sight and
under tanding of every man, by the medium of printing, the work becomes
a di tingui hable subject of property, and not totally destitute of corporeal
propertie . '
·
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ents. Many monopolies and exclusive rights were granted by

royal letters patent other than those relating to the use and

enjoyment of an invention, but it is with the latter only that

we are here concerned. 3

The practice of the sovereign in granting monopolies was

always opposed by the Common Law, on the ground that they

were contrary to natural right. 4 The courts could not prevent

the sovereign from issuing such grants, but they could punish

the procurement of them, and they could refuse to enforce

them. 5 They did so refuse in cases of monopolies which they

did not believe to be for the good of the realm.

Nevertheless the grants became so numerous and so ob-

noxious that in 1601 an attempt was made by Parliament to

abolish monopolies entirely. A promise by the Queen to lessen

the burden of them prevented action at this time, but during

the reign of James I, in. 1623, a statute was enacted, entitled

the statute against Monopolies. This act provided, "that all

monopolies, and all commissions, grants, licences, charters and

letters patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

made or granted to any person or persons, bodies politick or

corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole buying, selling, mak-

ing, working or using of anything within this realm, . . . are

altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, and so are and

shall be utterly void and of none effect, and in nowise to be put

in use or execution." The act contained, however, an express

exception from its operation of those letters patent and grants

of privilege, for a limited term, which had 1 been, or should be,

given for the "sole working or making of any manner of new

manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor

and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time

of making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as

also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the

3 The first letters patent for an invention are said to have been given

by Edward III to the inventor of a "philosopher's stone."

4 Coke, 3rd institute, Cap. 85.

5 Darcy v. Allin, .Noy. 173; 74 Eng. Rep. 1131; The Clothworkers of

Ipswich Case, Godbolt No. 351, p. 252, 78 Eng. Rep. 147.

6 21 Jac. .1. Ch. 3. The date is 1623 or 1624 according to the time at

which his reign is assumed to have commenced.

ents. Many monopolies and exclusive r~ghts were granted by
royal letters patent othev tban those relating to the use and
enjoyment of an invention, but it is with the latter only that
we are here concerned.'3
The practice of th~ sov-::reign in granting monopolies was
always opposed by the Common Law, on the ground that they
were contrary to natural right. 4 The courts could not prevenf
the sovereign from issuing such grants, but they could punish
the procurement of them, and they could refuse to enforce
them. 5 They did so refuse in ~ases of monopolies which they
·
did not believe to be for the good of the realm;
Nevertheless the grants became so numerous and so obnoxious that in 1601 an attempt was made by Parliament to
abo!!_sh ·monopolies entirely. A promise by the Queen to lessen
tl).e ·burden ·of them prevented action at this time, but during
the reign of Jam es I, in. l 62 3, a statute was enactea, entitled
the statl:lte against Monopolies. 6 This act provided, "that all
monopolies, and all commissions, grants, licences, charters and
letters patents heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be
made or granted to any person · or persons, bodies politick or·
corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working or using- of anything within this realm, . . . are·
altogether contrary to the laws ·of this realm, and so are and
shall be utterly void and of none effect, and in nowise to be put
in use or execution." The act contained, however, an express
exception from its operation of those letters pafent and grants
of privilege, for a limited t~rm, which had' been, or should be,
given fJ)r the "sole working or making of any manner of new
manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor_
and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time
of making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as
also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the
3

The first letters patent for an invention are said to have been given
by Edward III to the inventor of a "philosopher's stone."
4 Coke, 3rd institute, Cap. 85.
5
Darcy v. Allin, . Noy. 173; 74 :gng. Rep. l 131; The Clothworkers of
Ipswich Ca e; Godbolt No. 351, p. 252, 78 Eng. Rep. 147.
6 21 ] ac . . I. Ch. 3.
The ·date is 1623 or 1624 according to the time at
which his reign is assumed to have commenced.
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state, -by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of

trade, or generally inconvenient. . . ." .

This negative provision, excepting, monopoly patents to

inventors from the ban of the statute, has generally been

thought of as the original foundation of patent law. It is

quite clear, however, that royal patents to inventors would not

have been invalid, under the Common Law, before the statute,

but would have been enforced, as being actually for the good

of the realm, and that the exception in the statute was there-

fore merely declaratory of the Common Law. Lord Coke in

his Institutes says specifically that this proviso made such

patents no better than they would have been before the act,

but only excepted them from the express prohibition of the

act. 7 He further suggests as the reason they are good at all,

that they benefit the realm by offering a reward for the pro-

duction of new manufactures.

This is the position consistently taken by all who advocate

the propriety of granting monopolies to inventors. The re-

striction of the natural .right of the public to make use oi all
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knowledge revealed to it, is justified on the theory that the

grant. of. a sole right to inventors encourages and instigates the

production of knowledge, by stimulating search for it. 8 It is

not within the scope of this work to discuss the economic

propriety of granting patent monopolies ; it is sufficient to say

that legal validity of the grant is predicated upon the assump-

tion that it is for the good of the public. 9

* No. 3, Cap. 85.

' "It (the patent statute) was passed for the purpose of encouraging

useful invention and promoting new and useful improvements by the

protection and stimulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was

intended to secure to the public, after the lapse of the exclusive privileges

granted, the benefit of such inventions and improvements." Bauer v.

O'Donnell, 229 U. S. i, 10.

9 A discussion of the justification of the patent laws will be found in

Robinson on Patents, vol. I, p. 54 ff ; Hopkins on Patents, introduction to

Vol. i ; Articles by Fredk. P. Fish, Sci. Am., Sept. 27 and Oct. 4, 1913.

An unusual and excellent discussion of the justification of the monopoly

given by the patent law is to be found in "Inventors and Money-makers"

by F. W. Taussig. His thesis appears to be, that invention flows nattir-

Patents and Inventions

.4

state, by rai ing price of commodities at home, or hurt of
trade, or generally inconvenient. . . ." .
Thi necrative provi ion, excepting: monopoly patents to
inventors from the ban of the statute, has generally been
thought of as the original foundation of patent law. It is
quite clear, however, that royal patents to inventors would not
have been invalid, under the Common Law, before the statute,
but w~uld have been enforced, as being actually for the good
of the realm, and that the exception in the statute was therefore merely declaratory of the Common Law. Lord Coke in
his Institutes says spedfi~ally that this proviso made such
patents no better than they would have been before the act,
but only excepted them from the express prohibition of the
act. 7 He further suggests as the reason they are good at all,
that they benefit the realm by offering a reward for the production of new manufactures.
This is the position consistently taken by all who advocate
the propriety of granting: monopolies to inventors. The restr · tion of the natural ricrht of the public to make us
all
knowledge evealed to it, is justified on the theory that the
gra oLa. sole right to inventors encourages and instigates the
pr duct!gn of knowledge, by stimulating earch for it. 8 It is
not within the scope of this work to discuss the economic
propriety of granting patent monopolies; it is sufficient to say
that legal validity of the grant is predicated upon the· assumption that it is for the ·good of the public. 9
1

No. 3, Cap. 85.
"It (the patent tatute) was pa sed for the purpose of encouraging
useful invention and promoting new and u eful improvements by the
protection and timulation thereby given to inventive genius, and was
intended to ecure to the public, after the lapse of the exclu ive privileges
granted, the benefit of such inventions and improvements." Bauer v.
O'Donnell, 229 U. S. l, IO.
9 A discus ion of the justification of the patent law
will be found in
Robin on on Patents, vol. l, p. 54 ff; Hopkins on Patents, introduction to
Vol. I; Articles by Fredk. P. Fish, Sci. Am., Sept. 27 and Oct. 4, 1913.
An unusual and excellent discus ion of the ju tification of the monopoly
given by the patent law is to be found in "Inventor and Money-makers"
by F. \: . Tau ig. Hi thesi appear to be, that invention flow natur-
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This right of the sovereign, as recognized by the Common

Law and the Statute of Monopolies, to create by express grant

the sole right to enjoy the fruits of invention, became a pre-

rogative of the state governments of this country, 10 and it is

possible that they still have power to grant patents for inven-

tions within their own jurisdictions.

The right to issue monopoly patents to inventors is given to

the federal government by the Constitution. 11 It authorizes

Congress "to promote the progress of Science and Useful

Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors

the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-

eries." As nothing further is said in the Constitution upon the

subject, it would appear that Congress is unhampered as to the

character of the right it shall grant, except by the other pro-

visions of the Constitution and, possibly, by the rules of the

Common Law. 12 The grants might be made by special act

concerning particular inventions, if Congress so desired, in-

stead of by the general laws under which they are in fact se-

cured. 13 The law may also be retrospective as well as pros-
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pective for "the power of Congress to legislate upon the .sub-

ject of patents is plenary, by the terms of the Constitution,

and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no

limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so

that they do not take away the. rights of property in existing

patents." 14

THE PATENT STATUTES. The first general act providing for

the issuance of patents to inventors was that of April 10,

I 725i 5 This provided generally for the grant, by the Secre-

ally, in its fullest extent, from the primitive instinct for contrivance, but

that the monopoly is necessary to assure the commercial development and

practical perfection of inventions.

10 Act of 1793, 7; Livingston & Fulton v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns (N. Y.)

507.

11 Art. i, 8.

12 Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner 535.

13 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539; Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454;

Graham v. Johnston, 21 Fed. 40.

14 McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. 202.

15 The sequence of the various patent acts is set out in Root v. Railway

Co., 105 U. S. 189.

This right of the sovereign as recognized by the Common
Law and the Statute of Monopolies, to create by express grant
the sole right to enjoy the fruits of invention, became a prerogative of the state governments of this country, 10 and it is
possible that they still have power to grant patents for inventions within their own jurisdictions.
The right to issue monopoly patents to inventors is given to
the federal government by the Constitution. 11 It authorizes
Congress ''to promote the progress of Science and Useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoverie . ' As nothing further is said in the Constitution upon the
ubject, it would appear that Congress is unhampered as to the
character of the right it shall grant, except by the other provisions of the Constitution and, possibly, by the rules of the
Common Law. 12 The grants might be made by special act
concerning particular inventions, if Congress so desired, instead of by the general laws under which they are in fact secured.13 The law may also be retrospective as well as prospective for "the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary, by the terms of the Constitution,
and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no
limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so
that they do not take away the rights of property in existing
patents.' 14
THE PATENT STATUTE . The first general act providing for
the issuance of patents to inventors was that of pril 10,
15
I 7 0.
This provided generally for the grant, by the Secreally, in its fullest extent, from the primitive instinct for contrivance, but
that the monopoly is necessary to a sure the commercial development and
practical perfection of inventions.
10 Act of 1793, ~ 7; Livingston & Fulton v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns (N. ~.)

507.

11 Art. I, § 8.
12 Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sumner 535.
13 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539;

Evans v. Eaton, 3 Whe~t. 454;
Graham v. Johnston, 21 Fed. 40.
14 McClurg v. Kingsland, l How. 202.
15 The sequence of the various pat_
e nt acts is set out in Root v. Railway
Co., 105 U. S. 189.
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tary of State, Secretary of War and Attorney General, or any

tary of State, Secretary of War and Atton:ey General, or any
two of them, of a patent, to endure for I 4 years, to any inventor who came within the terms of the act. It provided for
a particular mode in which application for the patent should be
made and proceedings and conditions in accord with which
the patent should be issued. By later acts the duty of issuing
the patents was imposed upon the Secretary of State, 16 and
eventually a sub-department known as the Patent Office was
instituted to perform these duties, and the office of Commissioner of Patents was created. 11 In 1870-4 the patent laws
were revised and re-enacted in the form which, with some
minor changes is still iri effect. 18
This act provides that 19 "Any person who has invented or
discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements
thereof, not known or used by others in this country, before
his invention or discovery thereof' and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or discovery thereof, or more than
two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on
sale in this country for more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned,
may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other
due proceeding had, obtain a patent therefor."
"Every patent shall contain a short title or description of
the invention or discovery, correctly indicating its nature and
design, and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for
the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make,
u e, and vend the invention or discovery throughout the United
State and the Territories thereof, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification
an.cl drawing hall be annexed to the patent and be a part
thereof.'

two of them, of a patent, to endure for 14 years, to any in-

ventor who came within the terms of the act. It provided for

a particular mode in which application for the patent should be

made and proceedings and conditions in accord with which

the patent should be issued. By later acts the duty of issuing

the patents was imposed upon the Secretary of State, 16 and

eventually a sub-department known as the Patent Office was

instituted to perform these duties, and the office of Commis-

sioner of Patents was created. 17 In 1870-4 the patent laws

were revised and re-enacted in the form which, with some

minor changes, is still in effect. 18

This^act pro^desj^hatj 9 "Any person who has invented or

discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or

composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements

thereof, not known or used by others in this country, before

his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or de-

scribed in any printed publication in this or any foreign coun-

try, before his invention or discovery thereof, or more than
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two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on

sale in this country for more than two years prior to his ap-

plication, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned,

may, upon payment of the fees required by law, and other

due proceeding had, obtain a patent therefor."

"Every patent shall contain a short_ title or description of

the invention or discovery, correctly indicating its nature and

design, and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns73 r

the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make,

use, and vend the invention or discovery throughout the United

States and the Territories thereof, referring to the specifica-

tion for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification

and drawings shall be annexed to the patent and be a part

thereof."

16 Act of 1793.

17 Act of 1836.

8 The Commissioner of Patents will furnish, on application, without

charge copies of the Patent Laws as they now stand.

19 S 4886 and 4884.

16

Act of 1793.
Act of 1836.
1
The Commi ioner of Patents will furni h, on application, without
charge copies of the Patent Law as they now stand.
1
-:' 4 86 and 4884.
17
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INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES. The greatest bulk of

patent litigation has arisen out of controversy as to whether

some particular alleged invention was entitled to protection

under the terms of this statute and, if so, how far it should be

protected.

Our initial investigation, therefore, concerns the degree of

strictness with which the terms of the statute shall be construed

and unexpressed terms implied; that is to say, whether the

construction shall favor the alleged inventor, or the public,

whose natural right a valid patent would, restrict. Many

courts have sought for the answer to this through an exami-

nation of the fundamental justification for granting any

exclusive right of enjoyment to an inventor. Out of this have

arisen three different theories of the justifying purpose of

the patent laws. These are best denoted by the expression

generally~~used in reference to them, viz.: i. The patent is

a monooly. 2. It is a reward. 3. It is a contract between the

gj-sj^pnri flip invpntpr

The theory that a patent is a monopoly and should there-
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fore be interpreted most strictly against a patentee and in

favor of the public, proceeds upon the assumption that there is

in fact no justification for the patent laws; that they are not

of economic advantage to tta state. This theory is not sup-

ported in judicial decision, although there is remarkable con-

flict of expression as to whether or not a patent right is in

name a monopoly. Courts have said with equal positiveness

that it is a monopoly 20 and that it is not a monopoly. Indeed

the same judge has said in one case, 21 'This (patent) law

gives a monopoly, but not in an odious sense," and in another

case 22 "Patentees are not monopolists . . . the (patent) law

repudiates a monopoly." This conflict is due not to disagree-

ment as to the character of the patent right but to difference in

understanding of the word monopoly. In its simplest mean-

ing, monopoly is defined, from its root words /*oi/o>, sole, and

20 "A true and absolute monopoly," Heato'n-Peninsular, etc. Co. v.

Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288.

21 Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 "McLean 432 (1844).

22 Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean 303 (1855)-

INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES. The greatest bulk of
patent litigation has arisen out of controversy as to whether
some particular alleged invention was entitled to protection
under the terms of this statute and, if so, how far it should be ·
protected.
Our initial investigation, therefore, concerns the degree of
$trictness with which the terms of the statute shall be construed
and unexpressed terms implied; that is to say, whether the
construction shall favor the alleged inventor, or the public,
whose natural right a valid patent would . restrict. Many
courts have sought for the answer to this through an examination of the fundamental justification for granting any
exclusive right of enjoyment to an inventor. Out of this have
arisen three different theories of the justifying purpose of
the patent laws. These are best · denoted by t.he expression
genera y sed in reference to them, viz. : I. Th~ patent is
a monopoly. 2. It is a reward. 3. It is a contract between the
st~te and the in
The theory that a patent is a monopoly and should therefore be interpreted most strictly against a patentee and in
favor of the public, proceeds upon the assumption that there is
in fact no justification for the patent laws; that they are not
of economic advantage to the state._ This theory .is not supported in judicial decision, although there is remarkable conflict of expression as to whether or not a patent right is in
name a monopoly. Courts have said with equal positiveness
that it is a monopoly 20 and that it is not a monopoly. Indeed
the same judge has said in one case, 21 "This (patent) law
gives a monopoly, but not in an odious sense," and in another
case 22 "Patentees are not monopolists . . . the (patent) law
repudiates a monopoly." . This cQnflict is due not to disagreement as to the character of the patent right but to difference in
understanding of the word monopoly. In its simplest meaning, monopoly is defined, from its root worJs µ6vo-,, sole, and
20 "A true and absolute monopoly,"
Heato"n-Peninsular, etc. Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288.
2 1 Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 ·McLean 432 ( 1844).
22 Allen v. Hunter 6 McLean 303 ( 1855).
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e'iv, barter, sale, as "an exclusive privilege to carry on a

traffic." It can not be denied that, in this sense, a patent right

is a monopoly since it gives to the patentee an exclusive right

to make, use and vend the invention, and it is in this sense

that courts speak of it as being a monopoly. But in the usage

of the law, as well as of common parlance, the word has ac-

quired a certain odium because of the type of privileges with

which it was customarily connected. Coke says 23 "a monopoly

is an institution or allowance by the king by his grant, com-

mission, or otherwise, to any person ... for the sole buying,

selling, making, working, or using of anything whereby any

person or persons . . . are sought to be restrained of any

freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their

lawful trade." Blackstone 24 defined it as a grant "whereby the

subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufac-

turing or trading which he had before." It is to this last

phrase, this idea of deprivation of what the public already

actually had, that the hatred of monopolies is due. The right

of a patentee, however, is in no way a restraint upon the pub-
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lic in anything which they had before; it simply precludes pub-

lic use, for a limited time, of that which has just been re-

vealed to the public. The courts are thoroughly consistent in

holding that a patent "right is not a monopoly as defined by

Coke or Blackstone. The general opinion is well expressed in

Allen v. Hunter, 25 the court saying, "Patentees are not mo-

nopolists. This objection is often made, and it has its effect

on society. The imputation is unjust and impolitic. A mo-

nopolist is one who, by the exercise of the sovereign power,

takes from the public that which belongs to it, and gives to the

grantee and his assigns an exclusive use. On this ground mo-

nopolies are justly odious. It enables a favored individual to

tax the community for his exclusive benefit, for the use of

that to which every other person in the community, abstractly,

has an equal right with himself.

"Under the patent law this can never be done. No exclusive

23 3d Institute Cap. 85.

24 Commentaries Vol. 4-159.

25 6 McLean 303, 305.

1TwAttv, barter, sale, as "an exclusive privilege to carry on a

traffic. ' It can not be denied that, in this sense, a patent right
is a monopoly since it gives to the patentee an exclusive right
· to make, use and vend the invention, and it is in this sense
that courts spe~k of it as being a monopoly. But in the usage
of the law, as well as of common parlance, the word has acquired a certain odium because of the type of privileges with
which it was customarily connected. Coke ay 23 'a monopoly
i an institution or allowance by the king by his grant,· commission, or otherwise, to any person . ~ . for the sole buying,
selling, making, work~ng,_ or using of anything whereby any
person or persons . . . . are sought to be restrained of a1Jy
freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their
lawful trade." Blackstone24 defined it as a grant "whereby the
ubject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing or trading which he had before." It is to this last
phrase, this idea of deprivation of -what the public already
actually had, that the hatred of monopolies is due. -The right
of a patentee however, is in no way a restraint upon the public in anything which they had before; it simply precludes public use, for a limited time, of that which has just been revealed to the public. The courts are thorough! y consistent in
holding that a patent -right is nqt a monopoly as defined by
Coke or Blackstone. The general opinion is well expressed in
Allen v. Hunter, 2 5 the court saying, "Patentees are not monopolists. Thi objection is often made, and it has its effect
on society. The imputation is unjust and impolitic. A monopoli t i one who, by the exercise of the sovereign power.
take from the public that which belongs to it, .ana gives to the
rantee and hi as igns an exclusive use. On this ground monopolie are ju tly odiou . It enables a favored individual to
tax the community for hi exclu ive benefit, for the u e of
that to which every other per on in the community abstractly,
ha an equal riaht with him elf.
' Under the patent law thi can never be done. No exclu ive
23
24
2 :-;

3d In titute Cap. 85.
Commentarie Vol. 4-159.
6 McLean 303, 305.
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right can be granted for any thing which. the patentee has not

invented or discovered. If he claim any thing which was be-

fore known, his patent is void. So that the law repudiates a

monopoly. The right of the patentee entirely rests on his in-

vention or discovery of that which is useful, and which was

not known before. And the law gives him the exclusive use

of the thing invented or discovered, for a few years, as a com-

pensation for 'his ingenuity, labor and expense in producing

it.' This, then, in no sense partakes of the character of .mo-

nopoly.

"It then appears that patentees, so far from being mo-

nopolists hanging as dead weights upon the community, are

the benefactors of their country." 26

The patent is therefore treated either as a reward given to

the inventor for his success in adding to the stock of public

knowledge, 27 or as a contract between the inventor and the

state, whereby the latter assures him the exclusive right to his

invention for a term of years, in consideration of his revela-

tion of it to the public, which thereby acquires the possibility,
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through knowledge, of using it after the time has expired. 28

The courts are not at all definite, however, in their choice of

26 Bloomer v. Stolle, 5 McLean 158; Kedall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322,

328.

27 Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the

executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the com-

munity except the persons therein named as patentees, but as public fran-

chises granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the

purpose of securing to them, as such inventors, for the limited term therein

mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make and use and vend to

others to be used their, own inventions, as tending to promote the pro-

gress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of Compensation to the

inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and

right can be granted for any thing which .the patentee has not
invented or discovered. If he claim any thing which was betore known, his patent is void. So that the law repudiates a
monopoly. The right of the patentee entirely rests on his in.;
vention or di covery of that which is useful, and which was
not known before. And the law gives him the exclusive use
of the thing invented or discovered, for a few years, as a compensation for 'his ingenuity' labor and expense in producing
it. This then, in no sense partakes of the character of .monopoly.
It then appears that patentees, so far from being monopolists hanging a dead weights upon the ~ommunity, are
the benefactors of their country.' 26
The patent is therefore treated either as a reward given to
the inventor for hi success in adding to the stock of public
knowledge, 27 or as a contract between the inventor and the
tate, whereby the latter assures him the exclusive right to his
invention for a term of years, in consideration of his revelation of it to the public, which thereby acquires the possibility,
through knowledge, 6£ using it after the time has expired. 28
The courts are not at all definite, however, in their choice of

reducing the same to practice for the public benefit . . ."

28 DeFerranti v. Lyndmark, 3 D. C. App. 417. "While a patent is a

contract between the government and the patentee . . ." ; Ransom v. Mayor

26

Bloomer v. Stolle, 5 McLean 158; Kedall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322,

328.

of New York, i Fisher Pat. Cas. 252, 259, "when the patent is granted, it

becomes, to a certain extent, a contract upon the part of the government

with the party named in the patent, that they will, through their Courts,

and in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, protect him

in the exercise of the exclusive privilege which his patent gives to

him. . . ."

2 7 Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies, created by the
executive authority at the expense and 'to the prejudice of all the community except the persons therein named as patentees, but as pubEc franchi es granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the
purpose of securing to them, as such inventors, for the limited term therein
mentioned, the exclusive r~ght and liberty to make and use and vend to
others to be used their _own inventions, as tending to promote the prngress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the
inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and
reducing the same to practice for the public benefit . . ."
2 DeFerranti v. Lyndmark, 3 D. C. App. 417.
"While a· patent is a
contract between the government and the patentee ..."; Ransom v. Mayor
of New York, l Fisher Pat. Cas. 252, 259, ''when the patent is granted, it
become , to a certain extent, a contract upon the part of the government
with the party named in the patent, that they will, through their Courts,
and in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, protect him
in the exercise of the exclusive privilege which his patent gives to
him . . . ."
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terminology between "reward" and "contract." Thus in

. 1ogy bet ween " rewar d" an d " con t rac t ."
Th us m
.
termmo
29
Grant v. Raymond, one reads, "It (the patent) is the reward
stipulated for the advantages derived by the public from the
exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to
those exertions.' Qn the following page the court says, "The
communication of the discovery to the public has been made
in pursuance of law, with the intent to exercise a privilege
which is the consideration paid by the public for the future
use of the machine." Theoretically there: should be a different ~nterpretation and construction, if the intent of the statute
is to confer a mere reward, than there would be if it conferred
the patent right as the consideration in a contract. The one
is a mere gift from the public, to be construed in the giver's
favor, the other is an inducement for which a quid pro qu.o i
received, and to be construed like all fair contracts. Practically it is imi)ossible to say in just what respect the courts do
view it, but a full study of the cases shows clearly the broad
1Jroposition that the statute and the proceedings tmder it will
not be construed strictly as against either party, but with so
absolute impartiality as possible, so as to render the most
nearly equal measure of justice to both parties. 30 This is quite

Grant v. Raymond, 29 one reads, "It (the patent) is the reward

stipulated for the advantages derived by the public from the

exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to

those exertions." On the following page the court says, "The

communication of the discovery to the public has been made

in pursuance of law, with the intent to exercise a privilege

which is the consideration paid by the public for the future

use of the machine." Theoretically there should be a differ-

ent interpretation and construction, if the intent of the statute

is to confer a mere reward, than there would be if it conferred

the patent right as the consideration in a contract. The one

is a mere gift from the public, to be construed in the giver's

favor, the other is an inducement for which a quid pro quo is

received, and to be construed like all fair contracts. Practic-

ally it is impossible to say in just what respect the courts do

view it, but a full study of the cases shows clearly the broad

proposition that the statute and the proceedings under it will

not be construed strictly as against either party, but with so
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absolute impartiality as possible, so as to render the most

nearly equal measure of justice to both parties. 30 This is quite

29 6 Peters 217, 241.

30 The patent ''is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by

the public for the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimu-

lus to those exertions. The laws which are passed to give effect to this

purpose ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have

been made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United

States, where the full benefit has been actually received; if this can be

done without transcending the intention of the statute, or countenancing

acts which are fraudulent, or may prove mischievous. The public yields

nothing which it has not agreed to yield ; it receives all which it has con-

tracted to receive." Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters 217. Ames v. Howard,

i Sumner 482; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. 211, 223; Tannage Patent Co.

29

6 Peters 217, 241.
The patent ''is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by
the public for the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. The laws which are passed to give effect to this
purpose ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have
been made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United
States, where the full benefit has been actually received; if this can be
done without transcending the intention of the statute, or countenancing
acts which are fraudulent, or may prove mischievous. The public yields
nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive." Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters 217. Ames v. Howard,
1 Sumner 482; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. ZII, 223; Tannage Patent Co.
v. Zahn; 66 Fed. 986, 988; Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 26; Bauer v.
O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 10; 0 H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed.
340, 343, "A patent is, after all, nothing but a contract by which the government secures to the patentee the exclusive right to vend and use his
invention for a few years, in con ideration of the fact that he has perfected, and described it and has granted it use to the public for ever
after. The rules for the construction of contracts apply with equal force
to the interpretat!on of patent ."

v. Zahn; 66 Fed. 986, 988; Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. i, 26; Bauer v.

30

O'Donnell, 229 U. S. i, io; O H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed.

340, 343, "A patent is, after all, nothing but a contract by which the gov-

ernment secures to the patentee the exclusive right to vend and use his

invention for a few years, in consideration of the fact that he has per-

fected and described it and has granted its use to the public for ever

after. The rules for the construction of contracts apply with equal force

to the interpretation of patents."
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in accord with the expressed idea that the patent is both a re-

ward for the stimulation of invention and a contractual con-

sideration for the revelation of the invention to the public.

The subject of construction comes up in so many ways and

is so confused with interpretation as between the patentee and

an individual not representative of the public, that nothing
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more than this can be said as a general proposition.

in accord with the expressed idea that the patent is both a reward for the stimulation of invention and a contractual consideration for the revelation of the invention to the public.
The subject of construction comes up in so many ways and
is so confused with interpretation as bet~een the patentee and
an individual not representative of the public, that nothing
more than this can be said as a general proposition.
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CHAPTER II

WHAT MAY BE PATENTED

i. SOURCE

We come now to a discussion of the circumstances under

which one is entitled to a -patent. The statute reads 31 "Any

person who has invented or discovered any new and useful

art ... may . . . obtain a patent therefor." When, then,

. CHAPTER II

has a person "invented or discovered" something. This may

be considered, first, in connection with the source from which

the invention or discovery is obtained, disregarding for the

WHAT MAY BE PATENTED

present the character of the result.

It may be said broadly that nothing is invented or discov-

ered, imthin the meaning of the statute, which has not found

its source in the mind of the alleged inventor. It must be the

result of his mental operation upon external stimuli, and not

a mere ^representation or recreation of those stimuli in their

original forms.

IMPORTATION. It is probable that there has always been a

difference in the meaning of the words "inventor" and "im-

porter," but the distinction was formerly pne in name only.
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The two stood on the same plane of merit and were considered

together so often and with so little indication of real differ-

entiation that there is at least a little confusion in precisely

allocating their respective meaning. By the Common Law

and also by the exception in the Statute of Monopolies, the

bringing into the realm of a new trade or .device was consid-

ered as meritorious as was the evolution from the mind of a

new idea for a trade or device. This was, of course, perfectly

logical in the days when travel and intercourse were difficult

and rare, and knowledge percolated from one country to an-

other but slowly. The knowledge of one nation was not then,

as it has since come to be, equally the knowledge of any other

31 ? 4886.

§

SOURCE
We come now to a dis~ussion of the circumstances under
which one is entitled to a ·patent. The statute reads 31 "Any
person who has invented or discovered any new and useful
art . . . may . . . obtain a patent therefor." When, then,
has a person "invented or discovered" something. This may
be considered, first, in connection with the source from which
the invention or discovery is obtained, disregarding for the
present the character of the result.
It may be said broadly that nothing is invented or discovered, within the meaning· of the statute, which has not f ouiid
its source in the mind of the alleged inventor. It ust_be the
result of his mental operation upon external stimuli, and not
a mere representation or recreation of those stimuli in their
original forms.
.
IMPORTATION. It is probable that there has always been a
difference in the meaning of the words "inventor" and 'importer," but the distinction was formerly one in name only.
The two stood on the same plane of merit and were considered
together so often and with so lit.tie indication of real differentiation that there is at least a little confu~ion in precisely
allocating their respective meaning. By the Common Law
and also by the exception in the Statute of Monopolie · the
bringing into the realm of a new trade or .device was considered as meritorious as was the evolution from the mind of a
new idea for a trade or device. This was, of course, perfectly
logical in the day when travel and intercour e were difficult
and rare, and knowledge percolated from one country to another but lowly. The knowledae of one nation was not then,
a it ha ince come to be equally the knowledge of ~my other
31

I.

'4886.

..
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which chooses to note it. One who imported into England

Meaning of Invention

13

knowledge of a trade or a substance from abroad did so, usu-

ally, at considerable expense and risk to himself. Consequent-

ly we find royal patents granting monopolies of such importa-

tions consistently respected and enforced by the courts. Fur-

thermore it is evident from the cases that these importations

were sometimes called "inventions" equally with the produc-

tions of one's own mind, and were generally not very clearly

distinguished therefrom. 32

The proper application of the name "inventor" came into

question so late as 1878 in an English case 33 and it was de-

cided that it did not include a mere "importer." The court

sustained the proposition that an importer might be treated

legally as an inventor, but maintained that he was not nomi-

nally an inventor. 34

32 Darcy v. Allin, No. 173, 74 Eng. Rep. 13: The Clothworkers of

Ipswich Case, Godbolt p. 252, No. 351, 78 Eng. Rep. 147, "But if a man

hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom,

in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock, etc., or if a
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man hath made a new discovery of anything, in such cases the King of his

grace and favor, in recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by

charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or traffique for a

certain time, because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant and

have not the knowledge or skill to use it."

which chooses to note it. One who imported into England
knowledge of a trade or a substance from abr~ad did so, usually, at considerable expense and risk to himself. Consequently we find. royal patents granting monopolies of such importations consistently respected and enforced by the courts. Furthermore it is evidtnt from the cases that these importations
were sometimes called "inventions" equally with the productioris of one's own mind, and were generally not very clearly
distinguished therefrom. 32
The proper application of the name "inventor" c~me into
question so late as 1878 in an English case 33 · and 'it was decided that it did not include a mere "importer.'' The court
sustained the proposition that an importer might be treated
legally as an inventor, but maintained that he was not nominally an inventor. 34

33 Marsden v. Sayville Street, etc. Co., L, R. 3 Ex. Div. 203.

34 "It is difBcult to say a priori on what principle a person who did not

invent anything, but who merely imported from abroad into this realm

the invention of another, was treated by the judges as being the first and

true inventor. I have never been able to discover the principle, and I

could never get a satisfactory answer. The only answer was, It has been

so decided, and you are bound by the decisions. . . The grounds on which

it is put we do know . . . considering the difficulty which then a'ttended

communication from abroad, a man who brought in anything from abroad

did it at the peril of his life and consumption of his estate and stock,

and it was therefore such a meritorious service done to this kingdom, that

the king might lawfully grant him a monopoly. That is 'the ground it is

put upon. Now, there is some reason in that. It does not make him a

true and first inventor, but it does show a true and meritorious consider-

ation which warranted an exception from the general rule that monopolies

could not be granted." "No doubt it was that use (in the early cases)

which induced the judges, after the passing of the statute of James, to

treat the man who brought the invention from beyond the seas as being

32 Darcy v. Allin, No. 173, 74 Eng. Rep. - 13:
The Cloth workers of
Ipswich Case, Godbolt p. 252, No. 351, 78 _E ng. Rep. 147, "But if a man
hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom,
in peril of his life, and ·consumption of his estate or stock, etc., or if a
man hath made a new discovery of anything, in such cases the King of his
grace and favor, in recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by
charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or traffique for a
certain time, because at first the. people of the kingdom are ignorant and
have .not the knowledge or skill to use it."
33 Marsden v. Sayville Street, etc. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. Div. 203.
34 "It is difficult to say a priori on what principle a person who did not
invent anything, but who merely imported from abroad into this realm
the invention of- another, was treated by the judges as being the first and
true inventor. I have never been able to discover the principle, and I
could never get a satisfactory answer. The only answer was, It has been
so decided, and you are bound by the decisions. . . The grounds on which
it is put we do know ... considering the difficulty which then attended
communication from abroad, a man who brought in anything from abroad
did · it at the peril of his life and consumption of his estate and stock,
and it was therefore such a meritorious service done to this kingdom, that
the king might lawfully ·grant him a monopoly. That is · the ground it is
put upon. Now, there is some reason in that. It does not make him a
true and ~rst inventor, but it does show a true and meritorious consideration which warranted an exception from the general rule that · monopolies
could not be granted." "No doubt it was that use (in the early cases )
which induced the judges, after the pa sing of the statute of James, to
treat the !11an who brought the invention from beyond the seas as being
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In the United States the granting of patent monopolies by

Patents and Inventions

the colonies had been so infrequent that it may be said there

was no established custom before the privilege of granting

patents to inventors was conferred upon the federal govern-

ment by the framers of the Constitution. By that date the

facility of communication was such as to have removed com-

pletely the reasons because of which patents for importations

ha_d been sustained by the Common Law. 35 Nothing is said

expressly in the Constitution, or in the patent acts passed there-

under, regarding importation or importers as such, and the

only possible right to a patent for an importation would have

to depend, therefore, upon a favorable interpretation of the

word "invention." The courts have been uniform in holding

that "information" is not included in "invention." 36

DISCOVERY. The statute authorizes the issue of a patent to

one who has "invented or discovered" certain things. In or-

dinary~lisage the verb "discover" has a sense of bringing to

light that which before existed but was unknown. In such

sense Columbus "discovered" America and Newton "discov-
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ered" the law of gravity. It is defined as meaning to "un-

cover" or "disclose." In the Century Dictionary it is said,

in the same position as the first and true inventor, or as being in an

equivalent position, and gradually the language seems to have been changed

and he was treated as the true and first inventor." Marsden v. Sayville

St. etc. Co., supra. The court then went on to hold that whether the

"ordinary or the existing meaning" of the word inventor be used,

the particular plaintiff, as the facts lay, did not come within either. In a

recent English work (The Laws of England, by the Earl of Halsbury

and others, vol. 22, p. 130 ff ) it is said "An inventor is a person who dis-

covers* or finds out something new, a framer, contriver, or deviser of

what was before unknown. Invention is an act of the mind, and a

person whose mind performs the act is the true inventor." But almost

immediately the writer goes on to say "as the Statute of Monopolies was

In the United States the granting of patent monopolies by
the colonies had been so infrequent that it may be said there
wa no established custom before the privilege of granting
patents to inventors was conferred upon the federal government by the framers of the Constitution. By that date the
facility of communication was such as to have removed completely the reasons because of which patents for importations
had been sustained by the Common Law. 35 Nothing is said
expressly in the Constitution, or in the patent acts passed thereunder, regarding importation or importers as such, and the
only possible right to a · patent for an i1!1portation would have
to depend, therefore, upon a favorable interpretation of the
word "invention." The courts have been uniform in holding
that "information" is not included in "invention." 36
DrscovERY. The statute authorizes the is-sue of a patent to
one who has "invented or discovere~' certain things. In ordina~sage the verb "discover" has a sense of briQging to
light that which before existed but was unknO\vn. In such
sense Colun:ibus "discovered" America and Newton "discovered" the law of gravity. It is defined as meaning to "uncover" or "disclose." In the Century Dictionary it is said,

construed to intend to preserve all monopolies which would have been

good at common law, the words "true and first inventor" have always

been construed to include "true and first importer."

35 There seems to have been some belief even at the time the Consti-

tution was adopted that a monopoly for new importations would be de-

sirable. See Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, vol. II, 1153.

36 McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 427; and cases infra.

in the same position as the first and true inventor, or as being in an
equivalent position, and gradually the langl:lage seems to have been changed
and he was treated as the true and first inventor." Marsden v. Sayville
St. etc. Co., supra. The court then went on to hold that whether the
"ordinary or the existing meaning" of the word inventor be used,
the particular plaintiff, as the facts lay, did not come within either. In a
recent English work (The Laws of England, by the Earl of Halsbury
and others, vol. 22, p. 130 ff) it is said "An inventor is a person who discovers· or finds out something new, a framer, contriver, or deviser of
what was before unknown. Invention is an act of the mind, and a
per on whose mind performs the act is the true inventor." But almo t
immediately the writer goes on to say "as the Statute of Monopolies was
construed to intend to preserve all monopolies which would have been
good at common law, the words "true and first inventor" have alway
been construed to include "true and first importer."
35 There seem
to have been ome belief even at the time the Constitution was adopted that a monopoly for new importations would be deirable. See Story's Commentarie on the Constitution, vol. II, § 1153.
a McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 427; and cases infra.
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"Discover, Invent, agree in signifying to find out; but we

15

discover what already exists, though to us unknown ; we invent

what did not before exist." The conjunction of the two

words in the statute might seem to imply that one is comple-

mentary of the other and that the framers intended to allow

patenting of both inventions and discoveries, in the normal

sense of the words, provided only that they were not known

and used before. The courts have, however, consistently in-

terpreted the statutes as being confined to those things which

come within the meaning of "invention" only, and have treated

discovery as though it were synonymous therewith instead

of an addition to it.

The word "invention" has never been defined with any de-

gree of exactness in delimitation and both courts and writers

agree that it can not be. "The truth is," says the Supreme

Court, "the word can not be defined in such manner as to af-

ford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular

device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not." 3

But the cases all agree that there can not be invention without
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creation. Mere revelation of something existing but unknown

is not sufficient, there must be something produced by operation

of the mind.

A PRINCIPLE OR LAW OF NATURE, (that is, the fact that

from certain causes certain different results will "naturally"

and invariably follow) exists, at least according to many ac-

cepted philosophers, whether humanity is -aware of it or not. 38

The discovery that a certain result will follow from certain

relations of matter is not in any way creation of the result, it

is a mere revelation of the causal relation. It is truly dis-

covery, hi its usual sense, and not invention. It is therefore

not patentable. Possibly the statutes are defective economic-

ally, and unjust also, in not providing rewards for such reve-

, lation of important knowledge, but, as interpreted by the

37 McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 426.

38 As to whether principles of nature have been given to us by God

or by the human beings who first revealed them to us, is entertainingly

argued by Gerard and the Doctor in Reade's, "The Cloister and the

Hearth."

"Discover, Invent, agree in signifying t\) find out; but we
discover what already exists, though to us unknown; we invent
what did not before exist." The conjunction of the two
words in the statute might seem to imply that one is complementary of the other and that the framers intended to allow
patenting of both inventions and discoveries, in the normal
sense of the words, provided only that they were not known
and used before. The courts have, however, consistently interpreted the statutes as being confined to those things which
come within the meaning of "invention" only, and have treated
discovery as though it were synonymous therewith instead
of an addition to it.
The word "invention" has never been defined with any degree of exactness in delimitation and both courts and writers
agree that it can not be. "The truth is," says the Supreme
Court, "the word can not be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular
device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. " 3 7
But the cases all agree that there can not be invention without
creation. Mere revelation of something existing but unknown
is not sufficient, there must be something produced .by operation
of the mind.
A PRINCIPLE OR LAW OF NATURE, (that is, the fact that
from certai11 causes certain different results will "naturally"
and invariably follow) exists, at least according to many accepted philosophers, whether humanity is -aware of it or not. 38
The discovery that a certain result will follow from certain
relations of matter is not in any way creation of the result, it
is a mere revelation of the causal relation. It is truly discovery, :'!1 its usual sense, and not invention. It is therefore
not patentable. Possibly the statutes are defective economically, and unjust also, in no~ providing rewards for such reve. lation of important knowledge, but, as interpreted by the
37

McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 426.
As to whether principles of nature have been given to us by God
or by the human beings who first revealed them to us, is entertainingly
a rgued by Gerard and the Doctor in Reade's, "The Cloister and the
Hearth."
3"
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courts, they do not authorize any reward. The most con-

spicuous case of unpatentable discovery of a law of nature

is that of Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary. 39 The patentee

in this case had discovered that the introduction of sulphuric

ether to the lungs, that is to say, its inhalation, "would pro-

duce insensibility to pain, or such a state of quiet nervous ac-

tion as to render a person or animals incapable,, to a great ex-

tent, if not entirely, of experiencing pain while under ithe ac-

tion of the knife. ..." This beneficent effect, the court con-

ceded, had never been known before. It was, however, the

only new thing about the alleged invention, the ether itself and

the apparatus for applying it being both well known. It was,

in short, only the discovery of a result naturally arising from

a certain relation of matter. As the court put it, the patent

presented nothing new except the effect produced by well

known agents, administered in well known ways on well known

subjects.

The court recognized the ineffable benefit to humanity

of this discovery but nevertheless held the patent which
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had been issued to be invalid, saying "At common law an in-

ventor has no exclusive right to his invention or discovery.

That exclusive right is the creature of the statute, and to that

we must look to see if the right claimed in a given case is

within its terms. The act of Congress provides, 'that any

person or persons having discovered or invented any new and

useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,

or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,

manufacture, or composition of matter not known or used by

others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and

not, at the time of his application for a patent, in public use,

or on sale with his consent or allowance as the inventor or dis-

coverer,' shall be entitled to receive a patent therefor. The

true field of inquiry, in the present case, is to ascertain whether

or not the alleged invention, set forth in this specification, is

embraced within the scope of the act. Very little light can

be shed on our path by attempting to draw a practical distinc-

tion between the legal purport of the words 'discovery' and

39 5 Blatch. 116, 2 Fisher 320.

court , they qo not authorize any reward. The mo t conspicuous ca e ·of unpatentable discovery of a law of nature
i that of 1orton v. ew ork Eye Infirmary. 3 n The patentee
in thi ca e had di covered that the introduction of sulphuric
ether to the lung , that is to say, its inhalation, "would produce insen ibility to pain, or such a state of quiet nervous action a to render a person or animals incapable, to a great extent, if not entirely of experiencing pairi while under the action of the knife . . . . ' Thi beneficent effect the court conceded, had never been known before. It was, however, the
only new thing about the alleged invention, the ether itself and
the apparatus for applying it being both well known. It was,
in short, only the discovery of a result naturally arising from
a certain relation of matter. As the court put it, . the patent
presented nothing new except the effect produced by well
known agents, administered in well known ways on well known
ubjects.
The court recognized the ineffable benefit to humanity
of this discovery but nev ertheles held the patent which
had been i sued to be invalid, saying "At common law an inventor ha no exclusive right to his invention or di covery.
That exclusive right is the creature of the tatute, and to that
\\ e must look to see if the right claimed in a given case is
within its terms. The act of Congress provid~s, 'that any
per on or per ons having discovered or invented any new and
useful art machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine
manufacture or composition of matter not known or used by
other before his or their di co very or invention thereof, and
not at the time of his application for a patent, in public u e
or on ate \ rith hi con ent or allo'' ance a the inventor or di CO\ erer,
hall be entitled to receive a patent therefor. The
true field of inquiry in the pre ent ca e, i to a certain whether
r not the alle ed invention, et forth in thi pecification, i
embraced within the cope of the act. Very little light can
e hed on our path by attemptin to draw a practical di tincti n 1etween the lea-al purport of the wor<l:; di covery and
39
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'invention.' In its naked ordinary sense, a discovery is not

patentable. A discovery of a new principle, force, or law

operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter, will

not entitle the discoverer to a patent. It is only where the

explorer has gone beyond the mere domain of discovery, and

has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and connected

it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance of

which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that

he can secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws.

He then controls his discovery through the means by which

he has brought it into practical action, or their equivalent, and

only through them. It is then an invention, although it em-

braces a discovery. Sever the force or principle discovered

from the means or mechanism through which he has brought

it into the domain of invention, and it immediately falls out

of that domain and eludes his grasp. ' It is then a naked dis-

covery, and not an invention.

"A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patent-

able. No matter through what long, solitary vigils, or by
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what importunate efforts, the secret may have been wrung

from the bosom of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may

be applied. Something more is necessary." 40

The result of the case seems hard, but the exposition of the

court demonstrates that the patentee created nothing. He

could not therefore acquire a reward, because the patent laws

have never been construed as rewarding diligence in merely

finding out the vario'us possessions with which the Creator of

all things has already blessed the world.

Another case which is frequently cited as supporting the

rule that a principle of nature can not be patented, even though

newly discovered, is that of O'Reilly v. Morse. 41 The patentee,

Morse, had discovered that electricity, acting through the elec-

tro-magnet, could be used for the transmission of intelligible

signals, and he had devised a particular means for utilizing

this discovery. The first seven claims of his patent dealt with

40 The credit for the discovery is attributed to Morton, beyond doubt,

in Park's History of Med, 2d ed. p. 312.

41 15 How. 61.

'invention.' In its naked ordinary sense, a discovery is not
patentable. A discovery of a new principle, force, or law
operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter, will
not entitle the discoverer to a patent. It is only where the
explorer ha gone beyond the mere domain of discovery, and
has laid hold of the new principle, force, or law, and connected
it with some particular medium or mec~anical contrivance of
which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that
he can secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws.
He then controls pis discovery through the means by which
he has brought it into practical action, or their equivalent, and
only through them. It is then an invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the. force or principle discovered
from the means or mechanism through which he has brought
it into the domain of invention, and it immediately falls out
of that domain and -eludes his grasp. · It is then a naked discovery, and not an invention.
"A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable. No matter through what long, solitary ·vigils, or by
what imp9rtunate efforts, the secret may have been wrung
from the bosom of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may
be applied. Something-more is necessary. " 40
The result of the case seems hard, but the exposition of the
court demonstrates that the patentee created nothing. He
could not therefore acquire a reward, because the patent laws
have never been construed as rewarding diligence in merely
finding out the vai-io·us possessions with which the Creator of
all things has already blessed the world.
Another case which is frequently dted as supporting the
rule that a principl_e of nature can not be patented, even though
newly discovered, is that of O'Reilly v. Morse. 41 The patentee,
Morse, had discovered that electricity, acting through the electro-magnet, could be used for the transmission of intelligible
signals, and_ he had devised a particular means for utilizing
this discovery. The first seven claims of his patent dealt with
40

The credit for the discovery is attributed to Morton, beyond doubt,
·
in Park's History of Med, 2d ed. p. 312.
4 1 rs How. 6r.
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this particular idea of means and were sustained by the Su-
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preme Court. The eighth claim was broader, and amounted

in reality to a claim of the natural principle or force of

electro-magnetism for transmitting intelligible signals. It

read "I do not propose to limit myself to the specific ma-

chinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing

specification and claims; the essence of my invention being

the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic cur-

rent, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for

marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at

any distances, being a new application of that power of which

I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer." This claim the

court rejected as invalid saying of it, "It is impossible to mis-

understand the extent of this claim. He claims the exclusive

right to every improvement where the motive power is the

electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or

printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.

If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process

or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we
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now know some . future inventor, in the onward march of

science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a dis-

tance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without us-

ing any part of the process or combination set forth in the

plaintiff's specification. His invention may be less compli-

cated less liable to get out of order less expensive in con-

struction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by

this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have

the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee. No

one we suppose will maintain that Fulton could have taken

out a patent for his invention of propelling vessels by steam,

describing the process and machinery he used, and claimed

under it the exclusive right to use the motive power of steam,

however developed, for the purpose of propelling vessels. It-

can hardly be supposed that under such a patent he could have

prevented the use of the improved machinery which science

has since introduced ; although the motive power is steam, and

the result is the propulsion of vessels. Neither could the man

who first discovered that steam might, by a proper arrange-

this particular idea of means and were sustained by the Supreme Court. The eighth claim was broader, and amounted
in reality to a claim of the natural principle or force of
electro-magnetism for transmitting intelligible signals. . It
read "I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing
specification and claims; the essence of my invention being
the use of the motive power of the .electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at
any distances, being a new .application of that power of which
I claim to be the first inventor. or discoverer." This claim the
court rejected as invalid saying of it, "It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim. He claims the exclusive
right t.o every improvement where the motive power is the
electric or galvanic current, and the result is. the marking or
printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.
If this claim ·can be maintained, it matters not by what ·process
or machinery the result -is accomplished. For aught that we
now know some . future inventor, in the onward m·a rch of
science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the
plaintiff's spedfi,cation. His invention may be less complicated-less liable to get out of order-less expensive in construction, and -in its operation. But yet if it is co".ered by
this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have
the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee. No
one we suppose will maintain that Fulton could have taken
out a patent for his invention of propelling vessels by steam,
de cribing t~e process and machinery he used, and claimed
under it the exclu ive right to use the motive -power of steam,
however developed for the purpose of propelling vessels. It
can hardly be suppo ed that under uch a patent he could have·
prevented the use of the improved machinery which science·
ha ince introduced; although the motive power is steam, and
the re ult i the propul ion of ve els. Neither could the man
wh fir t di covered that steam might, by a proper arrange-
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ment of machinery, be used as a motive power to grind corn

19

or spin cotton, claim the right to the exclusive use of steam as

a motive power for the purpose of producing such effects." 42

42 In a sense this statement was dictum since it affected only the costs

of the suit and not its merits. Leroy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156; Id. 22

How. 132, 136; Foote v. Silsby, 2 Blatch. 260. An opposite view is set out

ment of machin~ry, be used as a motive power to grind corn
or spin cotton, claim the right to the exclusive use of steam as
a motive power for !he purpose of producing such effects." 42

by Mr. Justice Nelson in his dissenting opinion in Leroy v. Tatham, 14

How. 156, 186. "I shall not pursue a reference to the authorities on this

subject any further. The settled doctrine to be deduced from them, I think,

is, that a person having discovered the application for the first time of a

well-known law of nature, or well-known property of matter; by means

of which a new result in the arts or in manufactures is produced, and

has pointed out a mode by which it is produced, is entitled to a patent;

and, if he has not tied himself down in the specification to the particular

mode described, he is entitled to be protected against all modes by which

the same result is produced, by an application of the same law of nature or

property of matter. And a fortiori, if he has discovered the law of nature

or property of matter, and applied it, is he entitled to the patent, and afore-

said protection. And why should not this be the law. The original con-
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ception the novel idea in the one case, is the new application of the

principle or property of matter, and the new product in the arts or manu-

factures in the other, in the discovery of the principle or property, and

application, with like result. The mode or means are but incidental and

flowing naturally from the original conception ; and hence of inconsiderable

merit. But, it is said, this is patenting a principle, or element of nature.

The authorities to which I have referred, answer the objection. It was ans-

wered by Chief Justice Eyre, in the case of Watts's patent, in 1795, fifty-

seven years ago ; and more recently in still more explicit and authoritative

terms. And what if the principle is incorporated in the invention, and

the inventor protected in the enjoyment for the fourteen years. He is

protected only in the enjoyment of the application for the special purpose

and object to which it has been newly applied by his genius and skill. For

every other purpose and end, the principle is free for all mankind to use.

And, where it has been discovered, as well as applied to this one purpose,

and open to the world as to every other, the ground of complaint is cer-

tainly not very obvious. Undoubtedly, within the range of the purpose

and object for which the principle has been for the first time applied,

piracies are interfered with during the fourteen years. But anybody may

take it up and give to it any other application to the enlargement of the

arts and of manufactures, without restriction. He is only debarred from

the use of the new application for the limited time, which the genius of

others has already invented and put into successful practice. The protec-

tion does not go beyond the thing which, for the first time, has been

discovered and brought into practical use ; and is no broader than that

In a sense this statement was dictum since it affected only the costs
of the suit and not its merits. Leroy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156; Id. 22
How. 132, 136; Foote v. Silsby, 2 Blatch. 260. An opposite view is set out
by Mr. Justice Nelson in his dissenting opinion in Leroy v. Tatham, 14
How. 156, 186. "I shall not pursue a reference· to the. authorities on this
subject any further. The settled doctrine to be deduced from them, I think,
is, that a person having discovered the application for the first time of a
well-known law of nature, or well-known property of matter; by means
of which ·a new result in the arts or in manufactures is produced, and
has pointed out a mode by which it is produced, is entitled to a patent;
and, if he has not tied himself down in the specification to the particular
mode described, he is entitled to be protected against all modes by which
the same result is produced, by an application of the same law o'f nature or
property of matter. And a fortiori, if he has discovered the law of nature
or property of matter, and applied it, is he entitled to the patent, and aforeaid protection. And why should not this be the law. The original conception-the novel idea in the one case, is the new application of the
principle or property of matter, and the new product in the arts or manufactures-in the other in the discovery of the principle or property, and
application, with like result. The mode or means are but incidental and
flowing naturally from the original conception; and hence of inconsiderable
merit. But, it is said, this is patenting a principle, or element of nature.
The authorities to which I have referred, answer the objection. It was answered by Chief Ju tice Eyre, in the case of Watts's patent, in 1795, fiftyeven years ago; and more recently in still more explic~t and authoritative
terms. And what if the principle is incorporated in the invention, and
the inventor protected in the enjoyment for the fourteen years. He is
protected only in the enjoyment of the application for the special purpose
and object to which it has been newly applied by his genius and skill. For
every other purpose and end, the principle is free for all mankinJ to use.
And, where it has been discovered, as well as applied to this one purpose,
and open to the world a to every other, the ground of complaint is certainly not very obvious. Undoubtedly, within the range of the purpose
and object for which the principle has been for the first time applied,
piracies are interfered with during the fourteen years. B~t anybody rriay
take it up and give to it any other application to the enlargement of the
arts and of manufactures, without restriction. He is only debarred from
the use of the new application for the limited time, which the genius of
others has already invented and put into successful practice. The protecti on does not go beyond the thing which, for the first time, has been
discovered and brought into practical use; and is no broader than that
42
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CIPLE have been consistently sustained; indeed it would be

difficult to conceive of any mechanical contrivance whose ef-

PATENT

FOR THE MEANS OF UTILIZING A NATURAL PRIN-

fectuation of a given result, static or dynamic, did not make

use of some "natural principle." The conception of a means

of utilizing such a principle does, however, involve creation;

the means is something which did not before exist, in the

ordinary comprehension of existence, and such a concept is

therefore within the intended protection of the patent laws. 43

The courts have experienced considerable difficulty, how-

ever, in distinguishing with certainty between the use of a

principle, which is not patentable, and the means of utilizing

it, which is patentable. The discovery of a new principle is

held to entitle the discoverer to a wide range of protection in

the means he devises to utilize it. He is secured not merely in

the precise form of means he sets out in his patent but in all

forms which are essentially similar. The principle itself thus

becomes a part, at least, of the device, inasmuch as it is the real

distinguishing feature of two otherwise similar devices. The
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result is that in a certain sense the principle is actually pat-

ented, as part of the entire deznce. The difficulty of differ-

entiating between the patenting of a principle, by itself, and

the patenting of a device which is distinguished from other

devices only by the principle utilized in it, has created much

confusion. That the principle may be an essential part of a

patented device is sustained by many cases which, if the dis-

tinction between a principle by itself, and as part of a device,

extended to every other discoverer or inventor of a new art or manu-

facture. I own, I am incapable of comprehending the detriment to the

improvements in the country that may flow from this sort of protection

to inventors. To hold, in the case of inventions of this character, that

the novelty must consist of the mode or means of the new application

producing the new result, would be holding against the facts of the case,

as no one can but see, that the original conception reaches far beyond

these. It would be mistaking the skill of the mechanic for the genius

of the inventor."

* 3 O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 61 ; Neilson v. Harford, i Webs. Pat.

Cases, 295. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, Leroy v. Tntham, 14 How.

551 ; Parker v. Hulme, I Fish. Pat. Cases 44, Fed. Cas. No. 10740.

have been consi tently u tained · indeed it would be
difficult .to conceive of any mechanical contrivance whose effectuation of a given result, static or dynamic, did not make
u e of so.me "natural principle." The conception of a ·means
of utili·zing such a principle does however, involve creation;
the means is something which did not before exist, in the
ordinary comprehension of existence, and such a concept is
therefore within the intended protection of the patent laws. 43
The courts have experienced considerable · difficulty, however, in- distinguishing with certainty between the use of a
principle, whi_ch is not patentable, and the means of utilizing
it, which is patentable. The discovery of a new principle i
held to entitle the discoverer to a wide range of protection in
the means he devises to utilize it. He is secured not merely in
the precise form of means he sets out in his patent but in all
forms which are essentially similar. The principle itself thus
becomes ~ part, at least of the device, inasmuch as {t is the real
distinguishing feature of two otherwise similar devices. The
result is that in a certain sense the principle is actually patented, as patrt of the entire device. The difficulty of differentiating between the- patenting of a principle, by itself, and
the patenting of a device which is distinguished from other
devices only by the principle utilized in it, has created much
confusion. That the principle may be an essential part of a
patented device is sustained by many cases which, if the distinction between a principle by itself, and as part of a device,

CIPLE

extended to every other discoverer or inventor of a new art or manufacture. I own, I am incapable of comprehending the detriment to the
improvements in the country that may flow from thi ort of protection
to inventors. To hold, in the ca e of invention of thi . character, that
the novelty mu t consi t of the mode or mean of the new application
producing the new re ult, would be holding again t the fact of the case,
a no one can but -see, that the original conception reaches far beyond
these. It would be mistaking the skill of the mechanic for the geniu
of the inventor."
4-3 O'Reilly
. Mor e, 15 How. 61;
eilson v. Harford, I Web . Pat.
Ca e , 295. Tilghman . Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, Leroy v. T~tham, q How.
551 · Parker v. Hulme, I Fi h. Pat. C"l e 44, Fed. Ca . No. ro740.
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be not clearly understood, seem to conflict with the rule that

a principle can not be patented. The author suggests, though

far from stating it as the accepted rule, that the fundamental

difference between an unpatentable law of nature and one

which is patentable as part of a concrete contrivance, be it

"machine" or "process," is in the self-operative character of

the law involved. If it is a principle which will produce the

result automatically when merely given substance to operate

on it is unpatentable. It is utilized to be sure, but not through

the assistance of any means of utilization. Q3ut a principle

which produces the desired result only through physical mani-

pulation of substances, and as a concomitant of that manipula-

tion, not as a sequent to it, is patentable as part of the idea of

means whereby the result is produced. Certainly the cases de-

cided recently give credence to the proposition, that while a

principle of nature may not be patented as a means and an end

in itself, it may be patented as an integral part of an idea of

means the substantive part of which, even as an entirety, is

old. 44 That is to say, the principle alone could not be patented ;
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neither could the substantive contrivance by itself be patented,

for it is already well known ; but the new combination, of un-

patentable principle and old mechanical device, can itself be

patented.

An excellent illustration of this is seen in the case

of Leroy v. Tatham. 45 Here the patentee had discovered

44 This is in exact accord also with the theory on which patents are

economically justified, if the proposition of Mr. Taussig in "Money-Makers

and Inventors" is correct. This proposition is that people will invent and

make research to the full extent of their abilities of the creative in-

stinct, and without the stimulation of a legal reward, but that the monopoly

of a patent is necessary to induce capital to make inventions commercially

practical. If this be so, no reward is necessary to stimulate research and

discovery of the principles of nature, and, not being necessary, would not

be justifiable. But a reward is necessary to invessigate the development of

practical means of utilizing the discovered principle, and such a reward is

offered by the patent statutes. On this theory, therefore, the fact that

discovery of an important principle of nature is not patentable, but con-

ception of a means by which that principle may be put to practical use is

.

be not clearly understood, seem to conflict with the rule that
a principle can not be patented. The author st;iggests, though
far .from stating it as the accepted rule, that the fundamental
difference between an unpatentable law of nature and one
which is patentable as part of a concrete contrivance, be it
"machine" or "process, ' is in the self-operative character of
the law involved. If it is a principle which will produce the
result automatically when merely given substance to operate
on it is unpatentable. It is utilized to be sure, but not through
the assistance of any means of utilization. ( But a principle
.which produces the desired result only through physical manipulation of substances, and as a concomitant of that manipulation, not ·as a sequent to it, is patentable as pa,r t of the idea of
means whereby the result is produced. Certainly the cas~s decided recently give credence to the proposition, that while a
principle of nature may not be patented as a means and an end
in itself, it may be patented as an integral part of an idea of
means the substant,ive part of which, even as an entirety, is
old. 44 That is to say, the principle alone could not be patented; • .
neither could the substantive . contrivance by itself be patented,
for it is already well krn:>wn; but the new combina1tion, of unpatentable principle and old mechanical device, can itself be
patented.
An excellent illustration of this is seen in the case
of Leroy v. Tatham. 45 Here the patentee had discovered

patentable, even though the material part of that means be already well

known, is not a defect in the patent law, but a virtue.

45 14 How. 156. For the facts see Tatham v. Leroy, 2 Blatch. 474.

This is in exact accord also with the theory on which patents are
economically justified, if the proposition of Mr. Taussig in "Money-Makers
and Inventors" is correct. This proposition is that people will invent and
make research to the full extent of their abilities of the creative instinct, and without the stimulation of a legal reward, but that the monopoly
of a patent is necessary to . induce capital to make inventions commercially
practical. If this be so, no reward is necessary to stimulate research and
discovery of the principles of nature, and, not being necessary, would not
be justifiable. But a reward is necessary to invessigate the development of
practical means of utilizing the diswvered principle, and such a reward is
offered by the patent statutes. On this theory, therefore, the fact that
discovery of an important principle of nature is not patentable, but conception of a means by which that principle may be put to practical use is
patentable, even though the material p.art of that means be already well
known, is not a defect in the patent law, but a virtue.
45 14 How. 156.
For the facts see Tatham v. Leroy, 2 Blatch. 474.
44

Digitize b

TE

E fl.RC V

i alfmm

CALI 0

A.

22 Patents and Inventions

the principle that lead in a solid condition would re-

unite after separation, if heated under great pressure. He

devised a method of utilizing this principle in the making of

lead pipes, and claimed, as his invention, this particular device

when used for such a purpose. Similar machines, on a lighter

scale, had been used before this for other purposes such as the

making of clay pipes and macaroni. The court in this case

confined him to the device as set forth, without considering

its connection with a new principle, and held that evidence of

other similar devices for other purposes, utilizing other prin-

ciples, might be admitted to prove that the patentee's device

was not new. But this same case came before the Supreme

Court again, in equity, 46 and a conflicting decision was reached.

The court in the second case held that the device patented was

not deprived of novelty by the existence of other machines

similar to it, but smaller and intended for other purposes. The

novelty of the patentee's device lay, it would appear, in the

fact that it was used in combination with the new principle. 47

The patentee's concept was the new combination of the old
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machine with the novel principle ; clearly a new concept.

It can not therefore be correct to say broadly either that a

principle of nature can not be patented or that it can be pat-

ented. Either statement results in confusion. It must be

understood, before any statement is definite, in just what

sense the terms are used.

"FUNCTION," ''RESULT," "PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION," ETC.

What has just been said in regard to a principle of nature ap-

46 22 How. 132.

47 In Foote v. Silsby, 2 Blatch. 260, the court held, broadly that a patent

might be granted for any means, old or new, of utilizing a newly dis-

covered principle. Poillon v. Schmidt, 6 Blatch. 209 ; Tilghman v. Proctor,

102 U.S. 707. See also The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. i. The patent sus-

tained in Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, seemed to be

practically a patent for a principle, the means by which it might be utilized

are so general. At any rate, the court of Appeals declared the patent in-

valid because the appreciable means used was so nearly identical with

means long known. The Supreme Court reversed this, and held the patent

valid because the difference from the known means, slight as it was,

brought an entirely different principle into play.

Meaning of Invention
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23

plies equally to the patentability of such abstractions as the

function of a machine, or its principle of operation, etc. These

are qualities or characteristics of a device, and have no con-

ceivable existence except as appertaining to something else.

In no sense can they be created in and of themselves; if they

are created, it is because something else of which they are an

inherent quality or characteristic has been created. .Not being

themselves created they can not themselves be patented.

But the function which a device performs, the principle on

which it operates, or the result which it accomplishes may be

the particular characteristic which distinguishes it from other

devices. This function, etc., is an intrinsic part of the con-

cept which is the invention. Indeed, the result accomplished,

the purpose, the principle of operation, or the like, may, like

the principle of nature utilized, be the only characteristic which

distinguishes the device, that is, the concept, from the concept

of other devices. Just as the natural principle used in Tat-

ham's machine for making lead pipe was the only thing which

distinguished his invention from the old machines for making
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macaroni, so the result which a device accomplishes may serve

as its only distinction from known devices. If this difference

is sufficient to convince the courts that the later concept, as

characterized by its function, etc., was the result of inventive

genius, it may be patented. Thus it may happen that a device

is recognizedly patentable whose only distinguishing feature

is its principle of operation, its function, or the like. One

tends, therefore, to think of the function or principle of oper-

ation as having itself been patented, and is apt to say loosely

that it has been. This leads to a deal of confusion in the ex-

pressions of the cases. For instance, Mr. Justice Brown ap-

pears guilty of contradicting himself by saying, in one and the

same opinion, 48 first that a function can not be patented, and

then, that a ''pioneer patent," which gives the patentee an

especial breadth of protection "is commonly understood to

denote a patent covering a function never before performed."

But owing to the fact that these abstract qualities have them-

48 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S. 537.

plies equally to· the patentability of such abstractions as the
function of a machine, or its principle of operation, etc. These
are qualities or characteristics of a device, and have no conceivable existence except as appertaining to something else.
In no sense can they be created in and of themselves; if they
are created, it is because something else of which they are an
inherent quality or characteristic has been created. .Not being
themselves created they can not themselves be patented.
But the function which a device performs, the principle on
which it operates, or the result which it accomplishes may be
the particular characteristic which distinguishes it from other
devices. This function etc., is an intrinsic part of the concept which is the invention. Indeed, the result accomplished,
the purpose, the principle of operation, or the like, may, like
the principle of nature utilized, be the only characteristic which
distinguishes the device, that is, the concept, from the concept
of other devices. Just as the natural principle used in Tatham'~ machine for ma'.l}ing lead pipe was the only thing which
distinguished his invention from the old machines for making
macaroni, so the result which a device accomplishes may serve
as its only distinction from known devices. If this difference
is sufficient to convince the courts that the later concept as
characterized by its function, etc., was the result of inventive
genius, it may be patented. Thus it may happen that a device
is recognizedly patentable whose only distinguishing feature
is its principle of operation, its function, or the like. One
tends, therefore, to think of the function or principle of operation as having itself been patented, and is apt to say loosely
that it has been. This leads to a deal of confusion in the expressions of the cases. For instance, Mr. Justice Brown appears guilty of contradicting himself by saying, in one and the
same opinion, 48 first that a function can not be patented, and
then, that a "pioneer patent,"-which gives the patentee an
especial breadth of protection-"is commonly understood to
denote a patent covering a function never before performed."
But owing to the fact that these abstract qualities have them4

Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co.,
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selves no separate existence, it is only the devices character-

elves no eparate exi tenc~, it is only the devices character_ized by them that are patented and the cases demonstrate indubitably that devic~s diff ere~tiated from others by these characteristics only may be validly patented, if it required inventive
genius to conceive that difference.

ized by them that are patented, and the cases demonstrate in-

dubitably that devices differentiated from others by these char-

acteristics only may be validly patented, if it required inventive

genius to conceive that difference.

2. CHARACTER

Thus far we have considered the nature of patentable in-

ventions in respect to their source. We now take up their

necessary character.

AN INVENTION is A CONCEPT. Of first importance is the

proposition that an invention is not tangible. It is a concept;

2. CHARACTER

a thing evolved by the mind. It is not a tangible thing pro-

Thus far we have considered the nature of patentable inver:itions in respect to their source. We now take up their
necessary character.
N INVENTION IS A CONCEPT.
Of first importance is the
proposition that an inv.enti
o tangible. It is a consep ·
a thin evo ved by the mind. It is not a tangible · thing _p roThe statute does refer, to be sure,
duced by manual
to .ollewho has invented any new "art, mac ine, manufacture,
or composition of matter." These things are tangible. But it
does not say, one who has "made" a machine, etc.; it says "invented" such things. And the act of invent~on is ·undeniedly
and undeniably a mental and not a manual act. The phrase
'art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" merely
refers to and limits the subject matter of the co_ncept.
JYI achine, Manufacture, Composition of matter. Since patentable inventions are limited to concepts of a new art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, it is essential to
know just what those terms include. There is a most remarkable confusion of definition and judicial explanation of the
meaning of each terrri. A freq-u ent subject of dispute is
whether or not the privilege of patenting a "machine" includes
that of patenting a "tool." In other words is a "tool" a "machine?" Variant definitions are to be found in the cases ;49
text writer are equally indecisive of the meaning of machine.
Ir. Hopkin accept 50 the definition that the term 'machine'
include every mechanical d~vice or combination of mechanical power to produce ome function and to produce a certain

duced by manual effort. The statute does refer, to be sure,

to.omTvvho has invented any new "art, machine, manufacture,

or composition of matter." These things are tangible. But it

does not say, one who has "made" a machine, etc. ; it says "in-

vented" such things. And the act of invention is undeniedly

and undeniably a mental and not a manual act. The phrase

"art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" merely
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refers to and limits the subject matter of the concept.

Machine, Manufacture, Composition of matter. Since pat-

entable inventions are limited to concepts of a new art, ma-

chine, manufacture or composition of matter, it is essential to

know just what those terms include. There is a most remark-

able confusion of definition and judicial explanation of the

meaning of each term. A frequent subject of dispute is

whether or not the privilege of patenting a "machine" includes

that of patenting a "tool." In other words is a "tool" a "ma-

chine?" Variant definitions are to be found in the cases; 49

text writers are equally indecisive of the meaning of machine.

Mr. Hopkins accepts 50 the definition that "the term 'machine'

includes every mechanical device or combination of mechani-

cal powers to produce some function and to produce a certain

. 4f( Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252; Burr v. Duryee, I Wall. 531;

Coupe v. Weatherhead, 16 Fed. 673.

50 Hopkins on Patents, I. p. 53 ff.

:rn Corning v. Burden, I5 How. 252; Burr v. Duryee,
Coupe v. Weatherhead, 16 Fed. 673.
0 Hopkin
n Patent , I. p. 53 ff.
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effect or result." Macomber 51 says, vaguely, "A machine con-

sists in imposing upon mechanical elements the mind of the

inventor, working in harmony with the laws of mechanics to

effect a result." Robinson 52 insists that a distinction between

machines and other instruments is necessary for harmony in

the law and for its proper application. Nevertheless he rec-

ognizes that whether or not a device is a machine or a tool has

nothing whatever to do with its inherent patentability. The

name by which the inventor himself calls the device is imma-

terial to the validity of the patent; and if the device be not,

in fact, a "machine," it is equally as patentable as a "manu-

facture."

50 far as there is any harmony of usage of the terms, the

distinction appears to turn, generally speaking, upon whether

the desired result is accomplished by a dynamic means or a

static one. An inventively shaped collar button, for instance,

holding a collar in place by its mere presence, or accomplish-

ing the result of its own position with novel ease because of

its mere shape, would probably be a "manufacture." A thing
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of wheels and levers accomplishing the result of producing an

old form of collar button from flat, unformed material would

undoubtedly be a machine. A typewriter would probably be

a machine ; but would a pair of pincers, which accomplishes a

result by transmitting dynamic energy, be a machine ; or would

a hammer, or cold chisel? The question has never been set-

tled and it is fortunate that it does not need to be.

The term "composition of matter" is generally applied to

those embodiments of the invention whose peculiarity does

not depend upon external, visible shape, but upon internal re-

lations.

As Mr. Robinson himself says, the name "manufacture" in-

cludes "every article devised by man except machinery upon

the one side, and compositions of matter and designs upon the

other." The name by which the inventor characterizes his

concept is immaterial. The terms machine, manufacture, com-

position of matter and design cover everything tangible which

51 Fixed Law of Patents, p. 61.

52 Rob. on Patents, Vol. I, Ch. If.

effect or result." Macomber 51 say , vaguely, "A machine consists in imposing upon mechanical elements the mind of the
inventor, working in harmony with the laws of mechanics to
effect a result.' Robinson 5 2 insists that a distinction between
machines and other in truments is nece sary .f or harmony in
the law and for its proper application. Nevertheless he recognizes that whether or not a device is a machine or a tool has
nothing whatever to do with its inherent patentability. The
name by which the inventor himself calls the device is immaterial to the validity of the patent; and if the device be not,
in fact, a "machine," it is equally as patentable as a "manufacture."
So far as there is any harmony of usage of the terms, the·
d~stinction appears to tum, generally speaking, upon whether
the .desired result is accomplished by a dynamic means or a
static one. An inventively shaped collar button, for instance,
holding a collar in place by its mere presence, or accomplishing the result of its own position with novel ease because of
its mere shape, would probably be a "manufacture." A thing
of wheel and levers accomplishing the result of producing an
old form of collar button from flat unformed material would
undoubtedly be a machine. A typewriter would probably be
a machine· but would a pair of pincers, which accomplishes a
result by transmitting dynamic energy, be a machine; or would
a hammer, or cold chisel? The question has never been settled and it is fortunate that it does not n~ed to be.
The term "compo ition of matter is generally applied to
those embodiments of the invention whose peculiarity does ,
not depend ~tpon external, visible shape, but upon internal re-·
lations.
As Mr. Robinson himself says, the name "manufacture" includes "every article devised ·by man except machinery upon ·
the one side, and compositions of matter and designs upon the
other." The · name by which the inventor characterizes his
concept is immaterial. The terms machine, manufacture, COffi--' ·
position of matter and design cover everything tangible which '
51
52

Fixed Law of Patents, p. 61.
Rob. on Patents, Vol. 1, Ch. If.
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man could conceivably contrive. It seems clear therefore that

man could conceivably contrive. It eems clear therefore that
a concept of anything to be given tangible form by man is, o
far as its ubject-matter is concerned patentable. It is quite
unneces ary to decide into what class of tangible things it falls.
So far as the writer is aware, in no case has this ever been a
material issue. 53
A rt. The Century Dictionary defines an art as, "the combination or modification of things to adapt them to a given
end; the employment of a given means to effect a purpose;
a system of rules and traditional methods for facilitating
· ms. ' Des i
prov1s10n
the er ormance of
that an invention whose subject matter is an "art" may be
patented, the early cases had some doubt as to whether an
idea of accomplishing a given result by a novel series of steps,
or sequence of operations, could be patented. Such a sequence
of actions is usually called, in the patent law . a "process."
Of the cases which declare a rocess not to be at6:rtable,
that f isdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart 56 is t piThe invention was a met o ot manu ac urmg elt pulleys.
e
It appeared that pulleys as theretofore made had been more or
less out of balance, owing to the fact that tqe distance from
the axis of revolution to the inside of the rim was not uniform
along all radii. In consequence, when the outside of the rim
was ground to a perfect surface everywhere equidistant from

a concept of anything to be given tangible form by man is, so

far as its subject-matter is concerned, patentable. It is quite

unnecessary to decide into what class of tangible things it falls.

So far as the writer is aware, in no case has this ever been a

material issue. 53

Art. The Century Dictionary defines an art as, "the com-

bination or modification of things to adapt them to a given

end; the employment of a given means to effect a purpose;

. . . a system of rules an d traditional methods for facilitating

the jerfonnance"o?lrta* n -T >< ^ rnig " Despite the provision

that an invention whose subject matter is an "art" may be

patented, the early cases had some doubt as to whether an

idea of accomplishing a given result by a novel series of steps,

or sequence of operations, could be patented. Such a sequence

of actions is usually called, in the patent law, a "process."

Of the cases which declare a process ttot to be patentable,

that jaf,BisdQn..Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart 56 is typi-

caL-The invention was a metHod 6T manu f actunng "belt pulleys.
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It appeared that pulleys as theretofore made had been more or

less out of balance, owing to the fact that the distance from

the axis of revolution to the inside of the rim was not uniform

along all radii. In consequence, when the outside of the rim

was ground to a perfect surface everywhere equidistant from

53 A unique statement is found in Jacobs v. Baker, 7 Wall. 295 which

appears to be in conflict with the proposition that everything tangible is

included in the terms machine, manufacture or composition of matter.

The device patented was a jail having "a secret passage, or guard cham-

ber," around the outside of an iron-plate enclosure. The purpose was

to allow the keeper to hear the prisoners and oversee them without their

being conscious of his presence. The court held the patent to be invalid,

and in the course of its opinion said, "Now a jail can hardly come under

the denomination of a 'machine' ; nor, though made bv hands, can it well

be classed with 'manufactures'; nor, although compounded of matter,

can it be termed a 'composition of matter', in the meaning of the patent

act." This statement is, however, the merest dictum and the court, "waiv-

ing all these difficulties as hypercritical," found that there was no novelty

A unique statement is found in Jacobs v. Baker, 7 Wall. 295 which
appears to be in conflict with the proposition that everything tangible is
included in the terms machine, manufacture or composition of matter.
The device patented was a jail having "a secret passage, or guard chamber," around the outside of an iron-plate enclosure. The purpo e was
to allow the keeper to hear the prisoners and oversee them without their
being con cious of his presence. The court held the patent to be invalid,
and in the course of its opinion said, "Now a jail can hardly come under
the denomination of a 'machine'; nor, though made bv hands, can it well
be clas ed with 'manufactures'.; nor, although compounded of matter,
can it be termed a 'composition of matter', in the meaning of the patent
act." This tatement is, however, the merest dictum and the court, "waiving all the e difficulties a hypercritical," found that there was no novelty
what ver in the jail described but that it had been in use long before the
alleged inv ntion.
53

whatever in the jail described but that it had been in use long before the

alleged invention.

66 158 U. S. 68.
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the axis, the thickness of the rim necessarily varied at differ-

C hara.cteristics of Invention

ent radial points. The patentee proposed to obviate this in-

equality by grinding the ends of the radial arms to an equality

from the center before the rim itself was attached.

In a very confusing opinion the court says, "That the

patent is for a process in manufacture, and not for the mechan-

ism employed, nor for the finished product of sortie manu-

facture, is undeniable, and is so expressed upon the face of the

specification. That certain processes of manufacture are pat-

entable is as clear as that certain others are not, but nowhere

is the distinction between them accurately defined. There is

somewhat of the same obscurity in the line of demarcation as

in that between mechanical skill and invention, or in that be-

tween a new article of manufacture, which is universally hel'd

to be patentable, and the function of a machine, which it is

equally clear is not. It may be said in general that processes

of manufacture which involve chemical or other similar ele-

mental action are patentable, though mechanism may be nec-

essary in the application or carrying out of such process, while
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those which consist solely in the operation of a machine are

jiot_^Mual piTTCessgS which have been held to be patentable

require the aid of mechanism in their practical application,

but where such mechanism is subsidiary to the chemical action,

the fact that the patentee may be entitled to a patent upon his

mechanism does not impair his right to a patent for the pro-

cess ; since he would lose the benefit of his real discovery,

which might be applied in a dozen different ways, if he were

not entitled to such patent. But, if the operation of his de-

vice be purely mechanical, no such considerations apply, since

the function of the machine is entirely independent of any

chemical or other similar action." The court therefore came

to the stated conclusion that "all that he invented in fact was

a machine for the more perfect manufacture of such pulleys,

and the operation or function of such machine, however, is

not patentable as a process." The relation of this statement

to the first statement, that the patent was not for a machine,

is decidedly obscure. The real reason for the decision is ob-

the axis, the thickness of the rim necessarily ·varied at different radial points. The patentee proposed to obviate this inequality by grinding the ends of the radial arms to an equality
from the center before the rim itself was attached.
In a very confusing opinion the court says, "That the
patent is for a process in manufacture, and not for the mechanism employed, nor for the finished product of some manufacture, is undeniable, and is so expressed upon the 'face of the
patspecification. That ce · p. ocesses f manufactu
ut nowhere
entable is as clear as that certain other
is the istinction between them accurately defined. There is
somewhat of the same obscurity in the line of demarcation as
in that between mechanical skill and iuvention, or in that between a new article of manufacture, which is universally helG
to be patentable, and the function of a machine, which it is
~..-r.··"
equally clear is not. It may be said in ge eral
of manufacture which involve chemical or other similar elementcrl -action are patentable) though mechanism may be necessary in the application or carrying out of such process, while
those which consist solely in the oper ti
o
machine are
not.
os processes which have been held to be patentable
-;:equire the · aid of mechanism in their practical application,
but where such mechanism is subsidiary to the chemical action,
the fact that the patentee may be entitled to a patent upon his
. mechanism does not impair his right to a patent for the pro. cess; since he would lose the benefit of his real discovery,
which might be applied in a dozen d\fferent ways, if he were
not entitled to such patent. Bu!, if the operation of his device be purely mechanical, no such considerations apply, since
the function of the machine is entirely independent of any
chemical or other similar action." The court therefore came
to the stated conclusion that "all that he ·invented in fact was
a machine for the more perfect manufacture of such .pulleys,
and the operation or function of such machine, however, is
not patentable as a process." The relation of this statement
to the first statement, that the patent was not for a machine,
is decidedly obscure. The real reason for the decision is ob0
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vious enough, however, after the confusion of other state-

ment is stripped off, in the express finding that "in short, this

vious enough, however, after the confusion of other statement is stripped off, in the expre s finding that ' in short, this
is a patent only for uperior workmanship, and within all· the
authorities is invalid.'' 57
Of the ca e holding that a "
patentable, the
58
strange t is that of C hran
eener.
The purpose of the
inventor was "to increase the production of the best quality of
flour," and the invention "consisted in separating from the
meal first the superfine flour, and then the pulverulent impurities mingled with the flour producing portions of. the middlings-meal, which when reground and rebolted, would yield
pure white flour" thus increasing the total amount of such
white flour. The method described consisted "in passing the
gfound meal through a series of bolting-reels clothed with
cloth of progressively finer meshes, which pass the superfine
flour arid retard the escape of the finer and lighter impurities;
and, at the same time, subjecting the meal to blasts or currents
of air introduced by hollow perforated shafts furnished with
pipes so disposed that the force of the blast may act close to
the surface of the bolting-cloth; the· bolting-chest having an
opening at the top for the escape of the air, and of the finer
and liahter particles .therewith, through a chamber where the
particles are arrested, whilst the floor and sides of each compartment of the chest are made close, so as to prevent the
escape of the air in any other direction than through the said
opening. By this means, the superfine flour is separated, and
the fine and light specks and impurities, whfrh ordinarily ad"'l
here to the middlin s and degrade the flour produced therefrom, are got rid of · and when the middlino-s are now separated from the other portions of the meal, they are white and
clean and capable of being reground and rebolted so as to
produce uperfine flour equal in quality and even superior to
the fir t in talment. Thi i the process described; but the
patentee claim that it is not limited to any special arrange~

is a patent only for superior workmanship, and within all' the

authorities is invalid." 5

Of the cases holding that a "process 11 is patentable, the

strongest is that of rnrhran y^JVpner. 58 The purpose of the

inventor was "to increase the production of the best quality of

flour," and the invention "consisted in separating from the

meal first the superfine flour, and then the pulverulent impuri-

ties mingled with the flour producing portions of the mid-

dlings-meal, which when reground and reboltecl, would yield

pure white flour" thus increasing the total amount of such

white flour. The method described consisted "in passing the

ground meal through a series of bolting-reels clothed with

cloth of progressively finer meshes, which pass the superfine

flour and retard the escape of the finer and lighter impurities ;

and, at the same time, subjecting the meal to blasts or currents

of air introduced by hollow perforated shafts furnished with

pipes so disposed that the force of the blast may act close to
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the surface of the bolting-cloth; the bolting-chest having an

opening at the top for the escape of the air, and of the finer

and lighter particles therewith, through a chamber where the

particles are arrested, whilst the floor and sides of each com-

partment of the chest are made close, so as to prevent the

escape of the air in any other direction than through the said

opening. By this means, the superfine flour is separated, and

the fine and light specks and impurities, which ordinarily ad-

here to the middlings and degrade the flour produced there-

from, are got rid of ; and when the middlings are now sepa-

rated from the other portions of the meal, they are white and

clean, and capable of being reground and rebolted, so as to

produce superfine flour equal in quality and even superior to

the first instalment. This is the process described; but the

patentee claims that it is not limited to any special arrange-

57 For other cases in which it has been held that the alleged invention

revealed only superiority of workmanship and was therefore not inven-

tion, see infra.

68 94 U. S. 780.

57

For other cases in which it has been held that the alleged invention
revealed only uperiority f workman hip and was therefore not invention, ee infra.
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ment of machinery. He admits the prior use of currents of

air in the interior of the reels, introduced by means of hollow,

perforated shafts, for the purpose of keeping back the speck,

and increasing the quantity of superfine flour ; but not for puri-

fying the middlings preparatory to regrinding. His improve-

ment, therefore, does not consist in using drafts and currents

of air, but in the process as a whole, comprising the applica-

tion of the blast, and the carrying off of the fine impurities,

whereby the middlings are purified preparatory to regrinding

after being separated from the other parts." The defendants

used a formally different mechanical device, but the same pro-

cess of manufacture.

It w r as admitted that the new method had produced a revo-

lution in the manufacture of liour. The fact that the mechani-

cal devices actually used were old did not affect the validity <>f

the patent, the court held, because they were not themselves

the invention. This, the court said, was a process, and "That

a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular

form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If
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one of the steps of a process be that a certain substance is to

be reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material what

instrument or machinery is used to effect that object, whether

a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be

pointed out; but if the patent is not confined to that particular

tool or machine, the use of the others would be an infringe-

ment, the general process being the same. A process is a mode

of tre^&nejqjLof certanmaterials, to rocure a

It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-

matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or

thing. If newand useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece

of inaiJiinety. Inthe language of the patent law, it is an art

The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process

may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process it-

self may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result.

The process requires that certain things should be done with

certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be

used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.''

ment of machinery. He admits the prior use of currents of
air in the interior of the reel , introduced by means of hollow,
perforated shafts, for the purpose of keeping back the peck,
and increa ing the quantity of superfine flour· but not for purifying the middlings preparatory to regrinding. Hi improvement therefore, does not consist in u ing drafts and currents
of air, but in the pr ce a a whole, comprising the application of the blast and the carryino- off of the fine impurities,
whereby the m'i ddling are purified preparatory to regrinding
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one of the teps of a pro ess be that a certain ub tance is to
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Bradford. 59 The suit involved defendant's right to use a cer-

more recent tatement is found in E ,. anded Metal Co. v.
Bradf rd. 59 The uit involved defendant' right to use a certain machine for making ''expanded" sheet metal. ;Before
complainants patent, such metal had been made either by
cutting properly placed slits in the plates and then opening
the metal by bending the severed portions, as two operations,
or by cutting and opening, in a different way, simultaneously.
Both the e methods had the objection of distorting the external dimensions of the plate from which it was made. Golding conceived the idea of simultaneously cutting and opening
the metal by both bending and stretching the severed portions
and of following this up with a like operation in which the
location of the cuts was changed in a longitudinal as well as
a transverse direction. This method resulted in substantial
advantages. It was the coordination of these two operations
to produce the result, which in the opinion of the court constituted the invention.
·
The mechanism by which the work was perfected could
have been produced on demand by any competent mechanic.
Furthermore, no mechanism for doing it was described in the
specification, though enough was suggested to indicate to a
skilled mechanic what to construct for the purpose. It thus
appears that the invention could have been nothing more than
the method of procedure for accomplishing the result. The
real invention was a concept of procedure, although to be
carried out by substantial machinery. The court held the
patent valid. In discussing the meaning of this "process," it
quoted with approval 60 "A machine i a thing. A process is an ·
act r a mode of acting. The ne i visible to the eye-an
object of perpetual ob ervation. The other is a conception of
the mind, een nly by it effect when being executed or per£ rm ed. Either may be the mean of producing a useful reult.'
e therefore ' said the court, "reach the conclusion
that an inventi n or disc very of a pr c s or method involvm mechanical
e ati n , and rodu in a new and useful

tain machine for making "expanded" sheet metal. Before

complainant's patent, such metal had been made either by

cutting properly placed slits in the plates and then opening

the metal by bending the severed portions, as two operations,

or by cutting and opening, in a different way, simultaneously.

Both these methods had the objection of distorting the ex-

ternal dimensions of the plate from which it was made. Gold-

ing conceived the idea of simultaneously cutting and opening

the metal by both bending and stretching the severed portions

and of following this up with a like operation in which the

location of the cuts was changed in a longitudinal as well as

a transverse direction. This method resulted in substantial

advantages. It was the coordination of these two operations

to produce the result, which in the opinion of the court con-

stituted the invention.

The mechanism by which the work was perfected could

have been produced on demand by any competent mechanic.

Furthermore, no mechanism for doing it was described in the
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A more recent statement is found in Expanded Metal Co. v.

specification, though enough was suggested to indicate to a

skilled mechanic what to construct for the purpose. It thus

appears that the invention could have been nothing more than

the method of procedure for accomplishing the result. The

real invention was a concept of procedure, although to be

carried out by substantial machinery. The court held the

patent valid. In discussing the meaning of this "process," it

quoted with approval 60 "A machine is a thing. A process is an

act or a mode of acting. The one is visible to the eye an

object of perpetual observation. The other is a conception of

the mind, seen only by its effects when being executed or per-

formed. Either may be the means of producing a useful re-

sult." "We therefore," said the court, "reach the conclusion

that an invention or discovery of a process or method involv-

ing mechanical operations, and producing a new and useful

59 214 U. 5. 366.

60 Tilghman v. 'Proctor, 102 U. S. 707.

15 9

214

u. s. 366.

ao Tilghman v. 'Proctor,
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U. S. 707.
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result, may be within the protection of the Federal Statute,

Characteristics of Invention

and entitle the inventor to a patent for his discovery." 61

It now seems settled that the concept of a series of steps,

or a method of operation, to produce a stated result is patent-

able, so far as its subject matter is concerned. It will be noted,

however, that in all the cases cited on this point, the art, or

process, has been carried out through the manipulation of

substance and the use of tangible instrumentalities.

Mental process. It is a pertinent inquiry, therefore, whether

a method of accomplishing a given result which does not re-

quire the use of tangible instrumentalities ; in other words,

whether a purely mental process, not involving the manipula-

tion of substance, can be protected by patent as an "art." If,

for instance, a mathematician should evolve, as the result

of real inventive genius, a new method of determining

the cube root of numbers; or if a stage "magician" should

hit upon a novel method of conveying secret informa-

tion by means of apparently commonplace speech, would

not these methods of accomplishing the ends desired come
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within the statutory meaning of an "art" ? There is no

direct authority upon the question, but the writer fully be-

lieves that such a process of accomplishing a result is anJ^rt,"

and as such is patentable. The reason is negative; that' is,

there is no sound reason why it should not be patentable as an

art.

All the authority opposed to the proposition appears to be

61 Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U. S. I. The court upheld the patent in

this case although all the instrumentalities were well known, because "the

mode of using and applying these old instrumentalities" was new. "And

what is that but a new process? This process consists of a series of acts

done to the flax-seed. It is a mode of treatment." Cf. Gage v. Herring,

107 U. S. 640; Cf. Crescent Brewing Co. v. Gottfried 128 U. S. 158;

Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U. S. 288. "That the means, and the only means,

of applying the process, are strictly mechanical, is a matter of no mo-

ment, so far as patentability is concerned. If the process when distin-

guished from the means of performing it, is new, useful, and intellectu-

ally rises to the dignity of invention, it is patentable if it falls within

the meaning of the word 'art' as used in the statute." Buffalo Forge Co.

v. City of Buffalo, 255 Fed. 83.

result, may be within the protection of the Federal Statute~
and entitle the inventor to a patent for his discovery." 61
It now seems settled that the concept of a series of steps,
or a method of operation, to produce a stated result is patentable, so far as its subject matter is concerned. It will be noted,
however, that in all the cases cited on this point, the art, or
process, has been carried out through the manipulation of
substance and the use .of tangible instrumentalities.
al vrocess. It is a pertinent inquiry, therefore, whether
a method of accomplishing a given result which does not require the use of tangible instrumentalities; in other words,
whether a purely mental proce.ss, not involving the. manipulation of ·substance, can be protected by patent as an "art." If,
for instance, a mathematician should evolve, as the result
of real inventive genius, .a new method of ·determining
the cube root of numbers; or if .a stage "magician" should
hit upon a novel method of conveying secret information by means of apparently commonplace speech, would
not these methods of accomplishing the ends desired come
within the statutory meaning of an "art"? There is no
direct authority upon the question, but the writer fully believes that such a process of accomplishing a result is a " t,"
and as-ouch is atentable. The reason is negative; thaf is,
there is no sound reason why it should not be patentable as an
art.
All the authority opposed to the proposition appears t<? be
Lawther v. Hamilton, 124 U. S. I. The court upheld the patent in
this case although all the instrumentalities were well known, because "the
mode of usi~g and applying these old instrumentalities" was new. "And
what is that but a new process? This process consists of a series of acts
done to the flax-seed. It is a mode of treatment." Cf. Gage v. Herring,
107 U. S. 640; Cf. Crescent Brewing Co. v. Gottfried 128 U. S. 158;
Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U. S. 288. "That the means, and the only means,
of applying the process, are strictly mechanical, is a matter of no moment, so far as patentability is concerned. If the process when distinguished from the means of performing it, is new, useful, and intellectually rises to the dignity of invention, it is patentable-if . it falls within
the meaning of the word 'art' as "used in the statute." Buffalo Forge Co.
v. City of Buffalo, 255 Fed. 83.
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in the form of dicta only. The case of Hotel Security Check-

ing Co. vs. Lorraine Co. 54 is typical of all those most
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nearly in point. The claim of the patent was for a "means

for securing hotel or restaurant proprietors or others from

losses by the peculations of waiters, cashiers or other em-

ployees, which consists of a sheet provided with separate

spaces, having -suitable headings, substantially as described,

said heading being designatory of the several waiters to whom

the several spaces on the sheet are individually appropriated,

in conjunction w r ith separate slips, each so marked as to indi-

cate the waiter using it, whereby the selling price of all the

articles sold may be entered in duplicate, once upon the slip

of the waiter making the sale, and once upon his allotted space

upon the main sheet, substantially as and for the purpose speci-

fied." It will be observed that the claim really made was not

in the least for a mental process, nor even for a series of hu-

man actions, or other form of art, but for a wholly tangible

sheet of paper, to be used in conjunction with other sheets of

paper, all appropriately marked and designed. Of this tangible
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means the court said briefly, "It can not be maintained that

the physical means described by Hicks, the sheet and the

slip apart from their manner of use, present any new and

useful feature." The court then proceeded to discuss the case

on the seemingly unwarranted assumption that the patentee

had claimed an intangible thing. It said, "It is manifest that

the subject matter of the claim is not a machine, manufacture

or composition of matter. If within the language of the

statute at all, it must be as a 'new and useful art.' " It then

went on to say, "In the sense of the patent law, an art is not

a mere abstraction. A system of transacting business discon-

nected from the means for carrying out the system is not,

within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art. Ad-

vice is not patentable." This expression, and more of like

tenor, is pointedly to the effect that an intangible means of

effectuating a result is not patentable. The actual decision of

the case did not require any such, statement and is, in fact,

54 160 Fed. 467.

in the form of dicta only. The case of Hotel Security Checking Co. vs. Lorraine .Co.- 54 is typical of all those most
nearly in point. The claim of the patent was for a "means
for securing hotel or restaurant proprietors or others from
lo ses by the peculations of waiters, cashiers or other employees, which consists of a ~heet · provided with separate
spaces, having .suitable headings, substantially as described,
said heading being designatory of the several waiters to whom
the several spaces on the sheet are individually appropriated,
in conjunction with sep~rate slips, each so marked as to indicate the waiter using it, whereby the selling price of all the
articles sold may be entered in duplicate, once upon the slip
of the waiter making .the sale, and once upon his allotted space
upon the main sheet, substantially as and for the purpose specified." It will be observed that the cl3:im really made was not
in the least for a mental process, nor even for a series o(-human actions, or other form of art, but for a wholly tangible
sheet of paper, to be used in conjunction with other sheets of
paper, all appropriately marked and designed. Of this tangible
means the court said briefly, "It can not be maintained that
the phy ical means described by Hicks,-the sheet and the
slip-apart from their manner of use, present any new and
useful feature.'' The court then proceeded to discuss the case
on the seemingly unwarranted assumption that the patentee
had claimed an intangible thing. It said, "It is manifest .that
the subject matter of the claim is not a machine, manufacture
or composition of matter. If within the language of the
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·went on to ay, "In the sense of the patent law, an art is not
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placed on the ground that the fundamental principle of the

system is "as old as the art o*f book-keeping" and the patentee

Characteristics of Invention
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had "modified and adapted it to fit the ephemeral character of

the business in hand, but it required no exercise of the inven-

tive faculties to do this." The case thus clearly turns on the

lack of novelty of the alleged invention and the statements in

regard to the character of patentable invention are merely

dicta. 55

Lest this discussion may have somewhat overshadowed the

original proposition, it may well be said again, that although

an invention is an idea, not a tangible thing, not every idea

is patentable as an invention. It must be an idea of the classes

named in the statute, namely the idea of a new art, machine,

manufacture or composition of matter.

55 In a case more nearly in point (Fowler v. City of N. Y. 121 Fed. 747)

the patent was described by the court as "a new plan for handling the

large number of passengers who patronize the public vehicles provided

for rapid transit in large cities." It consisted in an arrangement of tracks

and stations such that passengers could be picked up at local stations, and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

transferred to express trains at express stops, without necessitating an

interfering use of the same tracks by both express and local trains. It

was in substance the now well known system of "island stations," or plat-

forms, located between the local and express tracks so that passengers

can be received at one side and transshipped from the other. It was

placed on the ground that the fundamental principle of the
system is "as old as the art ot book-keeping" and the patentee
had "modified and adapted it to fit the ephemeral character of
the business in hand, but it required no exercise of the inventive faculties to do this." Th~ case thus clearly turns on the
lack of novelty of the alleged invention and the statements in
regard to the character of patentable invention are merely
dicta. 55
Lest this discussion may have somewhat overshadowed the
original· proposition, it may well be said again, that although
an invention is an idea, not a tangible thing, not every idea
is patentable as an invention. It must be an idea of the classes
named in the statute, namely the idea of a new art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter.

argued that this system constituted a "machine." The court appears to

have doubted the proposition but to have conceded it for the sake of

argument, and on such concession, held the device unpatentable because

any competent engineer could have devised the same plan whenever it

should become practically usable. The only justification for interpreting

the case as authority for holding an intangible means of accomplishing

a result unpatentable is the fact that the court did concede, for the sake

of argument, that the contrivance in question was tangible. Another case

in which the real and expressed ground for the holding belies the loose

statements of patentability is Risdon Loco. Wks. v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68.

A class of cases apt to be confused with the character of patentable in-

vention is that in which the means employed to the end is the result of

selection and good judgment. The courts have held this excellence of

judgment not to constitute invention. This is equivalent only to holding

that this type of means is unpatentable for lack of invention and is quite

different from holding that no intangible means can be patented. Refer-

ences to particular cases are noted infra. See a further discussion in

15 Michigan Law Rey^ 660.

55 In a ca e more nearly in point (Fowler v. City of N. Y. 121 Fed. 747)
the patent was described by the court as "a new plan for handling the
large number of passengers who patronize the .p ublic vehicles provided
for rapid transit in large cities." It consisted in an arrangement of tracks
and stations such that passengers could be picked up at local stations, and
transferred to express trains at express stops, without necessitating an
interfering use of the same tracks by both express and local trains. It
was in substance the now well known system of "island stations," or platforms, located between the local and express tracks so that passengers
can be received at one side and transshipped from the other. It was
argued that this system constituted a "machine." The court appears to ·
have doubted the proposition but to have conceded it for the sake of
argument, and on such concession, held the device unpatentable because
any competent engineer could have devi ed the same plan whenever it
should become practically usable. The only justification for interpreting
the case as authority for holding an intangible means of accomplishing
.a result unpatentable is the fact that the court did concede, for the sake
of argument, that the contrivance in question was tangible. Another case
in which the real and expres sed ground for the holding belies the loose
statements of patentability is Risdon Loco. Wks. v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68.
A class of cases apt to be confused with the cha.r acter of patentable invention is that in which the means employed to the end is the result of
selection and good judgment. The courts have held this excellence of
judgment not to constitute invention. This is equivalent only to holding
that this type of means is unpatentabfe for lack of invention and is quite
.diffe'r ent from holding that no intangible means can be patented. References to particular cases are noted infra. See a further discussi'on in
15 Michigan Law Rey 66o.
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INVENTIVE QUALITY. We have already discussed inven-

tion in respect to the creative element which is necessary. But

~4
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while nothing is patentable as invention which is not the re-

sult of creation, not everything that has been created by a

person is patentable. One may actually create something by

the labor of his own mind so that, in respect to himself, it

comes within all the definitions of invention. But the~pucpQ.se

of the patent Jaws is to promote the progress of science and

the useful arts, not merely to reward mental effort as such.

Therefore nothing is patentable which is not "new." The fact

that a production is new to the producer does not bring it

within the statute ; it must be new to the public, to the science

and arts which the statutes intend to promote. 63

63 An interesting illustration of this proposition is found in New De-

parture Bell Co. v. Bevin Bros. Mfg., Co., 73 Fed. 469. The patent in issuo

was for a bicycle bell. It had gone into wide use, but the evidence in

the case revealed that a very similar mechanism had been described in

We have already di cussed invention in re I ct t the creative element which is necessary. But
while nothing i patentable as inventi n which is not the result of creation, not everything that has been created by a
person is patentable. One may actually create something by
the lab r of his own mind so that, in re pect to himself, it
comes within all the definitions of invention. But th
ose
of the
nt la ~ is to promote the progress of science and
the useful art not merely to reward mental effort as such.
L.LLLble which is not "new." The fact
that a production is new to the producer does not bring it
within the tatute; it must be new to the public, to the science
and arts which the statutes intend to promote. 63
INVENTIVE Q ALITY.

LllU7'.,.,,. ...

an English patent for door-bells and call bells issued to one Bennett some

fourteen years previous to that of the complainant. If this English
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mechanism had been utilized in this country, the court said, the fact

that it had not been utilized for bicycle bells until complainant's patent

would strongly have indicated the presence of invention. But, went on

the court, "this argument ... is not applicable to the case at bar. There

is no reason to suppose that Bennett or his bell was ever heard of by any

bell manufacturer in this country until his patent was unearthed by a

search for anticipating devices." "So well adapted, is that mechanism

to bicycle bells that it is almost inconceivable that it could have been

known to bell makers here during the 14 years in which they were try-

ing to improve such bells, .and yet was not availed of. No doubt, Rock-

well devised the striking mechanism set out in his patent independently,

and with no knowledge of what Bennett had done ; and, since that mechan-

ism was better adapted to meet the requirements of a bicycle bell than

anything which rival manufacturers had succeeded in producing, it may

be accepted as the fruit of an inventive conception, but its novelty is

negatived by the British patent. The statutes authorize the granting of

patents only for such inventions as have not been patented or described

in any printed publication in this or any foreign country before the ap-

plicant's embodiment of his own conception. It may be a hardship to

meritorious inventors, who, at the expenditure of much time and thought,

have hit upon some ingenious combination of mechanical devices, which,

for aught they know, is entirely novel, to find that, in some remote time

and place, some one else, of whom they never heard, has published to the

63 An interesting illustration of this proposition is found in New Departure Bell Co. v. Bevin Bros. Mfg., Co., 73 Fed. 469. The patent in issw~
was for a bicycle bell. It had gone into wide use, but the evidence in
the case revealed that a very similar mechanism had been described in
an Engli h patent for door-bells and call bells issued to one Bennett some
fourteen years previous to that of the complainant. If thi English
mechani m had been utilized in this country, the court said, the fact
that it had not been utilized for bicycle bell; until complainant's patent
would stronaJy have indicated the presence of in ention. But, went on
the court, ''this argument ... is not applicable to the case at bar. There
is no reason to suppose that Bennett or his bell was ever heard of by any
bell manufactiurer in this country until his patent was unearthed by a
earch for anticipating devices." "So well adapted. i that mechanism
to bicycle bells that it is almost inconceivable that it could have been
known to bell makers here during the 14 years in which they were trying to improve uch bells, . and yet was not availed of. No doubt, Rockwell devi ed the striking mechanism et out in his patent independently,
and with no knowledge of what Bennett had done· and, since that mechani m was better adapted to meet the requirement of a bicycle bell than
anything which rival manufacturers had ucceed d in pr ducing, it may
be accepted as the fruit of an inventive conception, but its novelty is
negatived by the Briti h pat nt. The statutes authorize the granting of
patents only for uch invention as have not been patented or described
in any printed publication in thi or any foreign country before the ap- .
plicant' embodim nt of hi own conception. It may be a hardship to
meritoriou inventors, who, at the expenditure of much time and thought,
have hit up n
me ingeniou c mbinati n of m chanical devices, which,
f r aught th y know, is entir ly nov 1, to find that, in ome remote time
and plac , om one lse, of whom t.h y never heard, ha published to the
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This question of novelty does not come up at the time of

application and issue of a patent, except as prior knowledge

35

is shown by other applications and already issued patents.

These are all that is of record in the Patent Office. New ap-

plications are compared with this record, and if anticipation

is clear a patent may be refused. But the office can not go

outside of this record to look for prior knowledge. The patent

when issued indicates, therefore, nothing whatever as to the

patentable novelty of the invention, except in respect to other

patents issued in this country. Even in this respect it indi-

cates but little since the benefit of the doubt is given to an

applicant when his device is at least superficially different from

anything theretofore patented.

Whether a production which is new to the creator himself

is properly to be called "invention" need not be here discussed.

It is possible that in correct definition, "invention" includes

the element of novelty as to all human knowledge. If this be

true, to speak of a new invention is redundant, and an inven-

tion which is lacking in novelty is not an invention. But in
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ordinary parlance both of courts and of laymen, invention is

applied to those productions which the producer thinks are

new, whether they are actually of such novelty as to be

patentable or not. The statute itself is either unreasonably re-

dundant or else is framed upon this usage; it reads "one who

has invented . . . any new . . . art, machine . . . not known

or used by others." The reports are replete with references

to "inventions" which are not patentable for lack of novelty. 64

The fact that a device can not be patented unless it is new

to the public, being accepted, the question at once arises, in

each case, whether the particular device is new or old.

world, in a patent or a printed publication, a full description of the very

combination over which they have been puzzling; but in such cases the

act, none the less, refuses them a patent."

64 Reed v. Cutter, I Story 590. 2 Robb. Pat. Cas. 81, Fed. Cas. No.

11,645; "Under our patent laws," says Judge Story, "No person, who is

not at once the first, as well as the original, inventor, by whom the in-

vention has been perfected and put into actual use, is entitled to a patent.

A subsequent inventor, although an original inventor, is not entitled to

any patent." Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U; S. 347, 350.

This question of povelty does not come up at the time of
application and issue of a patent, except as prior ·knowledge
is . s.h own - by other applications and already issued patents.
These are all that is of record in the Patent Office. New applications are compared with this record, and if anticipation
is clear a patent may be refused. .But the office can not go
outside of this record to look for prior knowledge. The patent
when issued indicates, therefore, . nothing whatever as to the
patentable novelty of the in.vention, except in respect to other
patents issued in this country. Even in this respect it indicates but little since the benefit of the doubt is given to an
applicant when his device is at least superficially different from
anything theretofore patented.
Whether a production which is new t~ the creator himself
is properly to be called "invention" need not be here discussed.
It is possible that in correct definition, "invention" includes
the element of novelty as to all human knowledge. If this be
true, to spe~ of a new invention is .redundant, and an invention which is lacking in novelty is not an invention. But in
ordinary parlance both of courts and of laymen, invention is
applied to those productions which the J!fodm:er -thinks .a e
new, whether they .are actually of such novelty as to be
patentable or not. The statute itself is either unreasonably redundant or else is framed upon this usage; it reads "one who
has invented . . . any new . . . art, machine . . . not known
or used by others." The reports are replete with references
to "inventions" which are not patentable for lack of novelty. 64
The fact that a device can not be patented unless it is new
to the public, being accepted, the question at once arises, in
each case, whether the particular device is new or old.
world, in a patent or a printed publication, a full description of the very
combination · over which they have been puzzling; but in such cases the
ac.t, none the less, refuses them a patent."
64
Reed v. Cutter, I Story 590. 2 Robb. Pat. Cas. 81, Fed. Cas. No.
II,645; "Under our patent law ," says Judge Story, "No person, who is
not at once the first, as welt as the original, inventor, by whom the invention has been perfected and put into actual use, is entitled to a patent.
A subsequent inventor, although an original inventor, is not entitled to
any patent." Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 u~ S. 347, · 350.
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The great bulk of litigation under the patent law has
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arisen out of this question. In mere terminology the question

sometimes takes the form of whether there is "novelty" in the

The great bulk of litigation under the patent law has
arisen out of this question. In mere terminology the question
sometimes takes the fo.r m of whether there is "novelty" in the
"invention," and sometimes whether the concept under consideration is really an "invention" or not. Properly ·speaking, whether it is "invention" should relate only to whether
or not it is such a creation of the mind as comes within the
legal meaning of "invention." Whether it is so new to the
public as to be patentable should come under the 'question of
"novelty~"
Nevertheless, both text-writers and courts often
discuss the matter of novelty of the idea as though it were
a matter of "invention." In a sense this is logical and arises
thus ;-the courts have consistently held that an alleged inventor must be presumed, legally, to have had knowledge of
everything similar to his own production,. whether he actually
had such knowledge or not. 65 This being the case, a production which is not new to the ublic is not new, in legal con- .
struction, even to the producer, and therefore can not be "invention" even as to him. It is absolutely impossible to allocate, upon a reasonable basis o.f distinction, those cases which
say that a particular device is not patentable because it is "not
new," and those. which refuse patentability on the ground that
it is "not invention" because not sufficiently unlike contrivances already known to s0ciety. Except for the form of expression used, however, the inquiry is precisely the same in
either class of cases, and the methods of solution are substantially identical. In .this analysis therefore, the issue will
be considered, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, as one
of invention or non-invention, on the principle that the alleged
inventor is presumed to have had knowledge of all existing
idea and therefore a production which is not "new ' could
not have been created by the mind of the person subsequently
claiming it. 66

"invention," and sometimes whether the concept under con-

sideration is really an "invention" or not. Properly speak-

ing, whether it is "invention" should relate only to whether

or not it is such a creation of the mind as comes within the

legal meaning of "invention." Whether it is so new to the

public as to be patentable should come under the question of

"novelty." Nevertheless, both text-writers and courts often

discuss the matter of novelty of the idea as though it were

a matter of "invention." In a sense this is logical and arises

thus; the courts have consistently held that an alleged in-

ventor must be presumed, legally, to have had knowledge of

everything similar to his own production, whether he actually

had such knowledge or not. 65 This being the case, a produc-

tion which is not new to the public is not new, in legal con-

struction, even to the producer, and therefore can not be "in-

vention" even as to him. It is absolutely impossible to allo-
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cate, upon a reasonable basis of distinction, those cases which

say that a particular device is not patentable because it is "not

new," and those, which refuse patentability on the ground that

it is "not invention" because not sufficiently unlike contriv-

ances already known to society. Except for the form of ex-

pression used, however, the inquiry is precisely the same in

either class of cases, and the methods of solution are sub-

stantially identical. In this analysis therefore, the issue will

be considered, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, as one

of invention or non-invention, on the principle that the alleged

inventor is presumed to have had knowledge of all existing

ideas and therefore a production which is not "new" could

not have been created by the mind of the person subsequently

claiming it. 66

65 Daylight Glass Mfg. Co. v. American Prismatic Glass Co., 142 Fed.

454; Foot v. Silsby, 2 Blatch. 260, 268.

66 The precision and extent of knowledge which will suffice to pre-

clude a production from being an invention and the amount of proof of

such knowledge which is necessary are discussed later.

65

Daylight Glass Mfg. Co. v. American Prismatic Glass Co., 142 Fed.
454; Fo t v. Silsby, 2 Blatch. 26o, 268.
6 The precision and extent of ~_nowledge which will suffice to preclude a production from being an invention and the amount of proof of
uch knowledge which is nece sary are discussed fater.
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It should be repeated here, however, that there is a real dis-

tinction between the act of "invention'' and certain other acts

such as "discovery" or "importation,'' and that the latter are

not patentable however "novel" they may be. It is only novel

inventions that the patent statute protects, and therefore it

seems more satisfactory to discuss the matter of novelty under

the term "invention" than under "novelty." There is less

chance for forgetfulness that "novelty" alone is not sufficient.

If the fact of invention depended upon the mere visible form

or manifestation of an art, machine, manufacture or com-

position of matter, the inquiry as to whether a production were

invention would involve simply the determination of identity

or non-identity of its form with the form of anything which

had already existed. But invention, as interpreted by the

courts, requires a creation by mental act, a new idea as well

as a new substantial and perceptible form. It follows there-

fore that the substantial

tically identical, vet the later one mav_he invention because it

involves a new concept, idea, principle, or whatsoever it may
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he called. " There is something new actually presented to the

public although tangibly embodied in an old form. Thus, a

device may be a new idea of means, because the purpose is

new, although the physical means is old. 67

On the other hand a device may be, in tangible "form, dif-

ferent from anything which had ever existed, but yet not be an

invention because its production involved no new concept or

idea of means sufficiently different from that of the first de-

vice to constitute invention. 678 We shall discuss this latter

condition first.

67 Such was the invention involved in Leroy v. Tatham, 22 How. 132,

The patent was sustained although the actual tangible form of the device

had existed in other usages before. Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597.

See also cases under new use for old device.

G7a The determination of this question is obviously a mental conclusion ;

in a sense, it is a question of fact. As a rule, however, it is not left to

j'uries to determine but is decided by the court itself. Courts sitting in

equity, may, of course, decide questions of fact themselves, but there is

no lack of judicial statement to the effect that when the trial is at law the

question should be submitted to the jury. Winans v. N. Y., etc. R. R.

37

It should be repeated here, however, that t~ere is a real distinction between the act of invention' and certain other acts
such as "discovery' or 'importation, ' and that the latter are
not patentable however "novel' they may be. It is only novel .
inventions that the patent statute protects, and therefore it
eems more satisfactory to discuss the matter of novelty under
the term ·" invention' than under 'novelty." There is less
chance for forgetfulness that "novelty" alone is not sufficient.
If the fact of inven_tion depended-upon the mere visible form
or manifestation of an art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, the inquiry as to whether a production were
invention would involve simply the determination of identity
or non-identity of its form with the form of anything which .
had already existed. But invention, as interpreted by the
courts, requires a creation by mental act, a new idea as well
as a new substantial and perceptible form. It follows therefore that the sub~s~ta~n~t~ia~l_f~ollrllJ.....Q.l~~~~~~ta,~@c-1~
tically identical et the later one ma be inve.-n...t., .·,. , .....,._.......,......,,;..::._
a new conce t, idea principle ·. or what oever it may
e . There is something new actually presented to the
pu he although tangibly embodied in an old form. Thus, a
device may be a new idea of means because the purpose is
new, although. the physical means is old. 67
On the other hand a device may be, in tangible 'form, different from .anything which had ever existed, but yet not be an
invention because its production involved no new concept or
idea of means sufficiently different from that of the first device to constitute invention. 67 a We shall discuss this latter
condition first.
67

Such was the invention involved in Leroy v. Tatham, 22 How. 132,
The patent was sustained although the actual tangible form of the device
had existed in other usages before. Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597.
See also cases under new use for old device.
678
The determination of this question is obviously a mental conclusion;
in a sense, it is a question of fact. As a rule, however, it is not left to
juries to determine but is decided by the court itself. Courts sitting in
equity, may, of course, decide questions of fact themselves, but there is
no lack of judicial statement to the effect that when the trial is at law the·
question should be submitted to the ju°j)y. \.Vinans v. N. Y., etc. R. R.
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Assuming, then, that the tangible form of a concept is un-
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like any form already known, is the concept itself sufficiently

different from anything else to be an invention? The answer

is not the ascertainment of a sensible fact ; it is wholly a mental

conclusion, deduced from the perceptible facts.

Whether this new idea, this novelty of concept, is present or

not, depends upon all the circumstances of each particular case.

There are no rules for determining it, in the sense that there

are rules for deciding issues in the common law. Such pre-

cision as is necessary to a rule is precluded by the fact that in

the nature of the subject no case can arise wherein the facts

are the same as those of a precedent case.

In ordinary processes of society and of individuals, the es-

sential circumstances are recurrently similar in many in-

stances. A man buying a suit of clothes on credit from a de-

partment store is very apt to do it under precisely the same

overt circumstances as the ten or the hundred men preceding

him have done. And, in consquence, it may fairly be said that,

he and his salesman had the same constructive intent in re-
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gard to the passing of title as did the buyers and sellers pre-

ceding. Proceeding to wider analogies, it is not illogical to

say that the buyer of clothes on credit has the same presump-

tive intent as to the passing of title as the buyer of furniture.

There is in all such cases a usual similarity of observable ex-

ternal circumstances. It is possible, also, by a long line of de-

cisions to give to words that may be commonly used a perfect-

ly definite legal meaning.

But where patents are concerned, the very nature of the

subject itself precludes similarity, and consequently eliminates

any possibility of definite standards. When a device whose

patentability is asserted is physically like a preceding device

there is usually no case for the court. The fact of exact iden-

tity, which is in such case apparent to any observer, obviates

any pretense of invention. On the other hand, a mere visible

difference between two devices does not ipso facto denote the

Co., 21 How. 88, "There was in fact but one question to be decided by

the court, viz.: the construction of the patent; the question of novelty

being the fact to be passed on by the jury." Jackson v. Allen, 120 Mass. 64.

suming, then that the tangible form of a concept is unlike any form already known, is the concept itself sufficiently
different from anything else to be an invention? The answer
is not the ascertainment of a sensible fact; it is wholly a mental
conclusion, deduced from the perceptible facts.
Whether this new idea, this novelty of concept, is present or
not, depend upon all the circumstances of each particular case.
There are no rules for determining it, in the sense that there
are rules for deciding issues in the common law. Such pre·cision as is necessary to a rule is precluded by the fact that in
the nature of the subject no case can arise wherein the facts
are the same as those of a precedent case.
In ordinary processes of society and of individuals, the essential circumstances are recurrently similar in many instances. A man buying a suit of doth es on credi_t from a department store is very apt to do it under precisely the same
overt circumstances as the ten or the hundred men preceding
hiin have do~e. And, in consquence, it may fairly be said that
he and his salesman had the same constructive intent in regard to the passing of title as did the buyers and sellers preceding. Proceeding to wider analogies, it is not illogical to
say that the buyer of clothes on credit has the same presumptive intent as to the passing of titl~ as the buyer of furniture.
There is in all such cases a usual similarity of observable external circumstances. It is possible, also, by a long line of decisions to give to words that may be commonly used a perfectly definite legal_meaning.
But where patents are concerned, the very nature of the
subject itself precludes similarity, and consequently eliminates
any possibility of definite standards. When a device whose
patentability is asserted is physically like a preceding device
there is usually no case for the court. The fact of exact identity,. which is in uch case apparent to any observer, obviates
any preten e of invention. On the other hand, a mere visible
difference between two device does not ipso facto denote the
Co., 21
ow. 88, "There was in fact but one question to be decided by
the court, viz.: the con truction of the patent; the question of novelty
bein the fact to be passed on by the ju y." Jack on v. Allen, 120 Mass. 64.

Characteristics of Invention 39

Characteristics of Invention

presence of invention. Whether it does actually denote inven-

39

tion is the issue to be decided. Broadly speaking, this issue,

and othersofjhejDatent law, can not e determined by a mere

comparison of those facts which are cognizable by the senses.

The decision must come from the operation of the mind upon

these observed facts. It is the conclusion of the particular

judge, in each case, whether the alleged invention is really a

new creation or merely a natural and normal modification of

existing ideas.

Sometimes where the observed facts are essentially the same

in many instances, the operation of a normal mind upon them

will produce the same conclusion that preceding normal minds

reached. Consequently, the conclusion which other minds

have arrived at, from approximately the same external facts

which now face a judge, may properly be considered by him in

reaching his own judicial conclusion. So it is possible to com-

pile a line of court decisions whose weight is of controlling

influence in a later case where a judicial conclusion is to be

reached upon facts that are essentially similar to those in the
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collected precedents.

But in patent law there can not be this requisite similarity

of external facts. The facts appreciable by the senses are the

concrete, and usually material, elements of the concept. Al-

ways they must be essentially different from the elements of

the devices which have preceded them or there is no case at

all.- The abstract similarity or dissimilarity of the whole to

something else, the legal likeness or difference, is purely a

conclusion of the mind from these always variant external

stimuli. As the visible, sensible, facts are always different it

follows that the conclusion of another mind in another case

can furnish no logical influence upon the decision to be made

and it is not only impossible to lay down rules for decision, as

in other branches of the law, but absurd to try. 68 As Mr.

Justice Story said long ago, 69 "The doctrine of patents may

truly be said to constitute the metaphysics of the law."

68 Marshall v. Wirt, 232 Fed. 603, each decision is a question of fact, and

stands on its own bottom.

69 Barrett v. Hall, i Mason 447, 471.

co
n
The decision must come from the operation of the min upan
these observed facts. It is the conclusiJ:m of the particular
judge, in each .case, whether the alleged invention is really a
new creation or merely. a natural and normal modification of
existing ideas.
Sometimes where the observed facts are essentially the same
in many instances, the operation of a normal mind upon them
will produce the same conclusion that preceding normal minds
reached. Consequently, the conclusion which other minds
have arrived at, from approximately the same ex ternal facts
. which now face a judge, may properly be con sidered by him in
reaching his own judicial conclusion. So it is possible to compile a line of court decisions whose weight is of controlling
influence in a later case where a judicial conclusion is to be
reached upon facts that are essentially similar to those in the
collected precedents.
But in patent law there can not be this requisite similarity
of external facts. The facts appreciable by the senses are the
concrete, and usually material, elements of the concept. Always they must be essentially different from the elements of
the devices which have preceded them or there is no case at
alL The abstract similarity or dissimilarity of the whole to
something else, the legal likeness or difference, is purely a
conclusion of the mind from these always variant external
stimuli. As the visible, sensible, facts are always different it
follows that the conclusion of another mind in another case
can furnish no logical influence upon the decision to be made
and it is not. only. impossible to lay down rules for decision, as
in other branches of the law, but absurd to try. 68 As Mr.
Justice Story said long ago, 69 "The doctrine of patents may ·
truly be said to constitute· the metaphysics of the law."
6

Marshall v. Wirt, 232 Fed. 6o3, each decision is a question of fact, and
stands on its own bottom.
·
· 69 Barrett v. Hall, I Mason 447, 471.
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To some slight advantage, however, decisions in regard to

the presence or absence of invention can be grouped according

To some slight advantage, however, decisions in regard to
the presence or absence of invention can be grouped according
to the particular tangible f ea tu re which distinguishes the device involved from other device . And to the extent that the
judicial opinions repeatedly refer to some characteristic circumstance as strongly indicating invention, or as negativing it, it
can be broadly laid down as a rule, though not an invariable
one, that the presence of such feature . indicates invention, or
otherwise. It may be said, however, that these "rules" have
been customarily restricted to the negative position that such
or such a feature does not indicate invention.
The great disadvantage of thus attempting to group decisions into even the least force£ ul or obligatory of "rules" is
that it tends to perpetuate the pernicious idea that certain concepts can not intrinsically be invention, regardless of their ·
novelty. We have seen that some things which are novel,
such as discoveries and importations, are not inventions, and
can not be patentable, as such, but that is because those things
are not creations of the mind. This proposition seems to con£use itself at times with the so called rules that certain characteristics do not usually denote sufficient mental genius to be
worth the name of invention, and the result is the anomalous
and vicious proposition that certain ch.a racteristic mental concepts can not be properly called inventions. Thus it is one
thing to say that the aggregation into a unit of static elements (e.g. the placing of an eraser in one end of a wooden
sheathed lead pencil) is not usually the product of inventive
genius and is therefore not usually invention. But it is quite
another thing to say that such aggregation does not ever indicate inventive genius, and as a matter of law ca.n not be
invention. This latter idea is found in the decisions much less
of ten than it used to be, but it is sometimes· fou~d, most obn xiou ly, in the Patent Office it elf and among young practitioners, trained by text-books and ledures in which it has
b en laid down a a real rule, that · certain mental creations,
uch as the concept of a particular aggregation, or of a subtituted material can not be con idered as inventions. It is
th ref re repeated most emphatically that the cases here

to the particular tangible feature which distinguishes the de-

vice involved from other devices. And to the extent that the

judicial opinions repeatedly refer to some characteristic circum-

stance as strongly indicating invention, or as negativing it, it

can be broadly laid down as a rule, though not an invariable

one, that the presence of such feature indicates invention, or

otherwise. It may be said, however, that these "rules" have

been customarily restricted to the negative position that such

or such a feature does not indicate invention.

The great disadvantage of thus attempting to group decis-

ions into even the least forceful or obligatory of "rules" is

that it tends to perpetuate the pernicious idea that certain con-

cepts can not intrinsically be invention, regardless of their

novelty. We have seen that some things which are novel,

such as discoveries and importations, are not inventions, and

can not be patentable, as such, but that is because those things

are not creations of the mind. This proposition seems to con-
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fuse itself at times with the so called rules that certain char-

acteristics do not usually denote sufficient mental genius to be

worth the name of invention, and the result is the anomalous

and vicious proposition that certain characteristic mental con-

cepts can not be properly called inventions. Thus it is one

thing to say that the aggregation into a unit of static ele-

ments (e.g. the placing of an eraser in one end of a wooden

sheathed lead pencil) is not usually the product of inventive

genius and is therefore not usually invention. But it is quite

another thing to say that such aggregation does not ever indi-

cate inventive genius, and, as a matter of law, can not be

invention. This latter idea is found in the decisions much less

often than it used to be, but it is sometimes 'found, most ob-

noxiously, in the Patent Office itself, and among young prac-

titioners, trained by text-books and lectures in which it has

been laid down as a real rule, that certain mental creations,

such as the concept of a particular aggregation, or of a sub-

stituted material, can not be considered as inventions. It is

therefore repeated most emphatically that the cases here
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grouped do not stand for rules that certain concepts are not

invention, but only illustrate concepts which courts have said,

in a number of particular and striking instances, did not in

those cases reveal invention.

The number of these groups or rules depends upon the

judgment of the particular classifier. One text-book of con-

siderable note 70 refers to twelve rules, another 71 to thirty-two.

The difference lies in the number of instances which each

author considered necessary before a rule could be deduced.

Of the thirty-two "rules" of Hopkins' text, some are deduced

as rules from the existence of but a single decision in which the

particular distinguishing feature was held not to indicate in-

vention. The only authority apparently needed for citing such a

decision as a "rule" is, to some minds, the fact that a court has

declared as its own generalization that the particular feature

involved does not constitute invention. If the mere statement

of the court that a particular feature never indicates, or gen-

erally cannot indicate, invention, may be taken as a "rule",

the number of rules possible is naturally greater than if they
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be deduced from a consistency of actual decisions. Only the

more generally accepted "rules" will be given here.

Excellence of workmen ?&// H r ^ nn " 1a *H " n t t n An**>

sufficient mental creation to constitute invention. Therefore

a particular manufacture, as such, is not patentably distin-

guished from others-of the same type merely because it is bet-

ter made. The art of making it, or the machinery by which

it is made might be patented under proper circumstances, but

the manufacture itself, {/ considered apart from the way it is

made is not patentable. It might be said, that the fact of bet-

ter workmanship is not in itself patentable. 72 But it is not im-

70 Walker.

71 Hopkins.

72 Risdon Locomotive Wks. v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, 80. "In short this

is a patent only for superior workmanship, and within all the authorities

is invalid. This court has repeatedly stated that all improvement is not

invention. If a certain device differs from what precedes it only in su-

periority of finish or in greater accuracy of detail, it is but the carrying

forward of an old idea and does not amount to invention. Thus, if it

has been customary to make an article of unpolished metal, it does not

grouped do not stand for rules that certain concepts are not
invention but only illustrate concepts which courts have said,
in a number of particular and striking instances, did not in
those cases reveal invention.
The number of these groups or rules depends upon the
judgment of the particular classifier. One text-book of considerable note70 refers to twelve rules, another 71 to thirty-two.
The difference lies in the number of instances· which each
author considered necessary before a rule could be deduced.
Of the thirty-two "rules" of Hopkins' text, ·some are deduced
as rules from the existence of but .a single decision in which the
particular distinguishing feature was held not to indicate invention. The .only authority apparently needed for citing such a
decision as a "rule;' is, to some minds, the fact that a cot.~rt has
declared as its own generalization that the particular feature
involved does not constitute invention. If the mere statement
of the court that a particular f ea tu re never indicates, oc generally cannot indicate, invention, may be taken as a "rule",
the number of rules possible is naturally greater than if they
be deduced from a consistency of .actual decisions. Only the
more generally accepted "rules" _will be given here.
orkmansh·
ettm-ttl'Ct'll'tftt-elf@;WOU to constitute inven ti on.
a particular manufacture, as such, is not patentably distinguished from others . of the same type merely because it is better made. The art of making it, or the machinery by which
it is made might be patented under proper circumstances, but
the manufacture itself, if considered apart from the way it is
made is not patentable. It might be said, that the fact of better workmanship is not in itself patentable. 7 2 But it is not imWalker.
Hopkins.
72
Risdon Locomotive Wks. v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, Bo. "In short this
is a pate"nt only for superior workmanship, and within all the authorities
is invalid. This •c ourt has repeatedly stated that all improvement is not
invention. If a certain device differs from what precedes it only in superiority of fi.~ish or in greater accuracy of detail, it is but · the carrying
forward of an old idea and does not amount to invention. Thus, if it
has been customary to make an article of unpolished metal, it does not
70

71
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possible that the fact of better workmanship might come from

some underlying idea that is itself an invention.

pos ible that the fact of better workmanship might come from
some underlying idea that is itself an invention.
Change arising froni the us~ of b tter or more desirable ma- ·
t ·azs 1 not normally treated as showing invention. Thu in
Hicks v. Kelsey, 73 the validity of a patent for a particular form
of "wagon reach," (the shaft connecting the front and rear
axles of a ·wagon), ·was in question. Ordinarily thi haft is
curved in such a way as to allo~ the front wheel to pass under
it when cramped for a turn. 'B efore the patentee change,
reaches had been made of wood with a strap, or straps, of iron
fastened along either ·side of the curved part. The patentee
conceived the idea of omitting the wood at the curve and bolting the iron straps together. By this means the shaft became
less bulky at the curve though in all other respects and purposes it remained the same. The court held the patent invalid,
saying, "The question is whether the mere chan ·e of material
-makina the curve of iron instead of wood and iron-was a
sufficient change to constitute invention; the purpose being the
same, the means of accomplishing it being the same, and the
form of the rea.ch and mode of operation being tl1e same. It
is certainly difficult to bring the case within any recognized
rule of novelty by which the patent can be sustained. The use
of one material instead of another in constructing a known

Change arising from the iise\Q.f beJi^m^moxz-dcsirablc ma-

tc^ials^not normally treated as showing invention. Thus in

Hicks v. Kelsey, 73 the validity of a patent for a particular form

of " wagon reach," (the shaft connecting the front and rear

axles of a wagon), was in question. Ordinarily this shaft is

curved in such a way as to allow the front wheel to pass under

it when cramped for a turn. Before the patentee's change,

reaches had been made of wood with a strap, or straps, of iron

fastened along either side of the curved part. The patentee

conceived the idea of omitting the wood at the curve and bolt-

ing the iron straps together. By this means the shaft became

less bulky at the curve though in all other respects and pur-

poses it remained the same. The court held the patent invalid,

saying, "The question is. whether the mere change of material

making the curve of iron instead of wood and iron was a

sufficient change to constitute invention; the purpose 1)eing the

same, the means of accomplishing it being the same, and the
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form of the reach and mode of operation being the same. It

is certainly difficult to bring the case within any recognized

rule of novelty by which the patent can be sustained. The use

of one material instead of another in constructing a known

involve invention to polish it. If a telescope has been made with a

certain degree of power, it involves no invention to make one which dif-

fers from the other only in its having greater power. If boards had

heretofore been planed by hand, a board better planed by machinery

would not be patentable, although in all these cases the machinery itself

would be patentable." (It should be noted, however, that a manufacture is

often identified not by its physical appearance but by its method of manu-

facture). International Tooth Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U. S. 55, 64.

"It is hardly necessary to say that it is no invention, within the meaning

of the law, to perform with increased speed a series of surgical oper-

ations old in themselves, and in the order in which they were before per-

formed. With what celerity these successive operations shall be per-

formed depends entirely upon the judgment and skill of the operator, and

does not involve any question of novelty which would entitle him to a

patent therefor." Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, n<); Edison v. Ameri-

involve invention to polish it. If a telescope has been made with a
certain degree of power, it involves no invention to make one which differs from the other only in its having greater power. If boards had
heretofore been planed by hand, a board better· planed by machinery
would not be patentable, although in all these case the machinery itself
would be patentable." (It should be noted, however, that a manufacture is
often identified not by its physical appearance but by its method of manufacture). Intern_ational Tooth Crown Co. v. Gaylord, 140 U. S. 55, 64.
"It is hardly nece ary to say that it is no invention, within the meaninoof the law, to perform with increased speed a eries of surgkal operations old in themselves, and in the order in which they were before p rformed. With what c lerity the e ucce sive operations shall be performed depend entirely upon the j ud menl and kill of the operator, and
doe not involve any que lion f nov lty which would entitle him to a
patent ther for." Smith v. Nich 1 , 21 Wall. 112, II~); Edison v. American Muto cop Co., l 14 Fed. 926, 935.
73 i8 Wall. 670.

can Mutoscope Co., 114 Fed. 926, 935.

73 18 Wall. 670.
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machine is, in most cases, so obviously a matter of mere me-

chanical judgment, and not of invention, that it cannot be

called an invention, unless some new and useful result, an in-

crease of efficiency, or a decided saving in the operation, is

clearly attained. Some evidence was given to show that the

wagon-reach of the plaintiff is a better reach, requiring less

repair, and having greater solidity than the wooden reach.

But it is not sufficient to bring the case out of the category of

more or less excellence of construction, ^^^^fhi 1 ^ * s the

same. Axe-helves made of hickory may be more durable and

more cheap in the end than those made of beech or pine, but

the first application of hickory to the purpose would not be,

therefore, patentable." 74

Mere enlargement has been helcjjnot to indicate the mental

creation neoessary to invention. 75

74 It should be noted that express exception is made if by the sub-

stitution of materials "some new and useful result" is produced. Hotch-

kiss v. Greenwood, n How. 248. In this case it was urged that it should

have been left to the jury to say whether or not the change of materials
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amounted to invention, but the court held as a matter of law that if the

change required no more skill than was required by an ordinary mechanic

there was no invention involved in making it. "The difference is formal,

43

machine is, in most cases, so obviously a matter of mere mechanical judgment, and not of invention, that it · cannot be
called an invention, unless some new and useful result, an increase of efficiency, or a decided saving . in the operation, is
clearly attained. Some evidence was given to show that the
wagon-reach of the plaintiff is a better reach, requiring less
repair, and having greater solidity than the wooden reach.
But it is not sufficient to bring the case out of the category of
more · or less excellence of construction.
he machine is the
same. Axe-helves made of hickory may be more durable and
more cheap in the end than those made of beech or pine, but
the first application of hickory to the purpose would not be,
therefore patentahle." 74
Mere enlar ement has been hel not to indicate the1mental

and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judg-

ment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the

manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, -but nothing

more." New York Belting & P. Co. v. Sierer, 149 Fed. 756; Crouch v.

Roemer, 103 U. S. 797; Guidet v. Brooklyn, 105 U. S. 550; Cf. Smith v.

Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486.

75 Phillips v. Page, 24 How. 164; Planing Machine Co. v. Keith, 101

U. S. 479 ; "The appellant contends that the Anson machine fails to be

an anticipation of the Woodbury invention, because, as they say, it has no

solid bed. It plainly has, however, a solid bed, adequate for the pur-

poses for which the machine was intended and used, for cutting, and

planing light material, sash, and blinds, and the bed is sufficiently solid

for such uses. It may be admitted it would be too weak for general

planing work upon boards or plank. It is comparatively a small machine.

It would not cease to be the same machine, in principle, if any one or

all of its constituents were enlarged or strengthened, so that it might

perform heavier work. True, the bed is divided by a slit running long-

itudinally from one end to the other; but the two parts are arranged so

as to constitute one bed, and is is not perceived why, if enlarged, it

would not answer all the purposes of the Woodbury machine. Mere en-

It should be noted that expre s exception is made if by the substitution of materials "some new and useful result". is produced. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, I I How. 248. In this case it was urged that it should
have been left to the jury to say whether or not the change of materials
amounted to invention, but the court held as a matter of law that if the
change required no more skill than was required by an ordinary mechanic
there was no invention involved in making it. "The difference is formal,
and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of j udgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the
manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, ·but nothing
more." New York Belting & P. Co. v. Sierer, 149 Fed. 756; Crouch v.
Roemer, 103 U. S. 797; Guidet v. Brooklyn, 105 U. S. 550; Cf. Smith v.
Goodyear . Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486.
75 Phillips v. ·page, 24 How. 164; Planing Machine Co. v. Keith, 101
U. S. 479; "The appellant contends that the Anson machine fails to be
an anticipation of the Woodbury invention, because, as they say, it has no
solid bed. . It plainly has, however, a solid bed, adequate for the purposes for whieh the machine was intended and used,-for cutting, and
planing light material, sash, and blinds, and the bed is sufficiently solid
for such u es. It may be admitted it would be too weak for general
planing work upon boards or plank. It is comparatively a small machine.
It would not cease to be the same machine, in principle, if any one or
all of its constituents were enlarged or strengthened, so that it might
perform heavier work. True, the bed is divided by a slit running longitudinally . from one end to the other; but the two part are arranged so
as to constitute one bed, and is i · not perceived why, if enlarged, it
would not answer all the purposes of the Woodbury machine. Mere en74
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d u plication of barts has not normally shown inven-

tion. In one case 76 involving a patent for the combination, in

44

a tobacco curer, of two sets of furnaces of different capacities

the court said, "But surely there can be no invention in this!

Where one stove is found to be unequal to the heating of a

room, to put another beside it, even though smaller, requires

no invention. And if at the time of the issue of plaintiff's

patent there was in use for curing tobacco, or anything else,

single furnaces, with flues entering a common flue with a re-

turn flue to the chimney, it is nol -a paientable combination to

"*"^^^^^^*^^^fc

put two furnaces side by side to accomplish the same purpose,

even though one be smaller than the other. The^laintiff s

combination produces no new result. It works in no different

manner. It is a mere colorable variation from the old method

of building furnaces, required no exercise of the inventive

faculty, and is not patentable." 77

But this rule like all the others is not absolute; it does not

largement is not invention. The simplest mechanic can make such a
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modification. Woodbury's patent claims no particular form of a bed.

It does not require the bed to be of any specified thickness, or constructed

in one piece. Its purpose is to furnish a firm and unyielding support to

the material when passing under the cutter, and that may be done as

well by constructing the bed of two parts as of one. An anvil composed

of two pieces is not the less an anvil, a solid block to resist the blows of

a hammer. A solid foundation of a house may be composed of more than

one stone. We cannot but think this objection to the Anson machine as

an anticipating device is entitled to no weight." Am. Road Machine Co.

v. Pennock & Co., 164 U. S. 26; American Well Works v. Austin Mfg.

Co., 98 Fed. 992, dictum.

76 Millner v. Voss & Co., 4 Hughes 262.

77 In Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187, it was held that the use, on a

circular saw, of two deflecting plates was not invention because of the

fact that the use of one had long been known. "Grant that 2 such plates

are in certain cases better than one used alone, still the question arises

whether it involves any invention to add the second plate to a machine al-

ready constructed with one plate. Beyond doubt, every operator who

had used a machine having one deflecting plate knew full well what the

function was that the deflecting plate was designed to accomplish, and

the reasons for placing it at the side of the saw are obvious to the un-

derstanding of every one who ever witnessed the operation of a circu-

lar saw. Ordinary mechanics know how to use bolts, rivets, and screws,

and it is obvious that any one knowing how to use such devices would

M

u. lica:tion o
ts has not nor ally shown inven76
tion. In one case inv·olvirig a patent fo-r the combination, in
a tobacco curer, of two sets of furnaces of different capacities
the court said, "But surely there can be no invention in this!
Where one stove is found to be unequal to the heating of a
room, to put another beside it, even thqugh smaller, requires
no invention. And if at the time of the issue of plaintiffs
patent there was in use for curing tobacco, or anything else,
single furnaces, with flues entering a common flue with a return flue to the chimn~y, it is
ntable combinatiqn to
put t
furnaces ide by side to accomplish the same p pose,
even thou h one b , smaller than the other. Th
laintiff's
com ination produces no new result. It works in no differe.n t
manner.
is a mere colorable variation from the old method
of building furnaces, required no exercise of the inventive
faculty, and is not patentable. " 77
·
But this rule like all the others is not absolute; it does not
largement is not invention. The simplest mechanic can make such a
modification. Woodbury's patent claims no particular form of a bed.
It does not require the bed to be of any specified thickness, or cops~ructed
in one piece. I ts purpose is to furnish a firm and unyielding support to
the material when passing under the cutter, and that may be done as
well by constructing the bed of two parts as of one. An anvjl composed
of two pieces is not the less an anvil, a solid block to resist the blows of
a hammer. A solid foundation of a house may be composed of more than
one stone. We cannot but think this objection to the Anson machine ~s
an anticipating device is entitled to no weight." Am. Road Machine Co.
v. Pennock & Co., 164 U. S. ~6; American Well Works v. Austin Mfg.
Co., 98 Fed. 992, dictum.
7 6Millner v. Vos.s & Co., 4 Hugh es 262.
77 In Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187, it was held that the use, on a
circular saw, of two deflecting plates was not invention because of the
fact that the use of one had long been known. "Grant that 2 such plates
are in certain C!lS s better than one used alone, still the question arises
whether it involves any invention to add the second plate to a machine already constructed with one plate. Beyond doubt, evrry operator who
had u ed a machine having one deflecting plate knew full well what the
function was that the deflecting plate was designed to accomplish, and
the rea on for placing it at the side of the saw are obvious to the understanding of every one who ever witnessed the operation of a cirreu1ar saw. Ordinary mechanics knoN how to use bolts, rivets, and screws,
and it is obvious that any one knowing. how to use such devices would
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mean that duplication can not be the result of invention. 78 In

one case where the device was actually only a duplication of

existing ones the court held the patent covering it to be valid,

saying, 79 "It is contended the changes made by Firm were

merely mechanical, and that in reality he but took the presses

which he found standing side by side, and banked them one

upon another, that the change involved was mere reconstruc-

tion, rearrangement, duplication. It is to be noted, however,

that printing-press construction is mechanically a highly-

developed industry. The complex and intricate details of these

great presses; the calls upon them for speed, strength, and

product ; the constant demand upon builders for improvement ;

and the keen rivalry existing among such builders and the

users of the presses, are factors which brought the art to

this high mechanical standard. The very fact that, with all

these stimulating considerations, insuring the most rapid strides

in mechanical advance, no such step as Firm's was taken in

duplex presses, shows that Firm's change was not in the line

of mechanical progress, but in the original, inventive sphere.
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Granted the change consisted in banking one press upon an-

other, yet the two, when so combined, and in their new relation,

so co-acted as to dispense with angle-bars, with a web-de-

know how to arrange a deflecting plate at one side of a circular saw

which had such a device properly arranged on the other side, it being

conceded that both deflecting plates are constructed and arranged pre-

cisely alike, except that one is placed on one side of the saw and the other

on the opposite side. Both are attached to the frame in the same man-

ner; nor is it shown, either in the specification or drawings, that there

is anything peculiar in the means employed for arranging the deflecting

plates at the sides of the saw, or in attaching the same to the frame.

Both are alike, except that the outer end of the one on the same side as

the strengthening plate projects farther from the saw than the inner end,

and that the other is rather smaller in diameter, and that the ends pro-

ject about an equal distance from the saw." Slawson v. Grand St. R. R.

mean that duplication can not be the result of invention. 78 In
one case where the device was actually only a duplication of
existing ones the court held the patent covering it to be valid,
saying, 79 "It is contended the changes made by Firm were
merely mechanical, and that in reality he but took the presses
which he found standing side by side, and banked them one
upon another, that the change involved was mere reconstruction_, rearrangement, duplication. It is to be noted, however,
that printing-press construction is mec amcally
big y,.dev~lopetl industry. The complex and intricate details of these
great presses; the calls upon them for s eed, strength, and
product; the constant demand upon ·builders for impr vement;
and the keen rivalry existing among such builders and the
users of the presses -are factors which brou ht the art to
this high mechanical standard. The very fact that, with all
these st' ulating considerations, insuring the most rapid strides
in mec nical advance, no such step as Firm's was taken in
duple presses, shows that Firm's change was not in the line
of mechanical progre s, but in the original inve.n tive sphere.
Granted the change consisted in banking one press. upon another, yet the two, when so combined, and in their new relation,
so co-acted as to dispense with angle-bars, with a web-de-

Co., 107 U. S. 649; Ferguson v. Roos Mfg. Co., 71 Fed. 416; New De-

parture Ball Co. v. Bevin Bros. Mfg. Co., 73 Fed. 469.

78 Duplication may constitute invention, Parker v. Hulme, i Fish. Pal.

Cases 44 Fed. Cas. No. 10740.

79 Goss Printing Press Co. v. Scott, 108 Fed. 253, 259.

know how to arrange a deflecting plate at one side of a circular saw
which had such a devite · properly arranged on the other side, it being
conceded that both deflecting plates are constructed and arranged precisely alike, except that one is placed on one side of the saw and the other
on the opposite side. Both 'are attached to the frame in the same manner; nor is it shown, either in the specification or drawings, that there
is anything peculiar in the means employed for arranging the defle~ting
plates at the sides of the saw, or in attaching the 's ame to the frame.
Both are alike, except that the outer end o{ the one on the same side as
the strengthening plate projects farther from the saw than the inner end,
and that the other is rather smaller in diameter, and that the ends proje.ct about an equal distance from the saw." Slawson v. Grand St. R. R.
Co., 107 U. S. 649; Fergus'On v. Roos Mfg. Co., 71 Fed. 416; New Departure Ball Co. v. Bevin Bros. Mfg. Co., 73 Fed. 46g.
78 Duplication may constitute invention, Parker v; Hulme, 1 Fish. Pat.
Cases 44 Fed. Cas. No. 10740.
79 Goss Printing Press Co. v. Scott, 108 Fed. 253, 259.
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fleeted course, and made possible a straight-line duplex press.

A single straight-line press in itself was no novelty, so far as

fleeted course, and made possible a straight-line duplex press.
single straight-line pre s in itself was no novelty so far a
the traight-line printing of an individual web is concerned;
but when the product of two such presses were united, it was
irm's device, by placing the
only through angle-bar agency.
two in nevv relations, eliminated the angle-bar, did away with
the tangent-turning webs, and thus secured valuable re ults.
The test in such cases is not whether duplicati n exists, but
whether duplication produces, not mere duplication of pro..:.
duct or function, but a new unitary, ad litional result, and not
the mere aggregate of prior, separate mechanism. The mere
elements of the combination are immaterial. In their individual rela ·ons they may be · old, may be mere duplicate ; but the
test i · ot t e c arac'ter
t e combinin · elements but the
res
rom their ema com · d." Duplication producing a new and a useful result, as it was here produced, may
be patentable. It renders useful what was previou ly useless.
~ga.tion. Merely to gather static elements into juxtaposifio~h eac.h other has been held not to indicate invention.
A case often cited upon this point is that of Reckendorfer v.
Faber. 0 The patent in this case was for the now common
wooden sheathed lead pencil, having an era er somewhat
larger in diameter than the lead, set into a cylindrical hole
in .one end. The court, three justices dissenting, held the
patent to be invalid, saying, "The combination, to be patentable, must produce a different force or effect} or result in the
combined forces or processes, from that given by their separate parts. There must be a new re ult produced by their
union: if not so, it i only an agaregation of separate elements.
n jn tance and an illustration are found in the di c very, that, by the u e of sulphur mixed with in lia-rubber,
the rubber could be vulcanized, and that without this agent
the rubber could not be vulcanized. The combination of th€
o 92 U. S. 347. It has always seemed to the writer that this ca e was

the straight-line printing of an individual web is concerned;

but, when the product of two such presses were united, it was

only through angle-bar agency. Firm's device, by placing the

two in new relations, eliminated the angle-bar, did away with

the tangent-turning webs, and thus secured valuable results.

The test in such cases is not whether duplication exists, but

whether duplication produces, not mere duplication of pro-

duct or function, but a new unitary, additional result, and not

the mere aggregate of prior, separate mechanism. The mere

elements of the combination are immaterial. In their individ-

ual relations they may be old, may be mere duplicates; but the

test isuiot tHeTcharactef 6f the combining elements, but the

result flowing from their being co^frjnH Duplication pfcP*

ducing a new and a useful result, as it was here produced, may

be patentable. It renders useful what was previously useless.

Aggregation. Merely to gather static elements into juxta-

position with each other has been held not to indicate invention.
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A case often cited upon this point is that of Reckendorfer v.

Faber. 80 The patent in this case was for the now common

wooden sheathed lead pencil, having an eraser somewhat

larger in diameter than the lead, set into a cylindrical hole

in one end. The court, three justices dissenting, held the

patent to be invalid, saying, "The combination, to be patenta-

ble, must produce a different force or effect, or result in the

combined forces or processes, from that given by their sepa-

rate parts. There must be a new result produced by their

union : if not so, it is only an aggregation of separate ele-

ments. An instance and an illustration are found in the dis-

covery, that, by the use of sulphur mixed with india-rubber,

the rubber could be vulcanized, and that without this agent

the rubber could not be vulcanized. The combination of the

80 92 U. S. 347. It has always seemed to the writer that this case was

wrongly decided that the collocation into one instrument of these various

elements showed much more inventive genius than many another collection

of interacting elements which has been upheld as invention. The whole

tenor of the case suggests the vision theory, heretofore referred to, that

certain concepts, such as aggregation, can not be considered invention-.

wr ngly decip d-that the collocation into one instrument of these various
lements showed mnch more inv ntiv genius than many another coll ction
of interacting element which ha been upheld as invention. The wh 1
t nor of the ca e ugae ts the vision theory; heretofore referred to, that
certain concept , uch a aggregation, can not be co11 idered inventiom
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two produced a result or an article entirely different from that

before in use. Another illustration may be found in the frame

tw produced a result or an article entirely different from that
before in u e. An ther illustration may be found in the frame
in a saw-mill which advance the log regularly to meet the
aw, and the saw which aws the log; the two co~operate and
are simultaneou in carrying on a continuous sawing. A stemwin lino- watch-key is another instance. The office of the stem
is to hold the watch, or hang the chain to the watch: the office
of the key is to wind it. When the stem is made the key, the
joint duty of holding the chain and winding the watch .is per£ rmed by the same in trument. A doubl~ effect is produced
or a -double duty performed by the combined result. In these
and numerous like cases the parts co-operate in producing the
final effect sometimes simultaneously, sometimes successively.
The re ult comes from the combined effect of the several parts,
not simply from the eparate action of each, and is, therefore,
patentable.. In the ca e e are on id ring, th part claimed
to make a combination are distinct and disconnected. /Not
nly i
re no new result but no joint operation. When the
lead is u ed, it performs the same operat10n an m the same
manner a it would do if there were no rubber at the other
end of the pencil; when the rubber is used, it i in the same
manner and performs the ame duty as if the lead were not in
the same pencil.
pencil is laid down and a rubber is taken
up, the one to write, the other to era e: a pencil is turned over
to erase with, or an eraser is turned over to write with. The
principle is the same in both . instances. It may be more convenient to have the two instruments on one rod than on two.
There may be a security against the absence of the tools of an
artist or mechanic from the fact, that, the greater the number,
the greater the danger of loss. It may be more convenient to
turn over the different end of the. same stick than to lay down
one stick and take up another. This, however, is not invention within the patent law, as the authorities cited fully how.
There is no relation between the instruments in the performance of their several functions, and no reciprocal action, no
part u ed in common. 1

in a saw-mill which advances the log regularly to meet the

saw, and the saw which saws the log; the two co-operate and

are simultaneous in carrying on a continuous sawing. A stem-

winding watch-key is another instance. The office of the stem

is to hold the watch, or hang the chain to the watch : the office

of the key is to wind it. When the stem is made the key, the

joint duty of holding the chain and winding the watch is per-

formed by the same instrument. A double effect is produced

or a double duty performed by the combined result. In these

and numerous like cases the parts co-operate in producing the

final effect sometimes simultaneously, sometimes successively.

The result comes from the combined effect of the several parts,

not simply from the separate action of each, and is, therefore,

patentable. In the.ase~w~are considering, the parts daimed

to make a combination are distinct and disconnected. Not

only is tlierc- no new result, but no joint operation. When the

leacfis used, it performs the same operation and in the same

manner as it would do if there were no rubber at the other
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end of the pencil; when the rubber is used, it is in the same

manner and performs the same duty as if the lead were not in

the same pencil. A pencil is laid down and a rubber is taken

up, the one to write, the other to erase : a pencil is turned over

to erase with, or an eraser is turned over to write with. The

principle is the same in both instances. It may be more con-

venient to have the two instruments on one rod than on two.

There may be a security against the absence of the tools of an

artist or mechanic from the fact, that, the greater the number,

the greater the danger of loss. It may be more convenient to

turn over the different ends of the, same stick than to lay down

one stick and take up another. This, however, is not inven-

tion within the patent law, as the authorities cited fully show.

There is no relation between the instruments in the perform-

ance of their several functions, and no reciprocal action, no

parts used in common." 81

81 Ace. Thacker Heating Co. v. Burtis, 121 U. S. 286. Here the patentee

had combined a fuel reservoir which was well known with a particular

1

Acc. Thacker Heating Co. v . . Burti , 121 U. S. 286. Here the patentee
ha<l combined a fuel reservoir which was welt known with a particular
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But, after all, practically every device involves juxtaposition
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of elements. A machine is an aggregation of wheels, shafts,

levers, etc. A patentable wash board is a juxtaposition of

wood and zinc parts; and so the list might run unendingly.

The statement that juxtaposition does not constitute invention

is therefore only possible of those groupings in which, as in

the Reckendorfer pencil, each element remains individual, in

proximity and connection with other elements which also re-

tain their identity. This is called aggregation, as distinct from

those combinations of elements which form a patentable de-

vice. 82 The distinction is often expressed by saying, as in the

Reckendorfer case, "The combination to be patentable must

produce a different force or effect, or result in the combined

forces or processes, from that given by their separate parts.

There must be a new result produced by their union ; if not so,

it is only an aggregation of separate elements." The same

idea is expressed in Hailes v. Van Wormer., 83 where the court

says : "It must be conceded that a new combination, if it pro-

duces new and useful results, is patentable, though all the con-
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stituents of the combination w r ere well known and in common

use before the combination was made. But the results must

be a product of the combination, and not a mere aggregate of

several results each the complete product of one of the com-

bined elements. Combined results are not necessarily a novel

result, nor are they an old result obtained in a new and im-

proved manner. Merely bringing old devices into juxtaposi-

form of stove which was also well known. They had not, however, been

used together before. The court held the patent void because invention

was absent. The confused reasoning of this case is an illustration of the

difficulties encountered in explaining absence of invention by some rule

of thumb.

Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wa.ll. 353, Stephenson v. Brooklyn Cross-

Town Ry. Co., 114 U. S. 149, Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310,

Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342, Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 159

U. S. 477, Grinnell Washing-Machine Co. v. E. E. Johnson Co., 247 U. S.

426, National Tube v. Aiken, 163 Fed. 254, James Spear Stove Co. v.

Kelsey Heating Co., 158 Fed. 622; Fort Pitt Supply Co. v. Ireland &

Matthews Mfg. Co., 232 Fed. 871.

82 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580.

8 3 20 Wall. 353-

But, after all, practically every device. involves juxtaposition
of elements.
machine is an aggregation of wheels, shafts,
lever , etc.
patentable wash board is a juxtaposition of
wood and zinc parts; and so the list might run unendingly.
The statement that juxtaposition does not con titute invention
is therefore only possible of those groupings in which, as in
the Reckendorf er pencil, each element remains individual, in
proximity and connection with other elements which also retain their identity. This is called aggregation, as distinct from
those combinations of elements which form a patentable device. 2 The distinction ·is often expressed by saying, as in the
Reckendorf er case, "The combination to he patentable must
produce a different force or effect, or result in the combined
forces or processes, from that given by their separate parts.
There must be a new result produced by their union; if not so,
it is only an aggregation of separate elements." !he same
idea is expressed in Hailes v. Van Wormer., 83 where the court
says: "It must be conceded that a. new combination, if it produces new and useful results, is patentable, though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common
use before the combination was made. But the results must
be a product of the combination, and not a mere aggregate of
several results each the complete product of one of the combined elements. Combined results are not necessarily a novel
result, nor are they an old result obtained in a new and improved manner. Merely bringing old devices into juxtaposiform of stove which was also well known. They had not, however, been
used together before. The court held the patent void because invention
was absent. The confused reasoning of thi case is an illustration of the
difficulties encountered in explaining absence of invention by some rule
of thumb.
Haile v. Van Wormer, 20 WC\11. 353, St phenson v. Brooklyn CrossTown Ry. Co., n4 U. S. 149, Pick ring v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310,
Palm r v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342, Richard v. Cha e Elevator Co., 159
U. S. 477, Grinnell Washing-Machine o. v. E. E. John son Co., 247 U. S.
426, Nati nal Tube v. Aiken, 163 Fed. 254, James Spear Stove Co. v.
·elsey
ating Co., 15 Fed. 622; Fort Pitt Supply Co. v. Ireland &
Matthew Mfg. Co., 232 ed. 87r.
s2 Loom Co. v.
iggins, 105 U'. S. 58o.
83 20 Wall. 353.
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tion, and there allowing each to work out its own effect with-

tion, and there allowing each to work out its own effect without the production of something novel, is not invention. No
one by bringing together several old devices without producing a new and useful result the joint product of the elements of
the combination and something more than an aggregate of old
results, can acquire a right to prevent others from using the
same devices,. either singly or in other combinations, or, even
if a new and useful result is obtained, can prevent others from
using some of the devices, omitting-others, in combination."
The real difficulty is in determining just when the juxtaposition of parts does produce a cooperative result ~uch that
the presence of invention is not prima f acie absent. If the
parts actively co-operate so. that there is mutual or reciprocal
action and interaction of some kind, the device is then ipso
facto a combination instead of aggregation and has possibilities of patentability. 84
But while this is the thought frequently expressed, it is a

out the production of something novel, is not invention. No

one by bringing together several old devices without produc-

ing a new and useful result the joint product of the elements of

the combination and something more than an aggregate of old

results, can acquire a right to prevent others from using the

same devices, either singly or in other combinations, or, even

if a new and useful result is obtained, can prevent others from

using some of the devices, omitting others, in combination."

The real difficulty is in determining just when the juxta-

position of parts does produce a cooperative result such that

the presence of invention is not prima facie absent. If the

parts actively co-operate so that there is mutual or reciprocal

action and interaction of some kind, the device is then ipso

facto a combination instead of aggregation and has possibili-

ties of patentability. 84

But \vhile this is the thought frequently expressed, it is a

84 Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310, 318. "In Nimmo's appara-

tus, it is perfectly clear that all the elements of the combination are old,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

and that each operates only in the old way. Beyond the separate and

well-known results produced by them severally, no one of them con-

tributes to the combined result any new feature; no one of them adds to

the combination anything more than its separate independent effect; no

one of them gives any additional efficiency to the others, or changes in

any way the mode or result of its action. In a patentable combination

of old elements, all the constituents must so enter into it as that each

qualifies every other ; to draw an illustration from another branch of the

law, they must be joint tenants of the domain of the invention, seized

Pickering v. McCuilough, 104 U. S. 310, 318. ''In Nimmo's apparatus, it is perfectly clear that all the elements of the combination are old,
and that each operates only in the old way. Beyond the separate and
well-known results _produced by ~hem severally, no one of them contributes to the combined result any new feature; no one of them adds to
the combination anything more than its separate independent effect; no
one of them gives any additional efficiency to the others, or changes in
any way the mode or result of its action. In a patentable combination
of old elements, a'll the constituents must so enter into it as that each
qualifies every other; to draw an illustration from another branch of the
law, they must be joint tenants of the domain of the invention, seized
each of every part per my et per tout, and not mere tenants in common,
with separate interests and estates. It must form eit~er a new machine
of a distinct character and function, or produce a result due to the joint
and co-operating action of all the elements, and which is not the mere
adding together of s~parate contributions. Otherwise it is only a mechanical juxtaposition, and not a vital uni.on. In the case of this apparatus the mould was known, and a rib or former was known, and their
use in combination was known. Salvetat described a rib, so arranged
that, after it had performed its function in shaping the interior of the
vessel, it could be withdrawn, through the top of the vessel, so as not to
produce injury by striking against its side. This rib Nimmo substituted
for the old one in the same combination. And this is the whole of the
invention. Upon the principle stated, there is no invention in it."
84

each of every part per my et per tout, and not mere tenants in common,

with separate interests and estates. It must form either a new machine

of a distinct character and function, or produce a result due to the joint

and co-operating action of all the elements, and which is not the mere

adding together of separate contributions. Otherwise it is only a me-

chanical juxtaposition, and not a vital union. In the case of this appara-

tus the mould was known, and a rib or former was known, and their

use in combination was known. Salvetat described a rib, so arranged

that, after it had performed its function in shaping the interior of the

vessel, it could be withdrawn, through the top of the vessel, so as not to

produce injury by striking against its side. This rib Nimmo substituted

for the old one in the same combination. And this is the whole of the

invention. Upon the principle stated, there is no invention in it."
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fact that mere static juxtaposition has been held so to co-oper-

ate in producing a new result as to be indicative of invention,

fact that mere tatic juxtaposition has been held ·o to co-operate in producing a new result as to be indicative f inventi n,
and therefore patentable. In Haile v. Van Wormer; just
iuote 1 fr m, the court assumed the validity of a patent covering the simple juxtaposition in a stove of a fire-pot, coal
mao-azine, revertible flue , etc., all f which by them elves were
old, but had never been so grouped together. In the case of
The Barbed Wire Patent 5 the court sustained the patent,
which was directly .attacked, despite the fact that the device
was nothing more than the collocation-aggregation, in its
non-technical sense-of fence wires twisted together and a
short transverse wire coiled at its central portion ab ut one of
the twisted strand , so that its ends would project therefrom
to form the well known barb. The court called it a combination, without discussing its differentiation from unpatentable
aggregation. 8 6
Conzbin.Q_tion. The word "combination" ordinarily means
any gr uping of parts, as for in tance, the ·combining of parts
of a stove into one whole or the I lacing together of wheel ,
shafts, etc., in combination to form a single machine. It is
so u ed generally in the patent law, and in thi sense we have
just discussed it. But it has also a technical use in patent law.
In this technical sense "combination" is used of a collection or
arrangement of parts which do not themselves entirely submerge their identity in the new device. In a machine, for instance, the identity of the individual wheels and other parts i
Entirely lost· they go to make up the machine which is itself
looked upon as the nly entity. The well known Seldon patent, 7 h wever, is an illustration of a "combination' in the
technical usao-e. It covered·the c llection in an automobile f
en ine, driving mechani m, and carriao-e. vVhile the e part
all went to make up the whole, yet their individual id ntity vvas
not 1 t a in th ca e of the part of a ingle machine. 8 Out

and therefore patentable. In Hailes v. Van Wormer, just

quoted from, the court assumed the validity of a patent cov-

ering the simple juxtaposition in a stove of a fire-pot, coal-

magazine, revertible flues, etc., all of which by themselves were

old, but had never been so grouped together. In the case of

The Barbed Wire Patent 85 the court sustained the patent,

which was directly attacked, despite the fact that the device

was nothing more than the collocation aggregation, in its

non-technical sense of fence wires twisted together and a

short transverse wire coiled at its central portion about one of

the twisted strands, so that its ends would project therefrom

to form the well known barb. The court called it a combina-

tion, without discussing its differentiation from unpatentable

aggregation. 86

Cnrnbination. The word "combination" ordinarily means

any grouping of parts, as for instance, the "combining of parts

of a stove into one whole or the placing together of wheels,
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shafts, etc., in combination to form a single machine. It is

so used generally in the patent law, and in this sense we have

just discussed it. But it has also a technical use in patent law.

In this technical sense "combination" is used of a collection or

arrangement of parts which do not themselves entirely sub-

merge their identity in the new device. In a machine, for in-

stance, the identity of the individual wheels and other parts is

entirely lost; they go to make up the machine which is itself

looked upon as the only entity. The well known Seldon pat-

ent, 87 however, is an illustration of a "combination" in the

technical usage. It covered* the collection in an automobile, of

engine, driving mechanism, and carriage. While these parts

all went to make up the whole, yet their individual identity was

not lost as in the case of the parts of a single machine. 88 Out

143 U. S. 275.

80 Juxtaposition of old elements in a rubber tire held invention, Dia-

mond Rubber Tire Co. v. Consolidated R. T. Co., '220 U. S. 428 ; Rubber

Tire -Co. v. Goodyear Co., 232 U, S. 413.

87 Col. Motor Car Co. v. Duerr, 184 Fed. 893.

88 Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 187. Barrett v. Hall, I Mason 447, 474.

85

r43 U. S. 275.

86

Juxtapo ition

f ld lemcnt in a rubber tire held invention Diam nd Rubber Tire C . _v. on lidatcd R. T. Co., '22 0 U. S. 428; ubber
., 232 u. s. 413.
ar
. v. Duerr, 184 F d. 8g3.
ees, rs Wall. 187. Barrett v. Ha11, l Ma n 447 474.
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of this use of combination grow such rules as that "the sub-

sc

stitution of equivalents is not such invention as will sustain a

patent," 89 and others having to do especially with changes in

a combination. 90 The fact that the combination consists of old

and well known elements does not necessarily deprive it of

patentability. 91

Mere change of form. Another holding, frequently ex-

pressed as a rule, is tha"t mere change of form does not con-

stitute invention. The difficulty with this as a "rule" is that

it is even more indefinite than the generalities just discussed.

of this use of combination g row such rules as that " the substitution of equivalents is not such invention as will sustain a
patent," 8 9 and others having to do especially with changes in
a combination. 90 The fact that the combination consists of old
and well know ll. elements does not necessarily deprive it of
p~tentability.

91

It leaves still open the question, what is mere change of form.

Practically all invention involves change of form in some

way, if only the change, for instance, from bulk steel to that

of a finished tool. Even if the rule be confined to change of

physical appearance without change of use or purpose there is

conflict. In harmony with the "rule" are such cases as Glue

Co. v. Upton. 92 Here the invention alleged was that "of glue

comminuted to small particles of practically uniform size, as

distinguished from the glue in angular flakes hitherto known."
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It was claimed for this form of glue, which was called "instan-

taneous and comminuted glue," that less preparation for use

was required, that it could be more readily put up in packages

as there were no large sharp edged -flakes to cut the container,

and that it had a more pleasing appearance. "It thus appears,"

said the court, "that the invention claimed is not any new

combination of ingredients, creating a different product, or

any new mechanical means by which a desirable change in the

lorm of a common article of commerce is obtained ; but it con-

sists only of the ordinary flake glue reduced to small particles

by mechanical division. The advantages from such division

consist in its more ready and rapid solution, its greater con-

89 Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112.

90 Burt v. Evory, 133 U. S. 349, McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419.

Moody v. Fiske, 2 Mason 112.

91 Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, Expanded Metal Co. v. Brad-

ford, 214 U. S 366; Rubber Tire Co v. Goodyear Co., 232 U. S. 413; Seim

v. Hurd, 232 U. S. 420. Hay v. Heath Cycle Co., 71 Fed. 411, Steiner v.

Voegtly Hardware Co., 178 Fed. 831

92 97 U. S. 3.

Mere cliange of f orni. Another holding, frequently expressed as a rule, is t ha t mere chang e of form does not constitute invention. The difficulty with this as a " rule" is that
it is even more indefinite than the gener alities just discussed .
It leaves still open the question, what 1s mere change of fo rm.
Practically all invention in volves change of form in some
way, if only the change, fo r instance, from bulk steel to that
of a finished tool. Even if the rule be confined to change of
physical appearance without change of use or purpose th~ re is
conflict. In harmony with the " rul e" are such cases as Glue
Co. v. U pton.92 H ere the invention alleg ed was that "of g lue
comminuted to small particles of practically uniform size, as
di stinguished from the glue in ang ular flakes hitherto known. "
1twas claimed for this form of glue, which was called " instantaneous and comminuted glue," that less preparation for use
was required, that it could be more readily put up in packages
as there were no large sharp edged flakes to cut the container,
and that it had a more pleasing appearance. "It thus appears,"
said the court, " that t~e invention claimed is not any new
combination of ing redients, creating a different product, or
any new mechanical means by which a desirable change in the
iorm of a common article of commerce is obtai ned; but it consists only of the ordinary Aake glue reduced to small particles
by mechanical di vision. The advantages from such di vision
consist in its more ready and rapid solution, its great~r conSmith v. Nichols, 21 W all. II2 .
Burt v. E vory, 133 U. S. 349, McClain v. O r tmeyer, 141 U. S. 419.
Moody v. Fiske, 2 Mason 112.
91
Loom Co. v. Higgin s, 105 U. S. 58o, E xpanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S 366: Rubber Tire Co v. Goodyear Co., 232 U. S. 413; Seim
v. Hurd, 232 U. S. 420. Hay v. H eath. Cycle Co., 7r Fed. 41 r, S teiner v.
Voegtly H ardware Co., 178 F ed. 831.
92
97 U. S. 3.
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venience for packing and retailing, and its whiter appearance

and enhanced salableness. The whole claim is to an old article

venience for packing and retailing, and its whiter appearance
and enhanced salableness. The whole claim is to an old article
of commerce in a state of mechanical division greater than
previou ly used, but unchanged in composition and propertie ; and the benefits arising from the increased division are
uch as appertain to every soluble substance when divided into
minute particles. · A distinction niust be observed between· a
new article of commerce and a new article which, as such, is
patentable. Any ·change in form from a previous condition
may render the article new in commerce; as powdere~ sugar is
a different article in commerce from loaf sugar, and ground
coffee is a different artide in commerce from coffee in the
berry. But to render the article new in the sense of the patent
law, it must be more· or less efficacious, or possess new properties by a combination with other ingredients; not from a
mere change of form produced by a mechanical division." 9 3
The inexactness of stating the result of such holdings as a
rule is however, shown by the case of Winans v. Denmead. 94
This concerned the validity of a patent for a body for railroad
freight cars. The bodies in use before the patent h~d been
rectangular. Tran portation of such freight as coal and ore in
these cars caused a great lateral pressure upon the body of th'e
car and· a consequent tendency to distortion. To overcome
this, so much bracing and stiffening was necessary that the
cars were capable of transporting a load of not more than
their own weight. The patentee had conceived the idea of
building the body in the form of a .frustrum of a cone, inverted. This so far did away with the tendency to distortion

of commerce in a state of mechanical division greater than

previously used, but unchanged in composition and proper-

ties; and the benefits arising from the increased division are

such as appertain to every soluble substance when divided into

minute particles. A distinction must be observed between a

new article of commerce and a new article which, as such, is

patentable. Any change in form from a previous condition

may render the article new in commerce ; as powdered sugar is

a different article in commerce from loaf sugar, and ground

coffee is a different article in commerce from coffee in the

berry. But to render the article new in the sense of the patent

law, it must be more or less efficacious, or possess new prop-

erties by a combination with other ingredients; not from a

mere change of form produced by a mechanical division." 9

The inexactness of stating the result of such holdings as a

rule is, however, shown by the case of Winans v. Denmead. 94

This concerned the validity of a patent for a body for railroad
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freight cars. The bodies in use before the patent had been

rectangular. Transportation of such freight as coal and ore in

these cars caused a great lateral pressure upon the body of tte

car and a consequent tendency to distortion. To overcome

this, so much bracing and stiffening was necessary that the

cars were capable of transporting a load of not more than

their own weight. The patentee had conceived the idea of

building the body in the form of a frustrum of a cone, in-

verted. This so far did away with the tendency to distortion

93 King v. Gallum, 109 U. S. 99. Validity was denied to a patent for the

idea of putting plastering hair into smaller bales than had been hereto-

fore known. The court did not refer to "change of form" at all. The

Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1/93, 2, provided specifically, "It is hereby enacted

and declared, that simply changing the form or propositions of any ma-

chine, or composition of matter in any degree, shall not be deemed a

discovery." Belding Mfg. Co. v. Corn Planter Co., 152 U. S. 100, Lowell

v. Lewis, i Mason 182, 189; "I say substantially the same invention, .be-

cause a mere change of form or proportions of any machine cannot, per

se, be deemed a new invention."

94 15 How. 330.

93

King v. Gallum, 109 U. S. 99. Validity was denied to a patent for the
idea of putting plast ring hair into smaller bales than had been heretof re known. The court did not refer to "change of form" at all. The
.atent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, §2, provided specifically, "It i hereby enacted
and declared, that simply changing the form or propositions of any machine, or composition of matter in any degree, shall not be deemed a
di covery." Belding Mfg. Co. v. Corn Planter Co., 152 U. S. 100, Lowell
v. Lewis, 1 Mason r 2, 189 · 'I say substantially the same invention, .becau e a mere change of form or proportions of any machine cannot, per
se, be d emed a' new invention."
94
15
ow. 330.
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as to permit elimination of a great deal of lateral bracing.

53

The cars could, in consequence, carry a load of considerably

more than their own weight, and they had other advantages

over the old rectangular ones. In its decision the court rec-

ognized that "under our law a patent can not be granted

merely for a change of form." But it held that the production

of the patentee involved more than a change of form and was,

in fact, an invention. The reasoning by which the decision is

i cached is, at least, not quite logically clear, on account of the

assumed necessity for holding that the change from a rec-

tangular container to a conical one was not merely a change

cf form. The truth is, it was merely a change of form, but it

required, according to the decision, the mental act of invention

to conceive of that change.

^Application of old device to new fnirbose^ It often occurs

that patentability is claimed tor an invention, even when the

substantial embodiment of the means conceived does not differ

at all, in form, from other known embodiments of means.

The quality of invention is alleged to lie in the conception of
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using such 'known substantial means for a new purpose; to

accomplish some result not before reached by that means.

Just when this application of an old and known device to the

accomplishment of an end for which it has not before been

use4_ amounts to invention, is a question which has greatly

troubled the courts. They are reasonably agreed that if the

new use is "analogous" to the old one, no invention is involved,

But that there may be invention in the. application of an old

device to a new and "non-analogous" end. The issue there-

fore, when the use only is changed and not the device, is

whether the purpose or use is so like the known use that no

inventive genius was required for its conception. One of the

clearest cases of "analogous" use is that considered in Penn-

sylvania Ry. Co. v. Locomotive, etc. Co. 95 Here the patentee

claimed to have invented the use of a certain swivel truck,

which allowed a slight amount of lateral motion, under rail-

road engines. Exactly the same form of truck, which was well

95 1 10 U. S. 490.

as to permit elimination of a great deal of lateral bracing.
The cars could, in consequence, carry a load Qt considerably
more than their own weight, and they had other advantages
over the old rectangular ones. In its· decision the court recognized that · "under our law a patent can not be granted
merely for a change of form." But it held that the production
of the patentee involved more than a change of form and was,
in fact, an invention. The reasoning by which the decision is
t eached is, a( least, not quite logically dear, on account of the
assumed necessity for holding that the change from· a rec. tangular container to a conical one was not merely a change
of form. The truth is, it wats merely a change of form, but it
required, according to the decision, the mental act of invention
to conceive of that change.
Applica.tion of old device to new ur ose. It often occurs
that patentabihty lS C atme for an invention, even when the
substantial embodiment of the. me~ns conceived does not differ
at all, · in form, from other knowr;t embodiments of means. ·
The quality of invention is alleged to lie in the conception of
using such known substantial means for a new purpose; to
accomplish some result not before reached by that means.
Ju
hen this application of an old and known device to the
accom lishment of an end for which it has not before been
used amounts to invention, is a question which has greatly
tr ubled the courts. They are reasonably agreed that if the
new use is "analogous" to the old one, no invention is involved,
Eut that there may be invention in the. application. 9£ an old
device to a new and "non-analogous" end. The issue therefore, when the use only is changed and not ·the device, is
~hether the purpose or use is so like the known use that no
inventive genius was required for its conception. One of the
clearest cases of "analogous" use is that considered in Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Locomotive, etc . Co. 9 5 Here the patentee
claimed to have invented the use of ·a certain swivel truck,
which allowed a slight amount of lateral motion, under railroad engines. Exactly the same form of truck, which was well .
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known, had already been used under railroad cars, for the

same purpose, but it had never been placed under an engine

until the patentee conceived the idea. The patent was held in-

valid on the ground that its subject matter had required no

invention. The court said, "It is settled by many decisions of

this court, which it is unnecessary to quote from or refer to

in detail, that the application of an old process or machine to

a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner

of application, and no result substantially distinct in its na-

ture, will not sustain a patent, even if the new form of result

has not before been contemplated."

In Grant v. Walter 96 the patentee had discovered that "silk

wound in a peculiar form of skein could be dyed in the skein.

Theretofore it had been dyed while in much smaller skeins

and then re-wound. The patentee's discovery effectuated con-

siderable saving in time and effort. What he claimed was his

particular form of skein when made up of silk ready for dye-

ing. Practically the same form of skein was already used for

silk from which the gum was to be boiled off, and which was
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not, therefore, ready for the dye. The court was in much

doubt as to just for what the patent purported to be but finally

decided apparently that it was for the skein. It therefore held

that, "The most that can be said of this Grant patent is that it

is a discovery of a new use for an old device which does not

involve patentability. However useful the nature of the new

use to which the skein is sought to be confined by the dis-

claimer, compared with the former uses to which the old skein

was applied at the date of the improvement, it forms only an

analogous or double use, or one so cognate and similar to the

uses and purposes of the former cross-reeled and laced skein

as not to involve anything more than mechanical skill, and

does not constitute invention, as is well settled by authorities

already referred to." 97

G 148 U. S. 547-

07 . Jones v. Cyphers, 126 Fed. 753, Bowman v. DeGrauw, 60 Fed. 907,

Brown v. Crane Co., 133 Fed 235. Mellon v. Wm. C. Gregg & Co., 137

Fed. 68, 77, "It is only when the new use is so recondite and remote from

that to which the old device has been applied, or for which it was con-
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known, had already been used under rail~oad cars, f r the
ame purpose, but it had never been placed under an engine
until the patentee conceived the idea. The patent wa held inalid on the ground that its subject matter had required no
invention. The court said, "It is settled by many deci ions of
this court, which it is unnecessary to quote' from or refer to
in detail, that the application of an old process or machine to
a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner
of application, and no result substantially distinct in its nature, will not sustain a pel:tent, even if the new form of re ult
has not before been contemplated."
In Grant v. W alter 96 the patentee had discovered that silk
wound in a peculiar form of skein could be dyed in the skein.
Theretofore it had been dyed while in much smaller skeins
and then re-wound._ The patentee's discovery effectuated con~iderable saving in time and effort. What he claimed was his
particular form of skein when made up of silk ready for dye. ing. Practically the same form of skein was already used for
silk from which the gum was to be boiled off, and which was
not, therefore, rea9.y for the dye. The court was in much
doubt as to just for what the patent purportecl to be but finally
decided apparently that it was for the skein. It therefore held
that, "The most that can be said of this Grant patent is that it
is a discovery of a new use for an old device which does not
involve patentability. However useful the nature of the new
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On the other hand, in Bary v. Harpoon Castor Mfg. Co., 98 a

device consisting of a spherically convex piece of metal, having

sharp projections vertical to its plane, on the concave side, and

intended to be fastened to the ends of table legs, etc., by driv-

ing the projections into the wood, the whole being to supply

the place of a "castor," was held patentable despite the fact

that an almost precisely similar article had previously been

used for ornamentation of Mexican saddles. The court said,

"In order to test the question let us assume that the exact

structure shown in the patent to Alleyn was taken from the

shield of a Scottish Highlander or the war bonnet of a North

American Indian 300 years ago, and was on exhibition in some

museum here. Would it not involve invention to put it to use

as a substitute for the elaborate, clumsy and expensive castors

now in use? We think it would." 9

These cases represent extremes on either side of the line.

Between them is the debatable ground. Whether the new use

is analogous, mere unpatentable "double use," or is a new

and novel one involving invention can not be determined by
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any rule of thumb. All that is possible is, "as a result of the

authorities upon this subject, it may be said that, if the new

use be so nearly analogous to the former one, that the applica-

bility of the device to its new use would occur to a person of

ordinary mechanical skill, it is only a case of double use, but

if the relations between them be remote, and especially if the

use of the old device produce a new result, it may at least in-

volve an exercise of the inventive faculty. Much, however,

must still depend upon the nature of the changes required to

adapt the device to its new use."

All of these decisions and "rules," and

many others, may be summed up in the proposition that no

ceived, that its application to the new use would not occur to the mind

of the ordinary mechanic, skilled in the art, seeking to devise means to

perform the desired function, with the old machine or combination present

before him, that its conception rises to the dignity of invention."

98 209 Fed. 207.

"Ace. DuBois v. Kirk, 158 U. S. 58; Here the presence of inventive

genius was determined by the theretofore unsatisfied need. Western Elec.

Co. v. La Rue, 139 U. S. 601.

On the other hand, in Bary v. Harpoon Castor Mfg. Co. 9 a
device consisting of a spherically convex piece of metal, having
sharp projections vertical to its plane, on the concave side, and
intended to be fastened to the ends of table legs, etc., by driving the projections into the wood, the whole being to supply
the place of a "castor," was held patentable despite the fact
that an almost precisely similar article had previously been
used for ornamentation of Mexican saddles. The court said,
"In order to test the question let us assume that the exact
tructure shown in the patent to· Alleyn was taken from the
·shield of a Scottish Highlander or the war bonnet of a North
American Indian 300 years ago, and was on exhibition in some
museum here. Would it not involve invention to put it to use
as a substitute for the elaborate, clumsy and expensive castors
now in use? We think it would." 99
These ·cases represent extremes on either side of the line.
Between them is the debatable ground. Whether the new use
is analogous, mere unpatentable "double use," or is a new
and novel one involving invention can not be determined by
any rule of thumb. All that is possible is, "as a result of the
authorities upon this subject, it may be said that, if the new
u e be so nearly analogous to the former one, that the applicability of the device to its new use would occur to a person of
ordinary mechanical skill, it is only a case of double use, but
if the relations between them be remote, and especially if the
use of the old device produce a new result, it may at least involve an exercise of the inveptive faculty. Much, however,
must _still depend upon the nature of the changes required to
adapt the device to its new use."
ha · l slcill. All of these decisions and "rules," and
many others, may be summed up in the proposition that no
ceived, that its application to the new use would not occur to the mind
of the ordinary mechanic, ·killed in the art, seeking to devise means to
perform the de ired function, with the old machine or combination present
before him, that it , conception rises to the dignity of invention."
9 209 Fed. 207.
99 Acc. DuBoi
v. Kirk, 158 U. S. 58; Here the presence of inventive
genius was determined by the theretofore unsati fied need. Western Elec.
Co. v. La Rue, 139 U. S. 6or.
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change, from what already is known, amounts to invention,

unless it is something more than any capable mechanic would

have accomplished when faced by the need for it. 100 It is just

the difficulty of determining whether a production has pro-

ceeded out of something more than mechanical skill which

makes patent law so inexact as a science. . "The task of dis-

tinguishing between invention and the power of adaptation

possessed by a skillful mechanic is not always an easy one,

nor have the courts apparently succeeded in formulating a

proposition to cover all cases. While the statutes require that

a patent, to be valid, must disclose invention and novelty, yet

the degree or amount of invention required is not prescribed,

and, from the nature of the case, can not be." 101 The various

so called rules above referred to are merely the attempts of

courts to formulate something by which the difficulty of this

decision can be lessened. But it arises afresh in each case,

and can be helped by precedents only to the most meagre

extent.

In the great bulk of cases in which a patent has been held
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void for want of the quality of invention in the device set

forth, the court has not even attempted to give reasons for its

finding. It has simply said something to the effect that "In

view of the prior art ... it can not be claimed that the com-

100 Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59, Smith v. Nichols, 21

Wall., 112, 118, Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, Blandy v. Griffith,

Fed. Cas. No. 1529, 3 Fisher 609. Blake v. Stafford, 6 Blatch. 195, 205.

Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., supra, "As soon as the mischief became

apparent, and the remedy was seriously and systematically studied by

those competent to deal with the subject, the present regulation was

promptly suggested and adopted, just as a skilled mechanic, witnessing

the performance of a machine, inadequate, by reason of some defect, to

accomplish the object for which it had been designed, by the application

of his common knowledge and experience, perceives the reason of the

failure, and' supplies what is obviously wanting. It is but the display of

the expected skill of the calling, and involves only the exercise of the

ordinary faculties of reasoning upon the materials supplied by a special

change, from what already is known, am unt to invention,
unless it is omething more than any capable mechanic would
have accomplished when faced by the need f r it. 100 It is just
the difficulty of determining whether a production has proceeded out of something more than mechanical skill which
makes patent law so inexact as a science. . "The task of distinguishing between invention and the power of adaptation
possessed by a skillful mechanic is not al.ways an easy one,
nor have the courts apparently succeeded in formulating a
proposition to cover all ~ases. While the statutes require that
a patent, to be valid, must disclose invention and novelty, yet
the degree or amount of invention required is not prescribed,
and, from the nature of the case, can not be. ' 101 The various
so called rules above ref erred to are merely the attempts of
courts to formulate something by which the difficulty of this
decis:on can be lessened. But it arises afresh in each -case,
arid can be helped by precedents only to the most meagre
extent.
In the great bulk of cases in which a patent has been held
void for want of the quality of invention in the device set
forth, the court has not even attempted to give reasons for its
finding. It has simply said something to the effect that "In
view of the prior art . . . it can not be claimed that the com-

knowledge, and the facility of manipulation which results from its habit-

ual and intelligent practice ; and is in no sense the creative work of that

inventive faculty which it is the purpose of the Constitution and the patent

laws to encourage and reward."

101 Hillborn v. Hale, etc. Mfg. Co., 69 Fed. 958, 963.

100 Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., II3 U. S. 59, Smith v. Nichols, 21
Wall., n2, 118, Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, Blandy v. Griffith,
Fed. Cas. No. 1529, 3 Fisher 6og. Blake v. Stafford, 6 Blatch. 195, 205.
Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., supra, "As soon as the mischief became
apparent, and the remedy was seriously and systematically studied by
those competent to deal with the subject, the pre ent regulation was
promptly suggested and adopted, ju t as a skilled mechanic, witnessing
the performance of a machine, inadeq~ate, by reason of some defect, to
accomplish the object for which it had been de igned, by the application
of his common knowledge and experience, perceive the rea on of the
failure, and supplies what is obviously wanting. It is but the di play of
· the expected kill of the calling, and invo·lves only the exercise of the
ordinary facultie of reasoning upon the mat rials upplied by a special
knowledge, and the facility of manipulation which r ults from its habitual and intelligent practice; and is in no en the creative work of that
inventiv faculty which it i the purpose of the Con titution and the patent
laws t
ncourage and reward."
101 Hillborn v. Hale, etc. Mfg. Co., 6g Fed. 95 , 963.
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bination in question exhibits such novelty as amounts to in-

vention." 102

The question of ability of a mechanic to make a device on

first call is never involved when the device is not a mere de-

velopment of existing forms, but is essentially unique. In

such case, the idea of means is indubitably a creation of the

mind and could not be a mere skillful change of something

existing.

To understand fully the difference between mere mechanical

skill and invention, and to reconcile many seemingly adverse

holdings, one must remember the existence of the "idea" as

well as the substantial "means" in invention. Many a device

covered by a valid patent, could have been produced by any

skillful mechanic who had been told what was wanted. Often,

as is evident in the range of equivalents against which an in-

vention is protected, other devices, totally unlike in substantial

form would be quite as efficient means. The thing that is pro-

tected, that is really patented, and hence is really the invention,

is the idea of accomplishing the result by the described means
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or its equivalent. It_is only when this idea of nieans could

have been thought, of by a skillful mechanic that the concept

is lacking in inventive genius, not when the substantially oper-

ating part, that is, the means itself, could have been devised

by one informed of the idea. 103

102 Fougeres v. Jones, 66 Fed. 316.

103 The foregoing discussion has been concerned chiefly with the fact

that mere physical difference does not indicate invention, but the con-

verse is equally true and mere physical similarity does not preclude it.

This is apparent from the cases involving the new use of an old device.

In Brown v. Puget Sound Reduction Co., no Fed. 383, the court said,

"The Holthoff-Wethey furnace, according to the description of it in the

specifications of the patent and the model exhibited to the court, is

double decked, <like the Brown furnace, and closely resembles it in other

particulars, to such an extent that in a mere casual observer would prob-

ably create an impression that the chief difference between the two is in

the superior construction of the Holthoff-Wethey furnace; but to reach

a just determination of the rights of the parties a close examination of

the two patents is necessary." They found such actual difference as

to warrant a decision of non-infringement.

Neither does similarity of name preclude invention. Machine Co. v.

Murphy, 97 U. S. I2O, 125.

bination in question exhibits such novelty as amounts to invention. " 102
The question of ability of a mechanic to make a device on
first call is never involved when the device is not a mere development of existing forms, but is essentially unique. In
such case, the idea of means is indubitably a creation of the.
mind and could not be a mere skill£ ul change of something
existing.
To understand fully the difference between mere mechanical
skill and m ntion, and to reconcile many seemingly adverse
o mgs, one must remember the existence of the "idea" as
well as the substantial "means" in invention. Many a device
covered by a valid patent, could have been produced by any
skillful mechanic who had been told what was wanted. Often,
as is evident in the range of equivalents against which an invention is protected, other devices, totally unlike in substantial
form would be quite as efficient means. The thing that is protected, that is really patented, and hence is really the invention,
is the idea of accomplishing the result by the des.cribed mean~
or its equivalent. It is onl when this ideal o means could
. a skill fail mechanic that the concept
have been though
is lacking in inventive genius, not when the substantia y overating part, that is, the means itself, could have been devised
by one informed of the idea. 103
Fougeres v. Jones, 66 Fed. 316.
The foregoing discussion has been concerned chiefly with the fact
that mere physical difference does not indicate invention, but the con- .
verse is equally true and mere physical similarity does not preclude it.
This is apparent from the cases involvin·g the new use of an old device.
In Brown v. Puget Sound Reduction Co., 1 IO Fed. 383, the court said,
"The Holthoff-W ethey furnace, according to the description of it in the
specifications of the patent and the model exhibited to the court, is
double decked, .dike the Brown furnace, and dose ly resembles it in other
particulars, to such an extent that in a mere casual observer would probably create an impression that the chief difference between the two is in
th.e superior construction of the Holthoff-Wethey furnace; but to reach
a just determination of the rights of the narties a close examination of
the two patents is necessary." They found such actual difference as
to warrant a decision of non-infringement.
Neither does similarity .of name preclude invention.
Machine Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 125.
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Various matters, wholly extraneous to the substance of the

contrivance itself, have been declared, recurrently, to have in-

1

Various matters, wholly extraneous to the substance of the
contrivance itself, have been declared, recurrently, to have influenced the court in its finding upon the question of invention. Theoretically perhaps, the character of an alleged invention should be predicated solely upon the peculiarities
by which the idea is manifested. But inasmuch as the determination is not directed by any definite limits, and there
can be no scientific exactness, it is inevitable that the opinion,
on which the determination actually rests, should be more or
less affected by other matters than simple contemplation of the
concept itself. The most obvious and recurrent of these extraneous influences are here set out.
The length of time requ.ired in evolving the alleged invention, it may be said at once, does not indicate whether it is in
fact invention or not. "Originality is the test of invention.
If that is successfully exercised, its product is protected; and
it is as immaterial whether it is displayed in greater or less
degree, or whether the new idea revealed itself to -the inventor
Ly a sudden flash of thought, or slowly dawned on h_is mind
after groping his way through many and dubious experiments."104 The production of the housewife who in a flash of
inspiration sees a simpler way of performing a -daily task, and
that of an Edison who definitely strives and experiments for
the means of accomplishing a certain result, may be equally
entitled to the protection of a patent. 105

fluenced the court in its finding upon the question of inven-

tion. Theoretically perhaps, the character of an alleged in-

vention should be predicated solely upon the peculiarities

by which the idea is manifested. But inasmuch as the de-

termination is not directed by any definite limits, and there

can be no scientific exactness, it is inevitable that the opinion,

on which the determination actually rests, should be more or

less affected by other matters than simple contemplation of the

concept itself. The most obvious and recurrent of these ex-

traneous influences are here set out.

The length of time required in evohnng the alleged inven-

tion, it may be said at once, does not indicate whether it is in

fact invention or not. "Originality is the test of invention.

If that is successfully exercised, its product is protected; and

it is as immaterial whether it is displayed in greater or less

degree, or whether the new idea revealed itself to the inventor

by a sudden flash of thought, or slowly dawned on his mind

after groping his way through many and dubious experi-
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ments." 104 The production of the housewife who in a flash of

inspiration sees a simpler way of performing a daily task, and

that of an Edison who definitely strives and experiments for

the means of accomplishing a certain result, may be equally

entitled to the protection of a patent. 105

10 * Blake v. Stafford, 6 Blatch. 195, 205 ; Bowman v. DeGrauw, 60 Fed.

907. "Nor does it detract from its merit that it is the result of experi-

ment and not the instant and perfect product of inventive power." Dia-

mond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 438.

105 O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62. .

The invention was a "flash of genius." O'Rourke Engineering Co.

v. M'Mullen, 160 Fed. 933, 937. The Goodyear patent for the composi-

tion of matter, which alone makes rubber usable for such purposes as

tires, has been upheld many times and has been enormously capitalized.

The invention was the result of mere accident, however. The inventor

in an apparently hopeless search for a composition that would effectuate

the purpose accidentally spilled some of a mixture on a hot stove, and the

discovery was made.

The patent upheld in Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261,

Blake v. Stafford, 6 Blatch. 195, 205; Bowman v. DeGrauw, 6o Fed.
"Nor does it detract from its merit that it is the result of experiment and not the instant and pe'rfect product of inventive power." Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 438.
10s O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 . .
The invention was a "flash of genius." O'Rourke Engineering Co.
v. M'Mullen, 160 Fed. 933, 937. The Goodyear patent for the composition of matter, which alone makes rubber u able for such purposes as
tires, has been upheld many times and has been enormously capitalized.
The invention was the result of mere accident, however. The inventor
in an apparently hopeless search for a composition that would effectuate
the purpose accidentally spilled some of a mixture on a hot stove, and the
discovery was made.
The patent upheld in Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261,
104

907.
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Lon% existing demand. The fact, however, that others have

been searching for a long time for a means of accomplishing

a certain result, does affect the question of whether invention

is present in the final revelation of such a means. The fact

that others engaged in the search were unable to evolve a

means, very clearly indicates that its production was beyond

the power of mere mechanical skill. This is illustrated in the

case of Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Thum. 108 The

patent here involved was for "a bowling alley runway, com-

prising a descending or downwardly sloped portion, beginning

at the pit end of the alley, and returning towards the players'

end, and an ascending or up-grade portion connected therewith,

and located near the playing end of the alley, which merges

into the ball receiving and retaining terminal of the runway,

all in such manner, as hereinbefore described, that the balls

put into the receiving end of the runway will roll downwardly

toward the playing end of the alley, and then, ascending the

up grade, or ascending portion of the runway, will pass thence

onto the terminal or ball receptacle of the player's end of the
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returnway without much shock or concussion." The court

said, "The improvement consists in an extremely simple, and,

it would seem, perfectly obvious, application of common knowl-

edge as to the law of gravitation. Were there nothing in the

record but the bare statement of facts above set forth, we

would be inclined to concur with the court below in the propo-

sition that: 'Had any skilled mechanic been asked to perfect

a structure that should gradually arrest the momentum of the

returning ball, an ascent would obviously have been the struc-

ture needed.' But in this case, as in the Singer Case, the evi-

dence shows conclusively, and, indeed, without contradiction,

followed from an unexpected discovery. The inventors were searching

for the minimum amount of oil that could be used in a certain process

for separating minerals from the undesirable quartz, or rocky material,

when crushed. They observed that when this apparent minimum had been

reached and the separation had ceased, a further reduction in the amount

of oily substances caused separation to begin again. Investigation of this

startling result disclosed the reason and the patent subsequently obtained

for it was upheld.

108 in Fed. 904.

Lon existin demand. The fact, however, that others have
been searching for a . long time for a means of accomplishing
a certain result, does affect the question of whether invention
is present in the final revelation of such a means. T e fact
that others el)gaged in the search were unable to evolve a
means, very clearl indicates at its )roduction was be ond
the power o
mechanical skill. This is illustrated in the
case of Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Thum. 108 The
. patent here involved was for "a bowling alley runway, comprising a descending or downwardly sloped portion, beginning
at the pit end of the alley, and returning towards the players'
end, and an ascending or up-grade portion connected therewith,
and located near the playing end of the alley, which merges
into the ball receiving and retaining terminal of the runway,
all in such manner, as hereinbefore described, that the balls
put into the receiving end of the runway will roll downwardly
toward the playing end of the alley, anei then, ascending the
up grade, or ascending portion of the runway, will pass thence
onto the terminal or ball receptacle of the player's end of the
returnway without much shock or concussion." The court
said, "The improvement consists in an extremely simple, and,
it would seem, perfectly obvious, application of common knowledge as to the law of gravitation. Were there nothing in the
record but the bare statement of facts above set forth, we
would be inclined to concur with the court below in the proposition that: 'Had any skilled mechanic been asked fo perfect
a structure that should gradually arrest the momentum o t e
returning ball, an ascent would obviously have been the structure needed.' But in this case, as in the Singer Case, the evidence shows conclusively, and, indeed, without contradiction,
followed from an unexpected discovery. The inventors were searchi_ng
for the minimum amount of oil that could be used in a certain process
for separating minerals from the undesirable quartz, or rocky material,
when crushed. They obserived that when this appar·e nt minimum had been
reached and the separation had ceased, a further reduction in the amount
of oily substances caused separation to begin again. Investigation of this
startling result disclosed the reason and the patent subsequently obtained
for it was upheld.
108II1 Fed. 904.
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that this very demand for an arrester of the returning ball was

6o
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before skilled mechanics for many years, and yet no one before

Reisky" hit -upon the device which now seems so obvious. The

defects of the old system were serious. The time required for

the return of the ball was not uniform, and in its entirety was

slow. If started with a shove, it came more quickly, but, if

merely placed in the trough, it made but slow time at the be-

ginning; and the player, desirous often of using a particular

ball already played became impatient. Whether started with a

shove or not, its velocity steadily increased, and it was running

at its highest speed when it came home against the post or

other ball at rest at the player's end. Moreover, this speed

was generally so high that the surfaces of the balls were

broken or chipped, particularly at the vicinity of the finger

holes, and thus soon became unfit for use. This damage put

the alley keeper to considerable expense in keeping the balls

in fair condition, or in getting new balls, and also resulted in

great dissatisfaction among the players at the damaged con-

dition of the balls. There was also constant danger of an in-
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cautious player having his hand among the homed balls when

the returning ball smashed in. The evidence shows that this

condition of affairs had lasted for a long time; the old style

of runway persisted for 40 years, during this period there was

a constant demand for an improvement which would remedy

the difficulty, and to that demand the skilled mechanic who put

up bowling alleys responded. Various devices were contrived,

all of them, save one, independent of the trough itself. Sus-

pended shot bags of various shapes, some with appendages in

the shape of patches or belts, weighted sections of hose pipe,

pieces of stiff leather attached shutter-wise across the trough,

pivoted levers having a piston entering a dashpot, are among

the devices independent of the trough. It was also sought to

retard the ball by successive transverse pieces of rope at the

sides or bottom of the trough. So many of these devices are

shown that it is apparent that the skilled mechanics were for

years trying to find some way to properly retard the ball, and

the proof conclusively shows that all of them were unsatis-

that this very demand for an arrester of the returning ball was
before skilled mechanics for many years, and yet no one before
Reis
· ·upon the device w 1cn now seems so obvious. The
def eats of the old system were serious. The time required for
the return of the ball was not uniform, and in its entirety was
slow. If started with a shove, it came more quickly, but, if
merely placed in the trough, it made but slow time at the beginning; and the player, desirous often of using a particular
ball already played became impatient. Whether started with a
shove or not, its velocity steadily increased, and it was running
at its higb.est speed when it came home against the post or
other ball at rest at the player's end. Moreover, this speed
was generally so high that the surfaces of the balls were
broken or chipped, particularly at the vicinity of the finger
holes, and thus soon became unfit for use. This damage put
the alley keeper to considerable expense in keeping the balls
in fair condition, or in getting new balls, and also resulted in
great dissatisfaction among the players at the damaged condition of the balls. There was also constant danger of an incautious player having his hand among the homed balls when
the returning ball smashed in. The evidence shows that this
condition of affairs had lasted for a long time; the old style
of runway persisted for 40 years, during this period there was
a constant demand for an improvement which would remedy
the difficulty, and to that demand the skilled mechanic who put
up bowling alleys responded. Various devices were contrived,
-all of them, save one, independent of the trough itself. Suspended shot bags of various shapes, some with appendages in
the shape of patches or belts, weighted sections of hose pipe,
pieces of stiff leather attached shutter-wise across the trough,
pivoted levers having a piston entering a dashpot, are among
the devices ·independent of the trough. It was also sought to
retard the ball by successive transverse pieces of rope at the
sides or bottom of the trough. So many of these devices are
shown that it is apparent that the skilled mechanics were for
years trying to find some way to properly retard the ball, and
the proof conclusively shows that all of them were unsatis-
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factory. Not one of them secured retardation by a change of

grade of the trough itself, until the patentee disclosed his

simple method, which has so commended itself, that now,

within three years after the issuance of the patent, 90 per-

cent of the existing bowling alleys have the new style, or

Reisky, returnways. In the face of this evidence, we can-

not hold that his improvement is devoid of patentable in-

vention."

Precisely this same doctrine has been declared by the Su-

preme Court in the case of Krementz v. Cottle Co. 109 It had

been claimed that the patent, which was for an improved

collar button, formed out of a single piece of sheet metal,

was anticipated by other- devices to the extent that, as the

lower court said, "any competent mechanic, versed in the

manufacture of hollow sheet-metal articles, having before

him the patents of Stokes and Keats, could have made these

improvements and modifications, without exercising inven-

tion, and by applying the ordinary skill of the calling." But

the upper court responded that, "The view of the court be-
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low, that Krementz's step in the art was one obvious to any

skilled mechanic, is negatived by the conduct of Cottle, the

president of the defendant company. He was himself a pat-

entee under letters granted April 16, 1878, for an improve-

ment in the construction of collar and sleeve buttons, and

put in evidence in this case. In his specifications he speaks

of the disadvantages of what he calls 'the common practice

to make the head, back and post of collar and sleeve buttons

separate, and to unite them by solder.' His improvement was

to form a button of two pieces ; the post and base forming one

piece, and then soldering to the post the head of the button as

the other piece. Yet, skilled as he was, and with his attention

specially turned to the subject, he failed to see, what Kre-

mentz afterwards saw, that a button might be made of one

continuous sheet of metal, wholly dispensing with solder, of

an improved shape, of increased strength, and requiring less

109 148 U. S. 556.

factory. Not one of them secured retardation by a change of
grade of the trough itself, until the patentee disclosed his
simple method, which has so commended itself, that now,
within three years after the issuance ·o f the patent, 90 percent of the existing bowling alleys have the new style, or
Reisky, returnways. In. the face of this evidence, we cannot hold that his i_mprovement is devoid of patentable invention."
Precisely this same doctrine has been declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Krementz v. Cottle Co. 1 09 It had
been claimed t~at the patent, which was for an improved
collar button, formed out of a single piece of sheet metal,
was anticipated by other'.. devices to the extent that, as the
lower court said, "any competent mechanic, versed in the
manufacture of hollow sheet-metal articles, having before
him the patents of Stokes and Keats, could have made these
improvements and modifications, without exercising invention, and by applying the ordinary skill of the calling." But
the upper court responded that, "The view of the court below; that Krementz' step in the art was one obvious to any
skilled mechanic~ is negatived by the conduct of Cottle, the
president of the defendant company. He was himself a patentee under letters granted April I 6, 1878, for an improvement in the construction of collar and sleeve buttons, and
put in evidence in this case. In his specifications he speaks
bf the disadvantages of what he calls 'the common practice
to make the head, back and post of collar and sleeve buttons
separate, and to unite them by solder.' His improvement was
to form a button of two pieces; the post and base forming one
piece, and then soldering to the post the head of the button as
the other piece. Yet, skilled as he was, and with his attention
specially turned to the subject, he failed to see, what Krementz afterwarqs saw, that a. button might be made of one
continuous sheet of metal, wholly dispensing with solder, of
an improved shape, of increased strength, ·and requiring less
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material." 111 The court therefore held the device to be the

product of invention rather than mere mechanical skill.

Patents and Inventions

Immediate acceptance by public. Another circumstance

closely akin to the fact that a device has been long sought for,

is the fact that when the alleged invention was offered to the

public it was., immediately accepted and welcomed. The

theory on which this influence is based is that immediate ac-

ceptance indicates an existing demand on the part of the pub-

lic, which was unsatisfied until the advent of the device in

question. If the device might have been produced by mere

mechanical skill, the public need would, in the foregoing

theory, have called it forth at once instead of remaining un-

satisfied. This has shown marked and admitted influence

upon the courts in inducing them to find the presence of in-

vention in the device. So closely allied is it to the circum-

stance of long search that reference to both is usually found

conjoined, and indeed, confused. 112 In the Krementz case

just quoted from, the court in reasoning to its conclusion of

patentability, further said, "It was also made to appear that
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the advantages of the new button were at once recognized

by the trade and by the public, and that very large quantities

have been sold.

"The argument drawn from the commercial success of a

111 Davis v. Parkman 71 Fed. 961. A claim of invention in turning the

foot-rest of a row-boat upward at an angle of 45 was upheld oh the

ground that "various rude and unsatisfactory expedients had been used

by many persons for the purpose of accomplishing what Davis accomp-

lished by the simple expedient of turning up the foot-board, that this

occurred to none of them, and that after it had been suggested by him

it came into general use.'" American Gramophone Co. v. Universal, 151

Fed. 595. McFarland v. Spencer, 23 Fed. 150. O'Rourke Engineering Co.

v. M'Mullen, 160 Fed. 933, "Where the court has to deal with a device

which has achieved undisputed success and accomplished a result never

attained before, which is new, useful and in large demand it is generally

safe to conclude that the man who made it is an inventor." In one case,

at least, the fact of a long existing desire for a device was held to be

evidence of stupidity on the part of the public concerned, rather than of

material. m 11 The court there.fore held the device to be the
product of invention rather than mere mechanical skill.
Immediate acceptance by public. Another circumstance
closely akin to the fact that a device has been long sought for,
is the fact that when the alleged invention was offered to the
public it
immediately accepted and we corned. The
theory on which this influence is based is that immediate acceptance ·ndicates an existing deman
the part o t e public, which was unsatisfied until the advent of the device in
question. If the device might have been produced by mere
mechanical skill, the p·ublic need would, in the foregoing
theory, have called it forth at once instead of remaining unsatisfied. This has shown marked and admitted influence
upon the courts in inducing them to find the presence of invention in the device. So closely allied is it to the circumstan~e of long search that reference to both is usually found
conjoined, and indeed, confused. 112 In the Krementz case
just quoted from, the court in reasoning to its conclusion of
patentability, furth_e r said, "It was also made to appear that
the advantages of the new button were at once recognized
by the trade and by the public, and that very large quantities
have been sold.
"The argument drawn from the commercial success of a

genius on the part of him who answered the call. Butler v. Steckel,

27 Fed. 219.

112 Consol. Car Heating Co. v. American, etc. Corp. 82 Fed. 993.

111 Davis v. Parkman 71 Fed. g6I.
A claim of invention in turning the
foot-rest of a row-boat upward at an angle of 45° was upheld oh the
ground that "various rude and unsatisfactory expedients had been used
by many persons for the purpose of accomplishing what Davis accomplished by the simple expedient of turning up the foot-board, that this
occurred to none of them, and that after it had been suggested by him
it came into general use."· American Gramophone Co. v. Universal, 151
Fed. 595. McFarland v. Spencer, 23 Fed. 150. O'Rourke Engineering Co.
v. M'Mullen, l6o Fed. 933, "Where the court has to deal with a device
which has achieved undisputed success and accomplished a result never
attained before, which is new, useful and in large demand it is generally
safe to conclude that the man who m·ade it is an inventor." In one case,
at least, the fact of a long existing desire for a device was held to be
evidence of stupidity on the part of the public concerned, rather than of
geniu on the part of him who answered the call. Butler v. Steckel,
27 Fed. 219.
112 Con ol. Car Heating Co. v. Am rican, etc. Corp. 82 Fed. 993.
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patented article is not always to be relied on. Other causes,

such as the enterprise of the vendors, and the resort to lavish

expenditures in advertising, may cooperate to promote a large

marketable demand. Yet, as was well said by Mr. Justice

Brown, in the case of Consolidated Brake-Shoe Co. v. Detroit

Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 894, 'When the other facts in the case leave

the question of invention in doubt, the fact that the device

has gone into general use and has displaced other devices

which had previously been employed for analogous uses, is

sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the existence of inven-

tion.'

"Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, 591, was a case

where the patented device consisted in a slight modification of

existing mechanism, and it was contended that this slight

change did not constitute a patentable invention ; but this view

did not prevail, the court saying: 'It is further argued, how-

ever, that supposing the devices to be sufficiently described,

they do not show any invention ; and that the combination

set forth in the fifth claim is a mere aggregation of old de-
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vices already well known; and therefore it is not patentable.

This argument would be sound if the combination claimed

by Webster w r as an obvious one for attaining the advantages

proposed, one which would occur to any mechanic skilled

in the art. But it is plain from the evidence, and from the

very fact that it was not sooner adopted and used, that it did

not for years occur in this light to even the most skilful per-

sons. It may have been under their very eyes; they may al-

most be said to have stumbled over it; but they certainly

failed to see it, to estimate its value, and to bring it into

notice, Who was the first to see it, to understand its value,

to give it shape and form, to bring it into notice and urge its

adoption, is a question to which we shall shortly give our

attention. At this point we are constrained to say that we

cannot yield our assent to the argument, that the combination

of the different parts or elements for attaining the object in

view was so obvious as to merit no title to invention. Now

that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to any one that

he could have done it as well. This is often the case with

patented . article is not always to be relied on. Qther causes,
such as the enterprise of the vendors, and the resort to lavish
expenditures in advertising, may cooperate to promote a large
marketable demand. Yet, as was well said by Mr. Justice
Brown, in the case of Consolidated Brake-Shoe Co. v. Detroit
Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 894, 'When the other facts in the case leave
the question of invention in doubt, the fact that the device
has gone into general use and has displaced other devices
which had previously been employed for analogous uses, is
sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the existence of invention.'
"Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580, 591, was . a case
where the patented device consisted in a slight modification of
existing mechanism, and it was contended that this slight
change did not constitute a patentable invention; but this view
did not prevail, the court saying: 'It is further argued, .howtver, that supposing the devices to be sufficiently described,
they do not show . any invention; and that the- combination
set forth in the fifth claim is a mere aggregation of old devices already well knowri; and therefore it is not patentable.
This argt1ment would be sound if the combination claimed
by webster was an obvious one for attaining the advantages
proposed,-one which would occur to any mechanic skilled
in the art. But it is plain from the evidence, and from the
very fact that it was not sooner adopted and used, that it did
not for years occur in this light to even the .m ost skilful persons. It may have been under their very eyes; they may almost be said to have stumbled over it; but they certainly
failed to see it, to estimate its value, and to bring it into
notice Who was the first to see it, to understand its value,
to give it shape and form, to bring it ·into notice and urge its
adoption, is a question to which we shall shortly give our
attention. At this point we are constrained to say that we
cannot yield our assent to the argument, that the combination
of the different parts or elements for attaining the object in
view was so obvious as to merit no title to invention. Now
that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to any one that
he could have done it as well. This is often the case with
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inventions of the greatest merit. It may be laid down as a
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general rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that if a

new combination and arrangement of known elements pro-

inventions of the greatest mei;it. H may be laid down as a
general rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that if a
new combination and arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial result never attained before, it is
evidence of invention. It was certainly a new and useful result to make a loom produce fifty yards a day when it never
before had produced more than forty; and we think that the
combination of elements by which this was effected, even if
those elements were separately known before, was invention
·
sufficient to form the basis of a patent.' " 113
But the utility of a device can not be relied on absolutely
as indicative of invention. It may not at all indicate a ne~d
that was unsatisfied. The demand may have arisen out of
recent changes in conditions, and have been at once supplied.
An 11lustration of this is seen in the case of Falk Mfg. Co.

duce a new and beneficial result never attained before, it is

evidence of invention. It was certainly a new and useful re-

sult to make a loom produce fifty yards a day when it never

before had produced more than forty; and we think that the

combination of elements by which this was effected, even if

those elements were separately known before, was invention

sufficient to form the basis of a patent.' " 113

But the utility of a device can not be relied on absolutely

as indicative of invention. It may not at all indicate a need

that was unsatisfied. The demand may have arisen out of

recent changes in conditions, and have been at once supplied.

An illustration of this is seen in the case of Falk Mfg. Co.

113 Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59, 72. "Such an increased

utility, beyond what had been attained by devices previously in use, in

cases of doubt, is usually regarded as determining the question of inven-

tion." Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. S. 275, "There are many instances in
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the reported decisions of this court where a monopoly has been sustained

in favor of the last of a series of inventors all of whom were groping to

attain a certain result, which only the last one of the number seemed able

to grasp." Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, 381; Adams

v. Howard, 19 Fed. 317, 318, "The defense that the patent is anticipated

by the lantern described in the prior application for a patent by Anthony

M. Duburn is not tenable, because there is no evidence, except his appli-

cation for a patent, that he ever invented such a lantern. It was con-

113 Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., II3 U. S. 59, 72. "Such an increased
utility, beyond what had been attained by devices previously in use, in
cases of doubt, is usually regarded as -determining the question of inven~
tion." Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. S. 275, "There are many instances in
the reported decisions of this court where a · monopoly has been sustained
in favor of the fast of a series of inventors all of whom were groping to
attain a certain result, which only the last one of the number seemed able
to grasp." Expanded . Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, 381; Adams
v. Howard, 19 Fed. 317, 318, "The defense that the patent is anticipated
by the lantern described in the prior application for a patent by Anthony
M. Duburn is not tenable, because there is no evidence, except his application for a patent, that he ever invented such a lantern. It was conceded by his solicitors upon the application that the model accompanying
his application would not answer for use as a lantern, although it was
sufficient to illustrate the construction of the device; and the examiner in
charge condemned the model as inoperative. As there i no evidence in
the case to show that such a lantern as was described in the appJjcation
and illustrated by the model was ever actually con tructed by Duburn,
ufficient does not appear to defeat the novelty of Irwin's invention."
American Caramel Co. v. Tho . Mill & Bro., 149 ~ed. 743 · Carnegie Steel
Co. v. Cambria Iron Company, 185 U. S. 403, 429; Magowan v. New York
Belting Co. , 141 U. . 332 · iamond Rubber Co. v. Con otidated Tire Co.,
220 U. S. 428, "It (the law) regards a change as evidence of novelty,
the acceptance and utility of a change as a further evidence, even a
demonstration." "Litigation shows and measures the exi tence of the
public demand for it use."

ceded by his solicitors upon the application that the model accompanying

his application would not answer for use as a lantern, although it was

sufficient to illustrate the construction of the device; and the examiner in

charge condemned the model as inoperative. As there is no evidence in

the case to show that such a lantern as was described in the application

and illustrated by the model was ever actually constructed by Duburn,

sufficient does not appear to defeat the novelty of Irwin's invention."

American Caramel Co. v. Thos. Mills & Bro., 149 Fed. 743 ; Carnegie Steel

Co. v. Cambria Iron Company, 185 U. S. 403, 429; Magowan v. New York

Belting Co., 141 U. S. 332 ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co.,

220 U. S. 428, "It (the law) regards a change as evidence of novelty,

the acceptance and utility of a change as a further evidence, even as

demonstration." "Litigation shows and measures the existence of the

public demand for its use."

IT
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v. Missouri R. R. Co. 114 The device here involved was for

welding steel rail- joints, and it varied but little from other

well-known devices. It was argued that the patent was valid,

despite this resemblance, because the extent to which the de-

vice was used, especially for welding electric streetcar rails,

proved its character as an invention. The court held how-

ever, that the utility was due to the fact that electric street

car rails had come into general use only recently, and was

not due to the fact that the device filled a long-felt want. 115

A warning against the overvaluation of utility as an indi-

cation of invention, has been issued by the Supreme Court,

which says, 116 "Counsel for the plaintiff in the case under con-

sideration has argued most earnestly that the only practical

test of invention is the effect of the device upon the useful

arts in other words, that utility is the sole test of invention,

and, inferentially at least, that the utility of a device is con-

clusively proven by the extent to which it has gone into gen-

eral use. He cited in this connection certain English cases

which go far to support his contention. These cases, how-
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ever, must not be construed in such way as to control the

language of our statute, which limits the benefits of patent

laws to things which are new as well as useful. By the com-

mon law of England, an importer the person who intro-

duced into the kingdom from any foreign country any useful

manufacture was as much entitled to a monopoly as if he

114 103 Fed. 295.

115 The court said, of the general topic, "The utility of a machine, article

of manufacture, process, or an improvement thereof, is only allowed to

turn the scale in favor of its patentability in those instances where the

question whether the inventive faculty has been exercised is balanced

with doubt and uncertainty. In such cases the conceded utility of a

patented machine or process, or an improvement thereof, may well be

allowed to sustain the patent; but conceded utility can not be permitted

to have that effect in a case like the one in hand, where the process whicli

is described and claimed as new is clearly old." Duer v. Corbin Lock Co.,

149 U. S. 216, "The mere fact that a patented article is popular and meets

with large and increasing sales is unimportant when the alleged invention

is clearly without patentable novelty."

116 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 427.

v. Missouri R. R. Co. 114 The device here involved was for
welding steel rail-joints, and it varied but little from other
well-known devices. It was argued that the patent was valid,
despite this resemblance, because the extent to which the device was used, especially for welding electric streetcar rails,
proved its character as an invention. The court held however, that the utility was due to the fact that electric street
car rails had come into general use only re.cently, and was
not due to the fact that the device filled a long-felt want. 115
A warning against the overvaluation of utility as an indication of invention, has been issued by the Supreme Court,
which says, 116 "Counsel for the plaintiff in the case under consideration has argued - most earnestly that the only practical
test of invention is .the effect of the device upon the useful
arts-in other words, that utility is the sole test of invention.
and, inferentially at least, that the utility of a device is conclusively proven by the extent to which it has gone into general use. He cited in this connection certain English cases
vvhich go far to support his contention. These cases, howtver, must not be construed in such way as to control the
languag~ of our statute, which limits the benefits of patent
laws to things which are new as well as useful. By the common law _of England, an importer-the person who introduced into the kingdom from any foreign country any useful
manufacture-was as much entitled to a monopoly as if he
114

103 Fed. 295.
The court said, of the general topic, "The utility of a machine, article
of manufacture, process, or . an impr:-ovement thereof, is only allowed to
turn the scale ~n favor of its patentability ih those instances where the
question whether the inventive faculty has been exercised is balanced
with doubt and uncertainty. In such cases the conceded utility of a
patented machine· or process, or an improvement thereof, may well be
allowed to sustain the patent; but conceded utility can not be permitted
to have that effect in a case like the one in hand, where the proce·ss which
is described and claimed as new is clearly old." Duer v. Corbin Lock Co.,
149 U. S. 216, "The mere fact that a patented article is popular and meets
with large and increasing sales is unimportant when the alleged invention
is clearly without patentable novelty."
116 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 427.
115
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had invented it. It is evident that these principles have no

application to the patent system of the United States, whose

Pa.tents and Inventions

65

beneficence is strictly limited to the invention of what is new

and useful, and that the English cases construing even their

more recent acts, must be received with some qualification.

That the extent to which a patented device has gone into

use is an unsafe criterion even of its actual utility, is evident

from the fact that the general introduction of manufactured

articles is as often effected by extensive and judicious ad-

vertising, activity in putting the goods upon the market and

large commissions to dealers, as by the intrinsic merit of the

articles themselves. The popularity of a proprietary medi-

cine, for instance, would be an unsafe criterion of its real

value, since it is a notorious fact that the extent to which such

preparations are sold is very largely dependent upon the lib-

erality with which they are advertised, and the attractive man-

ner in which they are put up and exposed to the eye of the pur-

chaser. If the generality of sales were made the test of patent-

ability, it would result that a person by securing a patent upon
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some trifling variation from previously known methods might,

by energy in pushing sales or by superiority in finishing or

decorating his goods, drive competitors out of the market and

secure a practical monopoly, without in fact having made the

slightest contribution of value to the useful arts. The very

case under consideration is not barren of testimony that the

great success of the McClain pads and clasping hooks, a large

demand for which seems to have arisen and increased year by

year, is due, partly at least, to the fact that he was the only

one who made the manufacture of sweat pads a specialty, that

he made them of a superior quality, advertised them in the

most extensive and attractive manner, and adopted means of

pushing them upon the market, and thereby largely increased

the extent of their sales. Indeed it is impossible from this tes-

timony to say how far the large sales of these 1 pads is due to

their superiority to others, or to the energy with which they

were forced upon the market. While this court has held in

a number of cases, even so late as Magowan v. The New York

Belting and Packing Co., ante, 332, decided at the present term,

had invented it. It is evident that these principles have no
application to the patent system of the United States, whose
beneficence is strictly limited to the invention of what is new
and u eful, and that the English cases con:truing e\ en their
more recent acts, must be received with some qualification.
That the extent to which a patented device has gone into
use is an unsafe criterion even of its actual utility, is evident
from the fact that the general intr duction of manufactured
articles is as often effected by extensive and judicious advertising, activity in putting the goods upon the market and
large commissions to dealers, as by the intrinsic merit of the
articles themselves. The popularity of a proprietary medicine, for instance, would be an unsafe criterion of its real
value, since it is a notorious fact that the extent to which such
preparations are sold is very largely dependent upon the liberality with which they are advertised, and the attractive manner in which they are put up and exposed to the eye of the purchaser. If the generality.of sales were made the test of patentability, it would result that a person by securing a patent upon
some trifling variation from previously known methods might,
by energy in pushing sales or by superiority in finishing or
decorating his goods, drive competitors out of the market and
secure a practical monopoly, without in fact having made the
slightest contribution of value to the useful arts. The very
case under consideration is not barren of testimony that the
great success of the McClain pads and clasping hooks, a large
demand for which seems to have arisen and increased year by
year, is due, partly at least, to the fact that he was the only
one who 'made the manufacture of sweat pads a specialty, that
he made them of a superior quality, advertised them in the
most extensive and attractive manner and adopted means of
pushing them upon the market, and thereby largely increased
the extent of their sales. Indeed it is impossible from this testimony to ay how far the large sales of these pads is due to
their superiority to others, or to the energy with which they
were forced upon the market. While this court has held in
a number of case , even so late as Magowan v. The New York
Belting and Packing Co. a.nte) 332, decided at the pre ent term,
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that in a doubtful case the fact that a patented article had gone

into general use is evidence of its utility, it is not conclusive

even of that much less of its patentable novelty."

The weight of such a factor is therefore absolutely inde-

terminate. Indeed, it is not altogether possible to delimit the

extent to which utility and public appreciation of a device ac-

tually influence the courts to declare the device an invention,

from a mere judicial use of such matters to bolster up an inde-

pendent conclusion of patentability. A recent case well in-

dicates the difference in effect of such a factor. 117 The Circuit

Court of Appeals 118 held the device to be lacking in inventive

novelty and reversed the decision of the District Court, which

had sustained the patent. This court in deciding invention to

be lacking, said, "The decision of the court below appears to

have been largely influenced by the consideration that the

appellees' patent had gone into extensive and successful use.

The fact that a patented device or process has gone into ex-

tensive and successful use is often of value in determining the

question of invention and patentability. It is referred to for
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the purpose of turning the scales in cases of grave doubt. It

is of no value whatever where the question of the invention or

patentability is free from doubt, and in any case its value de-

pends largely upon the causes which produced it. It is often

due to business ability in manufacturing, exploiting, and ad-

vertising, and to the fact that prior conditions have not stimu-

lated development. The appellees' process, originally patented

in Great Britain, has been installed in Australia, Sweden, Fin-

land, Chile, and Wales, and it is in the process of installation in

Cuba. It is not improbable that in those countries the prior

art may have been substantially unknown, and it is possible

that the appellees' success there is referable to the fact alleged

in the bill." The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Circuit

Court of appeals, and as one reason for so doing said, the pro-

cess "promptly came into extensive use for the concentration

of ores in most if not all of the principal mining countries of

the world, notably in the United States, Australia, Sweden,

117 Hyde v. Minerals Separation Co., 242 U. S. 261.

118 214 F. 100.

that in a doubtful case the .fact that a patented article had gone
into general use is evidence of its utility, it is riot conclusive
even of that-much less of its patentable novelty."
The weight of such a factor is therefore absolutely indeterminate. Indeed, it is not altogether possible to delimit the
extent to which utility and public appreciation of a device actually influence the courts to declare the device an invention,
from a mere judicial use of such matters to bolster up an independent conclusion of patentability. A recent case well indicates the difference in effect of such a factor. 117 The Circuit
Court of A ppeals 118 held the device 1.o be lacking in inventive
novelty and reversed the decision of the District Court, which
had sustained the patent. This court in deciding invention to
be lacking, said, "The decision of the court ~elow appears to
have been· largely influenced by the consideration that the
appellees' patent had gone into extensive and success£ ul use.
The fact that a pat.e nted device or process has gone into extensive and successful use is often of value in determining the
question of invention and patentability. It is referred to for
the purpose of turning the scales in cases of grave doubt. It
is of no value whatever where the question of the inventiDn -0r
patentability is free from doubt, and in any case its value depends largely upon · the causes which produced it. It is often
due to business ability in manufacturing, exploiting, and advertising, and to the fact that prior conditions have not stimulated development. The appellees' process, originally patented
in Great Britain, has been installed in Australia, Sweden, Finland, Chile, and Wales, and it is in the process of installation in
Cuba. It is not improbable that in those countries the prior
art may have been substantially unknown, and it is possible
that the appellees' success there is referable to the fact alleged
in the bill." The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Circuit
Court of appeals, and as one reason for so doing said, the process "promptly came into extensive use for the concentration
of ores in most if not all of the principal mining countries of
the world, nqtably in the United States, Australia, Sweden,
111

Hyde v. Minerals Separation Co., 242 U. S. 261.

118 214
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Chile and Cuba and . . . because of its economy and simplic-

ity it has largely replaced all earlier processes. This of itself

68
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is persuasive evidence of that invention which it is the purpose

of the patent laws to reward and protect." 119 Thus we find

the same fact disregarded by one court and given considerable

influence by another, because the reason why the device had

been so generally adopted was not made clear by counsel but

was left to the court's own guess.

The opinion of experts is supposed to have considerable

weight in the court's conclusion. Their testimony may be

heard by the court and usually is heard as a matter of course.

The expert's true function is to explain and interpret techni-

cal matters, and generally to elucidate the principles of the

patented contrivance, and their difference from or resemblance

to those of other contrivances. But the expert may also be

asked his opinion upon the ultimate issue as to whether the

particular device differs from others in such a way as to have

resulted from inventive genius. 119a

119 Doig v. Morgan Mach. Co., 59 C. C. A. 616; Grant v. Walter, 148
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U. S. 547; Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U. S. 139, "The argument

drawn from the commercial success of a patented article is not always to

be relied upon. Other causes such as the enterprise of the vendors and

the resort to large expenditures in advertising, may cooperate to promote

a large marketable demand." Apple v. Am. Shoe Mach. Co. 232 Fed. 603.

1198 If it be true that the presence or absence of "invention" is a ques-

tion of "law" for the court, rather than of fact for the jury, a mere wit-

ness ought not to be permitted to give his opinion in regard to it. It is

a conclusion for the judicial mind alone, based on all the evidentiary facts

of the case. Even if the question of invention be treated as one of fact

rather than of law, it is nevertheless the ultimate issue in the case. An

Chile and Cuba and . . . because of its economy and simplicity it has largely replaced all earlier processes. This of itself
is persuasive evidence of that invention which it is the purpose
of the patent laws to reward and protect." 119 Thus we find
the same fact disregarded by one court and given considerable
influence by another, because the reason why the device had
been so generally adopted was not made clear by counsel but
was left to the court's own guess.
The opinion of experts is supposed to have considerable
weight in the court's conclusion. Their testimony may be
heard by the court and usually is heard as a matter of course.
The expert's trne function is to explain and interpret technical matters, and generally to elucidate the principles of the
patented contrivance, and their difference from or resemblance
to those of other contrivances. But the expert may also be
asked his opinion upon the ultimate issue as to whether the
particular device differs from others in such a way as to have
resulted from inventive genius. 119 n

answer to it is not a basis for the decision; it is the decision itself. To

ask a witness his opinion as to the presence or absence of invention in

the concept in question, would be to ask him his opinion as to how the

court should decide the case, or what verdict the jury should bring in.

There is some conflict of authority, in cases relating to other branches

of law, as to whether such a question, whose answer "usurps the function

of the jury" is permissible. On the whole, it seems to be proper. Cham-

berlayne, Evidence sec. 1820; Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1921.

The point seems never to have been passed upon precisely in relation

to inventions, but it is clear that courts do in fact admit the opinions of

Doig v. Morgan Mach. Co., 59 C. C. A. 6!6; Grant v. Walter, 148
U. S. 547; Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U. S. 139, "The argument
drawn from the commercial success of a patented article is not always to
be relied upon. Other causes such as the enterprise of the vendors and
the resort to large expenditures in advertising, may cooperate to promote
a large marketable demand." Apple v. Am. Shoe Mach. Co. 232 Fed. 6o3.
11 9 a If it be true that the presence or absence of "invention" is a question of "law" for the court, rather than of fact for the jury, a mere witness ought not to be permitted to give his opinion in regard to it. It is
2 conclusion for the judicial mind alone, based on all the evidentiary facts
of the case. Even if the question of invention be treated as one of fact
rather than of law, it is nevertheless the ultimate issue in the case. A~
answer to it is not a basis for the decision; it is the decision itself. To
ask a witness his opinion as to the presence or absence of invention in
the concept in question, would be to ask him his. opinion as to how the
court should decide the case, or what verdict the jury should bring in.
There is some conflict of authority, in cases relating to other branches
of law, as to whether such a question, whose answer "usurps the function
of the jury" is permis ible. On the whole, it eems to be proper. Chamberlayne, Evidence sec. 1820; Wigmore on Evidence, ec. 1921.
The point seems neyer to have been passed upon precisely in relation
to inventions, but it i clear that ·courts do in fact admit the opinion of
11 9
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The personality and mental equipment of the particular

judge by whom the issue is decided undoubtedly has influence

upon the answer. A judge who can not drive a nail, to whom

a mechanical toy is an inexplicable mystery, and chemistry in-

comprehensible, will naturally tend to find invention in that

which a more technically trained judge would recognize as

mere mechanical skill. The reports show that certain judges

experts in regard to the presence or absence of invention. Ideal Stopper

Co. v. Crown Cork, etc. Co. 131 Fed. 244.

The opinion of experts in regard to the facts from which the ultimate

conclusion of invention or non-invention is to be derived may of course

be given. Thus, witnesses may point out and explain the features and

The personality and mental equipment of the particular
judge by whom the. issue is decided undoubtedly has influence
upon the answer. A judge who can not drive a nail, to whom
a mechanical toy is an inexplicable mystery, and chemistry incomprehensible, will naturally tend to find invention in that
which a more technically trained judge would recognize as
mere mechanical skill. The reports show that certain judges

characteristics of the device which is described in the patent, and may

state the extent to which any or all of these were already known before

the alleged invention. They may also point out to the court or jury the

essential as well as formal similarity and difference between an alleged

invention and the already known art, or between two particular devices.

"Experts may be examined to explain terms of art, and the state of the

art, at any given time. They may explain to the court and jury the
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machines, models, or drawings, exhibited. They may point out the dif-

ference or identity of the mechanical devices involved in their construc-

tion. The maxim of 'cuique in sua arte credum' permits them to be ex-

amined to questions of art or science peculiar to their trade or profes-

sion ; but professors or mechanics can not be received to prove to the

court or jury what is the proper or legal construction of any instrument

of writing." Winans v. New York & E. R. Co. 21 How. 88, 100. Com-

mercial Mfg. Co. v. Fairbank Co., 135 U. S. 176, 187. In National Cash

Reg. Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502, objection was raised because an expert

was asked to say whether a certain part of one machine was an "equiva-

lent" of a part of another machine. The court held the question proper,

saying, "The mechanism . . . was complicated, and an ordinary man un-

skilled in mechanics, might well have failed to understand it completely.

It was proper, therefore, that a witness skilled in mechanics and under-

standing the term 'mechanical equivalent,' should be allowed to express

to the jury his opinion of the relation of one machine to the other, subject

to further direct examination and to cross examination, in order to bring

out more clearly the grounds of his opinion." But compare Osgood

Dredge Co. v. Metropolitan etc. Co.,. 75 Fed. 670; Jackson v. Allen, 120

Mass. 64.

So, also, experts may be asked whether or not the patent does reveal

anything definite and, if so, just what it is. As stated in the text a patent

which does not describe some real, comprehensible concept is a nullity, but

the description need not be such as is clear to an untrained person. If it

experts in regard to the presence or absence of invention. Ideal Stopper
Co. v. Crown Cork, etc. Co. 131 Fed. 244.
The opinion of experts in regard to the facts from which the ultimate
conclusion of invention or non-invention is to be derived may of course
be given. Thus, witnesses may point out and explain the features and
characteristics of the device- which is described in the patent, and may
state the extent to which any or all of these were already known before
the alleged invention. They may also point out to the court or jury the
essential as well as formal similarity and difference between an alleged
invention and the already known art, or between two particular devices.
"Experts may be examined to explain terms of art, and the state of the
art, at any given time. They may explain to the court and jury the
machines, models, or drawings, exhibited. They may point out the difference or identity of the mechanical devices involved in their construction. The maxim of 'cuique in sua arte credum' permits them to be examined to questions of art or science peculiar to their trade or profession; but professors or mechanics can not be received to prove to the
court or jury what is the proper or legal construction of any instrument
of writing." Winans v. New York & E. R. Co. 21 How. 88, 100. Co'mmercial Mfg. Co. v. Fairbank Co., 135 U. S. 176, 187. In National Cash
Reg. Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502, objection was raised because an expert
was asked to say whether a certain part of one machine was an "equivalent" of a part of another machine. The court held the question proper,
saying, "The mechanism ... was complicated, and an ordinary man unskilled in mechanics, might well have failed to understand it completely.
It was proper, therefore, that a witness skilled in mechanics and understanding the term 'mechanical equivalent,' should be allowed to express
to the jury his opinion of the relation of one machine to the other, subject
to further direct examination and to cross examination, in order to bring
out more clearly the grounds of his opinion." But compare Osgood
Dredge Co. v. Metropolitan etc. Co.,. 75 Fed. 670; Jackson v. Alim, 120
Mass. 64.
So, also, experts may be asked whether or not the patent does reveal
anything definite and, if so, just what it is. As stated in the text a patent
which does not describe some real, comprehensible concept is a nullity, but
the description need not be such as is clear to an untrained person. If it
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have more often decided in favor of the presence of invention

Patents and Inventions

than against it, while others have the more often decided ad-

versely to invention. One judge by whom many decisions

have been rendered is well known among his friends to be lack-

ing in any mechanical ability, and to hit the nail on the thumb

more often than on the head. To one who has read many of

conveys a clear idea to persons skilled in the particular subject matter,

that is sufficient. It follows therefore that experts may be asked whether

the description is clear to them, and to translate it, as it were. See Loom

Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580.

It is not only permissible for experts to give their opinion on these

have more often decided in favor of the presence of invention
than against it, while others have the more often decided adversely to invention. One judge by whom many decisions
have been rendered is well known among his friends to be lacking in any mechanical ability, ai:id to hit the nail on the thumb
more often than on the head. To one who has read many of

matters, but it is expressly desired by courts in abstruse and technical

matters. Thus the court in Dececo Co. v. George E. Gilchrist Co., 125

Fed. 293, 296, said, "There may be, and there probably is, an underlying

suggestion applicable to both Mann and the present inventors which is

fundamental, and which was first put to use in this art by the former.

We are lacking, in this case, any explanation of the operation of either

device by any scientific person, capable of applying and making clear the

laws of pneumatics and hydraulics, each of which sciences are here in-
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volved in an occult manner. ... In the absence of the scientific explana-

tion which we say is not in the record, we are unable to find this propo-

sition proved. "Expert testimony should be introduced when difficult tech-

nical questions are involved. Fay v. Mason, 127 Fed. 325 ; Greene v.

Buckley, 135 Fed. 520.

But courts are, of course, not in any way bound by the testimony and

opinions of experts. "The admission of an expert witness is, of course,

entitled to weight in the interpretation of technical terms employed in a

patent. But the court is not necessarily concluded by such interpretation

when other satisfactory evidence is available." Panzl v. Battle, eta Co.,

138 Fed. 48. "Opinions of experts generally, though given under oath, are

but arguments in behalf of the side calling them." Ideal Stopper Co. v.

Crown Cork, etc. Co., 131 Fed. 244, 249; Winans v. New York & E. R. R.

Co., 21 How. 88. Indeed there is occasional judicial suggestion of a

feeling of general unreliability in expert testimony. "Unhappily we can-

not accept without reservation the opinions of the experts who have been

examined as witnesses, for they are necessarily partizans of the side call-

ing them, and essentially advocates, and their opinions are contradictory,

and tend to perplex, instead of elucidating, although they appear to be

gentlemen of great ability and deserved eminence." Ideal Stopper Co.

v. Crown Cork, etc. Co., 131 Fed. 244.

One can find in the opinions suggestions of possible value to witnesses.

For instance, "If the expert who is called to testify in such cases would

only appreciate that he is not addressing electrical engineers, but laymen,

conveys a clear idea to persons skilled in the particular subject matter,
that is sufficient. It follows therefore that experts may be asked whether
the description is clear to them, and to translate it, as it were. See Loom
Co. v. Higgins, 105· U. S. 58o.
It is not only permissible for experts to give their opinion on these
matters, but it is expressly desired by courts in abstruse and technical
matters. Thus the court in D ececo Co. v. George E. Gilchrist Co., 125
Fed. 293, 296, said, "There may be, and there probably is, an underlying
suggestion applicable to both Mann and the present inventors which is
fundamental, and which was first put to use in this art by the former.
We are lacking, in this case, any explanation of the operation of either
device by any scientific person, capable of applying and making clear the
laws of pneumatics and hydraulics, each of whkh sciences · are here involved in an occult manner . . . . In the absence of the scientific explanation which we say is not in the record, we are unable to find this proposition proved. "Expert testimony should be introduced when difficult technical questions are involved. Fay v. Mason, 127 Fed. 325; Greene v.
Bi4-ckley, 135 Fed. 520.
But courts are, of course, not in any way bound cy the testimony and
opinions of experts. "The admission of an expert witness is, of course,
entitled to weight in the interpretation of technical terms employed in a
patent. But the court is not necessarily concluded by such interpretation
when other satisfactory evidence is available." Panzl v. Battle, etc: Co.,
138 Fed. 48. "Opinions of experts generally, though given under oath, are
but arguments in behalf of the side calling them." Ideal Stopper Co. v.
Crown Cork, etc. Co., 131 Fed. 244, 249; Winans v. New York & E. R.R.
Co., 21 How. 88. Indeed there is occasional judicial suggestion of a
feeling of general unreliability in expert testimony. "Unhappily we cannot accept without reservation the opinions of the experts who have been
examined as witnesses, for they are necessarily partizans of the side calling them, and essentially advocates, and their opinions are contradictory,
and tend to perplex, instead of elucidating, although they appear to be
gentlemen of great ability and deserved eminence." Ideal Stopper Co.
v. Crown Cork, etc. Co., 131 Fed. 244.
One can find in the opinions suggestions of possible value to witnesses ..
For instance, "If the expert who is called to testify in such cases would
only appreciate that he is not addressing electrical engineers, but laymen,
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his decisions it is apparent that he tends to find invention in

anything mechanically ingenious, and to be loath to see in-

fringement where there is great material change. On the other

hand, another judge whose opinions indicate a highly tech-

nical education, is obviously conservative about dignifying a

production with the name of invention and very ready in hold-

ing an invention to have been infringed. It is, of course, per-

fectly reasonable that what might seem to an untrained mind

impossible of conception by any one but an inspired genius,

and if, when undertaking to describe what some particular patent showed

to a man skilled in the art, he would take the specifications and drawings

of the patent as his text, instead of some conventional paraphrase of his

own devising with its lettering entirely changed, he would materially

lighten the labor of the court." Western Elec. Co. v. Rochester Tel. Co.,

his decisions it is apparent that he tends to find invention in
anything mechanically ingenious, and to be loath to see infringement where there is great material change. On the other
hand, another judge whose opinions indicate a highly technical education, is obviously conservative about dignifying a
productiorr with the name of invention and very ready in holding an invention to have been infringed. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable that what might seem to an untrained mind
impossible of conception by any one but an inspired genius,

145 Fed. 41. Again there is pertinent suggestion, in Bene v. Jeantet, 129

U. S. 683, in the fact that although one witness testified as a matter of

theory that a certain alleged anticipation could not work, the court decided

against his proposition because an opposing witness testified that he had

made a device according to the description of the alleged anticipation
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which did actually work.

One frequent fault of expert testimony is its prolixity and volume. In

Columbia Motor Car Co. v. Duerr, 184 Fed. 893, where the only question

involved was whether the modern Otto type of compression gas engine

was essentially identical with the old Erayton type, the record of the

case filled 36 large volumes. In Am. Stove Co. v. Cleveland Foundry

Co., 158 Fed. 978, the court, in commenting upon another long record of

expert testimony, said, "As a contest between gentlemen learned in the

science .of the subject, it might be interesting if one had leisure, though

it seems sometimes to run into very attenuated points. This prolixity

seems not so much the fault of the witnesses as a mistake of the counsel.

It is not the province of witnesses to advocate the cause of the party who

calls him, nor to pass upon the questions of law and facts presented by

the controversy. Frequently, an expert witness may be of much aid to

the court in explaining matters which can only be appreciated and un-

derstood by learning higher than the ordinary; but his province is to in-

struct and not to decide ; and even the instruction is of uncertain value

when it is colored from standing in the place of a partisan for one of the

parties."

The last sentences of this opinion are quite worth noting: "Usually the

testimony of one competent witness on each side is enough to insure a

full and fair elucidation of what is recondite in the case. The voice of

a single teacher is worth more than a confusion of many tongues. And

the expense is worse than useless."

and if, when undertaking to describe what some particular patent showed
to a man skilled in the art, he would take the specifications and drawings
of the patent as his text, instead of some conventional paraphrase of his
own devising with its lettering entirely changed, he would materially
lighten the labor of the court." Western Elec. Co. v. Rochester Te.Z. Co.,
145 Fed. 41. Again there is pertinent suggestion, in Bene v. Jeantet, 129
U. S. 683, in the fact that although one witness testified as a matter of
theory that a certain alleged anticipation could not work, the court decided
against his proposition because an opposiug witness testified that he had
made a device according to the description of the alleged anticipation
which did actually work.
· One frequent fault of expert testimony is its prolixity and volume. In
Colwnibia Motor Car Co. v. Duerr, 184 Fed. 893, where the only question
involved was whether the modern Otto type of compression gas engine
was essentially identical with the old Brayton type, the record of the
case filled 36 large volumes. In Am,. Stove Co. v. Cleveland Foundry
Co., 158 Fed. 978, the court, in commenting upon another long record of
expert testimony, said, "As a contest between gentlemen learned in the
science of the subject, it might be interesting if one had leisure, though
it seems sometimes to run into very attenuated points. This prolixity
seems not so much the fault of the witnesses as a mistake of the counsel.
It is not the province of witn~sses to advocate the caus~ of the party who
calls him, nor to pass upon the questions of law and facts presented by
the controversy. Frequently, an expert witness may be of much aid to
the court in explaining matters which can only be appreciated and understood by learning higher than the ordinary ; but his province is to instruct and not to decide; and even the instruction is of uncertain value
when it is colored from standing in the place of a partisan for one of the
parties."
The last sentences of this opinion are quite worth noting: "Usually the
testimony of one competent witness on each side is enough to insure a
full and fair elucidation of what is recondite in the case. The voice of
a single teacher is worth more than a confusion of many tongues. And
the expense is worse than useless."
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would be to a mind skilled in the art, nothing but the mechani-
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cal answer to recent call. The reality of the influence of the

human factor upon the result is indubitably demonstrated by

the very many flatly conflicting decisions upon the same state

of facts in different circuits. A number of illustrations of

such divergence of personal conclusion are noted in a later sec-

tion. This influence of the unusual upon the result is sug-

gested by the words of Mr. Justice McKenna, in giving very

favorable interpretation to a recent patent. The device cov-

ered by it was a gas check for large breech-loading guns. It

had to withstand enormous pressure and great heat, yet it was

made of tallow and asbestos. "If our purpose was specula-

tive," said he, "not practical, we might pause to wonder how

such substances could produce such results under the conditions

to which they are subjected, and by wondering we express in

a way the quality of the invention." 120 This intrusion of di-

verse personalities into the decisions in patent cases can not

help but make for even greater uncertainty of rights than is

inherent in other subjects depending upon opinion. It fur-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

nishes at least one argument in favor of a special court for the

adjudication of controversies arising under the patent laws.

The opinion of other courts of concurrent or lower jurisdic-

tion, even upon the same facts, is not of any compulsory effect

upon the court which is trying a case. The statutes contain

nothing upon the matter and the courts themselves have never

recognized any obligation to follow the decisions of their co-

adjudicators. 121 Neither are the decisions of other courts of

120 U. S. v. Anciens Etablissements, 224 U. S. 309, 323. As indicative

of the effect of personality on the result, compare the different decisions

of an United States court and an English one upon the same facts, in

Haskell Golf Ball Co. v. Perfect, etc. Co., 143 Fed. 128 and 25 R. P. C.

194. The decision in the Selden Patent case, Columbia, etc. v. Duerr, 184

Fed. 893 is often said to have been affected by the court's disapproval of

the patentee's unconscionably long delay in procuring his patent.

For discussions of the proposal to establish a special court to try patent

cases, see The Report of the Committee on Pat. Law, Am. Bar Assn.,

1910, 43 Chi. Legal News, 63; Editorials, 20 Green Bag 203, 22 Id. 408;

H. K. Wagner, in 21 Case & Comment 265.

121 Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61 Fed. 834; Rubber Tire

Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed 358.

would be to a mind skilled in the art, nothing but the mechanical answer to recent call. The reality of the influence of the
human factor upon the result is indubitably demonstrated by
the very many flatly conflicting decisions upon the same state
of facts in different circuits. A number of illustrations of
such divergence of personal conclusion are noted in a later section. This influence of the unusual upon the result is ·suggested by the words of Mr. Justice McKenna, in giving very
favorable interpretation to a recent patent. The device covered by it was a gas check for large breech-loading guns. It
~ad to withstand enorm01,1s pressure and great heat, yet it was
made of tallow and asbestos. "If our purpose was speculative," said he, "not practical, we might pause to wonder how
such substances could produce such results under the conditions
to which they are subjected, and by wondering we express in
a way the quality of the invention." 120 This intrusion of diverse personalities into the decisions in patent cases can not
help qut make for even greater uncertainty of rights than is
inherent in other subjects depending upon opinion. It fur-.
nishes at least one argument in favor of a special court for the
adjudication of controversies arising under the patent laws.
The opinion of other courts of concurrent or lower jurisdiction, even upon the same facts, is not of any compulsory effect
upon the court which is trying a case. The statutes contain
nothing upon the matter and the courts themselves have never
recognized any obligation to follow the decisions of their coadjudicators.121 Neither are the decisions of other courts of
120 U. S. v. Anciens Etablissements, 224 U. S. 30<), 323. As indicative
of the effect of personality on the result, compare the different decisions
of an United States court and. an English one upon the· same facts, in
Haskell Golf Ball Co. v. Perfect, etc. Co., 143 Fed. 128 and 25 R. P. C.
194· The decision in the Selden Patent case, Columbia, etc. v. Duerr, 184Fed. 8g3 is oft~n said to have been affected by the court's disapproval of
the patentee's unconscionably long delay in procuring his patent.
For discussions of the proposal to establish a special court to try patent
cases, see The Report of the Committee on Pat. Law, Am. Bar Assn.,
1910, 43 Chi. Legal News, 63; Editorials, 20 Green Bag 203, 22 Id. 4o8;
H. K. Wagner, in 21 Case & Comment 265.
121 Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61 Fed. 834; Rubber Tire
Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed 358.
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any appreciable practical influence upon the opinion of later
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judges. There is an occasional dictum to the effect that the

decision of other courts, especially of the lower courts which

are being reviewed, ought not to be overturned except upon

strong evidence. 122 But even these remarks are seldom found,

and there is a distressing frequency of patents which have been

held valid in one or more jurisdictions and invalid in others,

and the number of times a lower court is reversed upon its

opinion of the validity or scope of a patent is astonishing. 123

The opinion of a superior court, however, has at least a lit-

tle weight when another suit on the same patent Comes before

the lower court. 124

122 Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61 Fed. 834; Nat'l Fold'g Box

& Paper Co. v. Elsos, 65 Fed. 1001.

123 As examples see, Am. Stove Co. v. Cleveland Foundry Co., 158 Fed.

978; Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 151

Fed. 237. The patent involved in this case was held valid in four circuits,

(91 Fed. 978; 116 Fed. 629; 147 Fed. 739; and one unreported). Two of

these decisions were reversed and the patent held invalid by the Circuit
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Court of Appeals, (Goodyear Tire & Riibber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel

any appreciable practical influence upon the opinion of later
judges. There is an occasional dictum to the effect that the
decision of other courts, especially of the lower courts whieh
are being reviewed, ought not to be <;>verturned except upon
strong evidence. 122 But even these remarks are seldom found,
and there is a distressing frequency of patents which have been
held valid in .one or more jurisdictions and invalid in others,
and the number of times a lower court is reversed upon its
opinion of the validity or scope of a patent is astonishing. 123
The opinion of a superior court, however, has at least a little weight when another suit on the same patent comes before
the lower court. 124

Co., 116 Fed. 363; Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Victor Rubber Tire C., 123

Fed. 85) ; and a writ of certiorari to review one of these decisions was re-

fused by the Sup. Ct. (Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-

ber Co., 187 U. S. 641). The circuit court of appeals in the principal case

sustained the validity of the patent. Its validity was declared by the Su-

preme Court in Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220

U. S. 428, Approved, Rubber Tire Co. v. Goodyear Co., 232 U. S. 413;

Mayor of N. Y. v. American Cable Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 1016; Fireball Gas Co.

v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239 U. S. 156; 168. Compare also the con-

flicting opinions as to who was the real inventor, in 229 Fed. 730 and 234

Fed. 343.

124 Anderson Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Potts, 108 Fed. 379 ; Rawson v.

Western Sand Blast Co., 118 Fed. 575; Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Victor

Rubber Tire Co., 123 Fed. 85 ; Cramer v. Singer Mfg. Co., 147 Fed. 917.

When the issue concerns not the validity of a patent or its infringement

but merely the propriety of a temporary injunction it would seem that

final adjudications of other courts ought to have considerable influence.

That they do so, is stated in Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61

Fed. 834, 836, "It may be' difficult to formulate a rule that will comprehend

all the conditions which could be presented, but we think it safe to say

that in general, where the validity of a patent has been sustained by prior

adjudication upon final hearing, and after bona fide and strenuous con-

1 22 Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61 Fed. 834; Nat'l Fold'g Box
& Paper Co. v. Elsos, 65 Fed. lOOI . .
123 As examples see, Am. Stove Co. v. Cleveland Foundry Co., 158 Fed.
978; Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Firestone Tire &. Rubber Co., 151
Fed. 237. The patent involved in this case was held valid in four circuits,
(91 Fed. 978; n6 Fed. 629; 147 Fed. 739; and one unreported). Two of
these decisions were reversed and the patent held invalid by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, (Goodyear Tfre & Rtfbber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel
Co., l 16 Fed. 363; Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Victor Rubber Tire C., 123
Fed. 85) ; and a writ of certiorari to review one of these decisions was refused by the Sup. Ct. (Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire -& Rubber Co., 187 U. S. 641). The circuit court of appeals in the principal case
sustained the validity of the patent. Its validity was declared by the Supreme Court in Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220
U. S. 428, Approved, Rubber Tire Co. v. Goodyear Co., 232 U. S. 4i3;
Mayor of N. Y. v. American Cable Ry. Co., oo Fed. 1016; Fireball Gas Co.
v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239 U. S. 156; 168. Compare also the conflicting opinions as to who was the real inventor, in 229 Fed. 730 and. 234
Fed. 343.
124 Anderson Foundry & Mach~ Co. v. Potts, 108 Fed. 379; Rawson v.
Western Sand Blast Co., u8 Fed. 575; Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Victor
Rubber Tire Co., 123 Fed. 85; Cramer v. Singer Mfg. Co., 147 Fed. 917.
When the issue concerns not the validity of a patent or _its infringement
b.ut merely the propriety of a temporary injunction it would seem that
final adjudications of other courts ought to have co.nsiderable influence.
That they do so, is stated in Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Edison Elec. Lt. Co., 61
Fed. 834, 836, "It may be· difficult to formulate a rule that will comprehend
all the conditions which could be presented, but we think it safe to say
·that in general, where the validity of a patent has been sustained by prior
adjudication upon final hearing, and after bona fide and strenuous con-
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The weakness of influence of other adjudications is shown

1-l-

in the statement and proceedings of the Supreme Court in Rub-
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test, the matter of its validity upon motion for preliminary injunction is

The weakness of influence of other adjudication is shown
in the statement and proceedings of the Supreme Court in Rub-

no longer at issue, all defense, except that of infringement, being re-

served to the final hearing; subject, however, to the single exception that,

where a new defense is interposed, the evidence to support it must be so

test, the matter of its validity upon motion for preliminary injunction i
no longer at issue, all defense, except that of infringement, being reserved to the final hearing; subject, however, to the single exception that,
where a new defense is interposed, the evidence to :mpport it mu t be o
cogent and persuasive as to impre,,s the court with the conviction that,
if it had been presented and considered in the former case, it would
probably have availed to a contrary conclusion. In the consideration of
such new defense of anticipation, regard should be had to the rule that
such a defense is an affirmative one; that the burden of proof i upon
him who asserts it; and that the grant of letters patent is prim a f acie evidence that the patentee is the first inventor of the device described therein, and of its novelty. Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120; Smith v. Vulcanite
Co., 93 U. S. 486; Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S. 94; Cantrell v.
Wallick, II7 U. S. 689, 6 Sup. Ct., 970; Barbed-Wire Patent, 143 U. S.
275, 12 Sup. St. 443, 450. The propriety of this ruJc is enforced by the
consideration that an adjudication in the case of a patent is not only a
judgment inter partes, but is a judicial construction of a grant by the
government, and in a broad sense deals with and determines the rights
of the public. A patent is sui generis. By it the public, through its
authorized representatives, grants a monopoly for a term of years in
consideration of the surrender of the invention to public use upon expiration of the term. When, upon judicial contest, a competent court
has sanctioned the grant, and determined the right thereunder, the monopoly hereby granted ought not to be permitted to be invaded except
upon a clear showing that the decis~on invoked in its favor was wrong.
It is true that the prior adjudication doe not deal with the · supposed new
defense, and does not affect the merits of that defense upon final hearing; but the fact that it was not presented, especially where the existence
of the cla:m was known to and considered by coun ·el, is a circumstance
to be considered by the court in passing judgment upon the merit upon
the hearing for an interlocutory injunction. We are of opinion that the
rule wa correctly interpreted by the court below, and properly applied
to the case in hand. We are asked to determine the extent to which this
court should go in review of an exercise of d! cretion by the court below
in granting a preliminary injunction. There would seem to be some divergence of opinion in the circuit courts of appeals upon this question.
The cases of Dudley E. Jone Co. v. Munger, etc. Manuf'g Co., 2 U. S.
App. 188, l C. C. A. 668, and 50 Fed. 785, in the fifth circuit; Watch Co.
v. Robbins, 6 U. S. App. 275, 3 C. C. A. 103 and 52 Fed. 337, and Blount
v. Societe Anonyme du Filtre Chamberland Sy teme Pasteur. 6 U. S. App.
337, 3 C. C. A. 455, and .53 Fed. 98, in the ixth circuit; Con oEdated
Electric Storage Co. v. Accumulator C ., 3 U. S. App. 579, 5 C. C. A. 202,

cogent and persuasive as to impress the court with the conviction that,

if it had been presented and considered in the former case, it would

probably have availed to a contrary conclusion. In the consideration of

such new defense of anticipation, regard should be had to the rule that

such a defense is an affirmative one ; that the burden of proof is upon

him who asserts it; and that the grant of letters patent is frima facie evi-

dence that the patentee is the first inventor of the device described there-

in, and of its novelty. Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120; Smith v. Vulcanite

Co., 93 U. S. 486; Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S. 94; Cantrell v.

Wallick, 117 U. S. 689, 6 Sup. Ct., 970; Barbed- Wire Patent, 143 U. S.

275, 12 Sup. St. 443, 450. The propriety of this rule is enforced by the

consideration that an adjudication in the case of a patent is not only a

judgment inter partes, but is a judicial construction of a grant by the
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government, and in a broad sense deals with and determines the rights

of the public. A patent is sui generis. By it the public, through its

authorized representatives, grants a monopoly for a term of years in

consideration of the surrender of the invention to public use upon ex-

piration of the term. When, upon judicial contest, a competent court

has sanctioned the grant, and determined the right thereunder, the mo-

nopoly hereby granted ought not to be permitted to be invaded except

upon a clear showing that the decision invoked in its favor was wrong.

It is true that the prior adjudication does not deal with the supposed new

defense, and does not affect the merits of that defense upon final hear-

ing; but the fact that it was not presented, especially where the existence

of the claim was known to and considered by counsel, is a circumstance

to be considered by the court in passing judgment upon the merits upon

the hearing for an interlocutory injunction. We are of opinion that the

rule was correctly interpreted by the court below, and properly applied

to the case in hand. We are asked to determine the extent to which this

court should go in review of an exercise of discretion by the court below

in granting a preliminary injunction. There would seem to be some di-

vergence of opinion in the circuit courts of appeals upon this question.

The cases of Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Hunger, etc., Manuf'g Co., 2 U. S.

App. 188, i C. C. A. 668, and 50 Fed. 785, in the fifth circuit; Watch Co.

v. Robbins, 6 U. S. App. 275, 3 C. C. A. 103, and 52 Fed. 337, and Blount

v. Societe Anonyme du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 6 U. S. App.

337, 3 C. C. A. 455, and 53 Fed. 98, in the sixth circuit ; Consolidated

Electric Storage Co. v. Accumulator Co., 3 U. S. App. 579, 5 C. C. A. 202,
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her Co. v. Goodyear. 120 Referring to the patent in suit, they
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said, ''The validity of the claim of the testator was never

shaken by any adjudication. It has been uniformly affirmed

and sustained. If the subject was never brought here before,

it was doubtless because those who were defeated elsewhere

saw no ground for the hope of a more favorable result in this

court. These considerations are very persuasive to the pre-

sumption that the claim of Chas. Goodyear, the elder, that he

\vas the original and first inventor is impregnable. If it were

not so we can not doubt that it would have been overthrown

in the numerous and several assaults would have been made

upon it. We have, however, examined the question by the light

of the evidence. . . ." The uniformity of opinion of other

courts upon the same matter did not, it appears, so satisfy the

last court as to obviate its independent examination of the

evidence.

and 55 Fed. 485, in the third circuit; American Paper Pail & Box Co. v.

National Folding Box & Paper Co., i U. S. App. 283, 2 C. C. A. 165, and

51 Fed. 229, in the second circuit; and Davis Electrical Works v. Edison
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Light Co., 5 U. S. App. 6n, 60 Fed. 276, in the first circuit, are perhaps

in antagonism, leading the court of the sixth circuit to certify the ques-

tion to the Supreme Court. That court, however, in Watch Co. v. Robbins,

148 U. S. 266, 13 Sup. Ct. 594, held that the fact that courts had reached

contradictory results did not under the statute warrant the submission

of the question or its decision, but might furnish ground for a certiorari

upon proper application. We do not deem it needful at this time to enter

ber Co. v. Goodyear. 126 Ref erring to the patent m. suit, they
said, "The validity of the claim of the testator was never
bhaken by any adjudication. It has been uniformly affirmed
and su~tained. If the subject was never brought here before,
it was doubtless because those who were defeated elsewhere
saw no ground for the hope of a more favorable result in this
court. These · considerations are very persuasive to the presumption that the claim of Chas. Goodyear, the elder, that he
was the original and first inventor is impregnable. If it were
not so we can not doubt that it would have been overthrown
in the numerous and several assaults would have been made
upon it. · We have, however, examined the question by the light
of the evidence. . . ~" The uniformity of opinion of other
courts upon the same matter did not, it _appears, so satisfy the
last court as to obviate its independent examination of the
evidence.

that field of discussion, because, assuming the right of the appellate court

to review to the fullest extent the decision of the court below, we are

satisfied with the correctness of the conclusion reached upon the merits

with respect to the issuance of the preliminary injunction." Approved in

Breshnaham v. Tripp Giant Leveller Co., 7 Fed. 920. In National Cash

Reg. Co. v. Am. Cash Reg. Co., 178 Fed. 79 the influence appears to have

been limited to adjudications of appellate courts.

126 9 Wall. 788, 793. The fact that a patent has been judicially declared

to be valid does not obligate another court even to grant a preliminary

injunction against infringement. "While it is a rule of comity, conven-

ience, and expediency that deference shall be paid to the judgment of a

co-ordinate tribunal sustaining the validity of a patent, its obligation is

ot imperative." Vulcan Soot Co. v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 255 Fed. 88.

and 55 Fed. 485, in the third circuit; American Paper Pail & Box Co. v.
National Folding Box & Paper Co., I U. S. App. 283, 2 C. C. A. 165, and
51 Fed. 229, in the second circuit; and Davis Electrical Works v. Edison
Light Co., 5 U. S. App. 6II, 60 Fed. 276, in the first circuit,-are perhaps
in antagonism, leading the court of the sixth circuit to certify the question to the Supreme Court. That court, however, in Watch Co. v. Robbins,
148 U. S. 266, 13 Sup. Ct. 594, held that the fact that courts had reached
contradictory results did not under the statute warrant the submission
of the question or its decision, but might furnish ground for a tertiorari
upon proper application. We do not deem it needful at this time to enter
that field of discussion, because, assuming the right of the appellate court
to review to the fullest extent the decision of the court below, we are
satisfied with the correctness of the conclusion reached upon the merits
with respect to the issuance of the preliminary injunction." Approved in
Breshnaham v. Tripp Giant Leveller Co., 7 Fed. 920. In National Cash
Reg. Co. v. Am. Cash Reg. Co., 178 Fed. 79 the influence r_ppears to have
been limited to adjudications of appellate courts.
126
9 Wall. 788, 793. The fact that a patent has been judicially declared
to be valid does not obligate another court even to grant a preliminary
injunction against infringement. "While it is a rule of comity, convenience, and expediency that deference shall be paid to the judgment of a
co-ordinate tribunal sustaining the validity of a patent, its obligation is
ot imperative." Vulcan Soot Co. v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 255 Fed. 88.

Oriqi al fr m

ll VE S

0 C

I 0

\JI

Patents and Inventions

Patents and Inventions

3. ORIGINALITY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

ANTICIPATION AND NOVELTY. The foregoing has been a

discussion of the general proposition that nothing amounts to

§ 3.

invention, within the meaning- of the patent laws, which is not

tated a certain degree of uncommon mental operation. If the

new product does not sufficiently differ from the existing

knowledge as to be invention it is, technically, said to be "an-

ticipated" by such knowledge. It is also said to lack novelty.

The expressions are practically synonymous; "anticipated" and

"lacking in novelty" are used interchangeably. 127 As has been

already said, the phrase "lacking in invention" is also syn-

onymous with the others, being merely a different way of say-

ing that a device has been anticipated and is lacking in novelty.

Some writers treat "invention" and "novelty" as distinct, but

it will be observed, that the same cases or type of cases are

used by them to show when invention is present, and when not,

as are used to illustrate the presence or absence of novelty. A

production can not be an invention, when knowledge of all the

prior art is conclusively presumed to be possessed by the in-
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ORIGINALITY-PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

ANTICIPATION AND NOVELTY.
The foregoing has been a
discussion of the gener.al proposition that nothing amounts to
invention, within the meaning- of the patent laws, which is not
so different from prior existing actualities as to have necessitated a certain degree of uncommon mental operation. If the
new product does not sufficiently differ from the existing
knowledge as to be invention it is, technically, said to be "anticipated" by such knowledge. It is also said to lack novelty.
The expressions are practically synonymous; "anticipated" and
"lacking in novelty" are u·sed interchangeably .121 As has been
already said, the phrase "lacking in invention" is also synonymous with the others, bdng merely a different way of saying that a device has been anticipated and is lacking in novelty.
Some writers treat "invention" and "novelty" as distinct, but
it will be observed, that the same cases or type of cases are
used by them to show when invention is present, and when not,
as are used to illustrate the pr~sence or absence of novelty. A
production can not be an invention, ·when knowledge of all the
i:,rior art is conclusively. presumed to be possessed by the inventor, unless it does possess novelty. It is only when invention is used in the very broad sense of something actually new
to the producer himself that it can be dissociated from novelty.
For the sake of convenience it is often used in this sense, but
there is no need for further discussion of the determination of
the presence of patentable invention under this head. The context usually shows clearly with which meaning the word invention is employed.
We come now to a discussion of the extent to which knowltdge must exist to ~onstitute anticipation, and the degree of
proof of its existence which is necessary.
.
~SE. The one exception to the requirement that
a production must be new, to be a patentable invention, is in the
fact that me e use in a f
·
at- .
entabilit of

so different from prior existing actualities as to have necessi-

ventor, unless it does possess novelty. It is only when inven-

tion is used in the very broad sense of something actually new

to the producer himself that it can be dissociated from novelty.

For the sake of convenience it is often used in this sense, but

there is no need for further discussion of the determination of

the presence of patentable invention under this head. The con-

text usually shows clearly with which meaning the word in-

vention is employed.

We come now to a discussion of the extent to which knowl-

edge must exist to constitute anticipation, and the degree of

proof of its existence which is necessary.

FOREIGN USE. The one exception to the requirement that

a production must be new, to be a patentable invention, is in the

fact that mere use in a foreign rountry dofts w^prfidiidf pat-

entability of a. d^vfeeTi this country.

127 But see the apparent distinction made in Crandall v. Richards, 8

Fed. 808.

12 1 But see the apparent distinction made in Crandall v. Richards, 8
Fed. 8o8.
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Prior Knowledge

If the applicant for a patent appears to have been ignorant

77

oi_suduise,' " and "."tHere fore to be more than a mere importer,

he is entitled to a patent despite the use. The statute of 1836

and those following authorize issue of a patent for an inven-

tion "not known,. jD3L_usedJ>y^^ country . . . and

not patentecLcaijiescxibedJ^^ this or

any foreign country." In the earlier statutes the words "in

this country," following "not known or used" were absent.

Under this phraseology it was held that use even in a foreign

country deprived an inventor of his right to a patent monopo-

ly. 129 But since the act of 1836 the Supreme Court has said

that a patent issued to one who believed himself the true and

first inventor is not avoided by evidence of mere prior use in a

foreign country. 130 In such case "the party who invents is not

strictly speaking the first and original inventor. The law as-

sumes that the improvement may have been known and used

before his discovery. Yet his patent is valid if he discovered

it by the efforts of his o\vn genius, and believed himself to be

the original inventor. The clause in question^ii^TTfies the
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words before used, and shows that by. knowledge and use the

legislature meant knowledge and use existing* in a manner ac-

cessT5Ie~to~the public. If the foreign invention had been printed

or patented, it was already given to the world and open to the

people of this country, as well as of others, upon reasonable

inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage from the

invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the com-

munity, and the inventor therefore is not considered to be

entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is not

patented nor described in any printed publication it might be

known and used in remote places for ages, and the people of

this country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining

knowledge would not be within their reach ; and, as far as their

interest is concerned, it would be the same thing as if the im-

provement had never been discovered. It is the inventor here

that brings it to them, and places it in their possession. And

as he does this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards

129 Whitney v. Emmet, Baldwin 303.

130 Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 476, 496.

If the applicant for a a tent a.pp@
a
en ·0 rant
o.Ls.ucli-..u.§.e, an . lierefore to be more than a mere importer,
he is entitled to patent des ite the use.· The statute of . I 836
. and those fol owing authorize issue of a patent for an invene by: ther in is country . . . and
tion "n t know
not paten
cribed i
prin
ufi 1cation in this or
any oreign count ." In the earlier statutes the words "in
this country," following "not known or used" were absent.
Under this phraseology it was held that use even in a foreign
country deprived an inventor of his right to a patent monopoly.129 But since the act of 1836 the Supreme Court has said
that a patent issued to one who belieY d him
e and
first inventor is not avoided by evidence of mere rior use in a
ign
t y. 130 In such case "the party who invents is not
f
strictly speaking the first and original inventor. The law assumes that the improvement may have been known and used
before his discovery. Yet his patent is valid if he discovered
·it by the efforts of his o
mus and believed himse1
be
th
· "nal .imrentor. The clause in uestlon u
the
words before used and sho
edge and use t e
nner aclegislature meant knowled e and use existin in
ce~si e to t e uh ic. If the foreign ·
en printed
or patented, it 'Yas-already given to the world and open to the
people of this countr , as well as of others up
easonable
inquiry. They would therefore derive no advantage from the
invention here. It would con e
e community, and the inventor therefore is not C<?nsidered to be
entitled to the reward. But if the foreign di covery is not
vatented nor described in any printed publication it might be
known and used in remote places for ages, and -the people of
this count be unable to pmfit by it. The means of obtaining
knowledge would not be within their reach; and, as far as their
interest is concerned, it would be the same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered. It is the inventor here
that brings it to them, and places it in their possession. And
as he does this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards

a

~

129 W'hitney v. Emme.t, Baldwin 303.
476, 496.

· 1so Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How.

in.al fr m

u v

0

c

ll 0

78 Patents and Inventions

. Patents and Inventions

him as the first and original inventor, and protects his patent,

although the improvement had in fact been invented before,

him as the first and original inventor, and protects his patent,
although the improvement had in fact been invented befo~e,
and used by others. " 131
It is to be noted that these ca·ses, even though they sustain
patents for devices already known abroad, do not conflict with
the rule that an importer is not entitled to a patent. They
merely hold that one wloio has truly created something by his
own mental action, and therefore believes himself to be not
only a t~ue inventor but also the first inventor, shall not lose
his right to a patent because the same thing was known but
not published in a foreign ·country. Proof that the alleged inyentor had acquired his own knowledge from abroad, and
therefore could not believe himself the inventor, but was merely
an importer, would undoubtedly deprive him of his right to a
patent. 132
The publication of knowledge, or the actual patenting of the
device, even in a foreign country will, as said in Gayler v.
Wilder, su.pra·, be sufficient to deprive a device of patentabllity'
here.
But if the ~oreign patent was taken· out by the same inventor
who is seeking a patent in this country the statute provides an
exception, in § 4887. "No person otherwise entitled thereto
shall be debarred from receiving a patent for his invention or
discovery by reason of its having been first patented or caused
to be patented by the inventor or his legal representatives or
assigns in a foreign country, unless the application for said
foreign patent was filed more than twelve months prior to the
filing of the application in this country, in which case no patent
shall be granted in this country.
"An application for patent filed in this country by' any person who has previously regularly filed an application for a
patent for the same invention or discovery in a foreign coun-

and used by others." 131

It is to be noted that these cases, even though they sustain

patents for devices already known abroad, do not conflict with

the rule that an importer is not entitled to a patent. They

merely hold that one wko has truly created something by his

own mental action, and therefore believes himself to be not

only a true inventor but also the first inventor, shall not lose

his right to a patent because the same thing was known but

not published in a foreign country. Proof that the alleged in-

ventor had acquired his own knowledge from abroad, and

therefore could not believe himself the inventor, but was merely

an importer, would undoubtedly deprive him of his right to a

patent. 132

The publication of knowledge, or the actual patenting of the

device, even in a foreign country will, as said in Gayler v.

Wilder, supra, be sufficient to deprive a device of patentability

here.
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But if the foreign patent was taken out by the same inventor

who is seeking a patent in this country the statute provides an

exception, in 4887. "No person otherwise entitled thereto

shall be debarred from receiving a patent for his invention or

discovery by reason of its having been first patented or caused

to be patented by the inventor or his legal representatives or

assigns in a foreign country, unless the application for said

foreign patent was filed more than twelve months prior to the

filing of the application in this country, in which case no patent

shall be granted in this country.

"An application for patent filed in this country by any per-

son who has previously regularly filed an application for a

patent for the same invention or discovery in a foreign coun-

131 O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, no. Roemer v. Simon, 95 U. S. 214.

Comely v. Marckwald, 17 Fed. 83, Schillinger v. Greenway Brew'g Co.

17 Fed. 244; Worswick Mfg. Co. v. Steiger, 17 Fed. 250, Doyle v. Spauld-

ing, 19 Fed. 744. McFarland v. Spencer, 23 Fed. 150. Vacuum Engineer-

ing Co. v. Dunn. 209 Fed. 219.

132 Roemer v. Simon, 95 U. S. 214 and cases supra.

131

O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, rm. Roemer v. Simon, 95 U. S. 214.
Cornely v. Marckwald, 17 Fed. 83, Schillinger v. Greenway Brew'g Co.
17 Fed. 244; Worswick Mfg. Co. v. Steiger, 17 Fed. 250, Doyle v. Spaulding, 19 Fed. 744. McFarland v. Spencer, 23 Fed. 150. Vacuum Engineering Co. v. Dunn. 209 Fed. 219.
1 3 2 Roemer v. Simon, 95 U. S. 214 an
cases supra.
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try which, by treaty, convention, or law, affords similar privi-

79

leges to citizens of the United States shall have the same force

try which, by treaty, convention, or law, affords similar 'privileges to citizens of the United States shall have the same force
and effect as the same application would have if filed in this;
country on the qate on which the application for patent for the
same invention or discovery was first filed in such foreign
country, provided the application in this country is filed within
twelve months from ·t he earliest date on which any such foreign application was filed ; but no patent shall be granted upon
such application.if the invention or discovery has been patented
or described in a printed publication in this or any foreign
country, or has been in public use or on sale in this country,
for more than t~o years prior to the date of filing in this
country.''
EXTENT OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. 'Knowledge or use in this
country, or description in a printed publication anywhere, constitute sufficient knowledge, by the very words of the statute,
to deprive a production of novelty. The prior knowledge
need not have been widespread to constitute · anticipation; it is
sufficient if it was general enough to be satisfactorily proved .
In a case as early as 1817, this particular point came before the
court, 133. which said "The law never could intend, that the
greater or less use, in which it might be, or the more or less
widely the knowledge of its existence might circulate, should
constitute the criterion by which to decide upon the validity of
any s.ubsequent patent for the same invention. I hold it, therefore, to be the true interpretation of this part of the Statute,
that any patent may be defeated by showing, that the thing
secured by the patent had been discovered and put in actual
use prior to the discovery of the patentee, however limited the
us~ or the knowledge of the prior discovery might have been."
The Supreme Court itself has said, 134 "~ prior knowledge
cind us~ by a single erson is sufficient. The number 1s immaterial. ' In this particular case the Pfior know~ to
have been held by at least five persons. While this dictum is

and effect as the same application would have if filed in this

country on the date on which the application for patent for the

same invention or discovery was first filed in such foreign

country, provided the application in this country is filed within

twelve months from the earliest date on which any such for-

eign application was filed ; but no patent shall be granted upon

such application if the invention or discovery has been patented

or described in a printed publication in this or any foreign

country, or has been in public use or on sale in this country,

for more than two years prior to the date of filing in this

country."

EXTENT OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. 'Knowledge or use in this

country, or description in a printed publication anywhere, con-

stitute sufficient knowledge, by the very words of the statute,

to deprive a production of novelty. The prior knowledge

need not have been widespread to constitute anticipation ; it is

sufficient if it was general enough to be satisfactorily proved.
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In a case as early as 1817, this particular point came before the

court, 133 which said "The law never could intend, that the

greater or less use, in which it might be, or the more or less

widely the knowledge of its existence might circulate, should

constitute the criterion by which to decide upon the validity of

any subsequent patent for the same invention. I hold it, there-

fore, to be the true interpretation of this part of the Statute,

that any patent may be defeated by showing, that the thing

secured by the patent had been discovered and put in actual

use prior to the discovery of the patentee, however limited the

use or the knowledge of the prior discovery might have been."

The Supreme Court itself has said, 134 "Tl^g prior knowledge

and use by a single person is sufficient. The number is imma-

terial." In this particular case the prior knowledgeTappears to

have been held by at least five persons. While this dictum is

133 Bedford v. Hunt, i Mason 302.

134 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120. Twentieth Century Co. v. Loew Mfg.

Co., 243 Fed. 373, 378, "Prior knowledge and use by a single person would

have been sufficient to require denial of the patent."

Bedford v. Hunt, l Mason 302.
Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120. Twentieth Century Co. v. Loew Mig.
Co., 243 Fed. 373, 378, "Prior knowledge and use by a single person would
have been sufficient to require denial of the patent."
133
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undoubtedly sound as a matter of law, it is obvious that the

actuality could seldom arise. If the knowledge were truly con-
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fined to one person, it is clear that the proof of such knowledge

undoubtedly sound as a matter of law, it is obvious that the
actuality could seldom arise. If the knowledge were truly confined to one person, it is clear that the proof of such knowledge
would, almost as a corollary, be confined to. the same one person. In view of the tendency of the courts to scrutinize most
carefully the evidence of alleged prior knowledge where, as
they say, the incentive to perjury is extreme, it is decidedly improbable that the testimony of one individual, that he, alone,
possessed knowledge of the device before the time of the disputed invention, would be accepted as sufficient to show anticipation. But it is not impossible; as is dear from the case · of
Bannerman v. Sanford. 135 In this case the prior knowledge
was actually embodied in a wooden model. Although this
model was known to but one individual and no use of the device had ever been made, the court held that it constituted anticipation, and quoted as authority the dictum of Coffin v ..
Ogden. 137
Some confusion as to this proposition, that the extent of the
prior knowledge is immaterial, is caused by the expression of
courts which have failed to distinguish clearly between knowledge and the proof of knowledge. As we have said, .the fact
that but one or two persons testify as to the existence of the
prior knowledge may well leave effective doubt as to its actuality. If a court being unsatisfied, for some such reason, as
to its existence, puts its decision upon the ground merely of
('absence of prior knowledge," there may be confusion as to
whether _!_h~ disbelieved the evidence, or believing it, did
not consider the knowledge proved to be sufficient. An excellent illustration of this looseness of thought and expression is
found in the case of Lincoln Iron Works v. M'Whirter Co. 139
The statement is definitely made in this case that, "It is not
enough to defeat the patent that some one other than Gilmour
(the patentee) had conceived the invention before he did, or
had even perfected it, so long as it had not been in public use
or described in some patent or publication." This is in flat

would, almost as a corollary, be confined to the same one per-

son. In view of the tendency of the courts to scrutinize most

carefully the evidence of alleged prior knowledge where, as

they say, the incentive to perjury is extreme, it is decidedly im-

probable that the testimony of one individual, that he, alone,

possessed knowledge of the device before the time of the dis-

puted invention, would be accepted as sufficient to show antici-

pation. But it is not impossible; as is clear from the case of

Bannerman v. Sanford. 135 In this case the prior knowledge

was actually embodied in a wooden model. Although this

model was known to but one individual and no use of the de-

vice had ever been made, the court held that it constituted an-

ticipation, and quoted as authority the dictum of Coffin v.

Ogden. 137

Some confusion as to this proposition, that the extent of the

prior knowledge is immaterial, is caused by the expression of
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courts which have failed to distinguish clearly between knowl-

edge and the proof of knowledge. As we have said,. the fact

that but one or two persons testify as to the existence of the

prior knowledge may well leave effective doubt as to its actu-

ality. If a court being unsatisfied, for some such reason, as

to its existence, puts its decision upon the ground merely of

"absence of prior knowledge," there may be confusion as to

whether the^courj: disbelieved the evidence, or believing it, did

not consider the knowledge proved to be sufficient. An excel-

lent illustration of this looseness of thought and expression is

found in the case of Lincoln Iron Works v. M'Whirter Co. 139

The statement is definitely made in this case that, "It is not

enough to defeat the patent that some one other than Gilmour

(the patentee) had conceived the invention before he did, or

had even perfected it, so long as it had not been in public use

or described in some patent or publication." This is in flat

135 QQ F e( J 294.

137 18 Wall. 120.

139 142 Fed. 967.

99 Fed. 294.
Wall. 120.
ts9 142 Fed. ¢7.
ia5
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conflict with the cases just referred to and contrary to the

81

statute itself. But on examination of the particular case, it

appears clearly that the matter of prior knowledge, as antici-

pation, was not involved in the statement quoted at all. The

question was whether the patentee, Gilmour, had obtained the

idea of the device which he patented from one Brown, to whom

it was claimed the credit for the invention really belonged, and

the court held that Gilmour had not obtained from Brown any-

thing new or patentable. The court then did adjudge -the

patent void, in view of prior knowledge, for lack of novelty.

This case stands as illustration also of the futility and positive

harm of relying for the law upon statements excerpted from

cases, instead of upon the facts and actual holdings thereof.

PROOF OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. But .althoughjthe prior knowl-

edge need not have been general, its actual existence must be

coacTusivety "proved This proof takes what may be consid-

ered as two distinct forms, which however are incapable of

exact differentiation. There must first be proved the existence

of some knowledge' as alleged; and then it must be demon-
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strated to the satisfaction of the court that this knowledge, as

proved to have existed, is in truth enough like the subsequent

alleged invention to constitute an anticipation of it. When the

alleged prior knowledge exists in some tangible or substantial

form, as in published works, or well known machines or pro-

cesses, the first proof is comparatively simple; the real issue

arises out of the attempt to identify this earlier knowledge with

that of the patent in suit. On the other hand, if the prior

knowledge is not embodied in any visible form, but rests only

in the memory of witnesses, there is a decided issue of fact,

arising from the necessity of proving the actual existence of

this alleged knowledge, before the issue of similarity can arise

at all. This is equally true where the alleged prior knowledge

is embodied in substantial form, in drawings, or in written de-

scription but the authentic date of these embodiments is dis-

putable. In such case the same issue of existence of the al-

leged knowledge arises before that of identity can be con-

sidered. There are so many correlations, however, between

conflict with the cases just referred to and contrary to the
statute itself. But on examination of the particular case, it
appears dearly that the matter of prior knowledge, as anticipation, was not involved in the statement quoted at all. The
question was whether the patentee, Gilmour, had obtained the
idea of the device which he patented from one Brown, to whom
it was claimed·the credit for the invention really belonged, and
the court held that Gilmour had not obtained from Brown anything new or patentable. The court then did adjudge ,the
patent void, in view of prior knowledge, for lack of novelty.
This case stands as illustration also of the futility and positive
harm of relying for the law upon statemen~s excerpted from
cases, instead of upon the facts and actual holdings thereof.
PROOF OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. But
h the rior knowlnee must be
edge need not have been eneral, its actua
_____ro_v_ed. This proof takes what may be considdistinct forms, whi~h however are incapable of
exact differentiation. There must first be proved the existence
of some knowledge· as alleged; and then it must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that this knowledge, as
proved to have existed, is in truth enough like the subsequent
alleged invention to constitute an anticipation of it. When the
alleged prior know ledge exists in some tangible or substantial
form, as in published works, or well known machines or processes, the first proof is comparatively simple; the real issue
arises out of the attempt to identify this earlier k,nowledge with
that of the patent in suit. On the other hand, if the prior
knowledge is not embodied in any visible form, but rests only
in the memory of witnesses, there is a decided issue of fact,
arising from the necessity of proving the actual existence of
this alleged knowledge, before the issue of similarity can· arise
at all. This is equally true where the alleged prior knowledge
is embodied in substantial form, in drawings, or in written description ·but the authentic date of these embodiments is disputable. In such case the s~me issue of existence of the alleged knowledge arises before that of identity can be considered. There are so many correlations, however, between

i al fr m

LT

E S

CA I 0

IA

82 Patents and Inventions

the existence and the identity of knowledge, that the issues and

2
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the proof can not well be separately treated. The whole mat-

ter must be considered as one issue, namely, that of the c.v'st-

ence of identical knowledge.

The uncertainty of oral testimony is commented on by the

Supreme Court, forcefully, in saying, 14i "We have now to deal

with certain unpatented devices, claimed to be complete antici-

pations of this patent, the existence and use of which are

proven only by oral testimony. In view of the unsatisfactory

character of such testimony, arising from the forgetfulness of

witnesses, their liability to mistakes, their proneness to recol-

lect things as the party calling them would have them recol-

lect them, aside from the temptation to actual perjury, courts

have not only imposed upon defendants the burden of proving

such devices, but have required that the proof shall be clear,

satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt. Witnesses whose

memories are prodded by the eagerness of interested parties

to elicit testimony favorable to themselves are not usually to

be depended upon for accurate information. The very fact,
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which courts as well as the public have not failed to recognize,

that almost every important patent, from the cotton gin of

Whitney to the one under consideration, has been attacked by

the testimony of witnesses who imagined they had made simi-

lar discoveries long before the patentee had claimed to have

invented 1 his device, has tended to throw a certain amount of

discredit upon all that class of evidence, and to demand that it

be subjected to the closest scrutiny. Indeed, the frequency

with which testimony is tortured, or fabricated outright, to

build up the defence of a prior use of the thing patented, goes

far to justify the popular impression that the inventor may be

treated as the lawful prey of the infringer." 143

ThePaten$_as__ Evidence.

tojjjpre sumption that the device covered thereby_is

novel. ~

1*2 The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. S. 275, 284.

143 Mere testimony of a single witness as to the prior existence of a

device held too uncertain to show anticipation. Peters v. Union Biscuit

Co., 120 Fed. 679.

the exi tence and the identity of know ledge, that the is ue and
the proof can not well be separately treated. The whole matter mu t be considered a one is ue, namely, that of the ex.'stence of identical knowledge.
The uncertainty of oral testimony is commented on by the
Supreme Court, forcefully, in sayino-, 142 "We have now to deal
with certain unpatented device , claimed to be complete anticipations of this patent, the existence and use of which are
proven only by oral testimony. In view of the unsatisfactory
character of such testimony, arising from the forgetfulness of
witnesses, their liability to mistakes, their proneness to recollect things as the party calling them would have them iecollect them, aside from the temptation to actual perjury, courts
have not only imposed upon defendants the burden of proving
such devices, but have required that the proof shall be clear,
satisfactory and beyond a reasonable doubt. Witnesses whose
memories are prodded· by the eagerness of interested partie
to elicit testimony favorable to themselves are not usually to
be. depended upon for accurate information. The very fact,
which courts as well as the public have not failed to .recognize,
that almost every important patent, from the cotton gin of
Whitney to the one under consideration, has been attacked by
the testimony of witnesses who imagined .they had made similar discoveries long before the patentee had claimed to have
invented· his device, has tended to throw a certain amount of
discredit upon all that class of evidence, and to demand that it
be subjected t.o the closest scrutiny. Indeed, the frequency
with which testimony is tortured, or fabricated outright, to
build up the defence of a prior use of the thing patented, goes
far to justify the popular .impre ion that the inventor may be
treated as the lawful prey of the infringer." 143
The Pat en t as E vid enc e. The~.!i~s?.=u!!.in~_.1.1.J~.um-'t"""....,........i..a.w.sr
gives nse to a resum tion that the device covere
novel.

----

The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U. ~· 275, 2 4.
Mere testimony of a ingle witnes as to the prior exi tence of a
device held too uncertain to how anticipation. Peters v. Union Biscuit_
Co., 120 Fed. 679.
142
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The burden of proving the invalidity of a patent is thus

thrown upon the par-ty asse-Ftog it. "The burden. of proof

rests upori-liim^ and every reasonable doubtjshould be resolved

agatnst'him." 140 u Evidence^T~Hour5tTurprobative~Tbrce will

riot overthrow the presumption of novelty and originality

arising from the grant of letters patent for an invention. It

has been frequently held that the defense of want of novelty or

originality must be made out by proof so clear and satisfac-

tory as to remove all reasonable doubt." 141 In the case quoted

from, to overthrow the presumption that the patentee, Bell,

was the first inventor, the other party introduced the testi-

mony of nearly 200 witnesses to prove the priority of a device

quite sufficiently identical with the patented one to deprive it

of novelty. Despite this overwhelming abundance of corrobo-

rative testimony, the court upheld the patent, questioning the

validity of the testimony very largely on the ground that if

such prior device had actually existed it would have been put

into use or, at least, patented.

SIMILARITY OF THE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AS PROVED. When,
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however, the existence of the prior knowledge has been pfovecTT

theTJsue'then rJecDines nut unt of evidence and credibilit, but

one o^f mere conclusion as tojts^similarity with the patented

rl^yirp .. This may be treated by {He "courts asTa quesHofrrrf

fact, to be proved by expert testimony, or as a mere conclusion

to be reached in some intuitive or logical way.

But in either aspect, it is not a matter to be determined by

rules of law, and could not be. Precedents may influence to

a certain extent, as in other findings on the matter of inven-

The burden of proving the jnvalidity of a patent is thus
thrown upo~-t-mg- it. "The--lnrden. of proof
rests u12-on "him, and every reasonable doubt should be resolved
~im. " 140 "~ence of doubtfUI probative force will
not overthrow the presumption of novelty and originality
arising from the grant of letters patent for an invention. It
has been frequently held that the defense of want of novelty or
originality must be made out by proof so clear and satisfactory as to remove all reasonable doubt." 141 In the case quoted
from, to overthrow the presumption that the patentee, Bell,
was the first inventor, the other party introduced the testimony of nearly 200 witnesses to prove the priority of a device
quite sufficiently identical with the patented one to deprive it
of novelty. Despite this overwhelming abundance of corroborative testimony, the court upheld the patent, questioning the
validity of the testimony very largely on the ground that if
such prior device had actually existed it would have been put
into use or, at least, patented.

tion, but each case must, in the very nature of the subject, be

determined solely on its own peculiar circumstances. The

expression of individual findings as rules of law is not un-

common in the reports, but it is wholly inaccurate, misleading,

140 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124. Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. 96,

Condit v. Brush, 132 U. S. 39, Am. Caramel Co. v. Mills & Bro., 149

Fed. 743-

141 Am. Bell Telephone Co. v. People's Telephone Co., 22 Fed. 309, 313,

citing authority. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Elliott-Fisher Co., 165

Fed. 927.

SIMILARITY OF THE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AS PROVED.

~en,

however, the existence of the prior knowledge has been pto~
the issue then 5ett>mes not-one-of-e~l'.lC@ aAd efeclifiilit', bt:1t
cne of mere conclusion as tOit;° similarity with the patented
d_eyice - This may be treated by the courts as a question oi
fact, to be proved by expert testimony, or as a mere conclusion
to be reached in some intuitive or logical way.
But in either aspect, it is not a matter to be determined by
rnles of law, and could not be. Precedents may influence to
a certain extent, as in other findings on the matter of inventiqn, but each case must, in the very nature of the subject, be
determined solely on its own peculiar circumstances. The
expression of individual findings as rules of law is not uncommon in the reports, but it is wholly inaccurate, misleading,

°Coffin

14

v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124. Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. 96,
Condit v. Brush, 132 U. S. 39, Am. Caramel Co. v. Mills & Bro., 149
Fed. 743.
141
Am. Bell Telephone Co. v. People's Telephone Co., 22 Fed. 309, 313,
citing authority. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Elliott-Fisher Co., 165
Fed. 927.
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and a source of much confusion when other courts come to a
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different conclusion upon similar superficial facts.

Use. JThe fact of use of a prior device has great influence

upon the decision in each of these questions. As is obvious

from the cases just referred to, actual use or absence of use,

may be a determinant factor in the credibility to be given to

evidence of the existence of the alleged prior knowledge. 14 *

So, also, as will be seen, it plays a very great part in determin-

ing the identity of the prior knowledge with that of the patent.

The proposition is that an already existing idea of means

which was never in fact put into use, was probably not essen-

tially identical with the later one which was actually put into

use. "In determining a question of this character (anticipa-

tion) it is a pertinent and reasonable inquiry, if it be true that

the disclosure of an earlier patent was substantially that of

144 Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 301, "Granting

the witnesses to be of the highest character, and never so conscientious

in their desire to tell only the truth, the possibility of their being mistaken

as to the exact device used, which, though bearing a general resemblance

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

to the one patented, may differ from it in the very particular which makes

it patentable, are such as to render oral testimony peculiarly untrust-

worthy; particularly so if the testimony be taken after the lapse of years

from the time the alleged anticipating device was used. If there be add-

ed to this a personal bias, or an incentive to color the testimony in the

interest of the party calling the witness, to say nothing of downright

and a source of much confusion when other court come to a
c.liff erent conclusion upon similar superficial -facts.
Use . . The fact of use of a prior device has great influence
upon t e decision in each of these questions. As is obvious
from the cases just referred to, actual use or absence of use,
may be a determinant factor in the credibility to be given to
evidence .of the existence of the alleged prior knowledge. 144
So, also, as will be seen, it plays a very great part in determining the identity of the prior knowledge with that of the patent.
The proposition is that an already existing idea of means
which was never in fact put into use, was probably not essentially identical with the later one which was actually put into
use. "In determining a question of this character ( anticipation) it is a pertinent and reasonable inquiry, if it be true that
the disclosure of an earlier patent was substantially that of

perjury, its value is, of course, still more seriously impaired. If, as he

says, in 1878, he tried a rigid extension and found it unserviceable, and

subsequently, in the same season, he invented a pivoted extension, and it

worked well, it is improbable that he would have cast it aside altogether

at the end of the season, and taken up again the theory of a rigid ex-

tension, and applied it not only to his own, but to a number of other

machines. His excuse that the binder was incapable of doing satisfactory

work during the season of 1879, by reason of the shortness of the grain

that season, is evidence that it was inoperative. If it had been a success,

he would hardly have thrown it aside permanently. Doubtless he did use

a rigid extension of some sort; but if he ever used a pivoted device at all

of which we have considerable doubt his efforts in that direction must

be relegated to the class of unsuccessful and abandoned experiments,

which, as we have repeatedly held, do not affect the validity of a subse-

quent patent." Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Municipal Signal

Co., 6 1 Fed. 948.

14 4 Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 301, "Granting
the witnesses to be of the highest character, and never so conscientious
in their desire to tell only the truth, the possibility of their being mistaken
as to the exact device used, which, though bearing a general resemblance
to the one patented, may differ from it in the very particular which makes
it patentable, are such as to render oral testimony peculiarly untrustworthy; particularly so if the testimony be taken after the lapse of years
from the time the allege.cl anticipating device was used. If there be add. cd to this a personal bias, or an incentive to color the testimony in the
interest of the party calling the witness, to say nothing of downright
perjury, its value is, of course, still more seriously impaired. If, as he
says, in 1878, he tried a rigid extension and found it unserviceable, and
subsequently, in the same season, he invented a pivoted extension, and it
worked well, it is improbable that he would have cast it aside altogether
at the end of the season, and taken up again the theory of a rigid extension, and applied it not only to his own, but to a number of other
machines. Hi excuse that the binder was incapable of doing satisfactory
work during the season of 1879, by reason of the shortness of the grain
that season, is evidence that it was inoperative. If it had been a success,
he would hardly have thrown it aside permanently. Doubtless he did use
a rigid extension of some sort; but if he ever used a pivoted device at all
--of which we have considerable doubt-his efforts in that direction must
be relegated to the class of unsuccessful and abandoned experiment~,
which, as we have repeatedly held, do not affect the validity of a subsequent patent." Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Municipal Signal
Co., 61 Fed. 948.
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Jones, why during a period of many years was it not practically

85

applied to the same use?" 145

The statute does not provide that the prior knowledge shall

have been put into actual use to constitute anticipation. It is

sufficient to deprive an alleged invention of patentability if it

weie used or known before. In many instances, there is prac-

tical reason why use should be required before a finding of

anticipation will be reached. Actual use often is necessary,

as has been said, to show that the prior knowledge was identi-

cal with the alleged invention; but, except as regards proof, if

the identity of the knowledge is otherwise clear, the prior

knowledge need not have been placed in use. 146

Even in cases where actual use has been held requisite to

show the real similarity of the prior device to the usable one in

question, only enough use to demonstrate this has been de-

manded. Thus in Brush v. Condit 147 only one embodiment of

the earlier known device had ever been made. It had been used

a very short time only, and then discarded. Nevertheless the

court said, "With a strong disinclination to permit the re-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

mains of old experiments to destroy the pecuniary value of a

145 Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 89 Fed. 721, 738.

146 Sayles v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co., 4 Fisher Pat. Cases. Hoe v. Miehle

Printing Press Co, 141 Fed. 112. It must, however, be noted that in at least

one case, very positive prior knowledge was held not to constitute anticipa-

tion because it had never gone into practical use. This was so held even

though the identity of knowledge was undisputed. Carnegie Steel Co.

v. Cambria Iron Co., 89 Fed. 721. The case involved a patent for the

process of mixing molten iron so as to produce uniformity by emptying

the contents of several converters into a central basin, from which the

combined contents were drawn off as desired. This was held not antici-

pated by an earlier publication in which it was said, "Uniform results

. . . can hardly be expected unless a number of blast furnace charges are

mixed. This would seem to be the theoretical solution of the problem."

Gayler v. Wilder 10 How. 476, 409, "The case was thus made to turn

not on the priority of invention only, but upon that and the fact of its

having been tested by experiments. This introduces a new principle into

the patent law. The right under the law depends upon the time of the

invention. An experimental test may show the value of the thing invented,

but it is no part of the invention." Stitt v. Eastern R. R. Co., 22 Fed.

649; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845.

i 132 U. S. 39-

Jones, why during a period of many years was it not practically
applied to the same use ?" 145
The statute does not provide · that the prior knowledge shall
have been put into actual use to constitute anticipation. It is
sufficient to deprive an alleged invention of patentability if it
wet e used or known before. In many instances, there is practical reason why use should be required before a finding of
anticipation will be reached. Actual use of ten is necessary,
as has been said, to show that the prior knowledge was identical with the alleged invention; but, except as regards proof, if
the identity of the knowledge is otherwise clear, the prior
knowledge need not have been placed in use. 146
Even in cases where actual use has been held requisite to
show the real similarity of the prior device to the usable one in
question, only enough use to demonstrate this has been demanded. Thus in Brush v. Condit147 only one embodiment of
the earlier known device had ever been made. It had been used
a very short time only, and then discarded. Nevertheless the
court said, "With a strong disinclination to permit the remains of old experiments to destroy the pecuniary value of a
Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria .Iron Co., 89 Fed. 721, 738.
Sayles v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co., 4 Fisher Pat. Cases. Hoe v. Miehle
Printing Press Co, 141 Fed. 112. It must, however, be noted that in at least
one case, very positive prior knowledge was held not to constitute anticipa- ·
tion because it had never gone into practical use. This was so held even
though the identity of knowledge was undi puted. Carnegie Steel Co.
v. Cambria Iron Co., 89 Fed. 721. The case involved a patent for the
process of mixing molten iron so as to produce uniformity by emptying
the contents of several converters into a central basin, from which the
combined contents were drawn off as desired. This was held not anticipated by an earlier publication in which it was said, "Uniform results
... c~n hardly be expected unless a number of blast furnace charges are
mixed: This would seem to be the theoretical solution of the problem."
Gayler v. Wilder IO How. 476, 409, "The case was thus made to turn
not on the priority of invention only, but upon that and the fact of its
having been tested by experiments. This introduce~ a new principle into
the patent law. The right under the law depends upon the time of the
invention. An experimental test may show the value of the thing invented,
but it is no part of the invention." Stitt v. Eastern R. R. Co., 22 Fed.
649; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co.; 108 Ftd. 845.
14 5
146

147 132
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patent for a useful and successful invention, and remembering

that the defendants must assume a weighty burden of proof,

I am of the opinion that the patentee's invention is clearly

proved to have been anticipated by that of Hayes." 1

Abandoned Experiments. Whether or not abandoned ex-

periments are sufficient to anticipate a later production, is a

question of evidence rather than of substantive law. It is

occasionally said that "abandoned experiments do not antici-

pate," as though it were" a matter of law that they could not. 149

This, however, is not correct. Abandoned experiments not

only can anticipate, theoretically, but have been held to do

so. 150 The abandonment of j^xp^rinjentg p^y result not from

the inutility and unsuccessf ulness of the device as developed,

but from wliolry' extraneous causes, such as lackjof capital to

buikLjriachinery. If the essential identity of the prior device,

concerning which the experiments were being made, with the

particular device in issue is clear, no further showing is neces-

sary. 151

But if the alleged anticipated device was different in formal
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structure from the later one, the difficulty of proving that it

was essentially identical with the later one is extreme. It is

perfectly obvious that a device which will not work is not the

same in form or construction as a device which will work.

If the prior device has been actually built, so that its formal

characteristics are clearly demonstrated, the question of an-

ticipation becomes merely the usual issue, already discussed,

of whether the change which made the latter device successful

required invention or was merely mechanical.

If the earlier device has not been formally embodied, there

is then a complication arising from the difficulty of determin-

ing exactly what the "experimental" device was, or purported

to be, either in form or essence. With this in view, there are

two possibilities in respect to an alleged anticipated device

148 Hall v. McNeale, 107 U. S. QO; Bedford v. Hunt, i Mason 301.

149 The Corn Planter Pat. 23 Wall. 181, 211. Deering v. Winona Har-

vester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 302.

150 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845.

15 1 Sayles v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co., 4 Fish. 584.

patent for a u ef ul and success£ ul invention, and remembering
that the def end ants must a surne a weighty burden of proof,
I am of the opinion that the patentee's in ention is clearly
proved to have been anticipated by that of Hayes. ' 1 4
ba.nd oned Exf)'eriments. Whether or not abandoned experiments are sufficient to anticipate a later production, is a
question of evidenc,e rather than of sub tantive la\<v. It is
occasionally said that "aband n
r men
o - t anticipate," as though it were a atter of law that they could not. 149
This, however, is not correct. Abandoned experiments not
only can anticipate, theoretically but have been held t o do
ents
t not from
so. 1 5 0 The abandonment of ex
the in utility and unsucc - ifrne of th de ·ee as developed,
but from
1 extraneous causes, such as lack of capital to
tuil machinery. If the essential identity of the prior device,
concerning which the experiments were being made, with the
particular device in issue is clear, n 0 further showing is necessary .1 5 1
But if the alleged anticipated device was different in formal
structure from the later one the difficulty of proving that it
was essentially identica.l with the later one is extreme. It is
perfectly obvious that a device which will not work is not the
same in form or construction as a device which will work.
If the prior device has been act~ally built, so that its formal
characteristics are clearly demonstrated, the question of anticipation becomes merely the usual issue already discussed,
of whether the change which made the latter device successful
required invention or was merely mechanical.
If the earlier device has not been formally embodied, there
is then a complication arising from the difficulty of determin~
ing exactly what the "experimental" device was or purported
to be, either in form or essence. With thi in view, there are
two pos ibili ties in respect to an alleged anticipated device
Hall v. McN eale, 107 U. S. 90; Bedford v. Hunt, I Mason 30I.
The Corn Planter Pat. 23 Wall. 181, 2n. Deering v. VVinon~ Harvester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 302.
l 50 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co. 108 Fed. 845.
1 51 Sayles v. Chi. & N. W . R. R. Co., 4 Fish. 584.
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which has never been put into practical use. It may have been

completed on paper, so that a device made according to the

plans and description would \vork, but no device may have

ever been made according to those plans. Or it may never

have been completely developed, either substantially or on

paper, to the extent that it would quite work.

In the former case, it certainly amounts to a prior descrip-

tion of the later device, and the only possible question is

whether this alleged description was in reality so clear that

an expert would, in following it, produce the later device. In

the latter case, the fact that it did not work, and could not be

made to w^ork, so far as the experimenter had proceeded, is

generally treated as rather conclusive evidence that the knowl-

edge represented by it was not sufficiently like the knowledge

represented by a workable device to constitute anticipation.

It is obvious, that the mere fact of prior knowledge not

having been put to actual use, can not be absolutely relied on

as negative invention. If the prior knowledge is clearly quite

identical with the patented device, as for instance if it \vere
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shown in a published statement word for word and completely

descriptive of the device, the anticipation could not logically

be avoided by the fact that the utility of the device had not

been generally recognized or that it had never been constructed.

Even if the prior knowledge were only substantially similar to

the patented device, the failure to use it might be due not to

essential and inventive difference from the later device, but

w r holly to extraneous circumstances. 152

DrawingSj_mpdels f etc. Where the prior knowledge exists

in the form. of a published description, or in the specification of

152 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845.

Crandall v. Richardson, 8 Fed. 808. "In a defence of prior use it is

often a controlling circumstance, where there is doubt in the proof, that,

considering the success of the later device, if it had been made previously

it would have attracted the attention of the trade and immediately have

gone into use ; but it often happens that from various fortuitous circum-

stances a complete "invention, in a branch of business where much depends

on energy and facilities and capital, fails to attract that attention which,

under different and better auspices, it receives when independently pro-

duced at a later day."

which has never been put into practical use. It may have been
completed on paper, so that a device made according to the
plans and description would work, but no device may have
ever been made according to those plans. Or it may neveihave been completely developed, either substantially or on
paper, to the extent that it would quite work.
In the former case, it certainly amounts to a prior description of the later device, and the only possible question is
whether this alleged description was in reality so clear that
an expert "ould, in following it, produce the later device. In
the latter case, the fact that it did not work, and could not be
made to work, so far as the experimenter had proceeded, is
generally treated as rather conclusive evidence that the knowltdge represented by it was not sufficiently like the knowledge
represented by a workable device to constitute anticipation.
It is obvious, that the mere fact of prior knowledge not
having been put to actual use, can not be absolutely relied on
as negative invention. If the prior knowledge is clearly quite
identical with the patented device, as for instance if it were
shown in a published statement word for word and completely
descriptive of the device, the anticipation could not logically
be avoided by the fa;ct that the utility of the device had not
Leen generally recognized or that it had never been constructed.
Even if the prior knowledge were only substantially similar to
the patented device, the failure to use it · might be due not to
e sential and inventive difference from the later device, but
wholly to extraneous circumstances. 152
Drawin s models, etc. Where the prior knowledge exists
in fhe form .of a published description, or in the specification of
1 5 2 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., rnS Fed. 845.
Crandall v. Richardson, 8 Fed. 8o8. "In a defence of prior use it is
often a controlling circumstance, where there is doubt in the proof, that,
·considering the success of the later device, if it had been made previously
it would have attracted the attention of the trade and immediately have
gone into use; but it often happens that from various fortuitous circumstances a complete ·invention, in a branch of business '"·here much depends
on energy and facilities and capital, fails to attract that attention which,
under different and better auspices, it receives when independent~y produced at a later day."
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c, patent, or in the existence of a mere model, the question of

88
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anticipation is, in the first inquiry, one of evidence only. Is

prior knowledge surely proved? Does the publication, the

patent, or the model clearly show the same device as the one

in question? If it does, the device in question is anticipated.

One text writer has taken a different position. 153 He says,

"Novelty of a machine or manufacture, is not negatived by any

prtQr unpublished drawings, no matter how completely they

may exhibit the patented invention, nor by any prior model, no

matter how fully it may coincide with the thing covered by the

gatent. The reason of this rule is not stated with fullness in

either of the cases which support it, but that reason is deducible

from the statute and from the nature of drawings and of

models. The statute provides, relevant to the newness of pat-

entable machines and manufactures that they shall not have

been previously known or used by others in this country. Now,

it is clear that to use a model or a drawing is not to use the

machine or manufacture which it represents ; and it is equally

obvious that to know a drawing or a model is not the same
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thing as knowing the article which that drawing or model

more or less imperfectly pictures to the eye. It follows that

neither of those things can negative the newness required by

the statute. Nor is the statutory provision on this point lack-

ing in good reasons to support it. Private drawings may be

mislaid or hidden, so as to preclude all probability of the pub-

lic ever deriving any benefit therefrom; and even if they are

seen by several or by many, they are apt to be understood by

few or by none. Models also are liable to be secluded from

view and to suffer change and thus to fail of propagation.

Moreover, if a patent could be defeated by producing a model

or a drawing to correspond therewith, and by testifying that

it was made at some sufficiently remote point of time in the

past, a strong temptation would be offered to perjury. Sev-

eral considerations of public policy and of private right com-

bine, therefore, to justify the rule of this section."

This seems to be supported, in part, at least, by the case of

153 Walker, Patents.

2~

patent, or in the existence of a mere model, the question of
anticipation is, in the first inquiry, one of evidence only. Is
prior knowledge surely proved? Does the publication, the
patent, or the model clearly show the same device as the one
in question? If it does, the device in question is anticipated.
One text writer has taken a different position. 153 IJe says,
Novelcy of a machine or manufa<:ture_, is not negatived by any
pr· r unpublished drawings no matter ho completely they
may~xhibit .Le atented invention, nor by any _prior model, no
matter how full it.may coincide with th thing covere4 by the
ate t. The reason of this rule is not stated with fullness in
either of the cases which support it, but that reason is deducible
from the statute and from the nature of drawings and of
models. The statute provides, relevant to ~he newness of patentable machines and manufactures that they shall not have
been previously known or used by others in this country. Now,
it is clear that to use a model or a drawing is not to use the
machine or manufacture which it represents; and-it is equally
obvious that to know a drawing or a model is not the same
thing as knowing the article which that drawing or model
more or less imperfectly pictures to the eye. It follows that
neither of those things can negative the newness required by
the statute. Nor is the statutory provision on this point lacking i~ good reasons to support it. Private drawings may be
mislaid or hidden, so as to preclude all probability of the public ever deriving any benefit therefrom; and even if they are
seen by several or by many, they are apt to be understood by
few or by none. Models also are liable to be secluded from
view and to suffer change and thus to fail of propagation.
Moreover, if a patent could be defeated by producing a model
or a drawing to correspond therewith, and by testifying that
it was made at some sufficiently remote point of time in the
past, a strong temptation would be offered to perjury. Several considerations of public policy and of private right combine, therefore, to justify the rule ·o f this section."
This seems to be supported in part at least, by the. case of
isa Walker, Patents.
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American Writing Machine Co. vs. Wagner Typewriter Co. 154

in which the court said "It is clear, as pointed out by Mr.

Walker, that knowledge of a model or a machine is not knowl-

edge of the machine itself any more than knowledge of a model

of Brooklyn Bridge is knowledge of that structure. But we

think the rule should be restricted to a model pure and simple

as the word is understood in common parlance, viz. : a pat-

tern, a copy, a representation usually upon a reduced scale.

The word "model" should not be construed to mean the identi-

cal device which is covered by the patent. If this were other-

wise a defendant who produces the exact structure of the

claims and proves that it was known prior to the date of the

alleged invention is completely answered if the complainant

can show -that the anticipating structure was filed as a model."

There are like expressions to be found in other cases. But on

examination it is clear that the true rule is one of evidence

simply. It is perfectly obvious that Mr. Walker has fallen in-

to the common error of confusing the embodiment of the in-

vention with the invention itself, and therefore he forgets that
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an invention might be known, or even used, even though it

had never been tangibly embodied. In the particular case just

referred to the court admits this, although it does lay down

the rule of law quoted, in saying further, "In the case of a

complicated machine a small model incapable of actual use may

be filed for the purpose of explaining and illustrating the draw-

ing ; that such a model alone would not anticipate is, of course,

perfectly clear. On the other hand, it frequently happens that

the applicant files as his* model not a pattern or representation

of the thing invented by him but the thing itself. Take, for

illustration, an application for a patent for a horseshoe nail

where one of the nails made by the inventor is filed as a model,

can it be that a subsequent applicant can hold a patent for that

nail or any feature thereof after proof of its prior existence

and the knowledge thereof by the public."

If one only keeps clearly in mind what Mr. Walker evidently

forgot and the court in the Typewriter case saw but vaguely,

154 151 Fed. 576.

American Writing Machine Co. v .·Wagner Typewriter Co. 154
in which the court aid ,.'It is clear, as pointed out by Mr.
Walker that knowledge of a model or a machine is not knowledge of the machine itself any more than knowledge of a model
of Brooklyn Bridge is knowledge of that structure. But we
think the rule should be restricted to a model pure and simple
as the word is understood in common parlance, viz. : a pattern, a copy, a representation usually upon a reduced scale.
The word 'model' should not be construed to mean the identical device which is covered by the patent. If this were otherwise a defendant who produces the exact structure of the
claims and proves that it was known prior to the date of the
alleged invention is completely answered if the complainant
can how .that the anticipating structure was filed as a -model."
There are like exp res ions to be found in other cases. But on
examination it is clear that the true rule is one of evidence
simply. It is perfectly obvious that Mr. Walker has fallen into the common error of confusing the em.bodiment of the invention with the invention itself, and therefore he for gets that
a.n invention might be known, or even used, even though it
had never been tangibly embodied. In the particular case just
referred to the court admits this, although it does lay down
the rule of law quoted, in saying further, "In the case of a
complicated machine a small model incapable of actual use may
be filed for the purpose of explaining and illustrating the drawing· that such a model alpne would not antitipate is, of course,
perfectly clear. On the other hand, it frequently happens that
the applicant files as his· model not a pattern or reprnsentation
of the thing invented by him but the thing itself. Take, for
illustration, an application for a paten.t for a horseshoe nail
where one of the nails made by the inventor is filed as a model,
can it be that a subsequent applicant can hold a patent for that
nail or any feature thereof after proof of its prior existence
and the know ledge thereof by the public."
·
If one only keeps clearly in mind what Mr. Walker evidently
forgot and the court in the Typewriter case saw but vaguely,
154 151

Fed. 576.
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namely, that an invention is a concept, not a tangible thing,
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then to know a drawing or a model is to know the invention

which they represent. Mr. Walker's reasons why the existence

of the drawing or model should be carefully scrutinized are

sound. But to seriously contend that the concept which con-

stitutes the invention could not be revealed to the public by a

full and clear written description of it, or by its embodiment

in miniature, would be ridiculous.

In the case of Keys v. Grant 155 the Supreme Court said it

was properly left to the jury to decide whether a device de-

scribed in a prior publication was in fact so similar to the

patented device as to anticipate the latter. As the prior knowl-

edge was represented only by this printed description, there

could have been no question for the jury if it were a rule of

law that published drawings could not anticipate. There is

no more reason why unpublished drawings should not also an-

ticipate, except the reason arising from the natural doubt as

to their authenticity.

The confusion arises from the fact that this issue of evi-
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dence is confused with the issue of whether the device as dem-

onstrated in the earlier form is the same in essence as the

later one. This latter issue is not one of evidence but one of

fact, whether for the court or the jury. It is, again, the usual

issue of whether the apparent change is such as amounted to

invention or is a merely formal and mechanical change, and is

determined by the same factors as in all such cases.

But although the foregoing statements of the present writer

are indisputable in theory, it must be recognized that the courts

do in fact hold inventions not to be anticipated by prior knowl-

edge shown by unpublished drawings, no matter how definite

and positive and exact a knowledge those drawings may reveal.

Such holdings are clearly indefensible as a matter of logic, but

they are based rather obviously on the court's opinion of public

good, and they must be reckoned with. 155 '

155 118 U. S. 25.

1558 In addition to cases already cited see, to this effect, Christie v.

Seybold, 55 Fed. 69 ; Automatic Weighing Mach. Co., v. Pneumatic Scale

Corp., 166 Fed. 288; See also the discussion under ''date of invention,"

post.

namely, that an invention ·is a concept, not a tangible thing,
then to know a drawing or a model is to know the invention
which they represent. Mr. Walker's reasons why the existence
of the drawing or model should be carefully scrutinized are
sound. But to seriously contend that the concept which const;tutes the invention could not be revealed to the public by a
full and clear written description of it, or by its embodiment
in miniature, would be ridiculous.
In the case of Keys v. Grant1 55 the Supreme Court said it
was properly left to the jury to decide whether a device described in a prior publication was in fact so sirpilar to the
patented device as to anticipate the latter. As the prior kn0wledge was represented only by this printed description, there
could have been no question for the jury if it were a rule of .
law that published drawings could not anticipate. There is
no more reason why unpublished drawings should not also anticipate, except the reason arising from the natural doubt as
to their authenticity:
The confusion arises from the fact that this issue of evidence is confused with the issue of whether the device as demonstrated in the earlier form is the same in essence as the
later one. This latter issue is not one of evidence but one of
fact, whether for the court or the jury. It is, again, the usual
issue of whether the apparent change is such as amounted to
invention or is a merely formal and mechanical change, and is
determined by the same factors as in all such cases.
But although the foregoing statements of the present writer
are indisputable in theory, it must be recognized that the courts
do· in fact hold inventions not to be anticipated by prior knowledge shown by unpublished drawings, no matter how definite
and positive and exact a knowledge those drawings may reveal.
Such holdings are clearly indefensible as a matter of logic, but
they are based rather obviously on the court's opinion of public
·
good, and they must be reckoned with. 1 553
II8 U. S. 25.
In addition to cases already cited see, to thjs effect, Christie v.
Seybold, 55 Fed. 6g; Automatic Weighing Mach. Co., v. Pneumatic Scale
Corp., 166 Fed. 288; See also the di cussion under "date of invention,"
1 55

1 55a
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Summary. The foregoing discussion has been concerned

simply with the evidence on which lack of novelty can be

predicated and the weight usually given to the 'different forms

which the evidence takes. It may be summed up as a general

proposition by saying that a prior patent, model or other

tangible embodiment offered as evidence of lack of novelty

must set forth the knowledge in such clear and unequivocal

form that a true and just comparison can be made of it with

the subsequent device. 156 But in the broadest aspect, after the

weight to be given the evidence is settled, the comparison re-

mains to be made ; the question of identity of the two ideas

of means still remains to be settled. This involves of course

the whole matter of "invention" and "novelty" thus far dis-

cussed. When the existence of the prior patent or other form

of knowledge is shown, so that the existence of the knowledge

is proved, and the issue thereby becomes one of identity, the

form of the prior knowledge ceases to be material, except as

stated in the foregoing discussion. If this is clearly borne in

mind much of the confusion as shown in decisions, between
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conclusions as to identity of concepts, and proof of the exist-

ence and characteristics of a particular concept, will be elimi-

nated a consumption devoutly to be desired.

A warning may be here adverted to, which is sometimes

uttered by the courts, against reading into the prior knowledge

something which is in fact not there. The subsequent device

may, when produced, seem so simple that its actual difference

from prior knowledge may appear immaterial. Whether it is

really immaterial or not, is the whole question of invention as

against mere mechanical skill. As one court has said, 157 "The

line which separates invention from mechanical skill is at best

a narrow one, and the difficulty of demarkation in this case is

156 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Elliott-Fisher Co., 165 Fed. 927, 930.

"The prior patent or publication relied upon must, by descriptive words or

drawings, or by both, contain and exhibit a substantial representation of

the patented improvement in such full, clear and exact terms as to enable

any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains to make,

construct, and practice the invention." Hanifen v. Godschalk Co., 84

Fed. 649.

157 Ideal Stopper Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 131 Fed. 24/1, 246.

Summa.ry. The foregoing discussion has been concerned
simply with the evidence on which lack of novelty can be
predicated and the weight usually given to the · different forms
which the evidence takes. It may be summed up as a general
proposition by saying that a prior patent, model or otlter
tangible embodiment offered as evidence of lack of novelty
must set forth the knowledge in such clear and ·unequivocal
form that a true and just comparison can be made of it with
the subsequent device. 156 But in the broadest aspect, after the
weight to be given the evidence is settled, the comparison remains to be made; the question of identity of the two ideas
of means still remains to be settled. This involves of course
the whole matter of "invention" and "novelty" thus far discussed. . When the existence of the prior patent or other form
of knowledge is shown, so that the existence of the knowledge
i$ proved and the issue thereby becomes one of identity, the
form of the prior knowledge ceases to be material, except as
stated in the foregoing discussion. If this is clearly borne in
mind much of the confusion as shown in decisions, .between
conclusions as to identity of ~oncepts, and proof of the existence and characteristics of a particular concept, will be eliminated-a consumption devoutly to be desired.
A warning may be here adverted to, which is sometimes
uttered by the courts, against reading into the prior knowledge
something which is in fact not there. The subsequent device
may, when produced, seem so simple that its actual difference
from prior knowledge may appear immaterial. Whether it is
really immaterial or not, is the whole question of invention as
against mere mechanical skill. As one court has said, 157 "The
line which separates invention from mechanical skill is at best
a narrow one, and the difficulty of demarkation in this case is
1

156 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Elliott-Fisher Co., 165 Fed. 927, 930.
"The prior patent or publication relied upon must, by descriptive words or
drawings, or by both, cont~in and exhibit a substantial representation of
the patented improvement in such full, clear and exad terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains to make,
construct, and practice the invention." Hanifen v. Godschalk Co., 84
Fed. 649.
1 5 7 Ideal Stopper Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 13 r Fed. 244, 246.
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enhanced by the fact that of necessity we look upon Young's

invention with eyes instructed by Painter's and other subse-

enhanced by the fact that of necessity we look upon Young's
invention with eyes instructed by Painter s and other subsequent patents, and must take care that we do not in such light
so reconstruct Youngs patent as to see in it those possibilities
which may seem very obvious now, but which may not have
been disclosed by the patent itself; for, vague and uncertain
· as may be the line of demarkation between mechanical skill
and invention, we could not deny Painter the right of invention, unless the idea upon which his patent is predicated is so
clearly set forth or suggested by Young that a mechanic, with
Young's patent before him, could by mere mechanical skill so
modify proportions or change the mode of operation a.a to
overcome the difficulties which excluded the prior device from
commercial utility, and thus make fruitful the inventive idea
which before was futile, merely through lack of the mechanical
skill needed for its development." 158
LosT ARTS. Certain forms of what might be called prior
.
knowledge, even when proved to exist arid to be identical with
that for which patent is sought, are held, as a matter of law,
not to anticipate so as to depriv~ a later invention of patentability. Prior kn
· had been for otten at the time
of a later production, will not suffice to deprive that la er concept o a en a i 1 y. The pu 1c is no more in possession of
forgotten knowledge than if that knowledge had never existed. It is generally believed that centuries ago certain arts
existed whose fruits have come down to us today, but whose
methods of procedure have been wholly lost to the world. It
can not be doubted but that if some one were to resurrect,
thr.o ugh his own creative power, the means of producing the
same result, he would not be precluded from a patent by the
fact that an art had once been known for producing the same
result. In Gayler v. Wilder159 the contention was set up that
the patent involved was void for lack of novelty because one
Conner had used a precisely similar device long before. The
court rejected the contention, sayinO', ' If the Conner safe had·

quent patents, and must take care that we do not in such light

so reconstruct Young's patent as to see in it those possibilities

which may seem very obvious now, but which may not have

been disclosed by the patent itself ; for, vague and uncertain

as may be the line of demarkation between mechanical skill

and invention, we could not deny Painter the right of inven-

tion, unless the idea upon which his patent is predicated is so

clearly set forth or suggested by Young that a mechanic, with

Young's patent before him, could by mere mechanical skill so

modify proportions or change the mode of operation as to

overcome the difficulties which excluded the prior device from

commercial utility, and thus make fruitful the inventive idea

which before was futile, merely through lack of the mechanical

skill needed for its development." 158

LOST ARTS. Certain forms of what might be called prior

knowledge, even when proved to exist and to be identical with

that for which patent is sought, are held, as a matter of law,
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not to anticipate so as to deprive a later invention of patent-

ability. Prjojrjcnj^dge-wiikh-had been f orgpttenjt the time

of a later production, will not suffice to deprive thaFIater con-

cepLcrTpatentability. The ^ublicTs no more in possession of

forgotten knowledge than if that knowledge had never ex-

isted. It is generally believed that centuries ago certain arts

existed whose fruits have come down to us today, but whose

methods of procedure have been wholly lost to the world. It

can not be doubted but that if some one were to resurrect,

-

through his own creative power, the means of producing the

same result, he would not be precluded from a patent by the

fact that an art had once been known for producing the same

result. In Gayler v. Wilder 159 the contention was set up that

the patent involved was void for lack of novelty because one

Conner had used a precisely similar device long before. The

court rejected the contention, saying, "If the Conner safe had'

158 Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 161.

159 10 How. 477.

158
159

Digitiz

INT

Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 161.
ro How. 477.

by

El P. CH VE

Origiral from

UNIVERS

0

CAU 0

Prior Knowledge . 93

Prior Knowledge

passed away from the memory of Conner himself, and of those

. 93

who had seen it, and the safe itself had disappeared, the knowl-

edge of the improvement was as completely lost as if it had

never been discovered. The public could derive no benefit

from it until it was discovered by another inventor. And if

Fitzgerald (the patentee) made his discovery by his own ef-.

forts, without any knowledge of Conner's, he invented an im-

provement that was then new, and at that time unknown ; and

it was not the less new and unknown because Conner's safe

was recalled to his memory by the success of Fitzgerald's

patent" 160

In this particular case there was a strong dissenting opinion

to the effect that Conner's knowledge, merely temporarily for-

gotten, was not truly a "lost" art. Mr. Justice McLean said,

"Conner's safe, as appears from the bill of exceptions, was

used in his counting-house, being accessible to every one, some

six or eight years. In 1838 it passed into other hands; but

into whose hands it does not appear. In 1843, Fitzgerald ob-

tained his patent. How long before that he made experiments
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to test the invention is not proved. At most, the time must

have been less than five years. This is a short period on which

to found a presumption of forgetfulness. The law authorizes

no such presumption. It can never become the law. It is not

founded on probability or reason. The question is, Was Con-

ner's invention prior to that of Fitzgerald? That it was of

older date by some ten or twelve years is proved. And the

instruction, it must be observed, was founded on the supposi-

tion that both inventions were similar.

"The instruction seems to attach great importance to the

fact that Conner's safe was used only for his private purpose.

This is of no importance. The invention is the question, and

not the manner in which the inventor used it. The safe was

constructed at the foundery, and must have been known to the

hands there employed. How can it be ascertained that Fitz-

gerald was not informed by some of these hands of the struc-

ture of Conner's safe, or by some one of the many hundreds

160 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 125.

passed away from the.memory of Conner himself, and of those
who had seen it, and the safe itself had disappeared, the knowl- edge of the improvement was as completely lost as if it had
never been discovered. The public could derive no benefit
from it until it was discovered by another inventor. And if
Fitzgerald (the patentee) made his discovery by his own ef-.
forts, without any knowledge of Conner's, he invented an improvement that was then new, and at that time unknown; and
it was not the less new and unknown because Conner's safe
was recalled to his memory by the success of Fitzgerald's
patent. " 160
In this particular case there was a strong dissenting opinion
to the effect that Conner's knowledge, merely temporarily forgotten, was not truly a "lost" art. Mr. Justice McLean said,
"Conner's s~fe, as appears from the bill of exceptions, was
used in his counting-house, being accessible to every one, some
six or ~ight years. In 1838 it passed into other hands; but
into whose hands it does not appear. In 1843, Fitzgerald obtained his patent. How long before that he made experiments
to test the invention is not proved. At most, the time must
have been less than five years. This is a short period on which
to found ~ presumption of forgetfulness. The law author'izes
110 such presumption. It can never become the law. It is not
founded on probability or reason. The question is, Was Conner's invention prior to that of Fitzgerald? That ii wa:s of
older date by some ten or twelve years is proved. And the
.instruction, it must be observed, was founded on the supposition that both inventions were similar.
"The instruction seems to attach great importance to the
fact that Conner's safe was used only for his private purpose.
This is of no importance. The invention is the question, and
not the manner in which the inventor used it. The safe was
constructed at the foundery, and must have been known to the
hands there employed. · How can it be ascertained that Fitzgerald was not informed by some of these hands of the structure of Conner's safe, or by some one of the many hundreds
160

Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 125.

Ori i al"fr m

UN

S

( 0

CA,U 0

I.Ai

94 Patents and Inventions

who had seen it in his counting-house in the city of New
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York. It was to guard against this, which is rarely if ever

susceptible of proof, that the act is express, if the thing pat-

who had seen it in his counting-house in the city of New
Yor:k. It was to guard against this, which is rarely if ever
susceptible of proof, that the act is express,-if the thing patented Wel:S known before, the patent is void. If the fact of 'this.
knowledge in any one be established, it is immaterial whether
the patentee may have known it or not, it avoids his patent."
Mr. Justice Daniel, ~lso dissenting, very pertinently said, "An
attempt has been made to compare the doctrine propounded by
the court to what it might be tho.ught is the law as applicable to
the discovery, or rather recovery, of the processes employed in
what have been called the lost arts. This illustration is ·in
itself somewhat equivocal, and by no means satisfactory; for
if that process could certainly be shown to be the same with
one claimed. by the modern inventor, his discovery could
scarcely have the merit of originality, or be the foundation of
txclusive right. But, in truth; the illustration attempted ·to be
drawn from a revival of a lost art is not apposite to the present case. The term lost arrt is applicable peculiarly to. certain
monuments of antiquity still remaining in the world, the
process of whose accomplishment has been lost for centuries,
has been irretrievably swept from the earth, with every vestige
of the archives or records of the nations with whom those arts
existed, and the origin or even the identity of which process
none can certainly establish. And if a means of producing
the effect we see and have amongst us be discovered, and none
can either by history or tradition ref er to a similar or to the
identical process, the inventor of that means may so far claim
the merit of originality, though the work itself may have been
produced possibly by the same means. But not one principle
drawn from such a state of things can be applied to a recent
proceeding, which c9unts from its origin scarcely a period of
fifteen years."
That mere temporary f a·r getfulness of knowledge does not
prevent that knowledge from anticipating is shown in Brush
v. Condit. 161 Here the patent was for a device to hold the
. carbon in electric arc lights. It had been preceded by a simi~

ented was known before, the patent is void. If the fact of this

knowledge in any one be established, it is immaterial whether

the patentee may have known it or not, it avoids his patent."

Mr. Justice Daniel, also dissenting, very pertinently said, "An

attempt has been made to compare the doctrine propounded by

the court to what it might be thought is the law as applicable to

the discovery, or rather recovery, of the processes employed in

what have been called the lost arts. This illustration is in

itself somewhat equivocal, and by no means satisfactory; for

if that process could certainly be shown to be the same with

one claimed by the modern inventor, his discovery could

scarcely have the merit of originality, or be the foundation of

exclusive right. But, in truth, the illustration attempted to be

drawn from a revival of a lost art is not apposite to the pres-

ent case. The term lost art is applicable peculiarly to certain

monuments of antiquity still remaining in the world, the
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process of whose accomplishment has been lost for centuries,

has been irretrievably swept from the earth, with every vestige

of the archives or records of the nations with whom those arts

existed, and the origin or even the identity of which process

none can certainly establish. And if a means of producing

the effect we see and have amongst us be discovered, and none

can either by history or tradition refer to a similar or to the

identical process, the inventor of that means may so far claim

the merit of originality, though the work itself may have been

produced possibly by the same means. But not one principle

drawn from such a state of things can be applied to a recent

proceeding, which counts from its origin scarcely a period of

fifteen years."

That mere temporary forgetfulness of knowledge does not

prevent that knowledge from anticipating is shown in Brush

v. Condit. 161 Here the patent was for a device to hold the

carbon in electric arc lights. It had been preceded by a simi-

isi 132 U. S. 39-

161 132

u. s. 39.
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lar device, as was shown on the trial, but the earlier one had

95

been used on only one lamp, for a very short time, and had

been then relegated to absolute desuetude. In ordinary par-

lance, it had been completely forgotten, till called to mind by

the later device. The court, admitting that the disuse might

tend to show dissimilarity with the later, used, one, but being

satisfied that there was an identity nevertheless, held that the

patented device was not patentable because of this earlier

knowledge.

The law is thus left open as to just how far a device, art,

etc., must have been forgotten to be technically "lost" and

therefore, not anticipatory. Theoretically, if it can be so far

recalled as to be compared with the later device, it is not lost at

all, merely forgotten. Practically, perhaps, the one who

causes its recall to public memory by his new device is quite

as worthy of a patent as one who absolutely creates a device.

The majority opinion in Gayler v. Wilder represents the prac-

tical view ; the dissenting opinion, and such cases as Brush v.

Condit, the theoretical one.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

UNRECOGNIZED RESULTS. Akin to the fact that lost knowl-

edge does not anticipate is the fact that an unrecognized re-

sult, an unperceived actuality, if such a phrase may be used,

will not serve to anticipate a subsequent alleged creation. In

the words of the court, 162 "novelty is not negatived by a prior

accidental production of the same thing, when the operator

does not recognize the means by which the accidental result is

accomplished, and no knowledge of them, or of the method of

its employment, is derived from it by any one." In Andrews

v. Carman, 163 one Green had patented a method of utilizing a

principle of nature. It was claimed that the principle had al-

ready, prior to his invention, been called into operation by

devices accomplishing the same purpose. The court- upheld

the patent, saying, "A chance operation of a principle, unrec-

ognized by any one at the time, and from which no informa-

tion of its existence, and no knowledge of a method of its

employment, is derived by any one, if proved to have occurred,

162 Wickelman v. Dick Co., 88 Fed. 264.

163 13 Blatch. 307, 323.

lar device, as was shown on the trial, but the earlier one had
been used on only one lamp, for a · very short time) a·n d had
teen then relegated to absolute desuetude. In ordinary par1?-nce, it had been completely forgotten, till called to .mind by
the later device. The court, admitting that the disuse might
tend to show dissimilarity with the later, used, one, but being
sati$fied that there was an 'identity nevertheless, held that the
patented device was not patentable because of this -earlier
knowledge.
The law is thus left open as to just how far a device, art,
etc., must have been forgotten to be technically "lost" and
therefore, not anticipatory. Theoretically, if it can be so far
recalled as to be compared with the later device, it is not lost at
all, merely forgotten. Practically, perhaps, thei one who
causes its rec<;tll to public memory by his new device is quite
as worthy of a patent as one who absolutely creates a device.
The majority opinion in Gayler v. Wilder represents the practical view; the dissenting opinion, and such cases as Brush v.
Condit, the theoretical one.
UNRECOGNIZED RESULTS. Akin to the fact that lost knowledge does not anticipate is the fact that an unrecognized result, an unperceived actuality, if such a phrase may be used,
will not serve to anticipate a subsequent alleged creation. In
the words of the court, 162 "novelty is not negatived by a prior
·accidental production of the same thing, when the operator
does not recognize the means by which the accidental result is
accomplished, and no knowledge of them, or of the method of
its employment, is derived from it by any one." In Andrews
v. Carman, 163 one Green had patented a method of utilizing a
principle of nature. It was claimed that the principle had already, prior to his invention, been called ihto operation by
devices accomplishing the same purpose. The court. upheld
the patent, saying, "A chance operation of a principle, unrecognized by any one at the time, and from which no information of its existence, and no knowledge of a method of its
employment, is derived by any one, if proved to have occurred,
162
163

Wickelman v. Dick Co., 88 Fed. 264.
13 Blatch. 307, 323.

Oriqi al fr m

v

LJ NIVE S f 0

CA I 0

IP1

g6 Patents and Inventions

will not be sufficient to defeat the claim of him who first dis-
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covers the principle, and, by putting it to a practical and in-

telligent use, first makes it available to man." 164

The holding is somewhat differently put in another case. 165

It was admitted that a certain earlier patented device ap-

proached very near the device in question and might have

been made into the same thing by a slight modification. It

was held not to anticipate, however, because it was not de-

signed by its maker for the purpose, and the fact that it could

have been so modified and used, was not evident to an ordi-

nary mechanic. 16 '

SCATTERED KNOWLEDGE. Since an invention is itself, as

such, a single idea, although it may be composed of many

minor constituent ideas, a patent is not necessarily defeated

by showing that some or all of the constituent ideas were al-

ready well known. These constituent ideas,' uncombined, and

each by itself, are not in any sense the one composite idea into

which the patentee has welded them. Knowledge of them by

themselves is not knowledge of the combination or composite
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into which they may be welded. Of course, the combining of

them into one whole may not have required the exercise of

inventive genius. In such case the existence of the separate

ideas would legally invalidate the patent for the composite

idea. The occasional statements to the effect that if the un-

combined elements do not show the combination, the patent

for the latter is therefor valid, are obviously not meant in their

literal significance. Contextually they mean only that if the

elements do not show the combination, the patent may be valid.

It is not necessarily so. But if in fact it did require invention

to create the patented idea out of the separate ideas, then the

patent is valid, however well known the separate ideas may

164 Warren Bros. v. Owosso, 166 Fed. 309.

165 Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 161.

186 This indicates the substantial identity of invention and novelty. The

particular device was not anticipated because to an ordinary mechanic the

slight change necessary was not obvious it would have taken more than

mechanical skill to have made the change ; hence the later device was a

true invention. Tilghman v. Proctor, '102 U. S. 707, 711.

will not be sufficient to def eat the claim of him who first dis-

covers th~ principle and, by puttino- it to a practical and intelligent use, fir t makes it available to man." 164
The holding is somewhat differently put in another case. 16•5
It was admitted that a certain earlier patented device approached very near the device in question and might have
been made into the same thing by a slight modification. It
was held not to anticipate, however, becau e it was not de . .
signed by its maker for the purpose, and the fact that it could
have been so modified and used, was not evident to an ordinary mechanic. 166 ·
SCATTERED KNOWLEDGE. Since an invention is itself, a
such; a single idea, although it may be composed of many
minor constituent ideas, a patent is not nece sarily defeated
by showing that some or all of the constituent ideas were already well known. These constituent ideas," uncombined, and
each by itself, are not in al).y sense the one composite idea into
which the patentee has welded them. Knowledge of them by
themselves is not knowledge of the combination or composite
into which they may be welded. Of course, the combining of
them into one whole inay not have required the exercise of
inventive genius. In such case the existence of the separate
ideas would legally invalidate the patent for the composite
idea. The occasional statements to the effect that if the uncombined elements do not show the combination, the patent for the latter is therefor valid, are obviously not meant in their
literal significance. Contextually they mean only that if the
elements do not show the combination, the patent may be valid.
It is not necessarily so. But if in fact it did require invention
to create the patented idea out of the separate ideas then the
patent is valid however well known the eparate ideas may
Warren Bro . v. Owosso, 166 Fed. 309.
Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 16I.
166 This indicates the sub tant\al identity of invention and novelty.
The
particular device was not anticipated becau e to an ordinary mechanic the
slight change neces ary was not obvious-it would have taken more than
mechanical skill to have made the change; hence the later device wa a
true invention. Tilghman v. Proctor, '102 U. S. 707, 7n.
164
165
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have been. Proof of the prior knowledge of these separate
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ideas is, therefore, pertinent in a suit, and should not be ex-

have been. Proof of the prior knowledge of these separate
ideas is, therefore, pertinent in a suit, and should not be excluded nor disregarded. But it does not of itself invalidate
the patent attacked. It only forms a background against which
the inventive quality of the idea patented can be determined.1 663
PATENTEE'S PRIOR REVELATIONS. The fact that the prior
knowledge was given to the world by the subsequent patentee
himself does not keep it from being such anticipation as will
render invalid the later patent. To quote from one decision,
"The various improvements or modifications in the process
of manufacturing of solidified collodion wh.ich are disclosed
in the earlier patents to the Hyatts are outstanding against this
vatent (also issued to the Hyatts) just as _much as if they were
issued to strangers. " 167
If this prior knowledge has been covered by a patent, granted
to the inventor and still held by him ~ the fact of anticipation.
will not matter, except as to the greater length of time that
the monopoly would exist if it could be obtained under the
later patent. If the earlier patent represents a subject matter
sufficiently like that of the later one to constitute . an anticipation of ~t, anything that would be an infringement of the later
sought patent ought, theoretically, to be an infringement of
the earlier patent. If the prior knowledge is not protected by
a patent, the inventor may avoid the evils of anticipation by
patenting his earlier device, unless he has been guilty of allowing too great a time to pass. Nevertheless, although the earlier
patent which would anticipate a later one ou.g ht to protect the
inventor to the same ~xtent as the later one asked for would
do, the practical result is not always so equally balanced.
Courts tend sometimes·.to find a device anticipated by a fundamental earlier patent when they might not be inclined to find

cluded nor disregarded. But it does not of itself invalidate

the patent attacked. It only forms a background against which

the inventive quality of the idea patented can be determined. 166 *

PATENTEE'S PRIOR REVELATIONS. The fact that the prior

knowledge was given to the world by the subsequent patentee

himself does not keep it from being such anticipation as will

render invalid the later patent. To quote from one decision,

"The various improvements or modifications in the process

of manufacturing of solidified collodion which are disclosed

in the earlier patents to the Hyatts are outstanding against this

patent (also issued to the Hyatts) just as much as if they were

issued to strangers." 167

If this prior knowledge has been covered by a patent, granted

to the inventor and still held by him, the fact of anticipation,

will not matter, except as to the greater length of time that

the monopoly would exist if it could be obtained under the

later patent. If the earlier patent represents a subject matter
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sufficiently like that of the later one to constitute. an anticipa-

tion of it, anything that would be an infringement of the later

sought patent ought, theoretically, to be an infringement of

the earlier patent. If the prior knowledge is not protected by

a patent, the inventor may avoid the evils of anticipation by

patenting his earlier device, unless he has been guilty of allow-

ing too great a time to pass. Nevertheless, although the earlier

patent which would anticipate a later one ought to protect the

inventor to the same extent as the later one asked for would

do, the practical result is not always so equally balanced.

Courts tend sometimes to find a device anticipated by a funda-

mental earlier patent when they might not be inclined to find

166a Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31; Smith v. Macbeth, 67 Fed. 137; Imperial

Bottle Co. v. Crown Cork etc. Co., 139 Fed. 312; Packard v. Lacing-Stud

Co., 70 Fed. 66.

167 Celluloid Mfg. Co., v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 42 Fed. 900, 905; So also

Doig v. Morgan Match Co., 59 C. C. A. 616; Underwood v. Gerber, 149

U. S. 224; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co. ,-151 U. S. 186; Bannerman v. Sanford,

99 Fed. 294; Williamson v. Neverslip Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 210.

Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 3r; Smith v. Macbeth, 67 Fed. 137; Imperial
Bottle Co. v. Crown Cork etc. Co., 139 Fed. 312; Packard v. Lacing-Stud
Co., 70 Fed. 66.
167 Celluloid Mfg. Co., v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 42 Fed. 900, 905; So also
Doig v. Morgan Match Co., 59 C. C. A. 616; Underwood v. Gerber, 149
U . S. 224; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,'"151 U . S. 186; Bannerman v. Sanford,
99 Fed. 294; Williamson v. N everslip Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 210.
166 a
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the later device within the protected scope of the earlier patent
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if the case should come up from that direction. For this rea-

son, it is sound policy for an inventor to cover all that he is

entitled to in a single patent, or at least in patents applied for

simultaneously, instead of delaying his application for any

part independent of, but closely related to, his main inven-

tion. 168

WHAT CONSTITUTES PRIORITY. The priority of the alleged

anticipating knowledge is not determined in relation to the

date the patent is issued nor even that on which it is applied

for. The knowledge, to anticipate, must have existed at the

time the invention was made. 169 The patent statute 1693 pro-

vides that an im^aii^r^may V^w

r used by other sJp-thJL l'6uiUiy. bpiuifchis invention

or~dkcoyery thereof."

If public knowledge is proved to have existed before the ap-

plication for the patent was filed, the patent is prima facie void

because of anticipation, lack of novelty 'in the invention, or

whatever one chooses to call it. In the absence of any other
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proof the invention is presumed to have first been brought in-

to existence at the time the application was filed, 170 and it would

therefore be subsequent to the public knowledge as proved.

But, inasmuch as the date of the invention is not restricted to

the date of application, the inventor is free to prove the real

ime at which his invention was brought into existence.

DATE OF INVENTION. The sufficiency of the evidence upon

this point takes two forms, which for the sake of true com-

prehension of the cases, must not be confused, although they

are not always clearly distinguished in judicial discussion. 171

The first issue upon the evidence is whether it amounts to proof

168 The right of including more than one invention in a single patent

is discussed infra.

169 Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433, 464.

1698 Section 4886.

170 Drewson v. Hatje, 131 Fed. 734; Automatic Weighing Mach. Co.

v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288.

171 Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed.

288.

the later device within the protected scope of the earlier patent
if the case hould come up from that direction. For this reason, it is sound policy for an inventor to cover all that he is
entitled to in a single patent, or at least in patents applied for
simultaneously, instead of delaying his application for any
part independent of, but closely related to, his main invention:168
W.HAT CONSTITUTES PRIORITY. The priority of the alleged
anticipating knowledge is not determined in relation to the
date the patent is issued nor even that on which it is applied
for. The knowledge, to anticipate, must have existed at the
time the invention was made. 169 The patent statute169 a proYides that an i
ve a atent i
· e .be "not
n or used by others ·
· coun ry, bef e his invention
o
ove thereof.''
. If public knowledge is proved to haye existed before the ap. plication for the patent was filed, the patent is prirna. f acie void
because of anticipation, lack of novelty ·in the invention, or
whatever one chooses to call it. In the absence of any other
proof the invention is presumed to have first been brought into existence at the time the application was filed, 110 and it would
therefore be subsequent to the public knowledge as ·proved.
But, inasmuch as the date of the invention is not restricted to
the date of application, the inventor is free to prove the real
time at which his invention was brought into existence.
DATE OF INVENTION. The sufficiency of the evidence upon
this point takes two forms, which for the sake of true comprehension of the cases, must not be confused, although they
are not always clearly distinguished in · judicial discussion. 171
The first issue upon the evidence is whet~er it amounts to proof

\J

l68 The right of including more than one invention in a single patent
is discussed infra.
169 Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433, 464.
169a Section 4886.
17 0 Drewson v. Hatje, 131 Fed. 734; Automatic Weighing Mach. Co.
v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288.
171 Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed.

288.
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of the real existence of any knowledge, regardless of the effect

of that knowledge. The inventor might testify under oath that

he had evolved his invention in complete detail long before he

made his application, but, unless this were corroborated by

other evidence, no court would be apt to fix the date of inven-

tion according to his statement. The possibility of mere mis-

take, to say nothing of deliberate falsehood, would be far too

great. An invention may be an invention even though it be still

locked in the mind of the inventor. But as Lord Justice Brian

said, centuries ago, 172 "The devil himself knows not the thought

of man," and if there has been no revelation of the invention to

others, no substantial embodiment or perceptible expression of

it, the proof, resting itself only in the statement of the soi-

disant inventor is extremely difficult if not impossible. This

was somewhat discussed in the case of Clark Thread Co. v.

Willimantic Linen Co. 173 "The allegation/' said the court,

"that the invention of Conant, for which his said letters patent

were granted, was made before the publication or sealing of

Weild's patent requires more careful consideration. . . . The
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only evidence on the question as to the time of Conant's inven-

tion is his own testimony, a species of evidence which, in cases

of this kind, ought to be received with great caution." The

court felt bound to construe the testimony very strictly against

the patentee, "because such testimony, given for the purpose

that this was, is necessarily subject to the gravest suspicion,

however honest and well intentioned the witness may be." Jif

the inventor could corroborate his statements by the testimony

of others to the effect that he had revealed to them his invention

in perfected form, it is possible that courts would accept such

testimony as sufficient proof, despite its being merely oral

statements depending on honesty and exactness of memory.

Certainly, however, the testimony would be severely scrutin-

ized and would be accepted as proof with the greatest hesi-

tancy. The statements of courts in respect to the strength of

evidence necessary to prove knowledge alleged to anticipate a

172 Yr. Bk. 17 Ed. IV. i, 2.

173 140 U. S. 481. See also, Symington Co. v. National Malleable Co., 39"

Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.
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of the real existence of any knowledge, regardless of the effect
of that knowledge. The inventor might testify under oath that
he had evolved his invention in complete det3.il long before he
made his application, but, unless this were corroborated by
other evidence, no court would be apt to fix the date of invention according to his statement. The possibility of mere mistake, to say nothing of deliberate falsehood, would be far too
great. · An invention may be an invention even though it be still
locked in the mind of the inventor. But as Lord Justice Brian
said, centuries ago, 112 "The devil himself knows not the thought
of man," and if there has been no rev~lation of the invention to
others, no substantial embodiment or perceptible expression of
it, the proof, resting itself only in the statement of the soidisa.nt inventor is extremely difficult if not impossible. This
was somewhat discussed in the case of Clark Thread Co. v.
Willimantic Linen Co. 173 "The allegation," said the court,
"that the invention of Conant, for which his said letters patent
were granted, was made before the publication or sealing of
W eild' s patent requires more careful consideration. . . . The
only evidence on the question as to the time of Conant's invention is his own testimony, a species of ~vidence which, in cases
of this kind, ought to be received with greJ.t caution." The
court felt bound to construe the testimony very strictly against
the patentee, "because such testimony, given for the purpose
that this was,. is necessarily subject to the gravest suspicion,
however honest and well intentioned the witness may be." If
the inventor could corroborate his statements by the testimony
of others to the effect that he had revealed to them his invention
in perfected form, it is possible that c·o urts would accept such
ttstim<2!:1l_ as sufficient proof~ ,despite its being merely oral
statements depending on honesty and exactness of mefl?.ory.
Certainly, however, the testimony would be severely scrutinized and would be accepted as proof wit he greatest hesi- tancy. The statements of courts in respect to the strength of
evidence necessary to prove knowledge alleged to anticipate a
Yr. Bk 17 Ed. IV. 1, 2.
140 U. S. 48I. See also, Symington Co. v. National Malleable Co., 39 ·
Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.
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patent, might be applied -equally well to the evidence concern-
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ing the date of invention. 174

-patent, might be applied ·equally well to the evidence concerning the date of invention. 174
Occasional courts have gone to the extreme of saying, in
effect, that the date of invention can not be fixed prior to the
time when the invention has been .actually embodied in substant.ial form. 175 These statements, while quite frequent, are
logically incorrect, although they do seem to be the law-with
some exceptions hereafter discussed. They appear to be based
on either of two ideas. One is the vicious error already ref erred to, that an invention is not a mere concept itself, but is
the tangible device resulting from some concept involving inventive genius. On this assumption there could, of course, be
no "invention" until there were a tangible contrivance; but the
assumption is, as we have said, wholly unwarranted by the
cases. 176
The other idea behind the statement is, that the existence of
the invention can not be satisfactorily proved without something more than oral testimony. This idea certainly finds a
great deal of support in the cases; and it is at least possible,
tha~ no amount of completely credible oral testimony would be
c;.ccepted as sufficient, by itself .177

Occasional courts have gone to the extreme of saying, in

effect, that the date of invention can not be fixed prior to the

time when the invention has been actually embodied in sub-

stantial form. 175 These statements, while quite frequent, are

logically incorrect, although they do seem to be the law with

some exceptions hereafter discussed. They appear to be based

on either of two ideas. One is the vicious error already re-

ferred to, that an invention is not a mere concept itself, but is

the tangible device resulting from some concept involving in-

ventive genius. On this assumption there could, of course,, be

no ''invention" until there were a tangible contrivance; but the

assumption is, as we have said, wholly unwarranted by the

cases. 176

The other idea behind the statement is, that the existence of

the invention can not be satisfactorily proved without some-

thing more than oral testimony. This idea certainly finds a

great deal of support in the cases; and it is at least possible,
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that no amount of completely credible oral testimony would be

accepted as sufficient, by itself. 177

174 Supra.

17E * Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 489;

Ellithorp v. Robertson, Fed. Cas. 4408, 4 Blatch. 307; Automatic Weighing

Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288, and cases therein cited ;

Symington Co. v. National Malleable Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.

176 Brown v. Crane Co., 133 Fed. 235, Grosscup J., speaking upon an issue

other than the one here referred to, "Invention is not in my judgment

confined to the concrete mechanical form into which an idea ultimately

evolves. Invention is the idea itself, the burst of new thought, the dis-

covery; and patentable invention is the conjunction cf these with appro-

priate and efficient and mechanical means." See other cases collected

supra.

177 A contrary opinion is expressed in Phila. & Trenton R. R. Co. v.

Stimpson, 14 Peters 448, 461, "In many cases of invention, it is hardly

Supra.
11~ Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 489;
Ellithorp v. Robertson, Fed. Cas. 44o8, 4 Blatch. 307; Automatic Weighing
Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288, and cases therein cited;
Symington Co. v. National Malleable Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542.
176 Brown v. Crane Co., 133 Fed. 235, Grosscup J., speaking upon an issue
other than the one here referred to, "Invention is not in my judgment
confined to the concrete. mechanical form into which an idea ultimately
evolves. Invention is the idea itself, -the burst of new thought, the discovery; and patentable invention is the conj unction cf these with appropriate and efficient and mechanical means." See other case collected
supra.
111 A contrary op~nion is expressed in Phila. & Trenton R. R. Co. v.
Stimpson, 14 Peters 448, 461, "In many ca es of invention, it is hardly
possible, in any other manner, to a certain the precise time and exact
origin of the particular invention. The invention itself is an intellectual
process or operation; and like all other expression of thought, can in
·many cases scarcely be made known, except by speech. The invention
may be consummated and perfect, and may be su~ceptible of complete
174

possible, in any other manner, to ascertain the precise time and exact

origin of the particular invention. The invention itself is an intellectual

process or operation ; and like all other expressions of thought, can in

"many cases scarcely be made known, except by speech. The invention

may be consummated and perfect, and may be susceptible of complete
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For this reason it behooves an inventor to keep such visible

record of the progress of his concept that, shouldjihejiate of

his invention be called into question, he can demonstrate^ be*

yoiSf a rlnnht flip flat* at wKTch he really evolved thgjxmccpt

that ^OQjistitutGG the invention.

The form which this corroborating evidence takes is not

material, so long as it demonstrates the existence of the in-

vention claimed. In many cases it has been in the shape of

drawings or written description. 178

description in words, a month, or even a year before it can be embodied

in any visible form, machine or composition of matter. It might take a

year to construct a steamboat, after the inventor had completely mastered

all the details of his invention, and had fully explained them to all the

various artisans whom he might employ to construct the different parts

of the machinery. And yet from those very details and explanations,

For this reason it behoo es-2.n inventor. to keep-such visible
record of the -progress of his conce t that should the date of ·
his inventio ~ ca ea into question, he can demonstrate beyonda doubt ..,_
"h he reall evol ed the concept
that c
·wtes the invent-i-en.
The form which this corroborating evidence takes is not
material, so long as it demonstrates the existence of the invention claimed. In many cases it has been m the shape of
drawings or written descri_ption. 178

another ingenious mechanic might be able to construct the whole appara-

tus, and assume to himself the priority of the invention. The conversa-

tions and declarations of a patentee, merely affirming that, at some for-

mer period, he invented that particular machine, might well be objected to.
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But his conversations and declarations, stating that he had made an

invention, and describing its details and explaining its operations, are

properly to be deemed an assertion of his right, at that time, as an in-

ventor, to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known ;

although not of their existence at an antecedent time." See also, Bullock

Mfg. Co. v. Crocker-Wheeler Co., 141 Fed. 101, 107.

178 Bullock Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Crocker-Wheeler Co., 141 Fed. 101 ; West-

inghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Instrument Co., 133 Fed. 167; Dodge

v. Porter, 98 Fed. 624; Draper v. Potomska Mills Corp., Fed. Cas. No.

4072.

Some confusion has been caused by the cases in which it is said that

drawings and descriptions do not constitute an invention and have no

effect upon a subsequently granted patent unless they are followed up to

practical embodiment, or reduction to practice with proper diligence.

Any such statement is on its face paradoxical, and is unsound. If the

drawings, etc., do not at least evidence the invention, they could have no

effect however diligently they should be followed up. If the invention

does not exist until reduced to practice, it does not exist until then how-

ever diligent the reduction may have been, and could not therefore take

precedence of an invention evolved before the reduction to practice. All

that such cases can stand for, in any sort of harmony with other cases,

is either that the strength of evidence of the drawings, etc., is weakened

description in words, a month, or even a year before it can be ~mbodied
in any visible form, machine or composition of matter. It might take a
year to construct a steamboat, after the inventor had completely mastered
all the details of his invention, and had fully explained them to all the
various artisans whom he might employ to construct the different .parts
of the machinery. Artd yet from those very details and explanations,
another ingenious mechanic might be able to construct the whole apparatus, and assume to himself the priority of the invention. The conversations and declarations of a patentee, merely affirming that, at some former period, he invented that particular machine, might well be objected to.
But his conversations and declarations, stating that he had made an
invention, and describing its details and explaining its operations, are
properly to be deemed an assertion of his right, at that !ime, as an inventor, to the extent of the facts and details which he then makes known;
although not of their existence at an antecedent time." See also, Bullock
Mfg. Co. v. Crocker-Wheeler Co., I4I Fed. IOI, I07.
118 Bullock Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Crocker-Wheeler Co., I4I Fed. IOI; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Instrument Co., I33 Fed. i67; Dodge
v. Porter, 98 Fed. 624; Draper v. Potomska Mills Corp., Fed. Cas. No.
4072.

by the lapse of time, or that the first inventor has lost his rights because

Some confusion has been caused by the cases in which it is said that
drawings and descriptions do not constitute an invention and . have no
e.ffect upon a subsequently granted patent unless they are followed up to
practical embodiment, or reduction to practice with prop.er diligence.
Any such statement is on its face paradoxical, and is unsound. If the
drawings, etc., do not at least evidence the invention, they could have no
effect however diligently they should be followed up. If the invention
does not exist until reduced to practice, it does not exist until then however diligent the reduction may have been, and could not therefore take
precedence of an invention evolved before the reduction to practice. Alt
that such cases can stand for, in any sort of harmony with other cases,
is either that the · strength of . evidence of the drawings, etc., is weakened
by the lapse of time, or that the first inventor has lost his rights because
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ions are not altogether in accord with the logical theory. In

theory, as we have just said, the date of the invention is the

date at which knowledge of the precise invention can be satis-

factorily proved to have existed. And a drawing or a clear

and specific description whose authenticity and existence on

the date alleged is beyond dispute, ought therefore to be suffi-

cient evidence to protect the inventor. But practically they

seem not to be sufficient when there is a question of priority of

invention between rival claimants for a patent. In such cases,

the courts do say, however illogically, that the date of inven-

tion is the date when the concept is first "reduced to practice."

Thus, in Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic

Scale Corp. 178a One Watson "conceived his invention, illus-

trated it by a drawing, and disclosed it to others, as early as

January 10, 1896. He reduced his invention to practice by the

building of a machine in April, 1897. He filed his application

March n, 1898." One Thomas had filed an application for a

patent for precisely the same invention in December, 1896.
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Thomas' application, therefore, was filed between the admitted

date of Watson's concept in its definite and complete form

and his embodiment of that concept in its tangible form. The

filing was assumed to be the date of Thomas' invention. The

issue was whether on these facts Watson or Thomas should

be considered the first inventor. Logically, of course, Watson

was admittedly the first inventor, he having definitely and pre-

cisely formulated the concept which was the invention nearly

a year before Thomas did so. But the decision of the court is

peculiar. It held the date of Watson's inventionr^to~beTAprtl',

of his long delay. If, in addition to holding that the earlier alleged in-

ventor has lost the right of precedence which his drawings, etc., might

have given and forfeited his possible monopoly, the subsequent and more

diligent inventor's patent is upheld, the result is to uphold a monopoly in

utter disregard of the fact that the invention covered thereby had been

known by others before the patentee evolved it. Pennsylvania Diamond

Drill Co. v. Simpson, 29 Fed. 288; Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v.

Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288.

i78 j66 Fed. 288.

But here again it must be sa_id emphatically that the deci ions are not altogether in accord with the logical theory. In
theory, as we have just said, the date of the invention is the
date at which knowledge of the precise invention can be satisfactorily proved to have existed. And a drawing or a clear
and specific description whose authenticity and existence on
the date alleged is beyond dispute, ought therefore to be sufficient evidence to protect the inventor. But practically they
seem not to be sufficient when there is a question of priority of
invention between riyal claimants for a patent. In such cases,
the courts do say, however illogically, that the date of invention is the date when the concept is first "reduced to practice."
Thus, in Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneumatic
Scale Corp. 17811 One Watson "conceived his invention, illustrated it by a drawing, and disclosed it to others, as early as
January 10, 1896. He reduced his invention to practice by· the
building of a machine in April, 1897. He filed his application
March II, 1898." One Thomas had filed an application for a
patent for precisely the same invention in December, 1896.
Thomas' application, therefore, was filed between the admitted
date of Watson's concept in its definite and complete form
and his embodiment of that concept in its tangible form. The
filing was assumed to be the date of Thomas' invention. The
issue was whether on these facts Watson or Thomas should
be considered the first inventor. Logically, of course, Watson
was admittedly the first inventor, he having definitely and precisely formulated the concept which was the invention nearly
a year before Thomas did so. But the decision o{ the court is
peculiar. It held the date of Watson's inventi9n o e
of his long delay. If, · in addition to holding that the earlier alleged inventor has lost the right of precedence which his drawings, etc., might
have given and forfeited his possible monopoly, the ubsequent and more
diligent inventor's patent is upqeld, the result is to uphold a monopoly in
utter disregard of the fact that the invention covered thereby had been
known by others before the patentee evolved it. Pennsylvania Diamond
Drill ·Co. v. Simpson, 29 Fed. 288; Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v.
Pneumafic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288.
11
118 166 Fed. 288.
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1897, and declared it to be ft rule that an invention dates not

from the time of its full and definite conception but from the

time it is first reduced to practice!! " ine authorities," savs tne

jm to be conclusive upon the point that a conception

evidenced by disclosure and drawings does not constitute an

invention under the patent laws." The illogicalness of this

position is justified by the court on a basis of public advantage.

But the court states two qualifications to this rule. The first

is that an ^pplicatioToFjrpatent will be treated as alsortrof

i r-tJYfL red "ctSSofiractice : that is to say, invention may

date from the. filing of the application even though the con-

cept has never actually been reduced to practice. As the court

puts it, "From these established and seemingly contradictory

principles of the patent law, first, that an invention in order

to be patentable must be reduced to practice, and, second, that,

under the statutes, reduction to practice is not essential either

before or after the grant of a patent, it follows that there must

be some stage of an invention when it must be presumed as a

matter of law that the inventor has reduced his invention to
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practice ; and that stage is presumed to have been reached when

he has done all that he is required to do to obtain a valid

patent, namely, when he has filed a complete and allowable

application; and hence the Patent Office has adopted the rule

that the filing of such_an_application is^cbnstructi ve TeducHon

to practice, and the federal courts haveTadopted tEeTule that

such an application is conclusive evidence that the patentee has

made his invention that is, reduced his invention to practice

at least as early as that date."

The second qualification is that the jiate of invention may

becarfferl- clcai back to the time of the Conception, even with-

out any reduction to practice, if the inventor has used^due dili-

gence_m attempting to reduce iftcTpractice. "It Js"c6nceded7 r

says the court, "that a patentee who has used 'reasonable dili-

gence in adapting and perfecting' his invention can carry the

date back to his drawings and disclosure. " 178b

i78> xhe right of an admittedly prior conceptor was declared to be lost

because of his unreasonable delay in reducing his concept to practice, and

1 ~'

and declared it to be a rule that an invention dates not
_ from the time of its full and definite conception but from the
· time it is first reduced to r c i
e authonttes, says e
, seem to be conclusive upon the point that a conception
evidenced by disclosure and drawings does not constitute an
invention under the patent laws." The illogicalness of this
position is ju.stified by the court on a basis of public advantage.
But the court states two qualifications to this rule. The first
is that ·an p ica ion or a atent will be freated as a sart-=Of
ractice; that is to say, invention may
con uc 1
date from the . filing of the application ~ven though the concept has never actually been reduced to practice. As the court
puts it, "From these established and seemingly ·contradictory
principles of the patent law, first, that an invention in order
to be patentable must be reduced to practice, and, second, that,
under the statutes, reduction to practice is not essential either
before or after the grant of a patent, it follows that there must
be some stage of an invention when it must be presumed as a
matter of law that the inventor has reduced his invention to
practice; and that stage is presumed to have been reached when
he has done all that he is required to do to obtain a valid
patent, namely, when he has filed a complete and allowable
application; and hence the Pat nt Offic~ has adopted the rule
that the filing of such an a lication is constructive re uc 10n
~' and the federal courts have a opte t e rule that
such an application is conclusive evidence that the patentee has
made his invention-that is, reduced. his invention to practice
-at least as early as that date."
The second qualification is that the date of invention may
b?carnai cleat back to the ttme of the conception, even withcut any reduction to practice, if the inventor has used due diligence in attempting to reduce ittO'practice. "It ·is conceded,"
says the court, "that a patentee who has u;ed 'reasonable diligence i.n adapting and perfecting' his invention can carry the
date back to his drawings and disclosure." 178b
11sb The right of an admittedly prior conceptor was declared to be lost
because of his unreasonable delay in reducing his concept to practice, and
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A working model_npt_ necessary. An actual working model

of theTnvention is not required. In the case of Loom Co. v.

A working model not necessary. An actual working model
of the invention is not required. In the case of Loom Co. v.
Higgins 179 the court quite precisely said, "An invention relating to machinery may be exhibited either in a drawing or in
a model, so as to lay the foundation of a claim to priority, if
it be sufficiently plain_to enable those s_!<illed in the art to un:
derstand i ."
Identification of knoi ledge. When a patemee has succeeded
in demonstrating to the court's satisfaction that he really did
have a certain definite idea at the time alleged, there then
arise;; the very diff er~nt question whether this idea is the same
one actually embodied in the patent. While it is frequently
left as a fact for the jury, and is in one s~nse a question of
fact, it is truly a question of psychological fact, a matter of
conclusion, reached by the operation of the judicial mind upon

Higgins 179 the court quite precisely said, "An invention relat-

ing to machinery may be exhibited either in a drawing or in

a model, so as to lay the foundation of a claim to priority, if

it be sufficiently plain, to enable those skilled in the art^to un-

Identification of knowledge. When a patemee has succeeded

in demonstrating to the court's satisfaction that he really did

have a certain definite idea at the time alleged, there then

arises the very different question whether this idea is the same

one actually embodied in the patent. While it is frequently

left as a fact for the jury, and is in one sense a question of

fact, it is truly a question of psychological fact, a matter of

conclusion, reached by the operation of the judicial mind upon

the patent of a subsequent conceptor of the same idea was upheld, in

One-Piece Lens Co. v. Bisight Co., 246 Fed. 450.

"Now Reno is in this dilemma : if his disclosure was complete in Octo-

ber, 1900, he was not reasonably diligent in waiting until the end of De-

cember, 1902, to file his application; if he was reasonably diligent it was
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because he needed for the completion of his conception the intervening

two years, and he does not antedate Stone & Brenchard. He himself sug-

gests no reason for the delay, but the necessity of engineering study, and

that did not interfere with an application if he had really fully conceived

the invention. . . . He makes no claim that poverty or sickness stood in

his way, nor that he was too engrossed with independent affairs, assum-

the patent of a subsequent conceptor of the same idea was upheld, in
One-Piece Lens Co. v. Bisight Co., 246 Fed. 450.
"Now Reno is in this dilemma : if his disclosure was complete in October, r900, he was not reasonably diligent in waiting until the end of December, 1902, to file his application; if he was reasonably diligent it was
because he needed for the compl_etion of his conception the intervening
two years, and he does not antedate Stone & Brenchard. He himself suggests no reason for the delay, but the necessity of engineering study, and
that did not interfere with an application if he had really fully conceived
the invention . . . . He make~ no claim that poverty or sickness stood in
his way, nor that he was too engrossed with independent affairs, assuming that such would be any excuse. For these reasons his date of invention must be in my judgment that of his application." United ':funnel Co.
v. Interborough, etc. Co., 20'J Fed. 561, 56g. ·
"Diligence is of the essence of a proper relation between the conception
and the reduction to practice of an invention, and must consist of a degree of effort that can fairly be characterized as 'substantially one continuous act.'" Twentieth Century Co. v. Loew Co., 243 Fed. 373, 384.
"As the evidence shows that both inventors used 'reasonable dilligence in adopting and perfecting' their inventions by reducing them to
practice, each can carry the date of his invention back to the date of his.
conception and disclosure ... and the one who first conceived and ·disclosed his invention and with reasonable diligence connected his conception with its reduction to practice is the 'original and first inventor' under
the statutes, without regard to which of the two first completed the reduction to practice." Evans v. A sociated, etc. Co., 241 Fed. 252.
179 105 u. s. 580.

ing that such would be any excuse. For these reasons his date of inven-

tion must be in my judgment that of his application." United Tunnel Co.

v. Interborough, etc. Co., 207 Fed. 561, 569.

"Diligence is of the essence of a proper relation between the conception

and the reduction to practice of an invention, and must consist of a de-

gree of effort that can fairly be characterized as 'substantially one con-

tinuous act.' " Twentieth Century Co. v. Loew Co., 243 Fed. 373, 384.

"As the evidence shows that both inventors used 'reasonable dilli-

gence in adopting and perfecting' their inventions by reducing them to

practice, each can carry the date of his invention back to the date of his

conception and disclosure . . . and the one who first conceived and 'dis-

closed his invention and with reasonable diligence connected his concep-

tion with its reduction to practice is the 'original and first inventor' under

the statutes, without regard to which of the two first completed the re-

duction to practice." Evans v. Associated, etc. Co., 241 Fed. 252.

" I05 U. S. 580.
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the perceptible actualities presented. Much the same prece-

105

dents may be used, in arriving at a particular conclusion upon

the perceptible actualities presented. Mu.ch the same precedents may be used, in arriving at a particular conclusion upon
the evidence presented, as are used for guidance in determining whether certain p·r ior knowledge.· constitutes anticipation.
The question is really the same. In the ascertainment of anticipation the inquiry is, whether the knowledge proved to
have existed, prior to the patent) is sufficiently defini~e ·and
similar to constitute substantially the same thing. When the
date of invention is in issue, the inquiry, in the particular
phase under discussion is, whether the concept proved to have
existed prior to the application for the patent is sufficiently
definite and similar enough, in essence, to that of the patent to
be substantially the same invention as that patented. The fact
that any change from the original idea whose date is proved,
and that covered by the patent, was made by the originator of
'the idea himself does not matter. If the change has been of
the essence, has required inventive genius, the date of_the new
invention can not be carried back to that of the original. ''The
invention or discovery relied upon as a defense must have been
complete, and capable of producing the result sought to be
accomplished; . . . If the thing were embryonic or irichoat;
if it rested in speculation or experiment; if the process pursued
for its development had failed to reach the point of consummation, it can not avail to def eat [or to protect] a patent founded
upon a discovery or invention which was completed, while in
the other case there was only progress, however near that
progress may have approximated the end in view. The law
requires not conjecture but certainty. If the question relates
to a machine, the conception must have been clothed in sulr
stantial forms which demonstrate at once its practical efficiency
and materiality." 180 And again;1 81 "Alt~ough prior unsuccess:tul experiments i~ part suggested the construction which the
pat~ntee adopted and perfected, this fact will not defeat [nor
182
protec~] the patent."
Neither would incomplete, inchoate

the evidence presented, as are used for guidance in determin-

ing whether certain prior knowledge constitutes anticipation.

The question is really the same. In the ascertainment of an-

ticipation the inquiry is, whether the knowledge proved to

have existed, prior to the patent, is sufficiently definite and

similar to constitute substantially the same thing. When the

date of invention is in issue, the inquiry, in the particular

phase under discussion is, whether the concept proved to have

existed prior to the application for the patent is sufficiently

definite and similar enough, in essence, to that of the patent to

be substantially the same invention as that patented. The fact

that any change from the original idea whose date is proved,

and that covered by the patent, was made by the originator of

'the idea himself does not matter. If the change has been of

the essence, has required inventive genius, the date of the new

invention can not be carried back to that of the original. 'The

invention or discovery relied upon as a defense must have been
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complete, and capable of producing the result sought to be

accomplished; ... If the thing were embryonic or inchoat;

if it rested in speculation or experiment; if the process pursued

for its development had failed to reach the point of consumma-

tion, it can not avail to defeat [or to protect] a patent founded

upon a discovery or invention which was completed, while in

the other case there was only progress, however near that

progress may have approximated the end in view. The law

requires not conjecture but certainty. If the question relates

to a machine, the conception must have been clothed in sub-

stantial forms which demonstrate at once its practical efficiency

and materiality." 180 And again, 181 " Although prior unsuccess-

ful experiments in part suggested the construction which the

patentee adopted and perfected, this fact will not defeat [nor

protect] the patent." 182 Neither would incomplete, inchoate

180 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124.

181 Whittlesey v. Ames, 13 Fed. 893, syl.

182 Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 602. "The settled rule of law

is that whoever first perfects a machine is entitled to the patent, and is

Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124.
Whittlesey v. Ames, 13 Fed. 893, syl.
182 Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 6o2.
"The settled rule of law
is tpat whoever first perfects a . machine is entitled to the patent, and is
l8o
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back of the date of application for the patent, against a show-

ing of knowledge between the dates of the experiments and

that of the application. 183

As illustrative of the effect of collateral circumstances upon

proof of the date of invention, is the case, just referred to, of

Loom Co. v. Higgins. 184 Here, one Davis professed to have

invented a device, prior to Webster's production of it. The

court rejected this claim, for lack of evidence, and said inci-

dentally, "Another circumstance seems to us as having much

weight in this connection. It was found that the loom No.

50, and the Sterling loom, when completed in 1871, worked

with wonderful success ; sometimes as many as sixty yards be-

ing woven on one loom in ten hours. If Davis was the in-

ventor of the wire motion applied to these looms, why did he

never apply for a patent for it? He was already a patentee

of a different and inferior apparatus. He knew all about the

method of going about to get a patent. He belonged to a

profession which is generally alive to the advantages of a
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patent-right. On the hypothesis of his being the real inventor

his conduct is inexplicable."

the real inventor, although others may have previously had the idea and

made some experiments toward putting it into practice. He is the inventor

and is entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to perfection

and made it capable of useful operation."

iss F or further authorities see the discussion of the inquiry as to what

constitutes sufficient knowledge to anticipate. Westinghouse Elec. Co. v.

Beacon Lamp Co., 95 Fed. 462; The Wood-paper Pat., 90 U. S. 566, 594;

Allis v. Buckstaff, 13 Fed. 879; Hillard v. Fisher-Book-Typewriter Co.,

159 Fed. 439, 441, "Statements in a prior application relied upon to prove

anticipation must be so clear and explicit that those skilled in the art "will

have no difficulty in ascertaining their meaning" ; Lincoln Iron Works v.

M'Whirter Co., 142 Fed. 967.

184 105 U. S. 580.

ideas of the invention suffice to carry the date of invention
back of the date of application for the patent, against a showing of knowledge between the dates of the experiments and
that of the application. 183
As illustrative of the effect of collateral circumstances upon
proof of the date of invention, is the case, just referred to, of
Loom Co. v. Higgins. 184 Here, one Davis professed to have
invented a device, prior to Webster's production of it. The
court rejected this claim, for lack of evidence, and said incidentally, "Another circumstance seems to us as having much
weight in this connection. · It was found that the loom No.
50, and the Sterling loom, when completed in 1871, worlced
with wonderful success; sometimes as many as sixty yards being woven on · ope loom in ten hours. If Davis was the inventor of the wire motion applied to these looms, why did he
never apply for a patent for it? He was already a patentee
of a different and inferior apparatus. He knew all about the
method of going about to get a patent. He belonged to a
profession which is generally alive to the advantages of a
patent-right. On the hypothesis of his being the real inventor
his conduct is inexplicable."
the real inventor, although others may have previously had the idea and
made some experiments toward putting it into practice. He is the inventor
and is entitled to the patent who first brought the machine to perfection
and made it capable of useful operation."
l83 For further authorities see the discussion of the inquiry as to what
constitutes sufficient knowledge to anticipate. Westinghouse Elec. Co. v.
Beacon Lamp Co., 95 F~d. 462; The Wood-paper Pat., 90 U. S. 566, 594;
Allis v. Buckstaff, 13 Fed. 879; Hillard v. Fisher-Book-Typewriter Co.,
159 Fed. 439, 441, "Statements in a prior application relied upon to prove
anticipation must be so clear and explicit that those .skilled in the art ill
have no difficulty in ascertaining their meaning"; Lincoln Irun Works v.
M'Whirter Co., 142 Fed. g67.
1 4 105 u. s. 58o.
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CHAPTER III

UTILITY

The statute provides that an invention to be patentable must

nnrTmh^h^jnew frit -must he "usefur^also: 185 It does not,

however, say just how much usefulness there shall be, nor does

it indicate what is meant by "useful" The 4uter-prtatioji_is

left-open to the courts. It is clear from the decisions that

CHAPTER III

"useful" is not used in the sense of "usable," If it were in

this sense, the patent office would be encumbered with a great

many fewer absolutely impractical "paper" inventions. There

are, for instance, of record, in the neighborhood of 700 patents

UTILITY

for various types of explosion turbines and parts thereof. Yet

manufacturers are unanimous in saying that a usable, practic-

able, explosion turbine can not be built, so far as present knowl-

edge of metals goes. It is evident therefore that these 700

patents are not for "usable" devices; yet no one would deny

that they are valid patents.

The requirement of usefulness has in fact been restricted to

the purpose for which the device is intended, and has not been

connected with the actual operation of the device. In an
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early case it was contended strongly that the requirement

should properly be applied to the device itself as well as to

the purpose of it. The literal form of the statute possibly

bears out this assertion, that a "useful art, machine, manufac-

ture or composition of matter" is one which can be used. But

the generally held judicial opinion was voiced in that case by

Mr. Justice Story as follows : 186 "To entitle the plaintiff to a

verdict, he must establish, that his machine is a new and use-

185 4886 "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or com-

position of matter" ; 4893 "if on such examination it shall appear . . .

that the same (the invention) is sufficiently useful and important, the Com-

missioner shall issue a patent therefore."

186 Lowell v. Lewis, I Mason 182.

The statute provides that an invention to be atentable must
no on y e new b
"
ful" also: 185 It does not,
however, say just how much usefulness there shall be, nor does
·nterpretation is
it indicate what is meant by "useful." T
le
p@
e- courts-. It is clear from the decisions that
"useful" is not used in the sense of "usable " If it were in
this sense, the patent office would be encumbered with a great
many fewer absolutely impr~ctical "paper" inventions. There
are, for instance, of record, in the neighborhood of 700 patents
for various types of explosion turbines and parts thereof. Yet
manufacturers are unanimous in saying that a usable, practicable, explosion turbine can not be built, so far as present knowledge of metals goes. It is evident therefore that these 700
patents are not for "usable" devices; yet no one would deny
that they are valid patents.
The requirement of usefulness has in fact been restricted to
the purpose for which the device is intended, and has not been
connected with the actual operation of the device. In an
early case it was contended strongly that the requirement
should properly be applied to 'the device itself as well as to
the purpose of it. The literal form of the statute possibly
bears out this assertion, that a "useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" is one which can be used. But
the generally held judicial opinion was voiced in that case by
Mr. Justice Story as follows :186 "To entitle the plaintiff to a
. verdict, he must establish, that his machine is a new and use1 5

§ 4886-"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter"; § 4893-"if on such examination it shall appear . . .
that the same (the invention) is sufficiently useful and important, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefore."
186 Lowell v. Lewi , I Mason 182.
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merely prima facie evidence of a very slight nature He must,

in the first place, establish it to be a useful invention ; for the

law will not allow the plaintiff to" recover, if the invention be

of a mischievous or injurious tendency. The defendant, how-

ever, has asserted a much more broad and sweeping doctrine ;

and one, which I feel myself called upon to negative in the

most explicit manner. He contends, that it is necessary for

the plaintiff to prove, that his invention is of general utility;

so that in fact, for the ordinary purpose of life, it must super-

sede the pumps in common use. In short, that it must be, for

the public, a better pump than the common pump ; and that un-

less the plaintiff can establish this position, the law will not

give him the benefit of a patent, even though in some peculiar

cases his invention might be applied with advantage. I do

not so understand the law. The Patent Act uses the phrase

"useful invention" merely incidentally; it occurs only in the

first section, and there it seems merely descriptive of the sub-

ject matter of the application, or of the conviction of the ap-
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plicant. The language is, 'when any person or persons shall

allege, that he or they have invented any new and useful art,

machine, etc/ he or they may, on pursuing the directions of

the Act, obtain a patent. Neither the oath required by the

second section, nor the special matter of defence allowed to

be given in evidence by the sixth section of the act, contains

any such qualification or reference to general utility, to estab-

lish the validity of the patent. Nor is it alluded to in the tenth

section as a cause, for which the patent may be vacated. To

be sure, all the matters of defence or of objection to the patent

are not enumerated in these sections. But if such an one as

that now contended for, had been intended, it is scarcely pos-

sible to account for its omission. In my judgment the argu-

ment is utterly without foundation. All that the law requires

is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to

the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The

word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in contrar

distinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new

f ul invention; .and of these facts his patent is to be considered
merely prima facie evidence of a very slight nature He must,
in the first place, establish it to be a useful invention; for the
law will not allow the plai_ntiff to recover, if the invention be
of Cl: mischievous or injurious tendency. The defendant, however, has asserted a much more broad and sweeping doctrine;
and one, which I feel myself called upon to negative in the
most explicit manner. He contends, that it is necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, that his invention is of general utility;
so that in fact, for the ordinary purpose of life, it must supersede the pumps in common use. In short, that it must be, for
the public, a better pump than the common pump; and that unless the plaintiff can establish this position, the law will not
give him the benefit of a patent, even though in ·some peculiar
cases his invention might be applied with advantage. I do
not so understand t~e law. The Patent Act uses the phrase
"useful invention" merely incidentally; it occurs only in the
first section, and there it seems merely descriptive of the subject matter of the application, or of the conviction of the applicant. The langµage is, 'when any person or persons shall
allege, that he or they have invented any new and useful art,
machine, etc,' he or they may, on pursuing the direct~ons of
the Act, obtain a patent. Neither the oath required by the
second section, nor the special matter of defence allowed to
be given in evidence by the sixth section of the act, contains .
any such qualification or reference to general utility, to establish the validity of the patent. Nor is it alluded to in the tenth
section as a cause, for which the patent may be vacated. To
be sure, all the matters of defence or of objection to the patent
are not enumerated in these sections. But if such an one as
that now contended for, had been intended, it is scarcely possible to account for its omission. In my judgment the argument is utterly without foundation. All that the law requires
is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The
word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the <ilct in contra:distinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance; a new
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invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to

facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.

But if the invention steers wide of these objections, whether

it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to

the interest of the patentee, but of no importance to the public.

If it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into con-

tempt and disregard." 187

Even though the device set forth in the patent be quite im-

practicable, in that precise substantial form, it is not neces-

sarily unpatentable. This is another illustration of the fact

that it is the idea which is really patented and not the particu-

lar form of embodiment described in the application. This

is quite definitely settled by those cases which hold that a

patent is infringed by some particular device, even though the

latter would work successfully and the one patented would

not, in the form described, work as well, if the change by

which the successful operation was brought about was due

solely to mechanical skill. "A machine can not be pronounced

useless or impracticable, because it is susceptible of improve-
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ment which will obviate or prevent embarassments to its most"

perfect operation. If it could, then it would be the duty of

the Courts to pronounce the patent for any machine void, so

soon as ordinary mechanical judgment, or even ingenuity, had

suggested an improvement which made it perform its desired

office more rapidly or more perfectly." 188

Indeed, a patent is valid even though the device as literally

described in it will not operate at all, if it can be made prac-

tically usable by mere mechanical skill. Such facts as these

came before the court in the case of Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.

Aluminum Stopper Co. 189 This was a suit for infringement,

and defense was made that the complainant's patent, on which

his action was based, was void for lack of utility. The de-

187 He repeats much the same thing in Bedford v. Hunt, i Mason 302 ;

Ace. Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash. 9, Fed. Cas. 7875.

188 Wheeler v. Clipper Mower & Reaper Co., 10 Blatch. 181, 189; Rogers

Typograph. Co. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 64 Fed. 799; Lamb Knit

Goods Co. v. Lamb Glove Co., 120 Fed. 267.

1 89 108 Fed. 845.

invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.
But if the. invention steers wide of these objections, whether
it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to
the interest of the patentee, but of no importance to the public.
If it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard. " 187
Even though the device set forth in the patent be quite impracticable, in that precise substantial form, it is not necessarily unpatentable. This is another illustration of the fact
that it is the idea which is really patented and not the particular form of embodiment described in the application. This
is quite definitely settled by those cases which hold that a
patent is infringed by some particular device, even though the
latter would work successfully and the one patented would
not, in the form described, work as well, if the change by
which the successful operation was brought about was due
solely to mechanical skill. "A machine can not be pronounced
useless or . impracticable, because it is susceptible of improvement which will obviate or prevent embarassments to its mosf
perfect operation. If it could, then it would be the duty of
the Courts to pronounce the patent for any machine void, so
soon as ordinary mechanical judgment, or even ingenuity, had
suggested an improvement which made it perform its desired
office more rapidly or more perfectly." 188
Indeed, a patent is valid even though the device as literally
<lescribed in it will not operate at all, if it can be made practically usable by mere mechanical skili. Such facts as these
came before the court in the case of Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Aluminum Stopper Co. 189 This was a suit for infringement,
and defense was made that the complainant's· patent, on which
his action was based, was void for lack of utility. The de18 7

He repeats much the same thing in Bedford v. Hunt, 1 Mason 302;
Acc. Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash. 9, Fed. Cas. 7875.
188
Wheeler v. Clipper Mower & Reaper Co., IO Blatch. 181, 189; Rogers
Typograph. Co. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 64 Fed. 799; Lamb Knit
Goods Co. v. Lamb Glove Co., 120 Fed. 267.
189 108 Fed. 845.
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fendants introduced, as evidence of this lack of utility, the

fact that one Lorenz had tried to make bottle stoppers by fol-

fendants introduced, as evidence of this lack of utility, the
iact that one Lorenz had tried to ~ake bottle stopEers by following faithfully the directions of the complainant's patent
and had been unable to do so successfully. Qther witnesses
also testified that success could not be attained by following
the directions. The trouble was that the flange of the stopper
as described was too short to fold tightly over the crown of
the bottle opening. , A mere slight increase in length of this
flange was all that was necessary to obviate the defect. J:'his,
the court said, any competent mechanic skilled in the art would
have realized, and Lorenz and the others failed merely because they were not sufficiently and properly conversant with
the particular art. No invention was needed to remedy the
inutility of the device. Hence the court held the patent to be
valid, despite the fact that, followed literally, it was not usable.
This court said specifically, "Utility being one of the qualities necessary to patentability, the granting of the patent is
prima facie evidence of it; and this is riot negatived by the
fact that the device is susceptible of improvement, or that
"like inventions are so far superior to it that they may entirely
supersede the use of it. Comparative utility between machines or processes is no criterion of infringement, and comparative superiority or inferiority does not necessarily import
noninfringement; nor does it tend to avoid infringement if
the def end ant's device is simpler and produces better results,
unless the cause is due to a difference in function or mode of
operation or some essential change in character. Differences
in utility do not necessarily import differences of invention.
The burden is upon the defendant, in a case like this, to prove
want of utility. He must show either that it is theoretically
impossible for such a · device to operate, or demonstrate by
clear proof that a person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains has endeavored in good faith to make the
patent work, and has been unable to do so. One of the reasons
for the failure of the experiments of Lorenz and Hall may be
found in the fact that they fallowed closely the directions in
the drawing of the Painter patent as to the dimensions of the

lowing faithfully the directions of the complainant's patent

and had been unable to do so successfully. Other witnesses

also testified that success could not be attained by following

the directions. The trouble was that the flange of the stopper

as described was too short to fold tightly over the crown of

the bottle opening. A mere slight increase in length of this

flange was all that was necessary to obviate the defect. This,

the court said, any competent mechanic skilled in the art would

have realized, and Lorenz and the others failed merely be-

cause they were not sufficiently and properly conversant with

the particular art. No invention was needed to remedy the

inutility of the device. Hence the court held the patent to be

valid, despite the fact that, followed literally, it was not usable.

This court said specifically, "Utility being one of the quali-

ties necessary to patentability, the granting of the patent is

prima facie evidence of it; and this is not negatived by the

fact that the device is susceptible of improvement, or that
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"like inventions are so far superior to it that they may entirely

supersede the use of it. Comparative utility between ma-

chines or processes is no criterion of infringement, and com-

parative superiority or inferiority does not necessarily import

noninf ringement ; nor does it tend to avoid infringement if

the defendant's device is simpler and produces better results,

unless the cause is due to a difference in function or mode of

operation or some essential change in character. Differences

in utility do not necessarily import differences of invention.

The burden is upon the defendant, in a case like this, to prove

want of utility. He must show either that it is theoretically

impossible for such a device to operate, or demonstrate by

clear proof that a person skilled in the art to which the in-

vention pertains has endeavored in good faith to make the

patent work, and has been unable to do so. One of the reasons

for the failure of the experiments of Lorenz and Hall may be

found in the fact that they followed closely the directions in

the drawing of the Painter patent as to the dimensions of the
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devices shown therein. The object of the drawings filed in

devices shown therein. The object of the drawings filed in
the patent office is attained if they dearly exhibit the principles involved, and, in a case like this, rigid adherence to the
dimensions thus exhibited is not required or expected, and, if
an intelligent mechanic would so proportion the dim~sions
as to ·secure practical results, in utility is not demonstrated by
experiments with material identical in form and proportion of
parts with the drawings in the patent. The special reason assigned for lack of utility consists in the shortness of the
flange of the cup which constitutes the bottle stopper, and increase in the length of the flange would cure the defect. That
is so obvious that no inventive faculty need be invoked to suggest it, and the learned counsel for the defendants admits in
his argument that the bottle stopper of Fig. 6 in the Painter
patent can be made useful by sufficiently increasing the length
of its flange so as to increase the depth of the cup. We can11ot think that a decision adverse to the utility and operativeness of this invention could safely rest on the ill success of
experim.e nts made by those who were no~ specially skilled in
the art, and where it is not obvious that they were specially
desirous of making their experiments succeed. " 190
Furthermore, if the device as shown in the patent requires
the application of something more than mechanical skill to
make it operate successfully, the courts have not declared the
vatent invalid; they have declared that the improved ~nd operative device is itself an invention, so difjerent from the inoperative one as not to be anticipated by it. 191
·
This doctrine, that practical usability is not necess.a ry to
patentability, and is not included in the "usefulness" of the
statute, seems to be a perfectly logical and desirable one. It
offers a maximum of protection without any deleterious result. If it develops that a device has been patented which
will not work in any practical way and can not by mere mechanical change be made usable, no harm whatever is done by
the issue of the patent. It secures to society no knowledge of

the patent office is attained if they clearly exhibit the princi-

ples involved, and, in a case like this, rigid adherence to the

dimensions thus exhibited is not required or expected, and, if

an intelligent mechanic would so proportion the dimensions

as to secure practical results, inutility is not demonstrated by

experiments with material identical in form and proportion of

parts with the drawings in the patent. The special reason as-

signed for lack of utility consists in the shortness of the

flange of the cup which constitutes the bottle stopper, and in-

crease in the length of the flange would cure the defect. That

is so obvious that no inventive faculty need be invoked to sug-

gest it, and the learned counsel for the defendants admits in

his argument that the bottle stopper of Fig. 6 in the Painter

patent can be made useful by sufficiently increasing the length

of its flange so as to increase the depth of the cup. We can-

not think that a decision adverse to the utility and operative-

ness of this invention could safely rest on the ill success of

experiments made by those who were not specially skilled in
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the art, and where it is not obvious that they were specially

desirous of making their experiments succeed." 190

Furthermore, if the device as shown in the patent requires

the application of something more than mechanical skill to

make it operate successfully, the courts have not declared the

patent invalid ; they have declared that the improved and oper-

ative device is itself an invention, so different from the in-

operative one as not to be anticipated by it. 191

This doctrine, that practical usability is not necessary to

patentability, and is not included in the "usefulness" of the

statute, seems to be a perfectly logical and desirable one. It

offers a maximum of protection without any deleterious re-

sult. If it develops that a device has been patented which

will not work in any practical way and can not by mere me-

chanical change be made usable, no harm whatever is done by

the issue of the patent. It secures to society no knowledge of

190 Ace. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Backus etc. Co., 153 Fed. 288.

191 See the .discussions under utility as evidence of invention, and un-

successful experiments as anticipation.

Acc. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Backus etc. Co., 153 Fed. 288.
See the .discussions under utility as evidence of invention, and unsuccessful experiments as anticipation.
190
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any value to be sure; but the public has not been deprived of

anything* which it could possibly desire. If it could be as-

serted that the public was actually deprived of something, in

being precluded from the use of the subject matter covered

by the patent, the very claim itself would demonstrate beyond

contradiction the fact that the device is actually of some use.

On the other hand, the issue of a patent for a possibly inoper-

ative or inutile device may be of great advantage to the pat-

entee. Its seeming inutility may be due merely to mechanical

defects which anyone skilled in the art can remove. If there

is ever call for the device, within the life of the patent, the

patentee should have, as the statute provides, the monopoly of

response to that call. If a change of circumstances should

make usable a device theretofore wholly futile, the patentee

should have the protection to which he is entitled for having

revealed the information whereby the newly developed need

may be satisfied. If the information which the patentee has

given could not be made useful by mechanical skill whenever

needed, or if the thought of using it to satisfy the newly de-
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veloped need itself amounted, to invention, the existence of the

patent would not prevent the maker of the inventive changes

or the originator of the new and "non-analogous" use from

putting his own ideas into practice. 192

There is just one possibility in which the valid patenting of

an inutile device might result harmfully to the public. A later

inventor might evolve an addition to the inoperative device

which, when used as a part of the patented device, or in con-

nection with it, would make it operate successfully. The later

invention could not be used alone. In such case it is con-

ceivable that it could not be used at all without the consent of

the patentee of the foundational device. In all probability,

however, the courts would hold, under such circumstances,

that the later device was not a mere patentable addition to the

already patented device, but that the later inventor was en-

titled to a patent for an entirely new device, which did not in-

fringe and was not anticipated by the earlier unsuccessful de-

192 See discussion under "new use for an old device."

any value to be sure; but the public has not been deprived of
<tnything which it could possibly desire. If it could be asserted that the public was actually deprived of something, in
beitig precluded from the use of the subject matter covered
by the patent, the very claim itself would demonstrate beyond
contradiction the fact that the device is actually of some use.
On the other hand, the issue of a patent for a possibly inoperative or inutile_device may be of great advantage to the patentee. Its seeming inutility may be due merely to mechanical
defects which anyone skilled .in the art can remove. If there
is ever call for the device, within the life of the patent, the
patentee should have, as the statute provides, the monopoly of
·response to that call. If a change of circumstances should
make usable ·a device thereto£ ore wholly futile, the patentee
should have the protection to which he is entitled for having
revealed the information whereby the newly developed need
may be satisfied. If the information which the patentee has
given could not be made useful by mechanical skill whenever
needed, or if the thought of using it to satisfy the newly developed need itself amo~nted to invention, the existence of the
patent would not prevent the maker of the inventive changes
or the originator of the new and "non-analogous" use from
putting his own ideas into practice. 192
There is just one poss~bility in which the valid patenting of
an inutile device might result harmfully to the public. A later
inventor might evolve an addition to the inoperative device
which, when used as a part of the patented device, or in conuection with it, would make it operate success£ ully. The later
invention could not be used alone. In such case it is conceivable that it could not be used at all without the consent of
the patentee of the foundational device. In all probability,
however, the courts would hold under such circumstances,
that the later device was not a mere patentable addition to the
already ·patented device, but that the later inventor was entitled to a patent for an entirely new device, which did not infringe and was not anticipated by the earlier unsuccessful de192

See di cussion under "new use for an old devir:e."
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vice. It is not difficult to comprehend that a device which

works may be an entirely different device from one which does

not work, even though the successful one contains, as an ele-

ment of itself, the device which failed of success. This is

seemingly the actuality in many of the cases holding devices

not to have been anticipated by similar but unsuccessful ex-

periments or by other unsuccessful forms of prior knowledge.

It does not appear, however, to have been specifically con-

sidered by the courts.

As a matter of fact, the charge that a patent is void for

lack of utility can by its very nature hardly come before a

court for consideration. The only person in a position to

make such a change would be one desiring himself to use the

patented device. It could not be brought up as an abstract

proposition. It could not be brought up by a patentee seeking

to avoid an allegation of lack of novelty in his own patent.

In the latter case, if the knowledge set up as anticipation did

in fact amount to anticipation, it would do the patentee no

good whatever to answer that the patent in which the antici-
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pating knowledge was shown was void. The prior knowledge

would remain as proved, whether covered by a valid patent

or open to the public. In such circumstances, the inutility of

the earlier device could be set up, not as affecting the validity

of the patent for it, but only as showing that it was not identi-

cal with the later device. The only possible way, therefore, in

which the invalidity of a patent, because of lack of usefulness

in the device covered by .it, could be called into issue, is by its

being set up in answer to a charge of infringement. An al-

leged in f ringer might answer, as has been done, that the com-

plainant's patent was itself void for lack of utility. But, on

the face of it, such a charge could not be sustained. If the

defendant in such a case were in fact infringing, his device

must be substantially the same as the one covered by the

patent. The very fact that the infringer was using the equiva-

lent of the patented device, and thereby infringing, would be

vice. It is not difficult to comprehend that a device which
works may be an entirely different device from one which does
not work, even though the success£ ul one contains, as an element of itself, the device which failed of success. This ·is
seemingly the actuality in many of the cases holding devices
not to have been anticipated by similar but unsuccessful experiments or by other unsuccessful forms of ·prior knowledge.
It does not appear, however, to have been specifically considered by the courts.
As a matter of fact, the charge that a patent is void for
lack of utility can by its very nature hardly come before a
court for consideration; The only person in a position to
make such a change would be one desiring himself to use the
patented device. It could not be brought up as an abstract
proposition. It could not be brought up by a patentee seeking
to avoid an allegation of. lack of novelty in his own patent.
In the latter case, if the knowledge set up as anticipation did
in fact ~mount to anticipation, it would do the patentee. no
good whatever to answer that the patent in which the anticipating knowledge was shown was void. The prior knowledge
~ould remain as proved, whether covered by a valid patent
or open to the public. In such circumstances, the inutility of
the earlier device could be_set up, not as affecting the validity
of the patent for it, but only as showing that it was not identical with the later device. The only posSible way, therefore, in
which the invalidity of a patent, because of lack of usefulness
in the device covered by .it, could be called into issue, is by its
being set up in answer to a charge of infringement. An .alleged infringer might answer, as has been done, that the comvlainant's patent was itself void for lack of utility. But, on
the face of it, such a charge could not be sustained·. If the
def endC:l.nt in such a case wer.e in fact infringing, hi~ device
must be substantially the same as the one covere<;l by the
patent. The very fact that the infringer was using the equivalent of the patented device, and thereby infringing, would be
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conclusive evidence against him that the patented device could

be used, that it was in fact "useful." 193

conclusive evidence against him that the patented device could
be used, that it was in fact -"useful." 193
Some slight confusion has been caused by the failure of
courts to recognize the distinction between comparative utility,
as showing the difference between inventions, and usefulness,
as necessary to the validity of a patent. An example of this
appears in Bliss v. The City of Brooklyn. 194 Here, a patent
had been issued for a particular form of hose coupling. Suit
was brought against the city, for infringement of this patent.
By way of defense it was contended that the device shown
by the patent was "worthless, and the patent, for this reason,
invalid." The court said, "The law upon the subject of utility
is not in doubt. No particular amount of utility is required to
rencer an invention patentable, but there must be some. When
the invention is shown to be worthless, the patent must fail.
Such appears to be the case in the present instance. The evidence fails to disclose any instance where the combination described in the reissued patent of 1869 has been su~cessfully
used. The plaintiff himself testifies, that he does not know of
any such coupling having been found to be of practical use.
Although he sells couplings, he never sold any such, and only
recollects three instances where their use has been attempted.
His testimony satisfies me that the combination described in
the patent here relied on proved inoperative and worthless."
On this ground the court held the patent to be invalid. It
might be very pertinently asked, why the city was using the
device if it were in reality useless. The answer, as shown by
the facts, is that the city was not using the device. covered by
the patent. at all. Its device contained an additional" feature, a
peculiar lug which served to remedy the defects of the earlier
device. "The introduction of this 11:1g," said the court, "makes
the combination a different combination from that described in
the plaintiff's patent of 1869. But, it is said, that the introduction of the lug is simply an improvement. I cannot se-

Some slight confusion has been caused by the failure of

courts to recognize the distinction between comparative utility,

as showing the difference between inventions, and usefulness,

as necessary to the validity of a patent. An example of this

appears in Bliss v. The City of Brooklyn. 194 Here, a patent

had been issued for a particular form of hose coupling. Suit

was brought against the city, for infringement of this patent.

By way of defense it was contended that the device shown

by the patent was "worthless, and the patent, for this reason,

invalid." The court said, "The law upon the subject of utility

is not in doubt. No particular amount of utility is required to

render an invention patentable, but there must be some. When

the invention is shown to be worthless, the patent must fail.

Such appears to be the case in the present instance. The evi-

dence fails to disclose any instance where the combination de-

scribed in the reissued patent of 1869 has been successfully

used. The plaintiff himself testifies, that he does not know of
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any such coupling having been found to be of practical use.

Although he sells couplings, he never sold any such, and only

recollects three instances where their use has been attempted.

His testimony satisfies me that the combination described in

the patent here relied on proved inoperative and worthless."

On this ground the Court held the patent to be invalid. It

might be very pertinently asked, why the city was using the

device if it were in reality useless. The answer, as shown by

the facts, is that the city was not using the device covered by

the patent at all. Its device contained an additional feature, a

peculiar lug which served to remedy the defects of the earlier

device. "The introduction of this lug," said the court, "makes

the combination a different combination from that described in

the plaintiff's patent of 1869. But, it is said, that the intro-

duction of the lug is simply an improvement. I cannot se

193 "The patent was itself evidence of the utility of Claim 4, and the

defendant was estopped from denying that it was of value" (dictum)

Westinghouse Co. v. Wagner Mfg. Co., 225 U. S. 604, 616.

194 10 Blatch. 521.

193 "The patent was itself evidence of the utility of Claim 4, and the
defendant was estopped from denying that it was of value" (dictum)
Westinghouse Co. v. Wagner Mfg. Co., 225 U. S. 6o4, 616.
19 4 IO Blatch. 52i.
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consider it. The two combinations are distinct, because they

i:Onsider it. The two combinations are distinct, because they
have different elements ~nd attain a different result. In .the
one combination, no lug appears, and no practical result is
attained. The introduction of the lug, for the first time produced a combination which accomplished any useful result.
An added element, which increases the efficien~y of a combination, of it~elf effective, is of the nature of an improvem~nt;
but, when the added element is essential to the production of
any useful result, such an addition is not an improvement, but
its use gives birth to the only patentable, because the first use£ul, combination."
The real ground of the decision, therefore, appears to have
been lack of substantial identity between the two devices, as
c.emonstrated by the inutilhy of the earlier one. It was quite
outside the scope of the case, and unnecessary, to hold that
the patent sued on was invalid. 195
That "useful" as employed in the statute appertains to the
purp'ose· of the device rather than to the device itself, is further indicated by the few cases in which patents have been declared invalid for lack of utility. One of the most illuminatingof these cases is that of Rickard v. DuBon. 196 The complainant here had secured· a patent for a process of treating tobacco leaves, while still growing, in such a way as to produce
spots upon them. The alleged purpose of the invention was
to improve the combustion properties of the leaves. The
court dismissed the suit, saying "The patent shows upon its
face that it is intended to secure a monopoly in the art of
spotting growing tobacco, without ·reference to improving its
quality. The only fact that lends color to the theory that the
treatment of the leaves by the patented process will improve
the quality is that tobacco rich irt organic. salts of potash absorbed from the soil has a porous carbon; and is there£ ore of
superior burning quality. But tobacco in which lime replaces
the potash has to that extent a compact carbon, and will ex. tinguish rapidly. According to the specification, lime can be

have different elements and attain a different result. In the

one combination, no lug appears, and no practical result is

attained. The introduction of the lug, for the first time pro-

duced a combination which accomplished any useful result.

An added element, which increases the efficiency of a combi-

nation, of itself effective, is of the nature of an improvement;

but, when the added element is essential to the production of

any useful result, such an addition is not an improvement, but

its use gives birth to the only patentable, because the first use-

ful, combination."

The real ground of the decision, therefore, appears to have

been lack of substantial identity between the two devices, as

demonstrated by the inutility of the earlier one. It was quite

outside the scope of the case, and unnecessary, to hold that

the patent sued on was invalid. 195

That "useful" as employed in the statute appertains to the

purpose of the device rather than to the device itself, is fur-

ther indicated by the few cases in which patents have been de-
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clared invalid for lack of utility. One of the most illuminating

of these cases is that of Rickard v. DuBon. 196 The complain-

ant here had secured a patent for a process of treating to-

bacco leaves, while still growing, in such a way as to produce

spots upon them. The alleged purpose of the invention was

to improve the combustion properties of the leaves. The

court dismissed the suit, saying "The patent shows upon its

face that it is intended to secure a monopoly in the art of

spotting growing tobacco, without reference to improving its

quality. The only fact that lends color to the theory that the

treatment of the leaves by the patented process will improve

the quality is that tobacco rich in organic salts of potash ab-

sorbed from the soil has a porous carbon, and is therefore of

superior burning quality. But tobacco in which lime replaces

the potash has to that extent a compact carbon, and will ex-

tinguish rapidly. According to the specification, lime can be

195 In Gibbs v. Hoffner, 19 Fed. 323, "usefulness" is very evidently con-

fused with lack of inventive novelty in view of the prior state of the art.

196 103 Fed. 868.

195

In Gibbs v. Hoffner, 19 Fed. 323, "usefulness" is very evidently con·
fused with lack of inventive novelty in view of the prior state of the art.
1 9 6 103 Fed. 868.
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substituted for potash in applying the process of the patent.
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And the claims of the patent/cover a treatment by any alkali.

In authorizing patents to the authors of new and useful dis-

coveries and inventions, congress did not intend to extend

protection to those which confer no other benefit upon the pub-

lic than the opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud.

To -war rant a patent, the invention must be useful; that is,

capable of some beneficial use as distinguished from a perni-

cious use."

In another case, 197 it was said, "In this case the verified

answer not only denies that the invention is new and useful,

but alleges a specific fact, which, if true, disposes of the ques-

tion of utility. It charges directly that the apparatus is used

for gambling purposes, and that it cannot be used for any

other purpose. Clearly, this is an allegation which, under the

rule, should be treated as testimony in favor of the defendants,

and, in view of the fact that the complainant has introduced

no testimony to support the patent, it is, in my judgment,

sufficient to entitle the defendants to a decree in their favor." 198
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It is to be observed that this doctrine of invalidity is re-

stricted to those cases in which the device can be utilized for

an undesirable and "useless" purpose only. The fact that it

may be used in an immoral, harmful, or otherwise undesirable

way does not deprive it of patentability, if it is capable of a

beneficial use also. Thus, in Fuller v. Berger, 199 the patented

device was a bogus-coin detector for coin operated slot-ma-

chines. It appeared that the complainants, who were assignees

of the fnventor, had never used the device, nor allowed its

use, on anything except gambling machines. The court found

that there was no element of chance necessarily connected with

the use of the detector, and that it could be applied to perfectly

legitimate machines, as well as to those used for gambling,

and would work on them equally well. It was decided there-

197 Schultze v. Holtz, 82 Fed. 448.

198 Animarium Co. v. Filloon, 102 Fed. 896; Mahler v. Animarium Co.,

in Fed. 530.

199 120 Fed. 274.

substituted for potash in applying the proces of the patent.
And the claims of the patent :co er a treatment by any alkali.
In _authorizing patents to the authors of new an~ useful discoveries and inventio~s, congre s did not intend to extend
protection to those which confer no other benefit upon the public than the opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud.
To · warrant a patent, the invention must be useful; that is,
capable of some beneficial use as distinguished from a perni·
cious use.''
197
In another case,
it was said, "In this case the verified
answer not only denies that the invention is new and useful,
but alleges a specific fact, which, if true, disposes of the question of utility. It charges directly that the apparatus is used
for gambling purposes, and that it cannot be used for any
other purpose. Clearly, this is an allegation which, under the
rule, should be treated as testimony in favor of the defendants,
and, in view of the fact that the complainant has introduced
no testimony to support the patent, · it -is, in my -judgment
sufficient to entitle the defendants to a decree in their favor. " 198
It is to be observed that this doctrine of invalidity is restricted to thos·e cases in which the device can be utilized for
an undesirable and "useless" purpose only. The fact that it
may be used in an immoral, harmful, or otherwise undesirable
way does not deprive it of patentability, if it is capable of a
beneficial use also. Thus, in Fuller v. Berger, 199 the patented
device was a bogus-coin detector for coin operated slot-machines. It appeared that the complainants, who were assignees
of the fnventor had· never used the device, :µor allowed its
use, on anything except gambling machines. The court found
that there was no element of chance necessarily connected with
the use of the detector, and that it could be applied to perfectly
legitimate m~chines, as well a to tho e u ed for gambling
and would work on them equally well. It was decided thereSchultze v. Holtz, 82 Fed. 448.
Animarium Co. v. Filloon, 102 Fed. 8<)6; Mahler v. Animarium Co.,
I I I Fed. 530.
- 199 120 Fed. 274.

..

191

198

0

Utility 117

Utility

fore, that although the device could be used for immoral and

harmful purposes, more readily, perhaps, than for innocuous

ones, and had been only so used, it could not be declared un-

patentable on that account. 195

199a It may be noted that while, as the foregoing discussion points out,

the utility of an invention has nothing to do with its validity, the Patent

Office occasionally takes an opposing position. It has been known to

refuse patents on the ground that the alleged invention was impractical

fore, that although the device could be used for immoral and
harmful purposes, more readily, perhaps, than for inn_ocuous
ones, and had been only so used, it could not be declared unpatentable on that account. 199 a

and would not work.
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199a It may b_
e noted that while, as the foregoing discussion points out,
the utility of an invention has nothing to do with its validity, the Patent
Office occasionally takes an opposing position. It has been known to
refuse patents on the ground that the alleged invention was impractical
and would n·o t work.
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CHAPTER IV

THE PERSON ENTITLED TO A PATENT

ONLY AN INVENTOR is ENTITLED TO APPLY for a patent for

the invention. The patenMtsdf niay^ if ihe- inventor requests,

be jssuejd-tQ^_another, 200 but the same section of the statute

which provides for this declares "in all cases of an application

by an assignee for the issue of a patent, the application shall

be made and the specification sworn to by the inventor or dis-

CHAPTER IV

coverer." Another section provides 201 "The applicant~shall

make oath that he does verily believe himself to be the original

and first inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, manufac-

THE PERSON ENTITLED TO

ture, composition or improvement for which he solicits a

A

p ATENT

patent." The only exception to the requirement that the in-

ventor himself must apply for the patent is that of 4896

ONLY AN INVENTOR IS ENTITLED TO APPLY for a patent for
the invention. The patent itself ma if t
equests,
be issu
ot r, 200 but the same section of the statute
which provides for this declares "in all cases of an application
by an assignee for the issue of a p ent the a lication shall
be made and theSpecification sworn to by the inventor or discoYefer.'~ Another section provides 201 "The apPlicant s all
make oath that he does verily believe himself to be the original
and first inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, manufacture, composition or improvement for which he solicits a
patent." The only exception to the requirement that the inventor himself must apply for the patent is that of § 4896
which provides that, "When any person, having made any
new inve ·
or disc
..which a p_at~miglii have
nted, dies ~fo_r__e pa
·
anted, the right of aptent shall devolve on hls exeplyin for an§ obtaining the
cutor or adminis -at_or, in trust for the heirs at aW-0 t e dee~ in case he shall have died intestate; or if he shall have
left a will disposing of the same, then in trust for his devisees,
as
in as-~-~-------'full manner and on- the same terms and conditions
.
t
same mi
e been claimed or enjoye _
tm m his
i · etime; and when any person having any new invention or
discovery fdr whicR
en mig
ave been granted becomes
·na- for and
insane before a a nt is granted the right of
obtaining the patent shall devolve on hi legally appointed
guardian, co!1servator or repre entatiY- · trust for his estate
in as full manner and on the same terms and conditions as the
same might have been claimed or enjoyed by him while sane;
and when the application is made by such legal representatives

which provides that, "When any person, having made any

new invention or discovery for which a patent might have

been granted, dies before a patent is granted, the right of ap-

plying^ for and obtaining the .patent shall devolve on his exe-

cutor or administrator, in trust for the heirs at law of the de-

ceasedj in case he shall have died intestate; or if he shall have
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left a will disposing of the same, then in trust for his devisees,

in as^ f ul]_manner_and on the jsame_ terms and conditions as

the^s^mejriight have been claimed or enjoyed by him in his

lifetime; and when any person having any new invention or

discovery f dr whicrTa~paTenT might have been granted becomes

insane before a^alent is granted the right of applying for and

obtaining the patent shall devolve on his legally appointed

guardian, conservator, or representative in trust for his estate

in as full manner and on the same terms and conditions as the

same might have been claimed or enjoyed by him while sane ;

and when the application is made by such legal representatives

200 4895.

iyerY

1

200 ~
201

4895.

§ 4892.
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the oath or affirmation required to be made shall be so varied

II9

in form that it can be made by them. The executor or admin-

istrator duly authorized under the law of any foreign country

to administer upon the estate of the deceased inventor shall, in

case the said inventor was not domiciled in the United States

at the time of his death, have the right to apply for and obtain

the patent. The authority of such foreign executor or ad-

ministrator shall be proved by certificate of a diplomatic or

consular officer of the United States. The foregoing section,

as to insane persons, is to cover all applications now on file

in the Patent Office or which may be hereafter made."

With this exception, a patenjLwhicJiJia^__be^n_j^ssued upon

theapplication of one ^ho is hot the inventor of~the device

tfierebv covered is void. It is no defense to this invalidity that

the application was made with the express consent of the in-

ventor. In Kennedy v. Hazelton, 202 the defendant had con-

tracted to assign to plaintiff all patents which he might there-

after obtain from the United States or Canada for inventions

appertaining to steam boilers. After this contract he did in-
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vent an improvement on steam boilers. In order to evade the

effect of his contract he entered into an arrangement with one

Goulding whereby application for a patent for this invention

was to be made in Goulding's name as inventor, though at the

defendant's expense. Goulding, then, "at the request and by

the procurement of the defendant" filed an application and the

patent was granted. He then assigned it to defendant. Plain-

tiff brought suit in equity to compel defendant to assign this

patent to him, according to the terms of the contract spoken

of. The court refused this request on the ground that it could

not compel the assignment of an absolutely void patent, and

referred the plaintiff to an action at law for breach of court.

In finding that the patent issued to Goulding was void the

court said, "The patent law makes it essential to the validity of

a patent, that it shall be granted on the application, supported

by the oath, of the original and first inventor (or of his execu-

tor or administrator), whether the patent is issued to him or

202 128 U. S. 667.

the oath or affirmation required to be made shall be so varied
in form that it can be made by them. The executor or admini trator duly authorized under the law of any foreign country
to administer upo~ the estate of the deceased inventor shall, in
case the said inventor was not domiciled in the United States
at the time of his death, have the right to apply for and obtain
the patent. The authority of such foreign executor or administrator shall be proved by certificate of a diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States. The foregoing section,
£ts to insane persons, is to cover all applications now on file
in the Patent Office or which may be hereafter made."
With this exception, a atent
· has been isssued upon
the ap lication of
who is not the inventor of t e evi e
t ereb covered is voi . It is no defense to this invalidity t at
the application was made with the express consent of the inventor. In Kennedy v. Hazelton, 202 the defendant had contracted to assign to plaintiff all patents which he might thereafter obtain from the United States or Canada for inventions
appertaining to steam boilers. After this contract he did invent an improvement on steam boilers. In order to evade the
·effect of his contract he entered into an arrangement with one
Goulding whereby application for a patent for this invention
was to be made in Goulding's name as inventor, though at the
defendant's expense. Goulding, then, "at the request and by
the procurement of the defendant' filed an application and the
patent was granted. He then assigned it to defendant. Plaintiff brought suit in equity to compel defendant to assign this
patent to him, according to the terms of the contract spoken
of. The court refused this request on the ground that it could
not compel the assigrunent of an absolutely. void patent, and
referred the plaintiff to an action at law for breach of court.
In ifinding that the patent issued to Goulding was void the
court said, "The patent law makes it essential to the valioity of
2. patent, that it shall be granted on the application, supported
by the oath, of the original and first inventor (or of his executor or administrator), whether the patent is issued to him or
2 0 2 128

u. s. 667.
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to his assignee. A patent which is not supported by the oath

of the inventor, but applied for by one who is not the inventor,

is ^unauthorized by law, and vend, and, whether taken out in

the name of the applicant or of any assignee of his, confers

no rights as against the public. Rev. Stat. 4886, 4920.

--

"The patent issued by the Commissioner to the defendant as

assignee of Goulding is only prima facie evidence that Gould-

ing was the inventor of the improvement patented; and the

presumption of its validity in this respect is rebutted and over-

thrown by the distinct allegation in the bill, admitted by the

demurrer, that the defendant, and not Goulding, was the in-

ventor.

"As the patent, upon the plaintiff's own showing, conferred

no title or right upon the defendant, a court of equity will

not order him to assign it to the plaintiff not only because

that would be to decree a conveyance of property in which the

de fendant, has,^ and . caiL .confer, no title but also because its

only ^possible value or use to the plaintiff would be to enable

him to impose 'upon the public by asserting rights under a
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void patent." 203

Even_jf_the true inventor joins in making application with

some one else _whqjvvas_not jointly an inventor with him, the

patentj.s_yo_id._ Conversely if an invention has been the joint

production of twojpersons, an application by one of them alone

as. inventor is insufficient to support a patent. In the words

of the court, 204 "it is one thing to say that the machine was

invented by Louis Royer, for example, and quite another

thing to say that it was invented by Herman and Louis Royer.

If this machine was invented by Herman and Louis, then it

would be untrue to say that it was invented by Louis only or

by Herman. If, on the other hand, it was invented solely by

Louis or solely by Herman, then it would be equally untrue to

say that it was invented by Herman and Louis ; and you are to

understand the law to be that if, in this respect, the patent

contains a statement which is untrue, and not in accordance

203 Hammond v. Pratt, 16 O. G. 1235.

204 Royer v. Coupe, 29 Fed. 358, 363 ; Hartshorn v. Saginaw Barrel Co.,

119 U. S. 664.

to hi assignee. A patent which is 1!Q.t su orted b the oath
of the inventor, but applied for by one who is not the inventor,
is unauthoriz b law, and void, and, whether taken out in
the name of the applicant or of any assignee of his, confers
no rights as against the public. Rev. Stat. . 4886, 4920.
"The patent issued by the Commissioner to the defendant as
assignee o.f Goulding is only prima facit: evidence that Goulding was the inventor of the improvement patented; and the
pre umption of its validity in this respect is rebutted and overthrown by the distinct allegation in the bill, admitted by the
demurrer, that the defendant, and not Goulding, was the inventor.
"As the patent, upon the plaintiff's own showing, conferred
no title or right upon the defendant, a court of equity will
not order hi~ to assign it to the plaintiff-not only because
that would be to de~ree a conveyance of property in which he
defendant, has, and can onfer,
title but also because its
only~ ·
va~ or us.e to the piaintiff would be to enable
him to impose . upon the public by asserting rights under a
void patent." 203
Ev ·
true.. inventor j.oins in making application with
some one else who
s_not jointly an. inventor with him, the
pa~void. Conversely · an invention has been the joint
r>roduction of two ersons, an application by one of th m alone
as inventor · Jn ufficien
s -oft a atent In the words
204
of the court,
"it is one thing to say that the machine was
invented by Louis Royer, for example, and quite another
thing to say that it was ·invented by Herman and Louis Royer.
If this machine was invented by Herman and Louis, then it
would be untru.e to say that it was invented by Louis only or
by Herman. If on the other hand, it was invented solely by
Louis or solely by Herman, then it would be equally untrue to
say that it wa invented by Herman and Louis· and you are to
under tand the law to be that if, in this re pect, the patent
contains a statement which is untrue, and not in accordance

/

Hammond v. Pratt, 16 0. G. 1235.
Royer v. Coupe, 29 Fed. 358, 363 · Hart horn v. Saginaw Barrel Co.,
I 19 U. S. 664.
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with the facts, then the penalty which the patentee pays is that

his patent is absolutely void, and of no effect." 2

Effect on real inventor s rights of another's application.

Just how the rights of the real inventor would be affected by an

application made in the name of some one else is not certain.

If the application were made without the consent, express or

tacit, of the true inventor, his right would not be in any way

derogated thereby. On the other hand; if the truejnventqr,

knowing that he was the inventor, shoul<T"consciously permit

application to be made by' another as inventor, it is highly prob-

^hlp that this ivnnjfjjy considered as conclusive evidence of

his intent to abandon his invention to the public. To deliber-

ately allow another to ask for a patent would be tantamount to

c. gift of the invention to the world, since the inventor would

be presumed to know that the patent, if issued to the other,

would be void and of no protection against use by the world.

The only doubt might arise in those cases where one who was

c, joint inventor had applied for a patent in his own name,

as sole inventor, honestly believing that to be the fact. Or con-
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versely, it might arise in cases where an inventor honestly be-

205 Welsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan, etc. Light Co., 104 Fed. 83, 43

C. C. A. 418; DeLaval Separator Co. v. Vermont Farm Machine Co., 135

Fed. 772, 68 C. C. A. 474, "It is true that the testimony of an inventor in

derogation of the validity of his own patent is usually open to suspicion;

and in case like this, where he has made oath, for the purpose of obtain-

ing a joint patent, that he and another inventor were the joint inventors

of the subject-matter, the court should reject his subsequent testimony to

the contrary, unless it carries a clear conviction that he did not intend

to falsify originally, but made the oath under misapprehension or mistake.

In this case the applicants were foreigners, supposedly unfamiliar with

our law of patents; and they had agreed to be joint owners of the patent.

Each had devised improvements which were within its general scope, and

those which had been the work of Reuther were disclosed and illustrated

in the specification and drawings, as well as were those which were the

work of Melotte. Thus both had contributed to the invention in its en-

tirety. Under these circumstances it is not strange that they did not dis-

criminate between the things devised and the things which were not neces-

sarily covered by the claims, and that they should have considered them-

selves joint inventors of the entirety, although some of the improvements

were independently devised by one and some of them by the other." Heu-

lings v. Reid, 58 Fed. 868.

"' ith the facts, then the penalty which the patentee pays is that
his patent is absolutely void, and of no effect." 205
Effect on real inventor) s rights of another's applica.tion.
Ju t how the rights of the real inventor would be affected by an
application made in the 1?-ame of some "one else is not certain.
If the application were made without the consent, express or
tacit of the true inventor, his right would not be in any way
. derogated thereby. On the other hand; if the true inventor
knowing that he was the inventor, shoul consciously permit
«pplication to be made b ano her as inventor, it is hio-hl robconclusi
·
able that this would be
his intent to abandon his invention to the ublic.
ate y a ow another to ask for a patent would be tantamount to
c-~ gift of the invention to the world, since the inventor woul1
be presumed to know that the patent if issued to the other,
would be void and of no protection against use by the world.
The only doubt might arise in those cases where one who was
a joint inventor had applied ·for a patent in his own name,
as sole inventor, honestly believing that to be the fact. Or conversely, it might arise in ca es where an inventor honestly beWelsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan, etc. Light Co., lq4 Fed. 83, 43
C. C. A. 418; DeLaval Separator Co. v. Vermont Farm Machine Co., 135
Fed. 772, 68 C. C. A. 474, "It is true that the testimony of an inventor in
derogation of the validity of his own patent is usually open to suspicion;
and in case like thi , where he has made oath, for the purpose of obtaining a joint patent, that he and another inventor were the joint inventors
of the subject-matter, the court should reject his subsequent testimony to
the contrary, unless it carries a clear conviction that he did not intend
to falsify originally, but made the oath under misapprehension or mistake.
In this case the applicants were foreigners, supposedly unfamiliar with
our law of patents; and they had agreed to be j o:nt owners of the patent.
Each had devised improvement which were within its general scope, and
those which had been the work of Reuther were disclosed and illustrated
in the specification and drawings, as well as were those which were the
work of Melotte. Thu both had contributed to the invention in its entirety. Under these circum t<l:nces it is not strange that they did not discriminate between the things devised and the things which were not necessarily covered by the claim , and that they should have considered them ..
selves joint inventors of the entirety, although some of the improvements
were independently. devi ed by one and ome of them by the other." Heulings v. Reid, 58 Fed. 868.
205
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lieved another to be entitled to joint credit, and made applica-

tion, accordingly, jointly with the other. Whether such an ap-

liev d another to be entitled to joint credit, 3.nd made application, accordingly, jointly with the other. Whether uch an application would, of it elf, preclude the true inventor from·making another application when he hould di CO\ er hi mi take
eems not to have been definitely pa ed on by the court .
RIGHT NOT RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR PER ON . Th . o-ht
to obtain a patent is not re tricted to any dass of per ons a
ccording
reS')eets sex a~, c1 1zenslll or an thin el e.
to the tatute, "Any erson" who has made an invention may
have a p tent erefore. Within the univer al scope o thi
privilege come aliens, 2 ~ 6 married women, and children. 201
While a corpru:ation is a "legal person," in some sen. es, it
could not, of course apply for a patent; it has no mind of it
own with which to invent anything. But i 111ay be made the
assignee of a patent, and a ~tent apQlied for by the inventor,
may- 1ssu~ ig_Jhe
e of a corporation.
PATENT MAY BE I SUED IN NAME OF ANOTHER. Although
only the inventor may apply for a patent the patent it elf may
be issuea to an one else whom the inventor designate by an
assigliiiie.n oi his right which has been put on reco-rd in the
Patent_Office. 41 The exclusive rig~t of enjoyment of the invention is then, of course, in the assignee, the patentee named.
The patent when issued is not ren-der d ·
·
the fact
that the person in whose name it was asked to be issued, and
to w om it was eventually a-ranted, was no lono-er living at
the date of is ile. The statute reads in the di j unctive, in providing that the patent shall grant the monopol _!:o the "patentee his heirs or ass1 ns.
ence if the patentee h!mself
his
be dead the grant takes effect in his heirs or assigns.
cir~ tance, t e death of the patentee before actual i sue of
the patent, was one of the element in the ca e of DeLa Vergne

plication, would, of itself, preclude the true inventor from mak-

ing another application when he should discover his mistake

seems not to have been definitely passed on by the courts.

RIGHT NOT RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR PERSONS. Thexight

to obtain ajDatent is not restricted to_any class of persons as

respects sex, ageTrace, citizenship or anything else. According

to the statute, "An^j3er_so.n" who has made an invention may

have_a patent tHefefore. Within the universal scoj^e ot This

privilege come aliens, 20< married women, and children. 207

While a corporation is a "legal person," in some senses, it

could not, of course, apply for a patent; it has_no mind of its

own with which to invent anything. But i t^i n ay J)e_made the

assignee of a patent, and a^patent, applied ; J or by the inventor,

may issue in the name of a corporation.

PATENT MAY BE ISSUED IN NAME OF ANOTHER. Although

only the inventor may apply for a patent, the patent itself may

be issued to anyone else whom the inventor designates, by an
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assignment pf hi$ right which has been put on record in thT

Patejnt Office. 418 The exclusive right of enjoyment of the in-

vention is then, of course, in the assignee, the patentee named.

The patent when issued is not rendered invalid by the fact

that the person in whose name it was asked to be issued, and

to whom it waseventually granted, was no longer living at

the date of issued The statute reads in the disjunctive, in pro-

viding that the patent shall grant the monopol^Jp the "pat-

entee, his heirs. oF assigns/^ Hence if the patentee himself

be dead, the grantjakes effect in his heirs or assigns! TEis

circumstance, tKedeath of the patentee before actual issue of

the patent, was one of the elements in the case of DeLaVergne

206 Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Peters 202.

207 Fetter v. Newhall, 17 Fed. 841. R. S. Title XI, ? 480, "All officers

and employes of the Patent Office shall be incapable, during the period

for which they hold their appointments, to acquire or take, directly or in-

directly, except by inheritance or bequest, any right or interest in any

patent issued by the Office."

4895 R. S.

Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Peter 292.
Fetter v. Newhall, 17 Fed. 84I. R. S. Title XI, ~ 480, "All officers
and employes of the Patent Office hall be incapable, during the period
for which they hold their appointment , to acquire or take, directly or indirectly, except by inheritance or bequest, any right or interest in any
patent i ued by the Office."
418 § 4895 R. s.
206

201
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Machine Co. v. Featherstone. 419 The defendant, on suit for

123

infringement, set up the contention that the patent was invalid

because of that circumstance; that it was a requisite in all

valid grants that there be a grantee in esse, a person capable of

receiving the grant in praesenti;* 20 that "heirs" was intended

only to indicate an estate of more than life, and was not a

word of purchase. The lower court held the patent void on

this account. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, say-

ing, "We aj-e to remember that it is to be assumed that James

Boyle had made a useful invention and taken all the necessary

steps to secure the benefits to be derived therefrom, and that

in view of the policy of the government to encourage genius

and promote the progress of the useful arts, by securing to the

inventor a fair and reasonable remuneration, a liberal con-

struction in favor of those who claim under him must be

adopted in the solution of the principal question before us.

It is also to be observed that, under the practice of the Patent

Office, a considerable time necessarily elapses after a patent

for an invention is allowed before it actually issues; that the
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applicants often reside at a great distance ; that the cases when

an inventor dies between the date of the application and the

allowance, and the allowance and the issue, must be of fre-

quent occurrence; and that this may happen when neither the

office nor the inventor's solicitors are aware of the death. The

reflection is a natural one that Congress, which, in framing the

provisions of the patent laws, must be presumed to have had

these possible occurrences in mind, did not contemplate that

all patents issued under such circumstances should be invali-

dated by the death of the inventor. What, then, was the in-

tention of Congress in providing for a grant to the "patentee,

his heirs or assigns?" Must it be construed as merely a per-

sonal grant to the individual, or may his personal representa-

tives be treated as grantees? In view of these considerations,

as the language of the statute admits of a construction which,

419 147 U. S. 209.

420 Citing Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 264; Gait v. Galloway, 4 Peters

332, holding a patent of land to a dead man and his heirs to be void.

McDonald v. Smalley, 6 Pet. 261.

419

Machine Co. v. Feathers~one.
The defendant, on suit for
infringement, set up the contention that the patent was invalid
because of that circumstance; that it was a requisite in all
valid grants that there be a grantee in esse, a person capable of
receiving the grant in pra·e senti ;4 20 fhat "heirs" was intended
only to indicate an estate of more than life, and was not a
word of purchase. The lower court held · the patent void on
this account. Th~ Supreme Court ~eversed this decision, saying, 'We a.re to remember that it is to be assumed that James
Boyle had made a useful invention and taken all the necessary
steps to secure the benefits to be derived therefrom, and that
in view of the policy of the government to encourage genius
and promote the progress of the useful arts, by securing to the
inventor a fair and reasonable remuneration, a liberal con5truction in favor of those who claim under him must be
adopted in the solution of the principal question before us.
It is also to be observed that, under the practice of the Patent
Office, a considerable time necessarily elapses after a patent
for an invention is allowed bdore it actually issues; that the
applicants often reside at a great distance; that the cases when
an inventor dies between the date of the application and the
allowance, and the allowance and the issue, must be of frequent occurrence; and that this may happen when neither the
office nor the inventor's solicitors are aware of the death. The
reflection is a natural one that Congress, which, in framing the
provisions of the patent laws, .m ust be presumed to have had
these possible occurrences in mind, did not contemplate that
all patents issued under such circumstances should be invalid~ted by the death of the inventor. What, then, was the intention of Congress in providing for a. grant to the "patentee,
his heirs or assigns?" Must it be construed as merely a personal grant to the individual, or may his personal representatives be treated as grantees? In view of these considerations,
as the language of the statute admits of a construction which,
419

147 U. S. 209.
Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 264; Galt v. Galloway, 4 Peters
..332, holding a patent of land to a dead man and his heirs to be void.
McDonald v. Smalley, 6 Pet. 261.
42
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in sustaining the grant, effectuates the settled policy of the

124
government in favor of inventors, our judgment is that that

construction should be adopted, and that the statute should be

in ustaining the grant effectuate the settled policy of the
o-overnment in favor of inventor , our judgment is that that
con truction should be adopted, and that the statute should be
read in the alternative, and the grant be treated as made to
the patentee or his heirs br assign .
\V HO IS THE INVENTOR. The inquiry then ari es, who i
the inventor of any particular device. T~is can only ari e
subsequently to the inquiry as to whether or not an invention
has been made. It differs essentially from the latter ~nquiry in
this way also :-the one assumes that some particular person
has produced a device and seeks to determine whether or not
that production amounted to invention; the other assumes that
3 certain device is an invention and seeks to determine to whom
the credit for that invention shall be given. The one question
i~ "what is an invention" and, correlatively, who is an inventor.,; the other "who is the inventor,' and, as a basis for the
cmswer "what is the invention." It is with thi inquiry that
we have now to deal. To whom belongs the credit for any
particular invention?
Since, as we have said before, an_ invention i an idea, the
inventor is the person who has conceived the particular idea.
The difficulty in answering the inquiry arises out of the fact
that the idea of~ is not always clearly delimited from the
idea of the result sought to be produced and from the actual
ubstantial embodiment of the idea. If the same person ha
conceived the idea of the resu t esired, and of the means of
reaching or producing it, and has himself embodied the idea,
there is, of course, no question. That person is the inventor.
An i ue ~e
ever when different per on have accompli he t e se
par
the whole work.
In the case of the electric teleo-raph for in tance it i comprehen ible that one person might have conceived and promul· ated the idea of u ing electricity for the transference of intelligence. He might have been the first to uggest that it
would be a very de irable and beneficial re ult if it could be
accompli bed.
nother tartino- with thi idea mio-ht evolve
2n idea of mean for accompli bing this result; he might de-

read in the alternative, and the grant be treated as made to

the patentee or his heirs or assigns.''

WHO is THE INVENTOR. The inquiry then arises, who is

the inventor of any particular device. This can only arise

subsequently to the inquiry as to whether or not an invention

has been made. It differs essentially from the latter inquiry in

this way also: the one assumes that some particular person

has produced a device and seeks to determine whether or not

that production amounted to invention ; the other assumes that

a certain device is an invention and seeks to determine to whom

the credit for that invention shall be given. The one question

is. "what is an invention" and, correlatively, who is an inven-

tor''; the other "who is the inventor," and, as a basis for the

answer, "what is the invention." It is with this inquiry that

we have now to deal. To whom belongs the credit for any

particular invention ?
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Since, as we have said before, an invention is an idea, the

inventor is the person who has conceived the particular idea.

The difficulty in answering the inquiry arises out of the fact

that the idea of wizans is not always clearly delimited from the

idea of the result sought to be produced and from the actual

substantial embodiment of the idea. If the' same person has

conceived the idea of the resSF desired, and of the means of

reaching or producing it, and has himself embodied the idea,

there is, of course, no question. That person is the inventor.

An issue arises, however, when different persons have accomp-

lished the separate parts.. aLthe whole work.

In the case of the electric telegraph, for instance, it is com-

prehensible that one person might have conceived and promul-

gated the idea of using electricity for the transference of in-

telligence. He might have been the first to suggest that it

would be a very desirable and beneficial result, if it could be

accomplished. Another, starting with this idea, might evolve

?.n idea of means for accomplishing this result; he might de-

IT
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vise the apparatus by which it could be done. A third person

might do the technical work of constructing this apparatus, of

making the necessary coils and keys, even of selecting the

type of wire that would best carry the current and figuring

the power of the magnets necessary. In such case it is evident

that only the second of these three persons would be entitled

to reward as an inventor. The first has been, perhaps, a

dreamer and a visionary, but he has given the world nothing

more than, at most, an aspiration toward which to strive. He

has not furnished anything whatsoever toward the attainment

of that aspiration. He has conceived a result, only; not the

idea of an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-

ter. The third person has been nothing more than a mechanic.

He has simply embodied the idea of the second person and

made what the -second directed him to make, using his techni-

cal skill in making it as effective as possible. He has done only

what any competent mechanical engineer skilled in that par-

ticular trade could have done. The second person, however,

has truly given something to the world. He has given a knowl-

first.
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edge of how to reach the desirable result pointed out by the

As this example is put, the division of accomplishment is

clear and sharp. But is it conceivable that the line of distinc-

tion might almost be undiscernable. Suppose, for instance,

number two had not conceived a distinct idea of means, but

had only suggested that electricity might be used for the trans-

mission of intelligence by means of some arrangement whereby

the current could be interrupted and the interruptions record-

ed. If, from this suggestion, the third man had evolved an

actual arrangement of magnets and keys whereby this re-

corded, or audible, interruption could be systematically ac-

complished, to whom then would belong the credit of the in-

vention? The first of these gave something more than a gen-

eral idea of result if not precisely an idea of means, it was

at least an idea of result by* means of which to produce an-

other result. On the other hand, the second man has done

something more than merely to carry out the directions of the

vi e the apparatus by which it could be d<?ne. A third person
might do the technical work of constructing this apparatus, of
making the necessary coils and keys, even of selecting the
type of wire that would best carry the . current and figuring
the power of the magnets nece sary. In such case it is evident
that only the second of these three persons would be entitled
to reward as an inventor. The fir?t has been, perhaps, a
dreamer and a visionary, but he has given the world nothing
more than, at most, an aspiration toward which to strive. He
has not furnished· anything whatsoever toward the attainment
of that aspiration. He has conceived a result, only; not the
idea of an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. The third person has been nothing more than a mechanic.
He has simply embodied the idea of the second · person and
made what the -second directed him to make, using his technical skill in making it as effective as possible. He has done only
what any competent mechanical engineer skilled in that particular trade could have done. The second p~rson, however,
has truly given somethipg to the world. He has given a knqwlcdge ·o f how to reach the desirable result pointed out by the
first.
As this example i put, the division of accomplishment is
clear and sharp. But is it conceivable that the line of distinction might almost be undiscernable. Suppose, for instance,
Humber two had not conceived a distinct idea of means, but
had oply suggested that electricity might be used for the trans- •
mis i<;m of intelligence by means of some arrangement whereby
the current could be interrupted and the interruptions recorded. If, from tl;lis suggestion, the third man had evolved an
actual arrangement of magnets and keys whereby this recorded, or audible, interruption could be systematically accomplished, to whom then would belong the credit of the invention? The first of these gave something more than a general idea of result-if not precisely an idea of means, it was
at least an idea of result by" means of _which to produce another result. On the other hand, the 'second man has done
something more than merely to carry out the directions of t~e
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first. He has created something, the particular means, by
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which the suggested results are accomplished. Yet what he

did might be something that any competent person trained in

electrical engineering could have done if given the fundamen-

tal suggestion produced by the other person. If this be the

case, the benefit to the public is due to the first of the two.

Cases such as this arise not infrequently, and it devolves

upon the court to decide which of the two is entitled to the

reward, given for invention. The question is absolutely im-

possible of determination, of course, by any rule of thumb.

Like practically all the other issues of the patent law, each

case must be decided in accord with its own particular cir-

cumstances. Each court must decide for itself what is the real

invention, and which of the alleged inventors has in fact given

it to the world. If anyone might have envisioned the result,

but not any technician could have produced the means of at-

taining it, credit belongs to the latter. If however it took

more than the mere ordinary course of mind, under the cir-

cumstances, to think of the result in .such terms of means,
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however indefinite, that any technician could thereafter ac-

complish it, the credit is due the abstract thinker. The only

value which particular precedents can have is to indicate the

various factors which have influenced other courts. 20 '

208 Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatch. 229. "Now, there is no doubt that a person,

to be entitled to the character of an inventor, within the meaning of the

Act of Congress, must himself have conceived the idea embodied in his

improvement. It must be the product of his own mind and genius and

not of another's. Thus, in this case, the arrangement patented must be

the product of the mind and genius of Carey, and not of Bowers' or

Fowler's. This is obvious to the most common apprehension. At the

same time, it is equally true that, in order to invalidate a patent on the

ground that the patentee did not conceive the idea embodied in the im-

provement, it must appear that the suggestions, if any, made to him by

others, would furnish all the information necessary to enable him to

construct the improvement. In other words, the suggestions must have

been sufficient to enable Carey, in this^ase, to construct a complete and

perfect machine. If they simply aided him in arriving at the useful re-

sult, but fell short of suggesting an arrangement that would constitute

a complete machine, and if, after all the suggestions, there was some-

thing left for him to devise and wo"k out by his own skill or ingenuity,

first. He ha created something the particular means by
which the uggested re ults are accomplished. Yet what he
did might be something that any competent person trained in
electrical engineering could have done if given the fundamental suggestion produced by the other person. If this be the
case, the benefit to the public i due to the first of the two.
Cases such as this arise not infrequently, and it de olve.s
upon the court to decide which of the two i entitled to the
reward. given for invention. The question is absolutely impossible of determination, of course, by any rule of thumb.
Like practically all th~ other issues of the patent law each
case must be decided in accord with its own particular circumstances. Each court must decide for itself what is the real
invention and which of the alleged inventors ha in fact given
it to the world. If anyone might have envisioned the result,
but not any technician could have produced the means- of attaining it, credit belongs to the latter. If however it took
more than ·the mere ordinary course of mind, under the circumstances, to think of the result in such terms of means,
however indefinite, that any technician could thereafter accomplish it, the credit is due the abstract thinker. The only
value which particular precedents can have is to indicate the
208
various factors which . have influenced other courts.
.
20s Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatch. 229.
"Now, there is no doubt that a per on,
to be entitled ·to the character of an inventor within the meaning of the
Act of Congres , must himself have conceived the idea embodied in hi
improvement. It must be the product of his own mind and geni~s and
not of another's. Thus, in this case, the arrangement patented m·ust be
the product of the mind ·and genius of Carey, and not of Bower ' or
fowler's. Thi i <Jbvious to the mo t common apprehension. At the
ame time, it is equally true that, in order to invalidate a patent on the
ground that the patentee did not conceive the idea embodied in the improvement, it must appear that the ugge tions, if any, made to him by
others, would furnish all the information nece sary to enable him to
con truct the improvement. In other words, the sugge tion mu t have
· been sufficient to enable Carey, in this. case, to con truct a complete and
perfect machine. If they simply aided him in arrivinrr at the u eful reult, but fell short of sugge ting an arrangement that would constitute
a complete machine and if, after all the sugge tion , there wa ornething left for him to devi e and iVO,..k out by hi own kill or ingenuity
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In general it may he gaid that-w^^n the. concept js_that of

a definite machine, manufacture or composition of matter, the

one who conceives it is the inventor, rather than the one who

ingeniously figures out the way to embody the concept. This

is illustrated by the case of Huebel v. Bernard. 205 Tfefnard

had conceived the idea of overcoming certain objections in

the customary type of sponge' and soap holders for bath tubs,

by making the holder of a peculiar form. He employed Hue-

bel to make a holder for him and pointed out the distinctive

?nd dominating feature of his improvement. He did not give

Huebel any definite drawing or specifications however. Hue-

bel having done the work claimed the invention. The court

admitted that he had "made a neater and more perfect device

than that in the mind of Bernard, at the time of the communi-

cation of his idea," but they credited the invention to Bernard,

on the ground that Huebel had used only mechanical skill.-

On the other hand, the idea of an indefinite machine, etc., only

vaguely conceived in its details, and known by its results

rather than by its construction, is really only an idea of a re-
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sult to be accomplished namely the creation of a machine

having the value or the effect of the machine desired. And

if the concept is one of a desirable result only, it is not a

patentable invention (if "invention" at all), and the person

in order to complete the arrangement, then he is, in contemplation of law,

to be regarded as the first and original discoverer. On the other hand,

the converse of the proposition is equally true. If the suggestions or

communications of another go to make up a complete and perfect ma-

chine, embodying all that is embraced in the patent subsequently issued

to the party to whom the suggestions were made, the patent is invalid,

because the real discovery belongs to another. These are all the obser-

vations I shall trouble you with on the first branch of the case. It is an

important question, and, in one aspect of the case, puts an end to the

controversy. It is for you to say, after weighing carefully the whole

evidence who is entitled to the. merit of this improvement who invented

and perfected it. I do not mean, who constructed the first machine, but

who conceived and gave practical form and effect to the ingenious ar-

In general it nlay be sa.i that
e.11
t is that of
a definite machine manufacture or com osition of matter, the
in¥ent
ra.the.r. fha
one who conceives it i
ingenious! figure -0ttt th \ ay to emhocL he concept. This
i.. illustrated by the case of Huebel v. Bernard. 209
ernard
had conceived the idea of overcoming certain objections in
the customary type of sponge· and soap holders for bath tubs,
by making the holder of a peculiar form. He employed Huebel to make a holder for him and pointed out the distinctiv~
and dominating feature of his improvement. He did not give
Huebel any definite dr~wing or specifications however. Huebel having done the work claimed the invention. The court
_a dmitted that he had "made a neater and mo.r e perfect de.vice
than that in the mind of Bernard, at the time of the communication of his idea," but they credited the invention to Bernard,
on the ground that Huebel had used only mechanical skill ...
On the other hand, the idea of an indefinite machine, etc., only
vaguely conceived in its details, and known by its results
rather than by its construction, is really only an idea of a result to be accomplished-namely the creation of a machine
having the value or the effect of the machine desired. And
if the concept is one of a desirable result only, it is not ~
patentable invention (if "invention" at all), and the person

-------

rangement which constitutes the improvement engrafted on the old

machines." Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 603 ; United Shirt &

Collar Co. v. Beattie, 149 Fed. 736.

209 15 App. D. C. 510.

in order to complete the arrangement, then he is, in cm1templation of law,
to be regarded as the fir t and original discoverer. On the other hand,
the converse of the proposition is equally true. If the suggestions or
communications of another go to make up a complete a.nd perfect machine, embodying all that is embraced in the patent subsequently issued
to the party to whom the suggestions were ~ade, the patent is invalid,
because the real discovery belongs to another. These are all the observations I shall trouble you with on the first btanch of the case. It is an
important question, and, in one a pect of the case, puts an end to the
controversy. It is for you to say, after weighing carefully the whole
evidence who is entitled to the . merit of this improvement-who invented
and perfected it. I do not mean, who constructed the first machine, but
who conceived and gave practical form and effect to the ingenious arrangement which constitutes the improvement engrafted on the old
ma,chines." Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 603; United Shirt &
Collar Co. v. Beattie, 149 Fed. 73~.
20 9 15 App. D. C. 5rn.
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the desired machine, or otherwise accomplishing the desired

result. This is illustrated by Forgie v. Oilwell Supply Co. 210

The patent here involved was for a means of unscrewing

certain oil well tools. Formerly this had been done by manual

effort and was accomplished with great difficulty. Forgie who

was familiar with the methods in use and their unsatisfactori-

ness, conceived the idea that it would be possible to accomplish

the result by mechanical power of some sort There had been

recently invented by one Barrett a hydraulic lifting jack and

Forgie suggested to Barrett that his jack could probably be

applied in some way to the purpose. Barrett then made cer-

tain changes in the jack and adapted it to be used in a. liDri-

zontal position to effectuate the end desired. Forgie obtained

a patent for this device as his own invention, which was the

patent sued on. The suit was dismissed on the ground that if

there was any invention at all in the device, the credit belonged

to Barrett, not to Forgie. "Undoubtedly," said the court,

"Mr. Forgie did describe to Mr. Barrett the usual method of
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coupling and uncoupling the tools with the old appliances, and

the great necessity for overcoming existing difficulties. He

conceded the value, and power of the jack invented by Mr.

Barrett, and repeatedly said that, if it could only be made

applicable to this work of coupling and uncoupling oil-well

tools, he thought it would do the work with ease. But there

was the rub. How could it be so applied? Evidently Forgie

had not the slightest idea as to this, for nowhere does it ap-

pear that he made the slightest suggestion, of any practicable

benefit, looking to this end. . . . "Admitting that he may have

had some conception of what was wanted -which, however,

is very doubtful mere conception is not invention. It is the

crystallizing of that conception into the invention itself, oper-

ative and practical, that entitles the inventor to the protection

of letters patent."

Between these two cases is the wide field in whjch decisions

can be made only as the mentality of each particular judge,

21058 Fed. 871.

entitled to a patent is he who conceives the means of making
the desired machine, o"r otherwise accomplishing the desired
result. This is illustrated by Forgie v. Oilwell Supply Co. 210
The patent here involved was for a mean of unscrewing
certain oil well tools. Formerly this had been done by manual
effort and was accomplLhecl with great diffi~ulty. Forgie who
was familiar with the ·methods in use and their unsatisfactoriness, conceived the idea thaf it would be ·possible to accomplish
the result by mechanical power of some sort. There had been
recently invented by one Barrett a hydraulic lifting jack and
Forgie suggested to Barrett that his jack could probably be
applied in some way to the purpose. Barrett then made certain chang·es in the jack and adapted it to be used in a. horizontal position to effectuate the end desired. Forgie obtained
a patent for this device as his own inv~ntion, which was the
patent sued on. The suit was dismissed on the ground that if
there was any invention at all" in the device, the credit belonged
to Barrett, not to Forgie. "Undoubtedly," said the court,
"Mr. Forgie did describe to Mr. Barrett the usual method of
coupling and uncoupling the tools with the old appliances, and
the great necessity for overcoming existing diffi.culties. He
c~nceded the value. and power of the jack invented by Mr.
Barrett, and repeatedly said that, if it could qnly be made
applicable to this work of coupling and uncoupling oil-well
tools, he thought it would do the work with ease. But there
'vas the rub. How could it be so applied? Evidently Forgie
had not the slightest idea as to this, for· nowhere does it · appear that he made the slightest suggestion, of any practicable
benefit, looking to this end. . . . "Admitting that he may have
had some conception of what was \vanted--which however,
i~ very doubtful-mere conception is not invention. It i the
cry tallizing of that conception into the invention itself, operative and practical, that entitles the inventor to the protection
of letters patent.'
Between these t o ca e i the wide field it1 \~ h.ich deci ions
can b.e made only a the mentality of each particular judge,
210

58 Fed. 871.
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acting upon the circumstances shown by the evidence, con-

cludes that the idea was the practical invention, or that it was

only an idea of result, the means of accomplishing which was

invented by the one who embodied the particular device used

thereto.

The fact that one has been doing certain mere mechanical

work for another, during the process of which an accident re-

veals a result not expected, and so new that the use of that

process to produce the result can be patented^ does not ipso

facto entitle the workman to the patent. This came before the

court in Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde. 211 The patentees

were engaged in research work to find a process of separating

mineral matter from crushed ore more economical than those

in use. During the experiments, a wholly unthought of meth-

od was revealed by accident, and a patent secured for it. The

results that occurred during the experiment were clear to any-

one, and the workman in charge could probably have repro-

duced them at will by repeating his actions by rote. The prin-

ciples or natural laws which produced the results, that is to
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say, the reason for the particular results, had to be thought out.

When the patent came into litigation, claim was made that the

patentees were not the original discoverers of the process

patented because "an employee of theirs happened to make the

analyses and observations which resulted immediately in the

discovery." The court dismissed this contention without fur-

ther comment than that, "The record shows very clearly that

the patentees planned the experiments in progress when the

discovery was made ; that they directed the investigations day

by day, conducting them in large part personally and that they

interpreted the results."

It does not appear -from such facts as are given that the em-

ployee had any realization whatever of the desirableness of the

result. The "invention" lay before his senses; his mode of

operation had produced certain results, but he himself had con-

ceived no idea of relation between method and result. It re-

mained for his employer to do that ; to perform the mental

211 242 U. S. 261.
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operation which c~nstitutes invention. If this assumption is
correct, the deci ion of the court is wholly in harmony with
those cases holding that unrecognized events, though prior in
time, do not serve to negative novelty in an invention. The
public has never been treated as having been in possession of
those transient combinations of circumstance producing a certain result when the relation or circumstance and result has
not been recognized. He who later gives knowledge thereof
to the world, gives it so~ething new.
If · the employee had recognized the sequence of circumstance and result in such a way as to bring into being a conscious appreciation thereof, so that he n:iight have applied it to
. i-·ractical use, it is doubtful if his claim to the title of inventor
couh:l have been avoided. It is well settled that an inventor's
ignorance of the principle by which a desired result is produced does not detract from the patentability of his idea of
means. All he needs to know is that a given result can be produced by certain means. The employee in this case would have
been the first to have conceived this particular means or method
of producing the desired result and there is no reason why,
in such case, he sh.ould not be considered the true inventor.
The right to a pa.tent, however, might be vested in the employer by the terms of the employment.
JOINT INVENTIONS. ·The difficulty of determining who is
the inv~ntor of a particular device would seem to be amelio- rated to some extent by the theory of "joint" inventors. If it
is possible that two or more persons may be equally and jointly
entitled to the credit for an invention, the troublesome necess~ty of attributing it to some one person may of ten be avoided.
The difficulty just discussed is in determining the person to
be properly accredited "inventor, where ''one uggests an
. idea in a general way and the 9ther falls in with it and gives
it definite practical embodiment." If we can say as in the
case from which the quotation is made, 212 that ' the two may
be considered joint inventors, ' an extremely troublesome decision is rendered unnecessary. Judicial opinions and text

operation which constitutes invention. If this assumption is

correct, the decision of the court is wholly in harmony with

those cases holding that unrecognized events, though prior in

time, do not serve to negative novelty in an invention. The

public has never been treated as having been in possession of

those transient combinations of circumstance producing a cer-

tain result when the relation or circumstance and result has

not been recognized. He who later gives knowledge thereof

to the world, gives it something new.

If the employee had recognized the sequence of circum-

stance and result in such a way as to bring into being a con-

scious appreciation thereof, so that he might have applied it to

practical use, it is doubtful if his claim to the title of inventor

couM have been avoided. It is well settled that an inventor's

ignorance of the principle by which a desired result is pro-

duced does not detract from the patentability of his idea of

means. All he needs to know is that a given result can be pro-

duced by certain means. The employee in this case would have

been the first to have conceived this particular means or method
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of producing the desired result and there is no reason why,

in such case, he should not be considered the true inventor.

The right to a patent, however, might be vested in the em-

ployer by the terms of the employment.

JOINT INVENTIONS. The difficulty of determining who is

the inventor of a particular device would seem to be amelio-

rated to some extent by the theory of " joint" inventors. If it

is possible that two or more persons may be equally and jointly

entitled to the credit for an invention, the troublesome neces-

sity of attributing it to some one person may often be avoided.

The difficulty just discussed is in determining the person to

be properly accredited "inventor," where "one suggests an

idea in a general way and the other falls in with it and gives

it definite practical embodiment." If we can say, as in the

case from which the quotation is made, 212 that "the two may

be considered joint inventors," an extremely troublesome de-

cision is rendered unnecessary. Judicial opinions and text

212 Gottfried v. Phillip Best Brewing Co., 5 13. & A. 4, 17 O. G. 675.

212
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books are replete with expressions indicating that inventions

may be the joint product of several minds. Patents have been

actually issued for joint inventions, and such patents have

been sustained by the courts, when their validity was in ques-

tion on grounds other than the fact of their being to "joint

inventors." They have thus been quite indisputably, though

obliquely, recognized as possible and proper. Mr. Justice

Story discussed this, saying, 213 "A joint patent may well be

granted upon a joint invention. There is no difficulty in sup-

posing in point of fact, that a complicated invention may be

the gradual result of the combined mental operations of two

persons acting together, pari passu, in the invention. And if

this be true, then as neither of them could justly claim to be

the sole inventor in such a case, it must follow, that the in-

vention is joint, and that they are jointly entitled to a patent.

And so are the express words of the Patent Act, which de-

clares, that if any person or persons shall allege, that he or

they have invention, etc., a patent shall be granted to him or

them for the invention."
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In Quincey Mining Co. v. Krause, 214 a patent issued to two

persons, apparently as joint inventors, was attacked for lack of

novelty and on the ground that the invention was not really

the joint product of their minds. The court answered, "It is

next said that the evidence tends to show that this idea of plac-

ing the outlet inside of the mortar was the thought of but one

of the patentees, and therefore could not be the subject of a

joint patent. If a claim covered but a single idea, it would be

difficult to c^n^eJY_lia^4t-Ould be patented ^by two ; bivt, when.

coyers_a series of steps or a jnumb^r^ elements in ^-

^lhe invention m?y w^H h<* jnjpt, though some of

the steps or some of the elements may have come as the

thought of but one. Such is the invention here patented, and

it would not be fatal to this patent if the fact is that Krause,

Sr., gave birth to the best thought connected with a combina-

tion claim which covers more than the place of the location

213 Barrett v. Hall, I Mason, 447,472.

214 151 Fed. 1012, 1017.

books are replete with expressions indicating that inventions
may be the joint product of several minds. Patents have been
actually issued for joint inventions, and such patents have
been ustained by the courts, when their validity was in question on grounds other than the fact of their being to "joint
inventors." They have thus been quite indisputably, though
obliquely, recognized as possible and proper. Mr. Justice
Story discussed this, saying, 213 "A joint patent may well be
granted ,upon a joint invention. There is no difficulty. in supposing in point of fact, that a complicated invention may be
the gradual result of the combined mental operations of two
J!ersons acting together, pari passu, in the invention. And ·if
I this be true, then as neither of them could justly claim to be
the sole inventor in such a case, it must follow, that the invention is joint, and that they are jointly entitled to a patent.
And so are the express words of the Patent Act, which declares, that if any person or person·s shall allege, that he or
they have invention, etc., a patent shall be granted to him or
them for the invention."
In Quincey Mining Co. v. Krause, 214 a patent issued to two
.persons, apparently as joint inventors, was attacked for lack-0f
novelty and on the ground that the invention was not really
the joint product of their minds. The court answered, "It is
next said that the evidence tends to show that this idea of placing the outlet inside of the mortar was the thought of but one
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difficult to concei
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Sr., gave birth to the best thought connected with a combination claim-which covers more than the place of the location
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of the discharge outlet. But- it is by no means shown that

Krause, Sr., alone solved the problem to be dealt with. The

evidence relied upon -is altogether too meager to overthrow a

patent. To destroy a patent granted for a joint invention,

upon the ground that it was the invention of only one of the

patentees, would require very clear evidence of a very reliable

character. That has not been produced."

Again in Welsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan Light Co. 2i;

The court said, "The patent contains two claims. The first,

which is in suit, is for a single thought, the described im-

provement in strengthening incandescent mantles, consisting

in coating the completed mantle with paraffine or other suitable

material. That thought might well have come to one when

in bed, and have been put to the practical test the next day, as

testified. It is difficult to apprehend how two could have

shared in the conception. The second claim, however, is dis-

tinctly different. It is for a method of forming incandescent

mantles, consisting of a number of steps, the combining of

which, to produce the desired result, may well have been the
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joint achievement of two or more minds/'

In commenting upon this case it has been said, "But it is

not difficult to conceive of a case where ah invention consisting

of a 'single thought' might be the product of collaboration of

two minds working toward and finally reaching the single

decisive step and taking it in step, so to speak, in such unity

and simultaneousness that neither of the two could declare

under oath which actually produced the 'single thought/ " 216

It is difficult to comprehend, however, how Athena could

have sprung, full panoplied, simultaneously from the heads of

Zeus and of Metis also. In the womb of Metis, first, she may

have been conceived and then come forth from the head of

Zeus, but she could have come simultaneously from both only

if both were one. As a child can not be the product of two

wombs, so a single thought cannot emerge from two minds.

It is true, that thoughts,, alike in substance, may originate sim-

ultaneously in two minds, but they are two thoughts, despite

215 104 Fed. 83; Worden v. Fisher, 11 Fed. 505.

216 Macomber, The Fixed Law of Patents, ? 704.

of the discharge outlet. But- it is by no means shown that
Krause, Sr., alone solved the problem to be dealt with. The
evidence relied upon · is altogether too meager to overthrow a
patent. To destroy a patent granted for a joint invention;
tipon the ground that it was the invention of only one of the
1-·atentees, would require very clear evidence of a very reliable
character. That has not been produced. '
Again in \Velsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan Light Co. 21 5
The court said, "The patent contains two claims. The first,
which is in suit, is for a single thought,-the described im- .
provement in strengthening incandescent mantles, consisting
in coating the completed mantle with paraffine or other suitable
material. That thought might- well have come to one when
in bed, and have been put to the practical test the next day, as
testified. It is ·difficult to apprehend how two could haye
shared in the conception. The second claim., however, is distinctly different. It is for a method of forming incandescent
mantles, consisting of .a number of steps, the combining of
which, to produce the desired_result, may well have bee~ the
joint achievement of two or more minds.'
In commenting upon this case it has been said, "But it is
not difficult to conceive of a case where ah invention consisting
o·f a 'single thought' might be the product of collaboration of
two minds working toward and . finally reaching the single
decisive step and taking it in step, so to speak, in such unity '
and simultaneousness that neither of the two could declare
under oath which actually produced the 'single thought.' ' 216
It is difficult to comprehend, however, how Athena could
have sprung, full panoplied, simultaneously from the heads of
Zeus and of Metis also. ·In the womb of Metis, first, she may
have been conceived and then come forth from the head of
Zeus, but she could have come simultaneously from both only
if both were one. As a child can not be the product of two
wombs, so a single thought cannot emerge from two mind .
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their similarity. For both thoughts the patent statute has not

made provision. It does not provide for a patent to all who

have invented something, but authorizes one to the first in-

ventor only. Nor, if it be comprehensible that two minds

might produce the same invention coincidentally, has the sta-

tute provided for a patent to both. It has simply failed to

consider such a case. To assert the contrary would be to main-

tain that utter strangers, working independently of each other,

happening to produce an invention simultaneously, would both

be entitled to patents therefore. 217

The cases in which a patent has been directly attacked be-

cause issued to joint inventors are comparatively few before

the upper courts. In nearly all of such cases, however, the

attack has been sustained on the ground that the invention had

not in fact been joint.

It is, therefore, perfectly sound as a matter of logic, and

probably correct as a matter of precedent, to say that there

can not be__such_a_thing as j_jm'nt inventing if t^ iT^FTfi^n

be-CG^oiI3^ed as a single idea! In such case the idea of means
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which constitutes the Invention must, by its very unity of na-

ture, have emanated from one mind only, and must be credited

to but that one mind.

But if an invention can be thought of as a composite of two

or more distinct, though co-operating ideas, it is possible for

217 The wording of the statute, which, to Mr. Justice Story, gave counte-

nance to the assertion that such things as joint inventions and joint

inventors were contemplated by it has since been changed. The act of

1836, 6, makes a partial change from the plural to the singular. It reads,

"Any person or persons, having discovered any new and useful art, . . .

not known by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof,

and not, at the time of his application for a patent," etc. "But before any

inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, he

shall deliver a written description," etc. "The applicant shall also make

oath or affirmation that he does verily believe that he is the original and

first inventor." As the statute now stands, however, it is worded wholly

in the singular; all words indicating the possibility of a plurality of in-

their similarity. For both thoughts the patent statute has ~ot
made provision. It does not provide for a patent to all who
have invented omething, but authorizes one to the first inventor only. Nor, if it be comprehensible that two minds
might produce the same invention coincidentally, has the statute provided for a patent to both. It has simply failed to
consider such a case. To assert the contrary would.be to maintain that utter stranger , working independently of each other,
·happening to produce an invention simultaneously, would. both
be entitled to patents therefore. 217
The cases in which a patent has been directly attacked because issued to joint inventors are comparatively few before
the upper courts. In nearly all of such cases, however, the
attack has been sustained on the ground that the invention had
not in fact been joint. _
It is, therefore, . perfectly sound as a matter of logic, and
probably correct as a matter of precedent, to say that there
can not be such a thing as a ·oint i
~entlon
b on
red as a sing e idea. In such case the idea of means
which constitutes the invention. must, by its very unity of nature, have emanated from one mind only, and must be credited
to but that one mind.
But if an invention can be thought of as a composite of two
or more distinct, though co-operating ideas, it is possible for

ventors of a single invention have been eliminated. If this change means

anything at all, it may be said to indicate the impossibility of joint in-

vention.

n 1 The wording of the statute, which, to Mr. Justice Story, gave countenance to the a sertion that such things as · joint inventions and joint
inventors were contemplated by it has since been changed. The act of
1836, § 6, makes a partial change from the plural to the singular. It reads,
"Any person or persons, having discovered any new and useful art, . . .
not known by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof,.
and not, at the time of his application for a patent," etc. "But before any
inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, he
shall deliver a written description," etc. "The applicant shall also make
oath or affirmation that he does verily believe that he is the original and
first inventor." As the statute now stands, however, it is worded wholly
in the singular; all words indicating the possibility of a plurality of inventor of a single invention have been eliminated. If this change means
anything at all, it may be said to indicate the impossibility of joint invention.

Oriqir.al fr m

Di itiz

I T R ET

E

Li

~IVE

S

0 CA I 0

IA

134 Patents and Inventions

it to be the joint product of two or more minds. The separate

ideas which go to make up the invention may emanate from

different minds, and the credit may be apportioned accordingly.

To the writer, the idea of invention as a concept, which per-

vades all the law, seems to preclude the possibility of a com-

posite of ideas. The credit seems, logically, to be due to the

master mind who welds the lesser ideas into the single perfect

whole which constitutes the real invention the one compre-

hensive concept of means by which a particular result is to be

accomplished. But while this seems the logical and consistent

view, the contrary opinions of the courts must be recognized

cS effective authority, and it must be said that, at least insofar

as an invention consists of two or more separable ideas, it may

be the product of joint inventors to whom a patent may prop-

erly issue.

Joint producers of these several ideas which enter into the

composite whole of the invention, are not entitled to joint

credit for the invention in all cases. When the ideas which

each has contributed are of comparatively equal importance, it
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is possible that they may be jointly entitled to credit for the

whole. But when the ideas of one contributor are insignifi-

cant compared with those of the other, when one has evolved

the principle idea and the other has merely added minor ideas

in elaboration of the main thought, only the first one, the origi-

nator of the fundamental idea, is entitled to the patent. In

the case of Agawarri Co. v. Jordan, 218 the defense to a suit for

infringement was that the patent was invalid, the invention

thereby having been made by another than the patentee, name-

ly by one Winslow. On the trial it appeared that Goulding,

who later became the patentee, had nearly completed his de-

vice when Winslow suggested certain parts for it as improve-

ments upon the ones that Goulding was using. This sugges-

tion was adopted by him, and parts were accordingly made by

Winslow, according to his idea, and substituted in the work-

ing model of Goulding's device. They proved to be useful

auxiliary parts, and the patent in question was then taken out

218 7 Wall. 583.
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it to be the joint product of two or more mind . The separate
ideas which go to make up the invention may emanate from
different mind , and the credit may be apportioned accordino-ly.
To the writer, the idea of invention a a concept, which pervades all the law eems to preclude the possibility of a compo ite of ideas. The credit eem logically to be due to the
ma ter mind who welds the le er ilea into the ingle perfect
whole which constitutes the real invention-the one compre}~en ive concept of mean by which a particular result is to be
accomplished. But while thi seems the logical and consistent
view, the contrary opinion of the courts mu t be recognized .
as effective authority and it must be aid that, at lea t insofar
as an invention consists of two or more separable ideas, it mav
be the product of joint inventors to whom a 1~atent may properly is ue.
Joint p~oducers of these everal ideas which enter into the
composite whole of the invention, are not entitled to joint
credit for the invention in all cases. When the ideas which
each has contributed are of comparatively equal importance, it
is possible that they may be jointly entitled to credit for the
whole. But when the idea of one contributor are insignificant compared with those of the other, when one has evolved
· the principle idea and the other has merely added minor idea
·in elaboration of the main thought, ·only the first one, the originator of the fundamental idea, is entitled to the patent. In
the case o.£ Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 21 the defense to a suit for
infringement was that the patent was invalid, the invention
thereby having been made by another than the patentee, namely by one Winslow. On the trial it appeared that Goulding,
who later became the patentee, ha l nearly completed hi device when Win low suggested certain parts for it a improvement upon the ones that Gouldino- wa using. Thi uo-ge tion was adopted by him, and part were accordingly made by
Winslow, according to his ilea and substituted in the workino- model of Goulding' device. They proved to be u ef ul
auxiliary part , and the patent in question wa then taken out
21

7 Wall. 5 3.
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by Goulding for the whole device, including these parts, as

his invention. Of the claim that the invention was Winslow's

the court said, "Valuable though it was and is, as aiding in

the accomplishment of the desired result, it is nevertheless a

great error to regard it as the invention described in the sub-

sequent patent, or as such a material part of the same that it

confers any right upon the party who made the suggestion to

claim to be the inventor, or a joint inventor, of the improve-

ment, or to suppose that the proof of what was done by that

party can constitute any defence, as against the owner of the
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patent, to the charge of infringement."

by Goulding for the whole device, including these parts, as
his invention. Of the claim that the invention was Winslow's
the court said, HValuable though it was and is, as aiding in
the accomplishment of the desired ·result, it is nevertheless a
great error to regard it as the inv:ention described in the subsequent patent, or as such a material part of the same that it
confers any right upon the party who made the suggestion to
claim to be the inventor, or a joint inventor, of the improvement, or to suppose that the proof of what was done by that
party can constitute any defence, as against the owner of the
patent to the charge o.f infringement.''
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CHAPTER V

Loss OF RIGHT TO A PATENT.

An inventor who, so far as the character of his production is

concerned, is entitled to a patent, may lose that right under

certain conditions. His invention may have been, at the time

of its creation, new and useful, not known or used by others

and not described in any printed publication, nor previously

CHAPTER V

patented ; nevertheless he may have so acted as to have de-

prived himself of the patent privilege. For_on-.thing r - the

statute specifically provides that an invention, even though

Lo

/>a^fe^^jaeiiJ2ade, shall not

OF RIGHT TO A PATENT

public__use^or on sale in llfis^ : ^ nr ' tr y fnr *nnrp than

prior to the filing of an appl : CRtinn for a_.pa.tfnt, or if it has

been patented or-described in any printed puMieatiommore than

two yeaj^jireyious thereto. Again, an invention can not be

patgnted if it fe proved to have been abandoned to the public

by-the inventor In the event that the invention were dedicated

to the public the

a patent would be lost to an inventor,

as in the case of abandonment, although such a contingency is
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not express!)Tcovered by the statute.

i. PUBLIC USE OR SALE

The phrase of the statute, "in public use or on sale in this

country for more than two years," has been very definitely in-

terpreted by the Supreme Court in a way that speaks for it-

self. 219 "The statutory clause upon which the second objec-

tion (to the validity of the patent) is founded is in the dis-

junctive. The language is, 'purchase, sale, or prior use' . ."'.

'for more than two years prior 1 to the application for the

patent. The phrase, 'for more,' as thus used, is loose and in-

accurate, and is to be understood as if the language were

219 Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92.

An inventor who so far as the character of his Jr dll.c.tion i
concerne , 1 enfitled to a patent, m?-y l~ that rio-ht under
certain conditions. His invention may have been, at the time
of it creation, new and u eful not known or used by other
and not described in any printed publication, nor previously
patented; nevertheles he may have o acted as to have deprived himself of the patent privilege. For
thino· the
tatute specifically provides that an invention, even though
pat~tli ble n ib en ~de' ha~ll~n;;o:'..!:.t....!;b~e:.-¥-':&..U..Ju.J.1-lw....i."'--""1i..-w.~....._,....u._i.u.
public use or on sale in
.
prior to the filino· of an appL a ·o fa a patent or if it ha
been patente r described in any printed puhli~tion more than
two years evious thereto. Again, an invention can -not be
1.: atented if it i roved to have be~n aban oned to the ublic
by
· ~. In the event that the invention were dedicated
to the public the rioa patent wou
e ost to an inventor,
as in the case of abandonment, although such a contingency is
rtot e press y covered by the statute.
• I. PuBLIC
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OR SALE

The phrase of the statu.te, "in public use or on sale in this
country for more than two years has been very definitely interpreted by the Supreme Court in a way that speaks for itself. 2 rn ·"The tatutory clau e upon which the second objecti~n (to the validity of the patent) i founded i in the di junctive. The language is, 'purchase, ale, or prior use . . .
for more than two years prior' to the application for the
patent. The phra e, 'for more, as thus used, i loo e and inaccurate and is to be under tood a if the language were
21 9

Con olidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright 94 U. S. 92.
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earlier than 'two years prior/ etc., or as if 'for' were omitted

from the sentence. This omission would produce the same

effect." 220 It is therefore settled that the use need not have

continued during two years, as the statute might seem to indi-

cate, nor need sales have occurred throughout a period of two

years. It is sufficient if the use, or the sale, took place earlier

than two years before the application, whether it continued

during the two years or not. 221

SINGLE SALE OR USE. The only real question involved in

this topic is as to what constitutes public use or sale within

the meaning of the statute. In the Consolidated Fruit Jar

case just quoted the court said, "The defects specified are also

in the singular. It follows that a single instance of sale or of

use by the patentee may, under the circumstances, be fatal to

the patent ; and such is the construction of the clause as given

by authoritative adjudication." In this particular case there

was in fact more than one instance of sale or use. The pat-

entee had made at least two dozen of the jars covered by the

later patent. Two of these he gave away and some others he
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sold, and the court found it to be a fair inference that the

recipients of them put them to the use for which they were

intended. 222 But in a later case, this authority was followed in

holding the right to a patent to be lost because of a single sale

220 The court quoted Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatch. 235, as follows : "The pat-

entee may forfeit his right to the invention if he constructs it and vends

it to others to use, or if he uses it publicly himself in the ordinary way

of a public use of a machine at any time prior to two years before he

makes His application for a patent. That is, he is not allowed to derive

any benefit from the sale or use of his machine, without forfeiting his

right, except within two years prior to the time he makes his applica-

tion." See other authorities therein cited. Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters

i ; Swain v. Holyoke Machine Co., 109 Fed. 154.

221 The earlier statutes did not restrict the use or sale, which would

destroy the right to a patent, to a time more than two years before the

application. Public use or sale within that time, if with the consent of

-earlier than 'two years prior,' etc., or as if 'for' were omitted
from the sentence. This omission would produce the same
effect. ' 220 It is therefore settled that the use need not have
continued during two years, as the statute might seem to indicate, nor need sales have occurred throughout a perjod of two
years. It is sufficient if the use, or the sale, took place earlier .
than two years before the application, whether it continued
during the two years or not. 221
SINGLE SALE OR USE.
The only real question involved in
this topic is as to what constitutes public use or sale within
the meaning of the statute. In the Consolidated Fruit Jar
case just quoted the court said, "The defects specified are also
in the singular. It follows that a single instance of sale or of
use by the patentee may, under the circumstances, be fatal to
the patent; and such is the construction of the clause as given
by authoritative adjudication." In this particular case there
was in fact more than one instance of sale or use. The patentee had made at least two dozen of the jars covered by the
later patent. Two of these he gave ·away and some others he
sold, and the court found it to be a fair inference that the
· recipients of them put them to the use for which they were
intended. 222 But in a later case thi~uthority was followed in
holding the right to a patent to be lost because of a single sale

the inventor would preclude him from obtaining a patent. Pennock v.

Dialogue; 2 Peters i, 19; Bates v. Coe, 08 U. S. 31, 46; Andrews v.

Hovey, 124 U. S. 694, 719.

222 Other authorities are cited in the case. Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556.

220 The court quoted Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatch. 235, as follows:
"The patentee may f~rfeit his right to the invention if he constructs it and vends
it to others to use, or if he uses it publicly himself in the ordinary way
of a public use of a machine at any time prior to two years before he
makes his application for a patent. That is, he is not allowed to derive
any benefit from the sale or use of his machine, without forfeiting his
right, except within two years prior to the time he makes his application." See other authorities therein dted. Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Peters
l; Swa1n v. Holyoke Machine Co., 109 Fed. 154·
221 The earlier statutes did not restrict the use or sale, which would
destroy the right to a patent, to a time more than two years before the
application. · Public use or sale within that time, if with the consent of
the inventor would preclude him from obtaining a patent. Pennock v.
Dialogue; 2 Peters l, 19; Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 46; Andrews v.
Hovey, 124 U. S. (Jg4, 719.
222
Other authorities are cited in the case. Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556.
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and use. 223 The patent involved was for a turbine water wheel.

and use. 22 3 The patent involved was for a turbine water wheel.
The undisputed evidence showed that a wheel substantially
identical to that covered by the patent had been sold, installed
and put in operation, by the inventor, a few days more than
two years previous to his application for a patent. On this
·showing of a single sale and use, barely outside the limit of
the time allowed, the -court held the patent to be invalid, aying "as a general rule, a single unrestricted sale by the patentee of his patented device, embodying his completed invention, is a public use or sale within ection 4886, of the Revised Statutes."
INVENTOR'S ACQUIESCE.NCE NOT MATERIAL. The pri"or u e
or sale need not, under the re en
te be with the knowltdge or consent
entor although under t e earlier
statutes this was not the case. 224 It is sufficient if public use
0r sale did occur more than two years pnor to tlie a.P lication.
This was settl~d in an elaborate opinion in the case of Andrews
v. Hovey. 225 The same case had been before the court previously and had come up for a rehearing. After an exceedingly
copious citation of authorities and a full discu sion of them the
court declared its affirmance of the previous decision, saying,
"Under § § 6, 7, and I 5 of the act of 1836, a patent was _m ade
invalid if, at the time of the application therefore, the invention had been in public use or on sale, with the consent or allowance of the patentee, however short the time. The secon~
clause of the 7th section (act of 1839) seems to us to clearly
intend, that, ~here the purchase sale, or prior use ref erred to
in it has been for more than two years prior to t~e application)
the patent shall be held to be invalid, without regard ' to the
consent or allowance of the inventor. " 226
Before the invalidity of a patent can be predicated upon the
gTotmd that the device was in public use or on ale rpore than
two years prior to the application on which the patent wa

The Undisputed evidence showed that a wheel substantially

identical to that covered by the patent had been sold, installed

and put in operation, by the inventor, a few days more than

two years previous to his application for a patent. On this

'showing of a single sale and use, barely outside the limit of

the time allowed, the 'court held the patent to be invalid, say-

ing "as a general rule, a single unrestricted sale by the pat-

entee of his patented device, embodying his completed inven-

tion, is a public use or sale within section 4886, of the Re-

vised Statutes."

INVENTOR'S ACQUIESCENCE NOT MATERIAL. The prior use

or sale need not, nnrW th* pr^ynt Qtatflt^ be with the knowl-

(-rW nr rnnaent ft* *ho inwflfrflv althnitg-h tmrW tViP ^arfW

statutes this was not the case. 224 It is sufficient if public use

or sale did occur, more than two years prior to the application.

This was settled in an elaborate opinion in the case of Andrews

v. Hovey. 225 The same case had been before the court previ-

ously and had come up for a rehearing. After an exceedingly
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copious citation of authorities and a full discussion of them, the

court declared its affirmance of the previous decision, saying,

"Under 6, 7, and 15 of the act of 1836, a patent was made

invalid if, at the time of the application therefore, the inven-

tion had been in public use or on sale, with the consent or al-

lowance of the patentee, however short the time. The second

clause of the 7th section (act of 1839) seems to us to clearly

intend, that, where the purchase, sale, or prior use referred to

in it has been for more than two years prior to the application,

the patent shall be held to be invalid, without regard -to the

consent or allowance of the inventor." 2

Before the invalidity of a patent can be predicated upon the

ground that the device was in public use or on sale more than

two years prior to the application on which the patent \vas

223 Swain v. Holyoke Machine Co., 109 Fed. 154.

224 Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Peters 292.

225 123 U. S. 267. 124 U. 5/694.

226 Bates v. Coe, 98 U. $.31. Eastman v. Mayor of N. Y., 134 Fed. 844.

Swain v. Holyoke Machine Co., 109 Fed. 154·
Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Peters 292.
2 25 123 U. S. 267.
124 U. S.' 694.
226 Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 3I.
Ea tman v. Mayor of N. Y. 134 Fed. 844.
22a

2 24
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L^ and decisive proof that such

use -or sale did actually take place." 7

SECRET USE. The statutejaatvides that the right to a patent

shall be lost through "public use" or some other form of public

knowledge. It does not preclude .an inventor from using his

device secretly as long as he desires before applying for a

patenfT Neither is any restriction upon indefinite secret use

reacTinto the statute by the courts. On the contrary the Su-

preme Court has explicitly said, 228 "Inventors may, if they can,

keep their invention secret; and if they do for any length of

time, they do not forfeit their right to apply for a patent,

unless another in the meantime has made jthejnvention, and se-

cured by patent the exclusive right to make, use and vend the

patented improvement. Within the rule, and subject to that

condition, inventors may delay to apply for a patent." The

exception as stated in this excerpt is obviously incorrect and

is characteristic of the looseness of statement with which

patent cases are filled. A subsequent inventor could not take

out a valid patent, as the court suggests, for the device. His
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patent would be invalid for lack of novelty, if the secretly used

device could be proved. Neither would the first inventor have

lost his right merely because a subsequent inventor had pro-

duced a like device and put it into use or on sale. By the very

words of the statute, the use or sale must have taken place

more than two years before the first inventor's application.

It may be said therefore, that an inventor does not lose Jiis

right to a" patent W any length of secret use, unless he fails, to

apply for a patent until ttiore than twp y^ars fl.ffer a similar

device has been used or sold. The cases referred to at the end

of this discussion may, however, establish a qualification of

this broad doctrine as laid down by the Supreme Court. */

Just what constitutes a "secret" use it is utterly impossible

to state. Certainly the courts are not prone to recognize a use

as secret. What might in ordinary parlance have been called

a secret use was held not to be such within the meaning of the

227Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 689; Penn. Electrical & Mfg. Co. v.

Conroy, 159 Fed. 943.

228 Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31.
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patented improvement. Within the rule, and subject to that
condition, inventors may delay to apply for a patent." The
exception as stated in this excerpt is obviously incorrect and
is characteristic of the looseness of statement with which
patent cases are filled. A subsequent inventor could not take
out a valid patent, as the court suggests, for the device. His
patent would be invalid for lack of novelty, if the secretly used
device could be proved. Neither would the first inventor have
lost his right merely because a suhsequent inventor had produced a like device and put it into use or on sale. By the very
words of the statute, the use or sale must have taken place
more than two years before the first inventor's application.
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to state. Certainly the courts are not prone to recognize a use
as secret. What might in ordinary parlance have been called
a secret use was held not to be such within the meaning of the
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patent statute, in the case of Perkins v. Nassau Card, etc. Co. 229

This is illuminating as to the attitude of the courts. The facts

may be given in its own words. "The patentee made a ma-

chine containing his invention in the year 1857, and in 1863

he substituted for it another varying in form and proportions,

but not in principle. These machines he used successively in

the ordinary way of his business, as a maker of card and paste-

board, until he applied for his patent, in 1876. The specifi-

cation and model represent precisely the machine of 1863.

During the time that the machines were used they stood in the

room with several other machines necessary for the other proc-

esses of making, drying and coloring pasteboard, and were

operated chiefly by one man, Moulton, who was sometimes as-

sisted by one other. About 23 workmen were employed upon

the other parts of the manufacture. The doors of the factory

were usually kept locked, and each of the 25 workmen had a

key. How many 'visitors came to the factory is one of the

disputed points. There were occasional visitors, but not many

persons came to the factory from mere curiosity. During
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some months Mr. Denison, a friend of the patentee, was given

the use of an upper room for making tags, and his workmen

passed in sight of the pasting machine. It is not proved that

any workmen, visitors, or other persons acquired or divulged

a knowledge of the mode of operation of the machine, until

the workman Moulton gave that information to the defendants,

in 1876." On these facts it was held that the device had been

in public use.

This doctrine, that when the public might have acquired

knowledge of the invention, through its use, it will be deemed

to have such knowledge, was carried into extreme form in the

case of Egbert v. Lippmann. 230 The patent sued on covered

a peculiar form of corset steels. It appeared from the evi-

dence that a woman, who afterward became the wife of the in-

ventor, had complained of corset steels breaking frequently.

To remedy this the inventor devised the steel, which he after-

229 2 Fed. 451.

230 104 U. S. 333-

patent statute in the case of Perkins v. Nassau Card, etc. Co. 229
This is illuminating as to the attitude of the courts. The facts
may be given in its own words. "The patentee made a machine containing his invention in the year 1857, and in 1863
he substituted for it another varying in form and proportions,
but not in principle. These machines he used successively in
the ordinary way of his business, as a maker of card and pasteboard, until he applied for his patent, in l 876. The specification and model represent precisely the machine of 1863.
During the time that the machines were used they stood in the
room with several other machines necessary for the other processes of making, drying and coloring pasteboard, and were
operated chiefly by one man·, Moulton, who was sometimes assisted by one other. About 23 workmen were employed upon
the other parts of the manufacture. The doors of the factory
were usually kept locked, and each of the 2 5 workmen had a
key. How many· visitors came to the factory is one of the
disputed points. There were occasional visitors, but not many
persons came to the factory from mere curiosity. During
some months Mr. Denison, a friend of the patentee, was given
the use of an upper room for making tags, and his workmen
passed in sight of the pasting machine. It is not proved that
any workmen, visitors, or other persons acquired or divulged
a knowledge of the mode of operation of the machine, until
the workman Moulton gave that information to the defendants,
in 1876." On these facts it was held that the device had been
in public use.
This doctrine, that when the p4blic might have a.c quired
know ledge of the invention, through its use, it will be deemed
to have such knowledge, was carried into extreme form in the
case of Egbert v. Lippmann. 230 The patent sued on covered
a peculiar form of corset steels. It appeared from the evidence that a woman, who afterward became the wife of the inventor, had complained of corset steels breaking frequently.
To remedy this the inventor devised the steel, which he after229
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ward patented, and gave her a set to wear. Later he gave her

another set. This set he showed to one other person. In the

words of the court, "This is the evidence presented by the

record, on which the defendants rely to establish the public

use of the invention by the patentee's consent and allowance.

The question for our decision is, whether this testimony' shows

a public use within the meaning of the statute.

"We observe, in the first place, that to constitute the pub-

lic use of an invention it is not necessary that more than one of

the patented articles should be publicly used. The use of a

great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one well-

defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent

as many. McClurg v. Kingsland, i How. 202 ; Consolidated

Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92 ; Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf .

229. For instance, if the inventor of a mower, a printing-

press, or a railway-car makes and sells-only cnc of the articles

invented by him, and allows the vendee to use it for two years,

without restriction or limitation, the use is just as public as if

he had sold and allowed the use of a great number.
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"We remark, secondly, that, whether the use of an invention

is public or private does not necessarily depend upon the num-

ber of persons to whom its use is known. If an inventor, hav-

ing made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be used by

the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or in-

junction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even

though, the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to

one person.

"We say, thirdly, that some inventions are by their very

character only capable of being used where they cannot be seen

or observed by the public eye. An invention may consist of a

lever or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch, or of

? rachet, shaft, or cog-wheel covered from view in the recesses

of a machine for spinning or weaving. Nevertheless, if its

inventor sells a machine of which his invention forms a part,

c'.nd allows it to be used without restriction of any kind the

use is a public one."

"Tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the

ward patented, and gave her a set to wear. Later he gave her
<mother set. This set he showed to one other person. In the
words of the ·court, "This is the evidence presented by the
record, on which the defendants rely to establish the public
use of the invention by the patentee's consent and allowance.
The question for our decision is, whether this testimony· shows
a public use within the meaning of the statute.
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an inv..ention 't · net neces acy
or
e of
the patented articles should. be publicly used.
he use of a
E;reat number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one welldefined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent
. as many. McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. 202; Consolidated
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92; Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf.
229. For instance, if the inventor of a mower, a printingpress, or a railway-car ma
ill-s-enly one of the articles
· a
o
·
ears
without striction or limitation, the use is just as public
if
l1e had sold and allowe th
. g: eat number.
"·We remark, secondly, that, whether the use of an invention
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the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is ·SO used, such use is public, even
though the use and knowledge of the use may be confined to
one person.
"We say, thirdly, that some inventions are by their very
character only capable of being used where they cannot be seen
or observed by the public eye. An invention may consist of a
lt.ver or spring, hidden in the running gear of a watch, or of
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2nd allows it to be used without restriction of any kind the
11se is a public one."
"Tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the
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complainant herself shows that for more than two years before the application for the original letters there was, by the
consent and allowance of Barnes, a public use of the invention, covered by them. He made and gave to h~r two pairs of
corset-steels, constructed according to his device, one in 18 55
and one in 1858. They,
re resented to her for use. He
imposed no obligation of secrecy, nor any condition or restriction whatever.. They were not presented for the purpose of
-experiment, nor to test their qualities. No such claim is set .
up in her testimony. The invention was at the time complete,
and there is no evidence that it was afterwards changed or
improved. The donee of the steels used them for years for
the purpose and in the manner designed by the inventor.
They were not capable of any other use. She might have exhibited them to any person, or made other steels of the same
kind, and used or sold them. without violating any condition
or restriction imposed on her by the inventor."
This opinion of the court was undoubtedly greatly influenced by the fact that during the eleven years which intervened between the date of the invention and that of the application the same device had come into very general use
through the revelation of subsequent inventors. As the court
said, "It is fair to presume that having learned from this
general use that there was some value in his invention, he attempted to resume, by his application, what by his acts he had
clearly dedicated to the public." It is extremely doubtful if,
had this not been the case, the court would have held the
slight use shown to be such as would invalidate the patent.
But under the circumstances, the statements of the court in
respect to public use, while they seem wholly correct, were
quite unnecessary. There was indubitable general public use
more than two years before the application, by others than the
patentee or his representatives. Under the rule, discussed
above, that the use need not be with the consent of the patentee ·
to have the effect of invalidating a patent, this use by others,
ansmg out of their own discoveries, clearly rendered the
patent void. The court got into its discussion of whether the

complainant herself shows that for more than two years be-

fore the application for the original letters there was, by the

consent and allowance of Barnes, a public use of the inven-

tion, covered by them. He made and gave to her two pairs of

corset-steels, constructed according to his device, one in 1855

and one in 1858. They__w_re presented to her for use. He

imposed no obligation of secrecy, nor any condition or restric-

tion whatever. They were not presented for the purpose of

experiment, nor to test their qualities. No such claim is set

up in her testimony. The invention was at the time complete,

and there is no evidence that it was afterwards changed or

improved. The donee of the steels used them for years for

the purpose and in the manner designed by the inventor.

They were not capable of any other use. She might have ex-

hibited them to any person, or made other steels of the same

kind, and used or sold them without violating any condition

or restriction imposed on her by the inventor."

This opinion of the court was undoubtedly greatly influ-

enced by the fact that during the eleven years which inter-
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vened between the date of the invention and that of the ap-

plication the same device had come into very general use

through the revelation of subsequent inventors. As the court

said, "It is fair to presume that having learned from this

general use that there was some value in his invention, he at-

tempted to resume, by his application, what by his acts he had

clearly dedicated to the public." It is extremely doubtful if,

had this not been the case, the court would have held the

slight use shown to be such as would invalidate the patent.

But under the circumstances, the statements of the court in

respect to public use, while they seem wholly correct, were

quite unnecessary. There was indubitable general public use,

more than two years before the application, by others than the

patentee or his representatives. Under the rule, discussed

above, that the use need not be with the consent of the patentee

to have the effect of invalidating a patent, this use by others,

arising out of their own discoveries, clearly rendered the

patent void. The court got into its discussion of whether the
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patentee's own use was sufficient to avoid the patent, in order

to eliminate the question, which it appears to have considered

unsettled at that time, whether unauthorized use by others

would have the same effect. 23]

As is suggested in the foregoing cases, the mere fact that

an invention is concealed from view when in use does not

prevent such use from being public within the meaning of the

statute. In Hale v. Macneale, 232 the invention was a tapering

bolt for hoi-ding together the series of plates which formed the

walls of a certain type of safe. When in place it was abso-

lutely hidden from view and could be examined only by de-

struction of the safe. More than two years before his appli-

cation, the inventor had constructed three safes containing this

device, all of which were sold and put into use. "The con-

struction and arrangement and purpose and mode of opera-

tion and use of the bolts in the safes were necessarily known

231 The dissenting opinion is clearly out of harmony with other ad-

judications. "It must, in the language of the act, be in public use or on

sale. If on sale, of course the public who buy can use it, and if used in
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public with his consent, it may be copied by others. In either event there

is an end of his exclusive right of use or sale. The word public is, there-

fore, an important member of the sentence. A private use with consent,

which could lead to no copy or reproduction of the machine, which taught

the nature of the invention to no one but the party to whom such con-

patentee's own use was sufficient to avoid the paterit, in order
to eliminate the question, which it appears to have considered
unsettled at that time, whether unauthorized use by others
would have the same effect. 231
As is suggested in the foregoing cases, the mere fact that
an invention is concealed from view when in use does not
prevent such use from 'being public within the meaning of the
232
statute~ In Hale v. Macneale,
the invention was a tapering
bolt for holding together the series of plates which formed the
walls of a certain type of safe. When in place it was absolutely hidden from view and could be examined only by destruction of the safe. More than tw
efote his
lication, the inventor had constructed three.sales containing this
device, all o which were sold and _put into use. "The construction and arrangement and purpose and mode of operation and use of the bolts in the safes ~ere necessarily known

sent was given, which left the public at large as ignorant of this as it

was before the author's discovery, was no abandonment to the public, and

did not defeat his claim for a patent. If the little steel spring inserted in

a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman, covered by her

outer clothing, and in a position always withheld from public observa-

tion, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line

between a private and a public use. The opinion argues that the use was

public, because, with the consent of the inventer to its use, no limitation

was imposed in regard to its use in public. It may be well imagined that

a prohibition to the party so permitted against exposing her use of the

steel spring to public observation would have been supposed to be a piece

of irony. An objection quite the opposite of this suggested by the opinion

is, that the invention was incapable of a public use. That is to say, that

while the statute says the right to the patent can only be defeated by a

use which is public, it is equally fatal to the claim, when it is permitted

to be used at all, that the article can never be used in public."

232 107 U. S. 90.

The dissenting opinion is clearly out of harmony with other adjudications. "It must, in the language of the act, be in public use or on
sale. If on sale, of course the public who buy can use it, and if used in
public with his consent, it may be copied by others. Jn either event there
is an end of his exclusive right of use or sale. The word public is, therefore; au important member of the sen~ence. A private use with consent,
which could lead to no copy or reproduction of the machine, which taught
the nature of the invention to no one but the party to whom such .con-:
sent was given, which left the public at large as ignorant of this as it
was before the author's discovery, was no abandonment to the public, and
·did not defeat his claim for a patent. If the little steel spring inserted in
a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woma!l, covered by her
outer clothing, and in a position always withheld from public observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a Joss to know the line
between a private and a public use. The opinion argues that the use was
public, because, with the consent of the inventer to its use, no limitation
was imposed in regard to its use in public. It may be well imagined that
a prohibition to the party so permitted against exposing her use of the
steel spring to public observation wc:m ld have been supposed to be a piece
of irony. An objectiQn quite the opposite of this suggested by the opinion
is, that t~e invention was incapable of a public use. That is to say, that
while the statute says the right to the patent can only be defeated by a
use which is public, it is equally fatal fo the claim, when it is permitted
to be used at all, that the article can never be used in public."
232 rn7 U. S. go.
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to the workmen who put them in. They were, it is true, hid-

den from view, after the safes were completed, and it re-

quired a destruction of the safes to bring them into view.

But this was no concealment of them or use of them in secret.

They had no more concealment than was inseparable from

any legitimate use of them." Accordingly the court held the

patent for the device to be invalid. 23 '

All this discussion as to what constitutes "secret use" seems

to have been rendered unnecessary, however, by the decision

in Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co. 233a The

facts were that Macbeth had invented a certain process in

1903, since which time the plaintiff Company, of which Mac-

beth was president, had been using it. The court admitted,

however, that this use had been "secret." In 1910 an em-

ployee of the plaintiff company had revealed the process, in

breach of his confidential relation, to the Jefferson Glass Co.,

which at once began to use it. On suit by the Macbeth Com-

pany, however, the state court enjoined the Jefferson Com-

pany from further using it or revealing it to others. 233b Dur-
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ing these court proceedings the secret of the process was not

revealed. It does not appear just how or when the defendant,

the General Electric Company, came by its knowledge of the

process. On these facts, the court might have held that there

was in fact a public use. This might have been predicated on

the use by the Macbeth Co., which would have been in accord

with Perkins v. Nassau Card Co., supra. Still more convinc-

ingly, the court might have said that the use by the Jefferson

Co. and the General Electric Co., although without plaintiff's

consent, was clearly a public use more than two years before

the statute.

But the court chose not to base its decision on either of

these grounds. On the contrary, it explicitly undertook to de-

cide, "whether one who has discovered and perfected an in-

233 Ace. Brush v. Condit, 132 U. S. 39, 49-

233 246 Fed. 695 ; writ of certiorari refused by Sup. Ct., 246 U. S. 659

(March, 1918) ; cited with approval in E. W. Bliss Co. v. Southern Can

Co., 251 Fed. 903, 907.

233b Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76.

to the workmen who pu~ them in. They were, it is true, hidden from view, after the safe were completed, and it required a destruction of the afes fo bring them into view.
But this wa no con·c ealment of them or u e of them in secret.
They had no more concealment than was in eparable from
any legitimate use of them." Accordingly the court held the
patent for the device to be invalid. 233
All this discussion as to what constitutes "secret use'' seems
to have been rendered unnecessary, however, by the decision
in Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co. 233 a The
facts were that Macbeth had invented a certain process in
1903, since which time the plaintiff Company, of which Macbeth was president, had been u ing it. The court admitted,
however, that this use had been "secret." In l9ro an employee of the plaintiff company had revealed the process, in
breach of- his confidential relation, to the J e~erson Glass Co.,
which at once began to use it. On suit by the Macbeth Company, however, the state court enjoined the Jefferson Company from further using it or revealing it to others. 233 b During these court proceedings the secret of the process was not
revealed. It does not appear just how or when the defendant
the General Electric Company, came by its knowledge of the
process. On these facts, the court might have held that there
was in fact a public use. This might have been predicated on
the use by the Macbeth Co., which would have been in accord
with Perkins v. Nassau Card Co"., supra. Still more convincingly, the court might have said that the use by the Jefferson
Co. and the General Electric Co., although without plaintiff's
consent, was clearly a public use more than two years before
the statute.
But the court chose not to base its decision on either of
these grounds. On the contrary, it explicitly undertook to decide, "whether one who has discovered and perfected an inAcc. Brush v. Condit, 132 U. S. 39, 49.
246 Fed. 6g5; writ of certiorari refused by Sup. Ct., 246 U. S. 659
(March, 1918) ; cited with approval in E. W. Bliss Co. v. Southern Can
Co., 251 Fed. 903, 907.
2 33b Macbeth-Evan Glass Co. v. Schnelbacq, 239 P a. 76.
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vention can employ it secretly more than nine years for pur-

poses only of profit, and then, upon encountering difficulty in

preserving his secret, rightfully secure a patent." It was not

pretended that Macbeth had really abandoned his invention to

the public. His constant effort to keep the secret of the in-

vention hidden from the public indisputably negatived this.

Nevertheless, the court held, on an interpretation of the policy

of the statute, that Macbeth had forfeited his right to a patent.

He had not abandoned the invention to the public as a mat-

ter of fact; it had not been in public use; but the right was

lost solely because of his secret use.

In this case, the rule, as clearly expressed, is that without

exception the right to a patent is forfeited by secret use which

is not for experimental purpose. This would cover the case

of an inventor who, having used his device in secret for a

time, should still apply for a patent before anyone else had

discovered the secret. The dicta on which the court in the

Macbeth case relies do not go this far. They declare the right

to a patent to be forfeited only when others have begun to use
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the invention before the inventor's application. Whether the

court in the Macbeth case really intended to go further than

this is not quite certain. 2330

EXPERIMENTAL USE. There is a type of use which, al-

though it may be quite visible to the public and even exercised

by the public generally, and gives to the public a full knowledge

of the invention, is, nevertheless, not held to be a "public use"

such as to preclude the subsequent issue of a patent. This is

what the courts denominate "experimental" use. No matter

how full and complete the use may have been, and no matter

how public it may have been, in the common usage of the

word, if the court feels, intuitively or otherwise, that such

use was "experimental" in its purpose, it is not public use with-

in the technical meaning of the statute.

Probably the most frequently cited case on this topic is that

of Elizabeth v. Paving Co. 234 The patent there attacked cov-

2330 For a further discussion, see 17 Mich. Law Rev. 499.

234 97 U. S. 126.

vention can employ it secretly more than nine years for purpo es only of profit, and then, upon encountering difficulty in
preserving his secret, rightfully secure a patent." It was not
pretended that Macbeth had really abandoned his invention to
the public. His constant effort to keep the secret of the invention hidden from the public indisputably negatived this.
Nevertheless, the court held, on an- interpretation of the policy
of the statute, that Macbeth had forfeited his right to a patent.
He had not abandoned the invention to the public as a matter of fact; it had not been in public use; but the right was
lost solely because of his secret use.
In this case, the rule, as clearly expressed, is that without
exception the right to a patent is forfeited b) ecret use which
is not for experimental purpose. This would cover the case
of an inventor who, having used his device in secret for a
time, should still apply for a patent before anyone else had
discovered the secret. The dicta on which the court in the
Macbeth case relies do not go this far. They declare the right
to a patent to be forfeited only when others have begun to use
th~ invention before the inventor's application. Whether the
court in the Macbeth case really intended to go further than
this is not quite certain. 233 c
Ex:PERIMENTAL UsE. There is a type of use which, although it may be quite visible to the public and even exercised
by the public generally, and gives to the public a full knowledge
of the invention, is nevertheless, not held to be a "public use"
such as to preclude the subsequent issue of a patent. This is
what the courts denominate "experimental" use. No matter
how full and complete the use may have been, and no matter
how public it may have been, in the common usage of the
word, if the court feels, intuitively or otherwise, that such
use was "experimental" in its purpose, it is not public use within the technical meaning of the statute.
Probably the most frequently cited case on this topic is that
of Elizabeth v. Paving Co. 234 The patent there attacked covFor a further discussion, see 17 Mich. Law Rev. 499.
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ered a form of street pavement made of wooden blocks. On
the part of the attackers it was ·shown that the inventor had
cau ed a stretch of his pavement to be laid upon a certain road
in Boston where it was used for a period of 6 years before his
application. The road on which it was so used was a public
toll-road, owned by a corporation in which the inventor was a
shareholder. The pavement was in front of the toll-house and
was about. 75' in length. The court held that this was not such
a public use of the invention as invalidated the subsequent
patent. It)Y_as constructed by the inventor at his own expense,
in order to ascertain the effect u on it 0£ heavily loaded
wagons an of constant use~ The inventor. came . frequently
to examine 1t and made many. inquiries, of other people, as to
its satisfaction.
Th~ court ~easoned to its holding that this was not a public
use, in the· technical sense, but -mere experimental one
follows: "That the use of the pavement in question was public in one sense cannot be disputed. But can it be said that
the invention was in public use? The use of an invention py
the inventor himself, or of any other person tinder his· direction; by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perf ect_ion, has never been regarded as such a use.
Curtis, Patents, sect. 381; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292. Now,
the nature of a stre~t pavement is such that it cannot be experimented upon satisfactorily except on a highway, which
is always public. When the subject of invention is a machine, it may be tested and tried in a building, ·e ither with or
without closed doors. In either case, such use is not a public
use, within the meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor
is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation. He may
see cause to alter it and improve it, or not. His experiments
will reveal the fact whether any and what alterations may be·
necessary. If durability is one of the qualities to be attained,
a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the
inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished.
And though, during all that period, he may not find that any
changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using-

ered a form of street pavement made of wooden blocks. On

the part of the attackers it was shown that the inventor had

caused a stretch of his pavement to be laid upon a certain road

in Boston where it was used for a period of 6 years before his

application. The road on which it was so used was a public

toll-road, owned by a corporation in which the inventor was a

shareholder. The pavement was in front of the toll-house and

was about. 75' in length. The court held that this was not such

a public use of the invention as invalidated the subsequent

patent. It was constructed by the inventor at his own expense,

in order to ascertain the effect upon it of heavily loaded

wagons and of constant use. The inventor came frequently

to examine it and made many inquiries, of other people, as to

its satisfaction.

The court reasoned to its holding that this was not a public

use, in the technical sense, but a^rnere experimental one as

follows : "That the use of the pavement in question was pub-

lic in one sense cannot be disputed. But can it be said that

the invention was in public use? The use of an invention by
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the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direc-

tion, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the inven-

tion to perfection, has never been regarded as such a use.

Curtis, Patents, sect. 381 ; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292. Now,

the nature of a street pavement is such that it cannot be ex-

perimented upon satisfactorily except on a highway, which

is always public. When the subject of invention is a ma-

chine, it may be tested and tried in a building, either with or

without closed doors. In either case, such use is not a public

use, within the meaning of the statute, so long as the inventor

is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation. He may

see cause to alter it and improve it, or not. His experiments

will reveal the fact whether any and what alterations may be

necessary. If durability is one of the qualities to be attained,

a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the

inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished.

And though, during all that period, he may not find that any

changes are necessary, yet he may be justly said to be using
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his machine only by way of experiment; and no one would say

that such a use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the

qualities of the machine, would be a public use, within the

meaning of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily

allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not on

sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own

control, and does not lose his title to a patent. It would not

be necessary, in such a case, that the machine should be put up

and used only in the inventor's own shop or premises. He

may have it put up and used in the premises of another, and

the use may inure to the benefit of the owner of the establish-

ment. Still, if used under the surveillance of the inventor,

and for the purpose of enabling him to test the machine, and

ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended, and

make such alterations and improvements as experience demon-

strates to be necessary, it will still be a mere experimental use,

and not a public use, within the meaning of the statute.

"Whilst the supposed machine is in such experimental use,

the public may be incidentally deriving a benefit from it. If it
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be a grist-mill, or a carding-machine, customers from the sur-

rounding country may enjoy the use of it by having their grain

made into flour, or their wool into rolls, and still it will not be

in public use, within the meaning of the law. But if the in-

ventor allows his machine to be used by other persons gen-

erally, either with or without compensation, or if it is, with

his consent, put on sale for such use, then it will be in public

use and on public sale, within the meaning of the law.

"If, now, we apply the same principles to this case, the an-

alogy will be seen at once. Nicholson wished to experiment

on his pavement. He believed it to be a good thing, but he

was not sure ; and the only mode in which he could test it was

to place a specimen of it in a public roadway. He did this at

his own expense, and with the consent of the owners of the

road. Durability was one of the qualities to be attained. He

wanted to know whether his pavement would stand, and

whether it would resist decay. Its character for durability

could not be ascertained without its being subjected to use for

his· machine only by way of experiment; and no one would say
that such a use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing the
qualities of the machine, would be a public use, within the
meaning of the statute. So long as he does · not voluntarily
allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not on
sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own
control, and does not lose his title to a patent. It would not
be necessary, in such a case, that the machine should be put up
and used only in the inventor's own shop or premises. He
niay have it put up and used in the premises of another, and
the l:lse may inure to the benefit of the owner of the establishment. Still, if used under the surveillance of the inventor,
and for the purpose of enabling him to test the machine, and
ascertain whether it will . answer the purpose intended, and
make such alterati~ns and improvements as experience demonstrates to be necessary, it will still be a mere experimental use,
and not a public use, within the meaning of the statute.
"Whilst the supposed machine is in such experimental use,
the public may be incidentally deriving a benefit from it. If it
be a grist-mill, or a carding-machine, customers from the surrom;iding country may enjoy the use of it by having their grain
made into flou~, or their wool into rolls, and still it will not be
in public use, within the meaning of the law. But if the inventor allows his machine to be used by other persons generally, either with or without compensation, or if it is, with
his consent, put on sale for such use, then it will be in public
use and on public sale, within the meaning of the law.
"If, now, we apply the same principles to this case, the analogy will be seen at once. Nich9lson wished to experiment
on his pavement. He believed it to be a good thing, but he
was not sure; and the only mode in which he could test it was
to place a specimen of it in a public roadway. He did this at
his own expense, and with the consent of the owners of the
road. Durability was one of the qualities to be attained. He
wanted to know whether his pavement would stand, and
whether it would resist decay. Its character for .d urability
could not be ascertained without its being subjected to use for
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a considerable time. He subjected it to such use, in good

faith, for the simple purpose of ascertaining whether it was

what he claimed it to be. Did he do anything more than the

inventor of the supposed machine might do, in testing his

invention? The public had the incidental use of the pavement,

it is true ; but was the invention in public use, within the mean-

ing of the statute? We think not. The proprietors of the

road alone used the invention, and used it at Nicholson's re-

quest, by way of experiment. The only way in which they

could use it was by allowing the public to pass over the pave-

ment."

The difference between technical public use and experimental

use such as does not invalidate a subsequent patent is impossi-

ble to formulate. Like most of the other issues of patent law-

cases, the character to be given to a proved use depends upon

the circumstances of each case and is a psychological fact. It

depends wholly upon the operation of mind of the particular

judge upon the particular circumstances. But, as in respect

to the other issues, precedents do show certain circumstances
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which have more or less apparently influenced the court in its

decision.

The fact that the inventor himself has appeared to be satis-

fied that his invention was at least usably perfect, has militated

against the proposition that it was merely experimental. In

the case just referred to the court said, "Had the city of Bos-

ton, or other parties, used the invention, by laying down the

pavement in other streets and places, with Nicholson's consent

and allowance, then, indeed, the invention itself would have

been in public use, within the meaning of the law ; but this was

not the case. Nicholson did not sell it, nor allow others to

use it or sell it. He did not let it go beyond his control. He

did nothing that indicated any intent to do so. He kept it

under his own eyes, and never for a moment abandoned the

intent to obtain a patent for it."

This idea was made the foundation of the holding in a later

case. 235 The invention here involved was an improvement in

235 Root v. Third Ave. R. R. 146 U. S. 210.

a considerable time. He subjected it to such u e, in good
faith, for the simple purpo e of ascertaining whether it \Vas
what he claimed it to be. Did he do anything more than the
inventor of the uppo ed machine might do, in te ting hi
invention? The public had the incidental u e of the pavement,
ft is true; but was the invention in public use, within the meaning of the statute? We think not. The proprietor of the
road alone used the invention, and u ed it at Nicholson s request, by way of experiment. The only way in which they
could use it was by allowing the public to pass over the pavement.'
The difference between technical public use and experimental
use such as does not invalidate a subsequent patent is impossible to formulate. Like most of the other issue of patent law
cases, the character to be given to a proved u e depends upon
the circumstances of each case and is a psychological fact. It
depends wholly upon the operation of mind of the particular
judge upon the particular circumstances. But as in respect
to the other i sues, precedents do show certain circumstances
which have more or less apparently influenced the court in its
decision.
The fact that the inventor himself has appeared to be satisfied that his invention was at least usably perfect, has militated
against the proposition that it was merely experimental. In
the case just referred to the court said "Had the city of Boston, or other parties, used the invention, by laying down· the
pavement in other streets and places, with Nicholson's consent
and allowance, then indeed, the invention itself would have
been in public use, within the meaning of the law; but this was
not the case. Nicholson did not sell it, nor allow others to
use it or sell it. He did not let it go be)'(ond his control. He
did nothing that indicated any intent to do so. He kept it
under his own eye , and never for a moment abandoned the
intent to obtain a patent for it.'
This idea wa made the foundation of the holding in a later
case. 235 The invention here involved was an improvement in
2as
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the construction of cable railways. More than two years prior

the COJ}Struction of cable railways. More than two years prior
to his application the inventor had put it into actual use on a
cable-railroad, of which he had been employed to superint~nd
the construction. He had apparently devised his invention in
the expectation that he would be. calle9 upon to construct this
particular road. He explained his .invention to the directors
of the road, and it was adopted by them. In defense of the
patent it was urged that this use was experimental merely and
the case of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co. was relied upon as
authority. The inventor testified that he had been possessed
by serious doubt as to the practicability of his device, and that
he delayed applying for a patent until the utility of the device
should have been tested by use. He did not, however, communicate this doubt to the directors of the road. The court
said of this, quoting the words of the lower court, "Manifestly the complainant received a consideration for devising
and consenting to the use of an invention which was designed
to be a complete, permanent struc~ure, which was to cost a
large sum of money, and which he knew would not meet the
expectation of those who had employed him, unless it should ·
prove to be in all respects a practically operative and reasonably durable one. If he had entertained any serious doubts
of . its adequacy for the purpose for which it was intended, it
would seem that he would not have recommended it in view
of the con~iderable sum it was to cost. At all events, he did
not treat it as an experimental thing, but allowed it to be appropriated as a complete and perfect invention, fit to be used
practically, and just as it was, until it should wear out, or
until it should demonstrate its own unsuitableness. He turned
it over to the owners without reserving any future control over
it, and knowing that, except as a subordinate, he would not be
permitted · to make any changes in it by way of experiment;
and at the time he had no present expectation of making any
material changes in it. He never made or suggested a change
in it after it went into use, and never made an examination
with a view of seeing whether it was defective, or could be
improved in any particular." The court held, therefore, that

to his application the inventor had put it into actual use on a

cable-railroad, of which he had been employed to superintend

the construction. He had apparently devised his invention in

the expectation that he would be. called upon to construct this

particular road. He explained his invention to the directors

of the road, and it was adopted by them. In defense of the

patent it was urged that this use was experimental merely and

the case of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co. was relied upon as

authority. The inventor testified that he had been possessed

by serious doubt as to the practicability of his device, and that

he delayed applying for a patent until the utility of the device

should have been tested by use. He did not, however, com-

municate this doubt to the directors of the road. The court

said of this, quoting the words of the lower court, "Mani-

festly the complainant received a consideration for devising

and consenting to the use of an invention which was designed

to be a complete, permanent structure, which was to cost a

large sum of money, and which he knew would not meet the
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expectation of those who had employed him, unless it should

prove to be in all respects a practically operative and reason-

ably durable one. If he had entertained any serious doubts

of its adequacy for the purpose for which it was intended, it

would seem that he would not have recommended it in view

of the considerable sum it was to cost. At all events, he did

not treat it as an experimental thing, but allowed it to be ap-

propriated as a complete and perfect invention, fit to be used

practically, and just as it was, until it should wear out, or

until it should demonstrate its own unsuitableness. He turned

it over to the owners without reserving any future control over

it, and knowing that, except as a subordinate, he would not be

permitted to make any changes in it by way of experiment;

and at the time he had no present expectation of making any

material changes in it. He never made or suggested a change

in it after it went into use, and never made an examination

with a view of seeing whether it was defective, or could be

improved in any particular." The court held, therefore, that
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the case did not come within the principles of the Pavement

the case did not come within the principles of the Pavement
Co. case, and that the patent was invalid. 23 6
The fact that the inventor has received a profit from the
use of his device does not necessarily demonstrate that the use
was more than experimental. The matter of profit was discussed by the court in Smith & Griggs M.f g. Co. v. Sprague. 2 3 7
The machine involved, which wa·s one for making buckle ,
"was practically successful, in that during the period of its
-use the complainant produced and sold about 50 ooo gross of
levers used on these shoe buckles, which he sold to his customers in the market. It was a public use in the ·sense of the
statute and within the decisions of this court, inasmuch as it
was used by the complainant in the regular conduct of his
business by workmen employed by him in its operation, and in
the view of such part of the public as cho e to resort to his
establishment,' either for the purpose of selling material for the
manufacture or of purchasing its product. It is claimed, however, and it was so decided by the Circuit Court, that this prior
use of the machine in that form was not a public use within
the prohibition of the statute so as to defeat the patent, because that use was experimental only, of an imperfect machine, embodying at:i incomplete invention, in order to enable
the inventor to perfect it by improvements actually added, and
to overcome defects developed by this use, which improvements
are contained in the three additional claims, and which were
aqded as parts of the invention within two years before the
date of the application.

Co. case, and that the patent was invalid. 236

The fact that the inventor has received a profit from the

use of his device does not necessarily demonstrate that the use

was more than experimental. The matter of profit was dis-

cussed by the court in Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague. 237

The machine involved, which was one for making buckles,

"was practically successful, in that during' the period of its

use the complainant produced and sold about 50,000 gross of

levers used on these shoe buckles, which he sold to his custo-

mers in the market. It was a public use in the sense of the

statute and within the decisions of this court, inasmuch as it

was used by the complainant in the regular conduct of his

business by workmen employed by him in its operation, and in

the view of such part of the public as chose to resort to his

establishment, either for the purpose of selling material for the

manufacture or of purchasing its product. It is claimed, how-

ever, and it was so decided by the Circuit Court, that this prior

use of the machine in that form was not a public use within
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the prohibition of the statute so as to defeat the patent, be-

cause that use was experimental only, of an imperfect ma-

chine, embodying an incomplete invention, in order to enable

the inventor to perfect it by improvements actually added, and

to overcome defects developed by this use, which improvements

are contained in the three additional claims, and which were

added as parts of the invention within two years before the

date of the application.''

236 Hall v. Macneale, 107 U. S. 90, 96. "It is contended that the safes

were experimental, and that the use was a use for experiment. But we

are of the opinion that this was not so. ... The invention was complete

in those safes. It was capable of producing the results sought to be

accomplished, though not as thoroughly as with the use of welded steel

and iron plates. ... As to their use being experimental it is not shown

that any attempt was made to see if the plates of the safes could be

stripped off, and thus to prove whether or not the conical bolts were effi-

cient. The safes were sold, and apparently, no experiment and no experi-

mental use was ever thought to be necessary. The idea of a use for ex-

periment was an afterthought."

237 123 U. S. 249.

236 Hall v. Macneale, 107 U. S. 90, 96.
'It is contended that the afe
were experimental, and that the use was a use for experiment. But we
.are of the opinion that this was not o . . . . The invention was complete
in. those safes. It was capable of producing the re ults sought to be
accomplished, though not as thoroughly a with the u e of welded teel
and iron plates . . . . As to their use being experimelital it i not hown
that any attempt was made t o see if the plate of the safes could be
stripped off, and thus to prove whether or not the conical bolts were efficient. The afe were sold, and apparently, no experiment and no experimental u e was ever thought to be nece ary. The idea of a u e for experiment was an afterthought."
2 37 123 u. s. 249.
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The court said, generally, that "The use by the inventor,

The court said, generally, that "The use by the inventor,
for the purpose of testing the machine, in order by experiment
to devise additional means for perfecting the success of its
operation, is admissible; and where, as incident to such use,
the product of its opera~ion is disposed of by sale, such profit
from its use does not change its character; but
ere the use
is mainl for the ur oses of trade and profit and the experiment is merely incidental to that, the principal and not the incident must give character to the use." But of the particular
case it said, "The use of the machine was apparently for the
purpose of conducting an established business; the machine itself was the only one used for the manufacture, of which the
patentee, by a prior patent", already had a monopoly. He alone
supplied the market with ·the article, and the whole demand
was satisfactorily met by this single machine. To this extent,
it operated successfully. That it was capable of improvement need not be denied, nor that, while it was in daily use,
its owner and inventor watched it with the view of devising
means to meet and overcome imperfections. in its operation;
but this much can be said in every such case. There are few
machines, probably, which are not susceptible of further development and improvement, and the ingenuity of mechanics
and inventors is commonly on the alert to discover defects and
invent remedies. The alterations made in the machine in
question, however useful, :vvere not vital to its organization.
Without them, it could and did work so as to be c·o mmercially
successful.
"The impression made upon us by the evidence, . the conclusion from which we cannot resist, is, that the patentee unduly
neglected and delayed to make his application for the patents,
and deprived. himself of his right thereto by the public use of
the machine in question, so far as it is embodied in the claims
under discussion.
"The proof falls far short of establishing that the main pur- pose in view, in the use of the machine by the patentee, prior
to his application, was to perfect its mechanism and improve
its operation. On the contrary, it seem~ to us that it shows

for the purpose of testing the machine, in order by experiment

to devise additional means for perfecting the success of its

operation, is admissible ; and where, as incident to such use,

the product of its operation is disposed of by sale, such profit

from its use does not change its character ; but^hexe_the use

isjiiainly for the purposes of trade and profit, and the experi-

ment is merely incidental to that, the principal and not the in-

cident must give character to the use." But of the particular

case it said, "The use of the machine was apparently for the

purpose of conducting an established business; the machine it-

self was the only one used for the manufacture, of which the

patentee, by a prior patent, already had a monopoly. He alone

supplied the market with the article, and the whole demand

was satisfactorily met by this single machine. To this extent,

it operated successfully. That it was capable of improve-

ment need not be denied, nor that, while it was in daily use,

its owner and inventor watched it with the view of devising

means to meet and overcome imperfections in its operation;
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but this much can be said in every such case. There are few

machines, probably, which are not susceptible of further de-

velopment and improvement, and the ingenuity of mechanics

and inventors is commonly on the alert to discover defects and

invent remedies. The alterations made in the machine in

question, however useful, were not vital to its organization.

Without them, it could and did work so as to be commercially

successful.

"The impression made upon us by the evidence, the conclu-

sion from which we cannot resist, is, that the patentee unduly

neglected and delayed to make his application for the patents,

and deprived himself of his right thereto by the public use of

the machine in question, so far as it is embodied in the claims

under discussion.

"The proof falls far short of establishing that the main pur-

pose in view, in the use of the machine by the patentee, prior

to his application, was to perfect its mechanism and improve

its operation. On the contrary, it seems to us that it shows
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that the real purpose in the use was to conduct the business of

the manufacture, the improvement and perfection of the ma-

chine being merely incidental and subsidiary.

"The case upon the proofs seems to us to fall within the

principle of the decision of this court in Hall v. Macneale, 107

U. S. 90, 96, 97. It was there said : 'It is contended that the

safes were experimental and that the use was a use for experi-

ment. But we are of opinion that this was not so, and that

the case falls within the principle laid down by this court in

Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120. The invention was complete

in those safes. It was capable of producing the results sought

to be accomplished, though not as thoroughly as with the use

of welded steel and iron plates. The construction and ar-

rangement and purpose and mode of operation and use of the

bolts in the safes were necessarily known to the workmen who

put them in. They were, it is true, hidden from view after

the safes were completed, and it required a destruction of the

safes to bring them into view. But this was no concealment

of them or use of them in secret. They had no more conceal-
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ment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of them.

As to the use being experimental, it is not shown that any

attempt was made to see if the plates of the safe could be

stripped off, and thus to prove whether or not the conical bolts

were efficient.' " 238

EXPERIMENTAL_SAI,E. The same principles apply to sale

as to use, and there may be an actual sale, more than two

years prior to the application, which does not, in law, amount

to a sale within the meaning of the statute. In Swain v.

Holyoke Machine Co. 239 the court said, "As_a general rule,

a single unrestricted sale by the patentee of his patented^ de-

vice, embodying his completed invention, is a public use or

saje^ within section 4886 of the Revised Statutes. There are

undoubtedly cases where the strict application of this rule

works great hardship. Some inventions are for large and

238 Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556; ClT Am. Caramel Co. v. Thos. Mills

& Bro. 149 Fed. 743, "Nor is such use a public use, which will defeat the

patent, because the product of the machine during the time was sold."

239 109 Fed. 154.

that the real purpo e in the use was to conduct the business of ·
the manufacture the improvement and perfection of the mac.hine being merely incidental and subsidiary.
'The case upon the proofs seems to us to fall within the
principle of the decision of this court in Hall v. Macneale, 107
U. S. 90, 96, 97. It was there said: . 'It is contended that the
safes were experimental and that the use was a use for experiment. But we are of opinion that this was not so, and that
the case falls within the principle laid down by this court in
Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120. The invention was complete
in those safes. It was capable of producing the results sought
to be accomplished, though npt as thoroughly as with the use
of welded steel and iron plates. The construction a!1d arrangement and purpose and mode of operation and use of the
bolts in the safes were necessarily known to the workmen who
put them in. They were, it is true, hidden from view after
the safes were completed, and it required a destruction of tl?-e
safes to bring them into view. But this was no concealment
of them or use of them in secret They hacl no more ·conceal- ..
ment than was inseparable from any legitimate use of them.
As to the use being experimental, it is not s~own that any
attempt was made to see if the plates of the safe could be
_stripped off, and thus to proye whether or not the conical bolts
were efficient.' " 238
EXPERIMENT AL SA E.
The same principles apply to sale
as to use, and there may be an actual sale, more than two
years prior to the application, which does not, in law, amount
to a sale within the meaning of the statute. In Swain v.
Holyoke Machine Co. 239 the court said, "A_s__...a_ _ ____,_.
a s· ale unrestricted sa b;y the atentee of hi1...;i__i~--~~
vice emborlJcin his completed invention, is a pub!' c use or
le within section 4886 of the Revised Statutes. There are
undoubtedly cases where the strict application of this rule
works great hardship. Some inventions are for large and
238 Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556; Cf. .A:m. Caramel Co. v. Thos. Mills
& Bro. 149 Fed. 743, "Nor is such use a public use, which will defeat the

patent, because the product of the machine during the time was sold.''
239
109 Fed. 154·
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costly structures, others require a long period of time to test

their practical utility, and still others are for small devices

which are attached to large machines. It follows that an in-

ventor, from lack of means or other circumstances, may be

forced to sell his patented device in order to test its utility or

efficiency. For this reason the cpurts in some instances have

declined to enforce the strict rule where the sale was attended

by some exceptional circumstances. The following cases il-

lustrate the exceptions to the general rule : Where the sale of

the machine was for the purpose of trial, and the machine was

warranted. Graham v. McCormick (C. C.) n Fed. 859, 862,

and Same v. Manufacturing Co., Id. 138, 142. Wfce*e-the

patentee derived no profit from the sale, and the device was a

mere appendage to a large machine sold by his employer. Har-

mon v. Struthers (C. C.) 57 Fed. 637. Where_the__sak was

made at an under price, and without profit to the inventor, and

for the purpose of securing a fair test of the invention. Innis

v. Boiler Works (C. C.) 22 Fed. 780. Where an imperfect

machine was sold, which did not embody the invention. Eas-
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tern Paper-Bag Co. v. Standard Paper-Bag Co. (C. C.) 30

Fed. 63, 66. Where the device sold did not embody the most

complete and perfect form of the invention. Draper v. Wat-

tles, 3 Ban. & A. 618, 620, Fed. Cas. No. 4,073.

"We should hesitate to lay down the broad proposition that

a single sale of a patented device for experimental purposes

works a forfeiture of the patent under the statute. We do

not understand that it has ever been so expressly decided by

the supreme court. It is certainly doubtful whether, under

such circumstances, the device can be said to be 'on sale,' with-

in the fair meaning of the statute. It does not follow that,

because a machine has been sold, it has passed the experimental

stage.

"Instead of laying down a fixed rule, it seems to us that in

each case the court should direct its attention to the funda-

mental inquiry : Undejijdiatxircurnstances^ancLfQr what pur-

po^e-did-4Jie-piiblic use or sa1e_tak_place? And, where it ap-

pears that there has been a public use or sale more than two

years before the application, the burden is thrown upon the

eo~cy

tructures, others require a long peri9d of time to test
their practical utility, and still others are for small devices.
which are attached to large machines. It follows that an inventor, from lack of means or other circumstances, may be
forced to sell his patented device in order to test its utility or
efficiency. For this reason the c.ourts in some instances have
declined to enforce the strict rule where the sale was attended
by some exceptional circumstances. The following cases illustrate the exceptions to the general rule : Where the sale of
the machine was for the purpose of trial, and the machi~e was
warranted. Graham v. McCormick ( C. C.) I I Fed. 859, 862,
and Same v. Manufacturing Co., Id. 138, 142. Wflere-the
patentee derived no _profit fro _the _sale, an the device was a
mere·appendage to a large machine sold by his employer. Harmon v. Struthers (C. C.) 57 Fed. 637. Where the
was
made at an under price, and without profit to the inventor, and.
for the purpose of securing a fair test of the invention. Innis v. Boiler Works (C. C.) 22 Fed. 780. Where an imperfect
machine was sold, which did not embody the invention. Eastern Paper-Bag Co. v. Standard Paper-Bag Co. ( C. C.) 30
Fed. 63, 66. Where the device sold did not embody the most
complete and perfect form of the invention. Draper v. Wattles, 3 Ban. & A. 618, 620, Fed. Cas. No. 4,073.
"We should hesitate to lay down the broad proposition that
a single sale of a patented. device · for experimental purposes
works a forfeiture of the patent under the statute. We do
not understand that it has ever been so expressly decided by
the supreme court. It is certainly doubtful whether, under
such circumstances, the device can be said to be 'on sale,' within . the fair meaning of the statute. It does not follow that,
because a machine has been sold, it has passed the experimental
stage.
"Instead of laying down a fixed rule, it seems to us th~t in
each case the court should direct its attention to the fundamental inquiry: Uncle
ircumstanc
ure or sale take place? And, where it appo
pears that there has been a public use or sale more than two
years before the application, the burden is thrown upon the
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patentee to establish, by full, clear, and convincing proofs, that
such use or sale was principally and primarily for experimental
purposes, and that such purposes were not merely incidental
or subsidiary. Whatever expressions may be found in the
opinions of the supreme court to the effect that a single sale
comes within the statutory prohibition, we think a careful examination of the cases shows that the primary and governing
consideration is the purpose and object of the inventor in making such sale." While this statement is mere dictu.m and the
actual holding of the case was that there had been a sale and
use within the meaning of the statute, it is a clear and forceful expression of what appears to be the settled rule.
A mere contract to sell, not accompanied by the passing of
title to anything, has been held not a "sale" within the meaning
of the statute. 240
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the purpose
of use or sale, which makes it experimental or otherwise, is
not decided in accord with the inventor's assertions in regard
to it. It depends instead upon the appearance whic_h all the
collateral facts give to it. An inventor who bears this in
mind, can so arrange his experiments as to inake their true
character muc~ more clearly demonstrable from the circnmstances than if he should .i gnore it.

patentee to establish, by full, clear, and convincing proofs, that

such use or sale was principally and primarily for experimental

purposes, and that such purposes were not merely incidental

or subsidiary. Whatever expressions may be found in the

opinions of the supreme court to the effect that a single sale

comes within the statutory prohibition, we think a careful ex-

amination of the cases shows that the primary and governing

consideration is the purpose and object of the inventor in mak-

ing such sale." While this statement is mere dictum and the

actual holding of the case was that there had been a sale and

use within the meaning of the statute, it is a clear and force-

ful expression of what appears to be the settled rule.

A mere contract to sell, not accompanied by the passing of

title to anything, has been held not a "sale" within the meaning

of the statute. 240

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the purpose

of use or sale, which makes it experimental or otherwise, is

not decided in accord with the inventor's assertions in regard

to it. It depends instead upon the appearance which all the
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collateral facts give to it. An inventor who bears this in

mind, can so arrange his experiments as to make their true

character much more clearly demonstrable from the circum-

stances than if he should ignore it.

2. ABANDONMENT

The statute makes abandonment of an invention a bar to

the .securing of a patent ; a bar that is distinct from the effect

of mere puBHc use or sale. In practice, abandonment is so in-

timately connected with use or sale as to be to a great extent in-

distinguishable from it. Whether or not an invention has

been abandoned to the public is obviously a question of fact

to be determined in each case, 241 but its determination is a

matter of conclusion, and not a mere matter of evidence. The

bar to a patent arising from abandonment is thus very different

from the bar arising from use or sale two years prior to the

application. The use and sale is a mere matter of demonstra-

240 Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 Fed. 145.

§ 2.

241 Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 331.

ABANDONMENT

The s,ta.tute makes abandonment of an invention a bar to
the ecuring of a patent ;-a bar that is distinct from the effect
of mere pu 1c use or sale. In practice, abandonment is so intimately connected with use or sale as to be to 3 great extent indistinguishable from it. Whether qr not an invention has
been abandoned to the public is obviously a question of fact
to be determined in each case, 241 but its determination is a
matter of conclusion and not a mere matter of evidence. The
bar to a patent arising from abandonment is thus very different
from the bar arising from use or sale two years prior to the
application. The use and sale is a mere matter of demonstrauo Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumat:c Tool Co., 232 Fed. 145.
241 Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 331.
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tion. If a public use or a sale has been proved, it automatic-

ally follows that the patent is invalid unless the use or sale

is excused as experimental. Abandonment, on the other hand

depends wholly upon the intent of the inventor. A conclusion

as to intent must be drawn, therefore, from the proved facts,

before the law can be applied. This conclusion can not be

subject to rules of law, for the very simple reason that there

is too little possibility of similar facts in enough particular

cases for the harmony of conclusions therein to demonstrate

a rule. Abandonment is therefore a matter of judicial con-

clusion as to intent, although we are accustomed to speak of

these conclusions, psychological facts perhaps, as facts to be

proved. In this sense, the intent to abandon, or, simply, aban-

donment, "may be proved either by express declaration of an

intention to abandon, or by conduct inconsistent with any

other conclusion." 242

PUBLIC USE. The fact tjiat an inventor let his device go

into public use, or has himself used it or put-it on sale with-

out making any effort to patent it, is reasonably clear evidence
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that he did not intend to patent it and had abandoned the right.

Because of this, it is possible for public use to bar the right to

a patent in two distinct ways. It may act as a bar as a matter

of law, absolutely regardless of the inventor's intent to take

out a patent, because it took place more than two years be-

fore his application. Or, it may bar his right, regardless of

the time at which it occurred, because it occurred under such

circumstances as to indicate clearly an intent to abandon the

invention to the public. The cause of the bar is quite different

in each case, but because of the presence of public use in each

case, the statutory bar of public use has become very much

confused with loss of the right to a patent throughout aban-

donment. In the case of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 243 for in-

stance, the court says, "An abandonment of an invention to

the public may be evinced by the conduct of the inventor at

any time, even within the two years named in the law. The

242 U. S. Rifle & Cartridge Co. v. Whitney Arms Co., 118 U. S. 22;

Planing Mach. Co. v. Keith, 101 U. S. 479, 484.

243 97 U. S. 126, 134.

tion. If a ublic use or a sale has been proved, it automatically follows that the _patent is invalid unless t e use or sale
is excused as experimental. Abandonment, on the other h<l:nd
de
he intent of the inventor.
c
·
as t.o intent must be drawn, therefore, rom fhe prove<}. facts,
before the law can be applied. This conclusion can not be
subject to rules of law, for the very simple reason that there
is too little possibility of similar facts in enough particular
cases for the harmony of conclusions therein to demonstrate
a rule. Abandonment is therefore a matter of judicial conclusion as to intent, although we are accustomed to speak of
these conclusions, psychological facts p_erhaps, as facts to be
proved. In this sense, the intent to abandon, or, simply, abandonment, "may be proved either by express declaration of an
intention to abandon, or by conduct inconsistent with any
other conclusion." 242
PUBLIC usE. The fact that an inventor let his device go
into public use or has
~
wif out makino- an effort to patent it is reasonably dear e.Y. •dence
that he did not intend to atent it and had abandoned the ri ht.
Because of this, it is possible .for public use to bar the right to
a patent in two distinct ways. It may act as a bar as a matte~
of l_aw, absolutely regardless of the inventor's intent to take
out a patent, because it took place more than two years be£ore his application. Or, it may bar his right, regardless of
the time at which it occurred, because it occurred under such
circumstances as to indicate clearly an intent to abandon the
invention to the public. The cause of the bar is quite different
in each case, but because of the presence of public use in each
case, the statutory bar of public use has become very much
confused with loss of the right to a patent throughout abandonment. In the case of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 243 for instance, the court says, "An abandonment of an invention to
the public may be evinced by the conduct of the inventor at
any time, even within the two years named in the law. The
242

U. S. Rifle & Cartridge Co. v. Whitney Arms Co.,
Pianing Mach. Co. v. Keith, IOI U. S. 479, 484.
243
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effect of the law is, that no such consequence will necessarily

follow from the invention being in public use or on sale, with

the inventor's consent and allowance, at any time within two

years before his application; but that if the invention is in

public use or on sale prior to that time, it will be conclusive

evidence of abandonment, and the patent will be void." The

latter part of this statement is absolutely unwarranted by the

statute or the cases. It is correct to the extent that under such

circumstances the patent will be void. But it will not be void

because the invention is conclusively deemed to have been

abandoned. The statute does not authorize this conclusion

and neither do the cases. The invention may possibly have

been abandoned, to be sure, but the patent is void, as a matter

of law, simply because the statute says it shall be void on ac-

count of the public use. 244 This failure to distinguish be-

tween avoidance because of public use more than two .years

prior to the application, and avoidance because of abandon-

ment as evidenced by public use, is found in very many of the

decisions upon the point and has led to a deal of confused
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thought and expression. It probably accounts, also, for the

part which the intent of the inventor plays in solving the ques-

tion whether an open use is "public use" within the meaning

of the statute, or merely "experimental" use. The intent of

the inventor subsequently to apply for a patent does, as dis-

cussed above, have an influence upon the court's conclusion as

to whether his use of the device is public or not. There is no

logical reason why this should be so to be found in the defi-

nition of "public." It is as open to knowledge and as no-

torious, as fully shared in by the public, whatever be the intent

of the inventor. But if the bar of public use be confused with

that of intent to abandon, there is an obvious reason why

244 The tendency to treat abandonment as a matter of law to be drawn

from certain circumstances is well illustrated in Kendall v. Winsor, 21

How. 322. The court says emphatically, as a matter of decision, that the

question of abandonment is one for the jury, yet, as a matter of dictum,

it says, an inventor may confer his invention upon the public, such inten-

tion being manifested expressly or by conduct, or he may forfeit his

rights "by a willful or negligent postponement of his claims, or by an at-

tempt to withold the benefit of his improvement from the public. . . ."

effect of the law is, that no such consequence will necessarily
follow from the invention being in public use or on sale, with
the inventor's con ent and allowance, at any time within two
years before his application; but that if the invention is in
public use or on sale prior to that time, it will be conclusive
evidence of abandonment, · and the patent will be void." The
latter part of this statement is absolutely unwarranted by the
statute or the cases. It is correct to the extent that under such
circumstances the patent will be void. But it will not be void
because the invention is conclusively deemed to have been
abandoned. The statute does not authorize this conclusion
and neither do the cases. The invention may possibly have
been abandoned to be sure, but the patent is void, as a matter
of law, simply because the statute says it shall be void on account of the public use. 244 This failure to distinguish between avoidance because of public use more than two .years
prior to the application, and avoidance because of abandonment as evidenced by public use, is found in very .many of the
decisions upon the point and has led to a deal of confused
thought and expression. It probably accounts, also, for the
part which the intent of the inventor plays in solving the que·stion whether an open use is "public use ' within the meaning
of the statute, or merely "experimental" use. The intent of
the inventor subsequently to apply for a patent does, as discussed above, have an influence upon the court's conclusion as
to whether his use of the device is puolic or not. There is no
logical reason why this should be so to be found in the de~
nition of "public." It is as open to knowledge and as notorious, as fully shared in by the public, whatever be the intent
of the inventor. But if the bar of public use be confused with
that of intent to abandon, there is an obvious reason why
244 The tendency to treat abandonment as a matter of law to be drawn
from certain circumstances is well illustrated in Kendall v. Win or, 21
How. 322. The court says emphatically, as a matter of decision, that the
question of abandonment is one for the jury, yet, as a matter of dictum,
it says, an inventor may confer his invention upon the public, such intention being manifested expressly or by conduct, or he may forfeit his
rights "by a willful or negligent postponement of his claims, or by an attempt to withold the benefit of his improvement from the public. . . ."
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public use without an intent to abandon should not be treated

as a bar. 245

FAILURE TO APPLY. The intent to abandon may be predi-

cated upon circumstances other than public use, as well as on

that. In one case 246 it was found that the inventor had evinced

an abandonment of his right to a patent because he had let

eight years pass by, after his original application was with-

drawn, without making any attempt to secure a patent. Dur-

ing this period other persons had taken out patents for simi-

lar devices. The court said, "An inventor, whose application

for a patent has been rejecteTLpanci jvho, wittiout substantial

reason jDr__X44se, omits for many years to take any step to

reinstate or renew it, must be held to have abandoned any

intention of further prosecuting his claim."

Delay in prosecuting an application not only may amount to

abandonment as a reasonable conclusion of fact, but is specific-

ally declared to be presumptive abandonment by the patent

statute. This provides, 247 "All Applications for_ patents shall

be completed and prepared for examination within one year
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after the filing of the application, and in default thereof, or

upon failure of the applicant to prosecute the same within one

year after any action therein, of whicE notice shall liave_ been

given to the applicant, they shall be regarded as abandoned by

the parties thereto, unless it be shown to the satisfaction of

the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoid-

able/' This phraseology leaves open the possibility of show-

ing that the delay was not in fact due to intent to abandon,

but it takes the burden of proof off from the party attacking

the patent, where it ordinarily rests, and puts it upon the pat-

entee himself. Commenting upon this, the court has said, 248

"All this shows the intention of Congress to require diligence

245 Under the earlier statutes, by which public use within two years of

the application would bar the right to a patent as well as public use more

than two years before it, there was a greater justification for injecting the

element of intent into the definition of public use than there is now. Shaw

v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 319; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. I.

246 U. S. Rifle & Cartridge Co. v. Whitney, 118 U. S. 22.

24 7 4894 R- S.

248 Planing Mach. Co. v. Keith, 101 U. S. 479, 485.

public use without an intent to abandon should not be treated
as a bar. 245
FAILURE TO APPLY.
The intent to abandon. may be predicated upon circumstances other than public use, as well as on
that. In one case 246 it was found that the inventor had evinced
an abandonment
his right
patent. he.cause
had let
eight years ass by, after his on inal application was withdrawn, without makin an itemµ
secui:e _a tent. • Durmg this period other persons had taken out P.a tents for similar devices. The court said, "An inventor, whose application
for a
tent has been rej C , an W O, Wl OU SU stantial
reason or
omits for man
ears to take an ste to
reinstate or renew it must be held to have abandoned any
. intention of further rosecutin his claim."
Delay in prosecuting an application not only may amount to
abandonment as a reasonable conclusion of fact, but is specifically declared to be presumptive abandonment by the patent
statute. This provides, 247 "All
lications for a tents shall
be completed and prepared for examination within one year
after the filing of the a Ii cation, and in default thereof, or
upon failure of the a Ii ani to rosecute the same within one
year after any action therein, of whic notice shall ave een
giv.en to the a licant they shall be regar ed as abandoned by
the parties
thereto, unless. it be shown to the satisfaction of
~
the Commissioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidahle." This phraseology leaves open the possibility of showing that the delay was not in fact due to intent to abandon,
but it takes the burden of proof off from the party attacking
the patent, where it ordinarily rests, and puts it upon the patentee himself. Commenting upon this, the court has said, 248
"All this shows the intention of Congress to require diligence
245

Under the earlier statutes, by which public use within two years of
the application. would bar the right to a patent as well as public use more ,
than two years before it, there was a · greater justification for injecting the
element of intent into the definition of public use than there is now. Shaw
v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 319; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. I.
24 6 U. · S. Rifle & Cartridge Co. v. Whitney, I 18 U. S. 22.
247
§ 4894 R. s.
248 Planing Mach. Co. v. Keith, 101 U. S. 479, 485.
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in prosecuting the claims to an exclusive right. An inventor
cannot 'Without cause hold his application pending during a
long period of years, leaving the public uncertain whether he
intends ever to prosecute it, and keeping the field of his invention closed against other inventors. It is not unfair to
him, after his application for a patent has been rejected, and
after he has for mariy years taken no steps to reinstate it, to
renew it, or to appeal, that it should be concluded he has
acquiesced in the rejection and abandoned any intention of
prosecuting his claim further. Such a conclusion is in accordance with common observation. · Especially is this so when,
during those years of his _inaction, he saw his invention go
into common use, and neither uttered a word of complaint or
remonstrance, nor was stimulated by it to a fresh attempt to
obtain a patent. When in reliance upon his supine inaction
during those years of his inaction the public has made use of
the result of his ingenuity _and has a·ccommodated its business
and its machinery to the improvement, it is no.t unjust to him
to hold that he shall be regarded as having assented to the appropriation, or, in other words, as hav :ng abandoned the invention. " 249
But the court followed up this statement by the recognition .
that "There may be, it is true, circumstances which will excuse
delay in prosecuting an application for .a patent, after it has
been rejected, such as extreme poverty of the applicant or protracted sickness. " 250
The application for a new patent to replace one already issued, and even a subsequent ab~ndonment ·of effort to secure
this reissue does not amount to an abandonment of the origi-

in prosecuting the claims to an exclusive right. An inventor

cannot without cqnse hold his application pending during a

long period of years, leaving the public uncertain whether he

intends ever to prosecute it, and keeping the field of his in-

vention closed against other inventors. It is not unfair to

him, after his application for a patent has been rejected, and

after he has for many years taken no steps to reinstate it, to

renew it, or to appeal, that it should be concluded he has

acquiesced in the rejection and abandoned any intention of

prosecuting his claim further. Such a conclusion is in ac-

cordance with common observation. Especially is this so when,

during those years of his inaction, he saw his invention go

into common use, and neither uttered a word of complaint or

remonstrance, nor was stimulated by it to a fresh attempt to

obtain a patent. When in reliance upon his supine inaction

during those years of his inaction the public has made use of

the result of his ingenuity and has accommodated its business

and its machinery to the improvement, it is not unjust to him

to hold that he shall be regarded as having assented to the ap-
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propriation, or, in other words, as having abandoned the in-

vention." 249

But the court followed up this statement by the recognition

that "There may be, it is true, circumstances which will excuse

delay in prosecuting an application for a patent, after it has

been rejected, such as extreme poverty of the applicant or pro-

tracted sickness." 250

The application for a new patent to replace one already is-

sued, and even a subsequent abandonment of effort to secure

this reissue does not amount to an abandonment of the origi-

249 Ace. Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432.

250 Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486, 501, "And the

proof respecting his health and pecuniary condition, together with his

constant efforts to obtain the necessary means to prosecute his right,

rebuts all presumption that he ever abandoned, actually or constructively,

either his invention or his application for a patent. That he never in-

tended an abandonment of his invention is perfectly clear ; and it was not

his fault that granting the patent was so long delayed." A dissenting

opinion argues that the long delay in this case did amount to abandonment.

Acc. Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432.
Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486, 501, "And the
proof respecting his health and pecuniary conditio!l, together with his
constant ·efforts to obtain the nece sary means to prosecute his right,
rebuts all presumption that he ever abandoned, actually or constructively,
either his invention or his application for a patent. That he never intended an abandonment of his invention is perfectly clear; and it was not
his fault that granting the ,Patent was so long delayed." A . dissenting
opinion argues that the long delay in this case did amount to abandonment.
249
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nal patent. That is still quite as valid and effective as when

it was duly issued. 251

A different type of acquiescence, on which abandonment was

predicated, arose in Hartshorn v. Saginaw Barrel Co. 252 Two

men, Campbell and Hartshorn, had invented the same device

at about the same time. Canipbell_suppgsed that he was the

later inventor and let Hartshorn take out a patent, himself

patenting only a part of his device. Many yea*-& later it de-

velopedjthat Campbell was in reality the first inventor, and

within a reasonable time thereafter he applied for a patent.

The lower court held this patent to be valid, under the circum-

stance^ me supreme Court said on tfr* mntrarv "Campbell

contented himself with the narrow claim originally contained

in his patent of 1867, an( l thereby acknowledged that he was

not entitled to the broader claim which he now asserts under

his reissue. He had the means and the opportunity at the time

the application for his original patent was pending to have

asserted his claim to priority of invention ; he choose not to

do so. He acquiesced in the^aiffl of hfo adyers^ry; he can
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not now claim what he then abandoned."

OMISSION FROM APPLICATION. This is really only a varia-

tion of the well settled doctrine that when an inventor has ap-

plied for a patent and specifically described therein the in-

vention for which he claims right of a monopoly, he is pre-

sumed to have claimed everything that he wants to protect. If

he has omitted from the application some part of the inven-

tion which he would be expected to have claimed at that time,

if at all, it is fair to assume that he did not intend to cover

that particular part by patent, but has abandoned it to the

public. In the words of the Court, 253 "The statute requires the

inventor to particularly point out and to claim distinctly the

improvement or combination which he claims as his discovery.

When, under this statute, the inventor has made his claims,

he has thereby disclaimed and dedicated to the public all other

combinations and improvements apparent from his specifica-

251 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606.

252 1 19 U. S. 664.

253 M'Bride v. Kingman, 97 Fed. 217, 223.
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OMISSION FROM APPLICATION. This is really only a variation of the well settled doctrine that when an inventor has applied for a patent and specifically described therein the invention for which he claims right of a monopoly, he is presumed to have claimed everything that he wants to protect. If
he has omitted from the application some part of the invention which he would be expected to have claimed at that time,
if at all, it is fair to assume that he did not intend to cover
that par.t icular part by patent, but has abandoned it to the .
· public. In the words of the court, 253 "
ta.tute equires the
inventor to particularly point out and to claim distinctly the
improvement or combination which h claims as his discovery.
When, under this statute, the inventor has made his claims,
he has thereby disclaimed and dedicated to the public all other
combinations and improvements apparent from his specifica251
252
253

ll

McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606.
119 u. s. 664.
.
M'Bride v. Kingman, 97 Fed. 217, 223.
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tion and claims that are not mere evasions of the device, combination or improvem~nt which he claims as his own. While
the patent is notice of the clai!11s which it contains and allows,
it constitutes an estoppel of the patentee from claiming under
that or any subsequent patent any combination or improvement
there shown which he has not clearly pointed out an_d distinctly
claimed as his discovery or invention when he received his
patent. It is a complete and a legal notice to every one-notice
on which every one has a right to rely-that he may freely use
such improvements artd combinations withol;1t claim or molestation from the patentee." "The b..' ect o ..the paten,. ., aw in
requiring the patentee to particularly point o~t and distinctly
claim f e part improvement or combination which he claims
as h1s -invention or disc ery, i ''·. not only .to secure to him all
to which he is entitled, but to apprise the pub ic of what i s 111
open to them." 254
The fair im lication from •the e uotations would be that
failure to claim all to which the a_p licant i
tit ed amounts
ipso facto) as a matter of law to an abandonment of the unclaimed part. But in both of the cases quoted from the issue
was not at all whether or not any part of the invention had
been in fact abandoned. · It was merely one of interpretation
of the patent as it stood. The decision was, that because the
claim did not actually cover the matter alleged, it could not
be made to cover such matter by judicial con truction. This
pr·o position that a patent could not be constructively extended
so as to cover what h~d not in fact been claimed is logical a
a rule of law. The other proposition, that failure to claim
amounts to abandonment, is not logical as a rule of law although it is ju tified as a rule of presumption. If the matter
which the inventor failed to claim ~ere omething which did
not necessarily need to have been included in the ame patent
as the matter which he did claim , it would be a po ibility, at
lea t, that he intended to claim it throuo-h another and eparate
application. Even if uch an intent were unu ual it would not
be unreasonable. To hold a a matter of law that failure to

tion and claims that are not mere evasions of the device, com-

bination, or improvement which he claims as his own. While

the patent is notice of the claims which it contains and allows,

it constitutes an estoppel of the patentee from claiming under

that or any subsequent patent any combination or improvement

there shown which he has not clearly pointed out and distinctly

claimed as his discovery or invention when he received his

patent. It is a complete and a legal notice to every one notice

on which every one has a right to rely that he may freely use

such improvements and combinations without claim or moles-

tation from the patentee." "The object of the patenrN^aw in

requiring the patentee to particularly point out and distinctly

claTm the part, improvement or combination which he claims

as his invention or discovery, is 'not only- .to" secure to him all

to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still

open to them." 254

The fair implication from these quotations would be that

failure to claim all to which the applicant is entitled amounts

ipso facto, as a matter of law, to an abandonment of the un-
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v claimed part. But in both of the cases quoted from the issue

was not at all whether or not any part of the invention had

been in fact abandoned. It was merely one of interpretation

of the patent as it stood. The decision was, that because the

claim did not actually cover the matter alleged, it could not

be made to cover such matter by judicial construction. This

proposition that a patent could not be constructively extended

so as to cover what had not in fact been claimed is logical as

a rule of law. The other proposition, that failure to claim

amounts to abandonment, is not logical as a rule of law, al-

though it is justified as a rule of presumption. If the matter

which the inventor failed to claim were something which did

not necessarily need to have been included in the same patent

as the matter which he did claim, it would be a possibility, at

least, that he intended to claim it through another and separate

application. Even if such an intent were unusual it would not

be unreasonable. To hold as a matter of law that failure to

254 McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 223.

254

McClain v. Ortmeyer, 141 U. S. 419, 223.
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claim in the first application constituted an abandonment, would

claim in the first application constituted an abandonment, would
be unreasonable and illogical. There could be, fairly, only a
presumption of such intent. If the mat~er omitted were something which could have been patented only in conjunction with
that claimed, the presumption is stronger. It could n.o t have
been omitted with the intent of patenting it separately, at a
later time. The neglect to claim it, whether through actual
intent not to, or mere indifference or carekssness, indicates
with reasonable conclusiveness an intent to abandon. But it
does not absolutely demonstrate such an intent. The omission
might very possibly have happened through mistake, or lack
of knowledge, or any form of inadvertence. If abandonment
depends upon intent as the cou t have ao-ree 1 c oes, it can
not lo ic y_ e redicated u on omission to claim arising out
of such a cause as mere inadvertence.
The actual decisions accord with what has just been said,
and abandonment is not conclusively presumed from mere
om1ss10n.
e JU 1c1al view of it is forcefully expressed in
Miller v. Brass Co. 2 55 This suit was based on the re-issue of
a patent which contained a claim not included within the original patent. The court held the new claim to be invalid because it had not been even described in the original patent and
could not- have been claimed therein. They recognized, however, that reissues are frequently made for the purpose of
enlarging the c_laims of original issues under proper circumstances, and that the original claim is not absolutely conclusive
upon the inventor as to t~e extent of his rights. In respect to
the circumstan~es ·under which the expansion is allowable, it
said, "If a patentee who has no corrections to suggest in his
specification except to make his claim broader and more comprehensive, uses due diligence in returning to the Patent Office,
and says 'I omitted this,' or 'my solicitor did not understand
that,' his application may be entertained, and, on a proper
showing, correction may be made. But it must be remembered
that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or ·combinations apparent on the

be unreasonable and illogical. There could be, fairly, only a

presumption of such intent. If the matter omitted were some-

thing which could have been patented only in conjunction with

that claimed, the presumption is stronger. It could not have

been omitted with the intent of patenting it separately, at a

later time. The neglect to claim it, whether through actual

intent not to, or mere indifference or carelessness, indicates

with reasonable conclusiveness an intent to abandon. But it

does not absolutely demonstrate such an intent. The omission

might very possibly have happened through mistake, or lack

of knowledge, or any form of inadvertence. If abandonment

depends upon intent, as the cjnirls_have agree^lTTtoes.jt can

not Iogicail5n5epredicated upon omission to claim arising out

of such a cause as mere inadvertence.

The actual decisions accord with what has just been said,

and abandonment is not conclusively presumed from""niere

omission^ The judicial view of it is forcefully expressed in

Miller v. Brass Co. 255 This suit was based on the re-issue of
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a patent which contained a claim not included within the origi-

nal patent. The court held the new claim to be invalid be-

cause it had not been even described in the original patent and

could not have been claimed therein. They recognized, how-

ever, that reissues are frequently made for the purpose of

enlarging the claims of original issues under proper circum-

stances, and that the original claim is not absolutely conclusive

upon the inventor as to the extent of his rights. In respect to

the circumstances under which the expansion is allowable, it

said, "If a patentee who has no corrections to suggest in his

specification except to make his claim broader and more com-

prehensive, uses due diligence in returning to the Patent Office,

and says 'I omitted this,' or 'my solicitor did not understand

that/ his application may be entertained, and, on a proper

showing, correction may be made. But it must be remembered

that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omis-

sion to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the

255 104 U. S. 350.
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face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of

that which is not claimed. It is a declaration that that which is

not claimed is either not the patentee's invention, or, if his, he

dedicates it to the public. This legal effect of the patent can-

not be revoked unless the patentee surrenders it and proves

that the specification was framed by real inadvertence, acci-

dent, or mistake, without any fraudulent or deceptive inten-

tion on his part ; and this should be done with all due diligence

and speed. Any unnecessary laches or delay in a matter thus

apparent on the record affects the right to alter or reissue the

patent for such cause. If two years' public enjoyment of an

invention with the consent and allowance of the inventor is

evidence of abandonment and a bar to an application for a

patent, a public disclaimer in the patent itself should be con-

strued equally favorable to the public. Nothing but a clear

mistake, or inadvertence, and a speedy application for its cor-

rection, is admissible when it is sought merely to enlarge the

claim. " In short, the rule as laid down by this court is simply

that omission to claim amounts to abandonment, as a matter
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of law, jmless the patentee demonstrates, within a reasonable

time, that it w.a5_noi-an abandonment. All of which is but a

cumbersome way of saying that abandonment will only be

presumed from omission.

The precise question came before the court in Miller v. Eagle

Mfg. Co. 256 The patentee had taken out two patents, the de-

scriptions and drawings of which were identical. The claims,

however, differed, in that the later issued one claimed matter

not included in the claim of the first. There was a valid reason

for the making of this division, and the court distinctly held

that "Where the second patent covers matter described in the

prior patent, essentially distinct and separable from the in-

vention covered thereby and claims made thereunder, its valid-

ity may be sustained." 257

256 I 5I U. S. 186.

257 It is also, however, said quite as distinctly that a single invention may

not be split and part of its features patented at one time and part at

another. It might be commented that a single invention capable of being

split into parts which 'are themselves patentable as inventions is an un-

illustrated paradox.

face of the i~ atent, are, in law a dedication to the public of
that which is not claimed. It is a declaration that that which is
not claimed is either not the patentee s invention, or, if his, he
dedicates it to the public. This legal effect of the paten't cannot be revoked unless the patentee surrender it and proves
that the spe~ification was framed by- real inadvertence, accident, or mistake, withouf any fraudulent or deceptive intention on his part; and this should be done with all due diligence
and speed. Any unnecessary }aches or delay in a matter thus
apparent on the record affects the right to alter or reissue the
patent for such cause. If two years' public enjoyment of an
invention with the consent and allowance of the inventor is
evidence of abandonment and a bar to an application for a
patent, a public disclaimer in the patent itself should be construed equally favorable to the public. Nothing but a clear
t cormistake, or inad ertence, and a s eedy applicatio
rection · admissible when it is sought merely to enlarge the
~·" In s ort tfie ru~e as laid down b this court is simply
that omission to claim amounts to abandonment, q.s a . ma er
of law, tnless the patentee demonstrates, withi a reasonable
. . . . . . .._.._..-...--_,.__...... Yol~~~-a.ban<l-Qllfilent. All of which is but a
cumbersome way of saying that abandonment will only be
presumed from omission.
The precise question came before the court in Miller v. Eagle
Mfg. Co. 2 56 The patentee had taken out two patents, tP,e descriptions and drawings of which were identical. The claims,
however, differed, in that the later issued one claimed matter
not included in the claim of the first. There was a valid reason
for the making of this division, and the court · distinctly held
that "Where the econd patent covers matter described in the
prior patent es entially distinct and eparable from the invention covered thereby and claims made thereunder, its validity may be ustain~d."

--

257

151 U. S. 186.
It is also, however, sai~ quite as distinctly that a single invention may
not be split and part of its features patented at one time and part at
another. It might be commented that a ing~e invention capable of being
split into parts which ·are themselve patentable a invention is an unillustrated paradox.
2 56
257
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Correction of omissions. It might be supposed that whether

an inventor intended to abandon or not, he must lose any part

of his invention which he failed to claim when he should have

done so, because the statute does not provide for a correction

under such circumstances. It provides for the issue of a patent

for an invention, but not for the issue of a second patent in

case the first one has not been broad enough. Logically there

seems to be no answer to such a position. The invention

should be treated as lost, not by abandonment, but by failing

to apply for a patent.

Practically, however, the courts have protected the inventor

from such loss as a result of his mistake,, by their interpreta-

tion of 4916 R. S. This provides that, "Whenever any

patent is inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective or

insufficient specification, or by reason of the patentee claiming

as his own invention or discovery more than he had a right to

claim as new, if the error has arisen by inadvertence, accident,

or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention,
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the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such patent and

the payment of the duty required by law, cause a new patent

for the^same invention, ^and. in accordance wtflTthe~corrected

specification, to be issued to the patentee, or, in case of his

death or of an assignment of the whole or any undivided part

of the original patent, then to his executors, administrators, or

assigns, for the unexpired part of the term of the original

patent. Such surrender shall take effect upon the issue of the

amended patent. The Commissioner may, in his discretion,

cause several patents to be issued for distinct and separate

parts of the thing patented, upon demand of the applicant, and

upon payment of the required fee for a reissue for each of

such reissued letters patent. The specifications and claim in

every such case shall be subject to revision and restriction in

the same manner as original applications are. Every patent

so reissued, together with the corrected specifications, shall

have the same effect and operation in law, on the trial of all

actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the same had been

originally filed in such corrected form; but no new matter

Correction of omissions. It might be supposed that whether
an inventor intended to abandon or not, he must lose any part
of his invention which he failed to claim when he should have
done so, because the statute does not provide for a correction
under such circumstances. It provides for the issue of a patent
for an invention, but not for the issue of a second patent in
case the first one has not been broad enough. Logically there
seems to be no answer to such a position. The invention
should be treated as lost, not by abandonment, but by failing
to apply for a patent.
Practically, however,- the courts have protected the inventor
from such loss as a result of his mistake, . by their interpretation of § 49 I 6 R. S. This provides that, "Wil@l~e.t:
patent is ino rative or invalid, by reas
of a d
· r
insufficient specification, or by reason of the patentee claiming
as 1s own invention or discove more than he ad a ri ht to
claim as new, if the error has arisen by inadvertence accident,
or mistake, and without any fraudulent or dece tive intention,
the Commissioner shall, on the surrender of such atent and
the payment of the duty re uired by law, cause a new pate~t
for t e same invention and in accordance 1 1 the correcte_d
specification, to be issued to the patentee, or, in case of his
death or of an assignment of the whole or any ~ndivided part
of the original patent, then to his executors, administrators, or
assigns, for the unexpired part of the term of the original
patent. Such surrender shall take effect upon the issue of the
amended patent. The Commissioner may, in his discretion,
cause several patents to be issued for distinct and separate
parts of the thing patented, upon demand of the applicant, and
upon payment of the required fee for a reissue for each of
such reissued letters patent. The specifications and claim in
every such case shall be subject to revision and restriction in
the same manner as original applications are. Every patent
so reissued, together with the corrected specifications, shall
have the same effect and operation in law, on the trial of all
actions for causes thereafter .arising} as if the same had been
originally filed in such corrected form·; but no new matter
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shall be introduced into the specification, nor in case of a ma-

chine patent shall the model or drawings be amended, except

each by the other; but when there is neither model nor draw-

ing, .amendments may be made upon proof satisfactory to the

Commissioner that such new matter or amendment was a

part of the original invention, and was omitted from the speci-

fication by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, as aforesaid/' 258

DEDICATION OF AN INVENTION TO THE PUBLIC is not differ-

ent from abandonment, in the ordinary speech of the courts.

The words are often used indiscriminately. If judges were

to make a distinction it would probably be in : accord with the

distinction of non-technical usage; abandonment carrying the

idea of negative intent, of acts of omission ; dedication im-

plying positive acts and intent definitely to confer the right

upon the public.

The foregoing discussion has dealt with abandonment or

dedication to the public. There is a form of what might be

called abandonment or dedication to particular individuals
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which, while it does not affect the inventor's right in respect

to the public generally, does affect it in respect to these indi-

viduals. This is found in the statute itself 259 which provides

"Every, person who purchases of the inventor or discoverer,

or with his knowledge and consent, constructs any newly .in-

vented or discovered machine, or other patentable article, prior

to the application by the inventor or discoverer for a patent,

or who sells or uses one so constructed, shall have the right to

use, and vend to others to be_jised, the spe^ific^thing so made

or purchased, without liability therefor."

258 James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356 ; Electric Gas Lighting Co. v. Boston

Elec. Co., 139 U. S. 481 ; Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H.

Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 396; Ide v. Trorlicht, etc. Carpet Co., 115 Fed. 137. The

Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 3 Wall. 315, syll. I, "Where a party having made

application for a patent for certain improvements, afterwards, with his

claim still on file, makes application for another but distinct improvement

in the same branch of art, in which second application he describes the

former improvement, but does not in such second application claim it as

original, the description in such second application and non-claim of it

there, is not a dedication of the first invention to the public/'

259 R. S. 4899-

shall be introduced into the specification, nor in_ case of a machine patent shall the model or drawings be amended, except
each by the other; but when there is neither model nor drawing, _amendments may be made upon proof satisfactory to the
Commissioner that such new matter or amendment was a
part of the ori"ginal invention, and was omitted from the specification by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, as aforesaid." 258
DEDICATION OF AN INVENTION TO THE PUBLIC is not different from abandonment, in the ordinary speech of the courts.
The words are often used indiscriminately. If judges were
to make a distinction it would probably be i~ . accord with the
distinction of non-technical usage; abandonment carrying the
idea .of . negative intent, of acts of omission; dedication implying positive acts and intent definitely to confer the right
upon the publi~. .
The foregoing discussion has dealt with abandonment or
dedication to the public. There is a ·form of what might be
called abandonment or dedication to particular individuals
which, while it does not affect the inventor's right in respect
to. the public generally, does aff~ct it in respect to these individuals. This is found in the statute itself2 59 which provides
"Ever_JL...Person who purchases of the inventor or discoverer,
or with his knowledge and consent constructs any newl invented or discovered machine, or other atentable article, prior
to the application by the inventor or discoverer for a patent,
or w o sells or uses one SD constructed, shall have the t:ight to
d, the specific thing so made
use and vend to others to b
,2.1" purchased, without liability therefor."
258

James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Electric Gas Lighting Co. v. Boston
Elec. Co., 139 U. S. 481; Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H.
Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 396; Ide v. Trorlicht, etc. Carpet Co., rr5 Fed. 137· The
Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 3 Wall. 315, yll. r, "Where a party having made
application for a patent for certain improvements, after~ard , with his
claim still on file, makes application for another but di tinct improvement
in the same branch of art, in which second application he describes the
former improvement, but does not in such st::cond application claim it as
original, the description in such second application and non-claim of it
there, is not a dedication of- the fir t invention .to th~ public.''
250 R. s. § 4899.
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CHAPTER VI

SECURING A PATENT

i. FORM OF APPLICATION

The statute provides that 260 "Before any inventor or discov-

erer shalLreceive a patent for his invention or discovery, he

shall make application therefor, in writing, to the Commis-

CHAPTER VI

sioner of Patents, and shall file in the Patent Office a written

description of the same, and of the manner and process of

making, constructing, compounding and using it, in such full,

SECURING A

clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled

p A'iENT

in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is

§

most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use

I. FORM OF APPLICATION

the same; and in case of a machine, he shall explain the prin-

ciple thereof, and the best mode in which he has contemplated

applying that principle, so as to distinguish it from other in-

ventions; and he shall particularly point out and distinctly

claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims

as his invention or discovery. ThesggicatiQn_and claim shall

be signed by the inventor and attested by two witnesses.
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"When the nature of the case admits of drawings, the ap^

plicant shall furnish one copy signed by the inventor or his

attorney in fact, and attested by two witnesses, which shall be

filed in the Patent Office ; and a copy of the drawing, to be

furnished by the Patent Office, shall be attached to the patent

-as a part of the specification.

"When the invention or discovery is of a composition of

matter, the .applicant, if required by the Commissioner, shall

furnish specimens of ingredients and of the composition, suffi-

cient in quantity for the purpose of experiment.

"In all cases which admit of representation by model, the

applicant, if required by the Commissioner, shall furnish a

260 R. S. ^ 4888-4893.

The statute provides that2 60 "Before any inventor ~r discoverer shall r ceive a patent for is invention. or discovery, he
sh
make application .t ere or, · wntm , to e omm·ssioner of Patents, and shall file in the Patent Office a written
descripti~n of the sameJ and of the manner and Q_rdcess of
making, constructing, compounding and using it, in such full,
o.n... skilled
cle r concise, and exact terms as to enable any
in the art orscience to which it appertai~s, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use
the same; and in case of a machine, he shall explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which he has contemplated
applying that principle, so as to distinguish it from other in-:
ventions; and he shall particularly point out and distinctly
claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims
as his invention or discovery. The~· _n and-claim shall
b signed b ~e inventor and attested by two witnesses.
"When the nature of the case admits of drawings, the a~
plicant shall furnish one copy signed by the inventor or his
attorney in fact, and attested by two ~frnesses, which shall be
filed in the Patent Office; and a copy of the drawing, to be
fµrnished by the Patent Office, shall be attached to the patent
.as a .part of the specification.
"When the invention or discovery is of a composition of
matter, the .applicant, if required by the Commissioner, shall
furnish specimens of ingredients and of the composition, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment.
"In all cases which admit of representation by model, the
applicant, if required by the Commissioner, shall furnish a
260
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model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously the several
parts of his invention or discovery.
·
"The applicapt shall make oath that he does verily believe
himself to be the origjnal _an_d
· entor or 1sc
of
the art, machine, manufacture, composition or improvement
for which he solicits a patent; that he does not know and does
not believe that the same
er be ore nown or used; and
shall state of what country he is a citizen. Such oath may be
made efore any person within the United States authorized
by law to administer oaths, or, when the applicant resides in a
foreign country, before any minister, charge d' affaires, con~ul, or commercial agent holding commission under the Government of the United States, or before any ·n otary public,
judge, or magistrate having an official seal and authorized to
administer oaths in the foreign country in which the applicant
may be, whose authority shall be proved by certificate of a
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States.
"On the filing of any such application and the payment of
the fees required by law, the Commissioner of Patents shall
cause an examination to be made of the alleged new invention
or discovery; and if on such examination it shall appear that
the claimant is justly entitled to a patent under the law, and
that the same is sufficiently useful and important, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefor."
In amplification of these provisions of the statute, the Patent Office has made more definite and specific rules in regard
to application for a patent and other proceedings to obtain
it. 261 "The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval
of the Secretary e-f the Interior may
im t · e establLsh regulations, not inconsistent with law for the conduct of
proceedmgs in the Patent Office." Copies of these rule will
be furnished free of charge npon application to the C'.)mmissioner of Patent . As they are definite, and appertain only to

model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously the several

parts of his invention or discovery.

"The applicant shall make oath that he does verily believe

himself to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of

the art, machine, manufacture, composition, or improvement

for which he solicits a patent ; that he does not know and does

not believe that the same, was ever before known or used; and

shall state of what country he is a citizen. Such oath may be

made before any person within the United States authorized

by law to administer oaths, or, when the applicant resides in a

foreign country, before any minister, charge d' affaires, con-

sul, or commercial agent holding commission under the Gov-

ernment of the United States, or before any notary public,

judge, or magistrate having an official seal and authorized to

administer oaths in the foreign country in which the applicant

may be, whose authority shall be proved by certificate of a

diplomatic or consular officer of the United States.

"On the filing of any such application and the payment of
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the fees required by law, the Commissioner of Patents shall

cause an examination to be made of the alleged new invention

or discovery; and if on such examination it shall appear that

the claimant is justly entitled to a patent under the law, and

that the same is sufficiently useful and important, the Commis-

sioner shall issue a patent therefor."

In amplification of these provisions of the statute, the Pat-

ent Office has made more definite and specific rules in regard

to application for a patent and other proceedings to obtain

it. 261 "The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval

of the Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time estab-

lish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of

proceedings in the Patent Office." Copies of these rules will

be furnished free of charge upon application to the Commis-

sioner of Patents. As they are definite, and appertain only to

261 This is authorized by R. S. S 483, "The Commissioner of Patents,

subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may from time

to time establish regulations, not inconsistent with Law, for the conduct

of proceedings in the Patent Office."

This is authorized by R. S. <483, "The Commissioner of Patents,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may from time
to time establi h regulation not inconsistent with Law, for the conduct
of proceedings in the Pa~ent Office."
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the undisputed and clear details of procedure, they need not

be set out here nor discussed at length.

TITLE. The application must be by petition under oath,

signed by the inventor, if he is alive and sane. It must be in

the English language, as must be also the specifications and

oath. The rules provide that the petition must "designate by

title the invention sought to be patented." The form of this

designation is, however, relatively unimportant, and it need

not be exact nor complete provided the petition properly adopts,

by reference, a specification of the invention by which it is

sufficiently set forth. This matter came before the court in the

case of Hogg v. Emerson. 262 The invention for which the

patent issued was entitled, "a new and useful improvement in

the steam engine." The suit itself was brought for violation

of a patent for an "improvement in the steam engine and in

the mode of propelling therewith 'either vessels on the water

or carriages on the land." It was contended that the offer in

evidence of the patent, as entitled, did not prove the existence
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of a patent such as set out in the suit. The court held that the

identity of the patent need not be determined by the title alone,

but that the specification annexed to the petition was a part of

it and should be read in connection with it. The holding of

the court and its reasons can not be set out more clearly than

in its own language which is as follows : "Coupling the two

last together, they constitute the very thing described in the

writ. But whether they can properly be so united here, and

the effect of it to remove the difficulty, have been questioned,

and must therefore be further examined. We are apt to be

misled, in this country, by the laws and forms bearing on this

point in England being so different in some respects from what

exist here. There the patent is first issued, and contains no

reference to the specification, except a stipulation that one

shall, in the required time, be filed, giving a more minute de-

scription of the matter patented. It need not be filed under

two to four months, in the discretion of the proper officer.

(Gods. Pat., 176.) Under these circumstances, it will be seen

202 6 How. 437.

the undisputed and clear details of procedure, they need not
be set out here nor discussed at length.
TITLE. The application must be by petition under oath,
signed by the inventor, if he is alive and sane. It must be in
the Eng · language, as must be also the specifications and
oath. The rules provide that the pe · · n must "designate by
title the invention sought to be patented." The form of this
designation is, however, relatively unimportant, and it need
not be exad nor complete provided the petition properly adopts,
by reference, a specification of the invention by which it is
sufficiently set forth. This matter came before the court in the
case of Hogg v. Emerson. 262 The invention for which the
patent issued was entitled, "a new and useful improvement in
the steam engine." · The suit itself was brought for violation
_o f a patent for an "improvement in the steam engine and in
the mode of propelling therewith ·either vessels on the water
or carriages on the land." It was contended that the offer in
evide~ce of the patent, as entitled, did not prove the existence
of. a patent such as set out in the suit. The court held that the
identity of the patent need not be determined by the title alone,
but that the specification annexed to the petition was a part of
it and should be read in connection with it. The holding of
the court and its reasons can not be set out more clearly than
in its own language which is as follows : "Coupling the two
last together, they constitute the very thing described in the
writ. But whether they can properly be so united here, and
the effect of it to remove the difficulty, have been questioned,
and must there£ ore be f urt}:ier examined. We are apt to be
misled, in this country, by the laws and forms bearing on this
voint in England being so different in some respects from what
exist here. There the patent is first issued, and contains no
reference to the specification, except a stipulation that one
shall-, in the required time, be filed, giving a more minute description of the matter patented. It need not be filed under
two to four months, in the discretion of the proper officer.
(Gods. Pat., I 76.) Under these circumstances, it will be seen
262

6 How. 437.
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that the patent, going out alone there, must in its title or head-

that the patent, going out alone there, must in its title or heading be fuller than her~, where it goes out with the minute specification. But even there it may afterwards be aided, and its
matter be made more clear,
ha1 the s ecification con ins.
They are, says Gods. Pat., ro8, 'connected together,' and 'one
may be looked at to understand the other.' See also 2 H. BL
478; I Webst. Pat. Cas., q7; 8 T. R., 95. There, ho':Vever, it
will not answer to allow the specification, filed separately and
long after, to be resorted to for supplying any entire omission
in the patent; else something may -be thus inserted afterwards
which had never been previously examined by the proper officers, and which, if it had been submitted to them in the patent
and examined, might have prevented the allowance of it, and
which the world is not aware of, seeing only the letters-pCitent
without the specification, and without any reference whatever
to its contents. 3 Brod. & B., 5. The whole facts and law,
however, are different here. This patent issueq March 8th,
1834, and is therefore to be tested by the act of Congress· then
in force, which passed February 21st, I 793. (I ~tat. at L.
318.) In the third section of that act it is expressly provided,
'that every inventor,' before he can receive a patent,' 'shall deliver a written description of his invent.ion,' &c. ; thus giving
priority very properly to the specification rather than the
patent. This change from the English practice existed in the
first patent law, passed April 10th, 1790 (1 Stat. at L., 109),
and is reta~ned in the last act of Congress on this subject,
passed July 4th, 1836 (5 Stat. at L:, u9). It was wisely introduced, in order that the officers of the government might
at the outset have before them full means to examine and understand the claim to an invention better, and decide more judiciously whether to grant a patent or not, and might be able
to give to the world fuller, more accurate, and early descriptions of it than would be possible under the laws and practice
in England. In this country, then, the specification being required to be prepared and filed before the patent issues, it can
well be referred to therein in extenso, as co"ntaining the whole
subj_ect-matter of the claim or petition for a patent, and then

ing be fuller than here, where it goes out with the minute speci-

fication. But even there it may afterwards be aided, and its

matter be made more clear, by what the specification contains.

They are, says Gods. Pat., 108, 'connected together,' and 'one

may be looked at to understand the other.' See also 2 H. Bl.

478; i Webst. Pat. Cas., 117; 8 T. R., 95. There, however, it

will not answer to allow the specification, filed separately and

long after, to be resorted to for supplying any entire omission

in the patent ; else something may be thus inserted afterwards

which had never been previously examined by the proper offi-

cers, and which, if it had been submitted to them in the patent

and examined, might have prevented the allowance of it, and

which the world is not aware of, seeing only the letters-patent

without the specification, and without any reference whatever

to its contents. 3 Brod. & B., 5. The whole facts and law,

however, are different here. This patent issued March 8th,

1834, and is therefore to be tested by the act of Congress then
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in force, which passed February 2ist, 1793. (i Stat. at L.

318.) In the third section of that act it is expressly provided,

'that every inventor, before he can receive a patent,' 'shall de-

liver a written description of his invention,' &c. ; thus giving

priority very properly to the specification rather than the

patent. This change from the English practice existed in the

first patent law, passed April loth, 1790 (i Stat. at L., 109),

and is retained in the last act of Congress on this subject,

passed July 4th, 1836 (5 Stat. at L., 119). It was wisely in-

troduced, in order that the officers of the government might

at the outset have before them full means to examine and un-

derstand the claim to an invention better, and decide more ju-

diciously whether to grant a patent or not, and might be able

to give to the world fuller, more accurate, and early descrip-

tions of it than would be possible under the laws and practice

in England. In this country, then, the specification being re-

quired to be prepared and filed before the patent issues, it can

well be referred to therein in extenso, as containing the whole

subject-matter of the claim or petition for a patent, and then.
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not only be recorded for information, as the laws both in Eng-

land and here require, but beyond what is practicable there, be

united and go out with the letters-patent themselves, so as to

be sure that these last thus contain the substance of what is

designed to be regarded as a portion of the petition, and thus

exhibit with accuracy all the claim by the inventor. In this

view, and under such laws and practice here, it will be seen

that the contents of the petition, as well as the petition itself,

became a very unimportant form, except as construed to adopt

the specification, and the contents of the latter to be consid-

ered substantially as the contents of the former."

FILING OF PARTS. As suggested in the foregoing quotation,

an application consists o "the first fee of $15, a petition, speci-

fication, and oath ; and drawings, model or specimen when re-

quired." "It is desirable," says the rules, 263 "that all parts of

the complete application be deposited in the office at the same

time, and that all the papers embraced in the application be

attached together; otherwise a letter must accompany each
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part, accurately and clearly connecting it with the other parts

of jhe_ap j plication." It J3_Jiil^^solutelv necessary that all

pa4ls_j3e_jfiled_togther and, if identified with the other parts

as provided, the petition may precede the specification and

both may precede the model, etc. Inasmuch as the specifica-

tion and drawings constitute the real description of the inven-

tion, which need not be set out at length in the petition, it is

obvious that no examination can be made and no patent issue

till the specification, etc., are filed, so as to complete the peti-

tion. Hence the rules very reasonably provide that an applica-

tion for a patent will not be placed upon the files for examina-

tion_until__all_ Jjsj2gTts z _ Jjave_begrji_ recorded . The application

must be completed and prepared for exhibition within one

year 264 after the filing of the petition. In default of such

completion, or if the applicant shall have failed to prosecute

the application within one year after any action upon it, of

which notice shall have been mailed him or his agent, the ap-

263 Rule 32.

264 Two years until amendment of 1897.

not only be recorded for information, as the laws both in Eng- '
land and here require, but beyond what is practicable there, be
united and go out with the letters-patent themselves, so as to
be sure that these last thus contain the substance of what is
designed to be regarded as a portion of the petition, and thus
exhibit with accuracy all the claim by the inventor. In this
view, and under such laws and practice here, it will be seen
that the contents of the petition, as well as the petition itself,
became a very unimportant form, except as construed to adopt
the specification, and the contents of the latter to be considered substantially as the contents of the former."
FILING OF PARTS. As suggested in the foreo-oing quotation,
an application consists o "the first fee of $I 5, a petition, specification and oath· and drawings, model or specimen when required." ''It is desirable,' says the rules, 263 "that all parts of
the complete application be deposited in the office at the same
time, and that all" the papers embraced in the application be
attached together· other ise a letter must accompany each
par accurately and lea ., connectin it witn t e ot erparts
· of th
J lication."
It ·
absolute! necessar that all
p~er and, jf identified with the other parts
as provided, the petition may · p·recede the specification and
both may precede the model, etc. Inasmuch as tlie specification and drawinas constitute the real description of the invention, which need not be set out at length in the petition, it is
obvious that no examination can be made and no patent issue
till the specification, etc., are filed, so as to complete the petition. Hence the rules very reasonably provide that an application for a patent ill not be placed upon the files for examination until all its arts have been re ded. The application
must be completed and prepared for exhibition within one
. year 264 after the filing of the petition. In default of such
completion, or if the applicant shall have failed to · prosecute
the application within one year after any action upon it, of
which noti~e shall have been mailed him or his agent, the ap263
26 4

Rule 32.
Two years unt!l amendment of 18g7.

Ori in al fr m

U IVE S ( 0 CA.U 0

r!iJ

A

Patents and Inventions

170 Patents and Inventions

plication shall be regarded as abandoned, unless it be shown to

plication shall be regarded as abandoned, unless it be shown to
the Commissioher that such lelc1y was unavoidable. 2 65

the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable. 265

2. DESCRIPTION

Since the specj^cation is the..rea^description of the invention

it is nf p^cefHing importance. According to the rules, in "this

2. DESCRIPTION

instance a paraphrase of the statute, "The specification -is a

written description of the invention or discovery and of the

Since the spe ification is the real description of the invention
it i
cee · importance. According to t e rules, in this
instance a paraphrase of the statute·, "The specification ·is a
written description of the invention or discovery and of the
manner and process of making, constructing, compounding,
and using the same, and is req ·
·n such full clear,
concise, and exact terms
)erso killed in the
art ,or science to which the invention or di c.overy appertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected to make, construct,
compound, and use the same. The specification must set forth
the precise invention for which a patent is solicited, and explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which the
applicant has contemplated applying that ·principle, in such
manner as to distinguish it from other inventions. In case of
a mere improvement the specification must particularly point
out the parts to which the improvement relates, and must by
explicit language distinguish between what is old and what is
claimed as new; and the description and the drawings, as well
as the claims, should be confined to the specific improvement
and such parts as necessarily co-operate with it. The specification must conclude with a specific and distinct claim or claims
of the part, improvement, or combination which the applicant
regards as his invention or discovery. When there are drawings the description shall refer to the different views by
ures
and to the differen
y letters or numerals (preferably
the latter)."
Great care is necessary to set out exactly the device-the
idea of means-for which the inventor de ires a monopoly.
He must describe and claim all that he has invented and
wi hes to protect and he should not claim anything outside
the bound of his own patentable invention.
The purpo e of thi description i.. nf ronrse. to identify the

manner and process of making, constructing, compounding,

and using the same, and is reqtrired-to-bejn such full, clear,

concise, and exggtjermg^as to en able, .any person skilled in the

art or science to which the invention or discovery appertains,

or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct,

compound, and use the same. The specification must set forth

the precise invention for which a patent is solicited, and ex-

plain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which the

applicant has contemplated applying that principle, in such

manner as to distinguish it from other inventions. In case of

a mere improvement, the specification must particularly point
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out the parts to which the improvement relates, and must by

explicit language distinguish between what is old and what is

claimed as new ; and the description and the drawings, as well

as the claims, should be confined to the specific improvement

and such parts as necessarily co-operate with it. The specifica-

tion must conclude with a specific and distinct claim or claims

of the part, improvement, or combination which the applicant

regards as his invention or discovery. When there are draw-

ings the description shall refer to the different views by figures

and to the different parts by letters or numerals (preferably

the latter)/'

Great care is necessary to set out exactly the device the

idea of means for which the inventor desires a monopoly.

He must describe and claim all that he has invented and

wishes to protect and he should not claim anything outside

the bounds of his own patentable invention.

The purpose of this description is. of course, to identify the

2fir > Rule 31.

2 65

Di itiz

E

Rule 31.

Securing a Pa.t ent
Securing a Patent

invention and to delimit it, for purposes of protection, from

invention and to delimit it, for purposes of protection, from
all other knowledge, to which the inventor has no particular
right. In Hogg v. Emerson 266 this description is invested with
a three fold purpose, "to enable the commissioner of Patents
to judge correctly whether the matter claimed is new or too
broad,-to enable courts, when it is contested afterward before them, to form a like judgment. ... . And so that the
public, while the term continues, may be able to understand
what the patent is, and refrain from its use, unless licensed. " 26 7
MusT BE DEFINITE. It sequentially follows that an inventor
who has not described anything, can not be protected in anything, no matter what his claims are. If he has not s.e t forth
any definite idea of means of <Jccomplishing a result he has
contributed nothing definite to _public knowledge, and is entitled tu nothing definite by way of reward. Incandescent
Light Patent 2 68 is an illustration of this. The patent sued on
purported to cover an invention appertainifig to incandescent
electric light. There had been considerable difficulty in this
art owing to the fact that the carbon filaments in the lamps
were subject to rapid disintegration: The· improvement described by the patentees was the use "of an incandescent conductor of carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material in
contradistinction to a similar conductor made from mineral or
gas .carbon." No especial description of making this conductor
was given nor did the patent claim any definitely particularized
substance which· might be used for making it. The defendant
used a certain kind of bamboo fibre which he had discovered
as suitable for the purpose, quite by accident, af~er trying many
other kinds of wood fibres none of which could be made to
work. The patentees, said the court, "supposed they had discovered in carbonized paper the best material for an incandescent conductor. Instead of confining themselves to carbonized paper, as they might have done, and in fact did, in their
third claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous or textile material, when in fact an e~amination of over six thousand

all other knowledge, to which the inventor has no particular

right. In Hogg v. Emerson 266 this description is invested with

a three fold purpose, "to enable the commissioner of Patents

to judge correctly whether the matter claimed is new or too

broad, to enable courts, when it is contested afterward be-

fore them, to form a like judgment. . . . And so that the

public, while the term continues, may be able to understand

what the patent is, and refrain from its use, unless licensed." 267

MUST BE DEFINITE. It sequentially follows that an inventor

\vho has not described anything, can not be protected in any-

thing, no matter what his claims are. If he has not set forth

any definite idea of means of accomplishing a result he has

contributed nothing definite to public knowledge, and is en-

titled to nothing definite by way of reward. Incandescent

Light Patent 268 is an illustration of this. The patent sued on

purported to cover an invention appertaining to incandescent

electric light. There had been considerable difficulty in this
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art owing to the fact that the carbon filaments in the lamps

were subject to rapid disintegration. The improvement de-

scribed by the patentees was the use "of an incandescent con-

ductor of carbon made from a vegetable fibrous material in

contradistinction to a similar conductor made from mineral or

gas carbon." No especial description of making this conductor

was given nor did the patent claim any definitely particularized

substance which might be used for making it. The defendant

used a certain kind of bamboo fibre which he had discovered

as suitable for the purpose, quite by accident, after trying many

other kinds of wood fibres none of which could be made to

work. The patentees, said the court, "supposed they had dis-

covered in carbonized paper the best material for an incandes-

cent conductor. Instead of confining themselves to carbon-

ized paper, as they might have done, and in fact did, in their

third claim, they made a broad claim for every fibrous or tex-

tile material, when in fact an examination of over six thousand

266 6 How. 437, 483, citing other authority.

267 Accd. The Incandescent Light Pat., 159 U. S. 465, 474.

2 <58 159 U. S. 465

266

2 61
268

IT

6 How. 437, 483, citing other authority.
Aced. The Incandescent Light Pat., 159 U. S. 465, 474.
159 u. s. 465
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vegetabl~ growths showed that -none of them possessed the
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vegetable growths showed that none of them possessed the

peculiar qualities that fitted them for that purpose. Was everybody then precluded by this broad claim from making further
investigation? We think not," . . . "If the descri tion pe so
·
11 exce t b independva ue and unc
ent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the
patent 1
·d." So the cour 11-e most strictly, "The claims
of the patent, with the exception of the third, are too indefinite
to be the subject of a valid monopoly."
In a somewhat similar. case 269 the plaintiff had discovered a
new substance compounded of fusel oil and the mineral and
<·arthy oils, which he denominated a "burning fluid." In describing it he said, "the exact quantity of fusel oil which is
necessary to produce the most desirable compound must be determined by .experiment." The defendants used a combination
of the same ingredients described by the patentee. It was left
to the j_ury to determine whether the defendant's proportions
were substantially the same as those of the patentee's, and the
verdict was adverse to the latter. The court in upholding. the
verdict and judgment said, "Now a machine which consists of
a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and its effects may be calculated a priori, while a discovery of a new
substance by means of chemical combinations of known materials is empirical and discovered by experiment. Where a
patent is claimed for such a discovery, it should state the component parts of the new manufacture claimed with clearness
erson attempting to use the
and pr · ·
discovery to fi
tme.nt.
e law reqmres the
ap 1cant for a patent-right to deliver a written des-cription of
the manner and process of makirig and compounding his newdiscovered compound. The art is new; and therefore persons
cannot be presumed to be skilled in it, or to anticipate the result of chemical combinations of elements not in daily u e.. ' 210

peculiar qualities that fitted them for that purpose. Was every-

body then precluded by this broad claim from making further

investigation? We think not," . . . "If the description be so

vacriip anj fflipertain that ftp nn t > ran tell, except by independ-.

ent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the

pateinFTsllmid." So the court held most strictly, 'The claims

of the patent, with the exception of the third, are too indefinite

to be the subject of a valid monopoly."

In a somewhat similar case 269 the plaintiff had discovered a

new substance compounded of fusel oil and the mineral and

earthy oils, which he denominated a "burning fluid." In de-

scribing it he said, "the exact quantity of fusel oil which is

necessary to produce the most desirable compound must be de-

termined by experiment." The defendants used a combination

of the same ingredients described by the patentee. It was left

to the jury to determine whether the defendant's proportions

were substantially the same as those of the patentee's, and the
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verdict was adverse to the latter. The court in upholding the

verdict and judgment said, "Now a machine which consists of

a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and its ef-

fects may be calculated a priori, while a discovery of a new

substance by means of chemical combinations of known ma-

terials is empirical and discovered by experiment. Where a

patent is claimed for such a discovery, it should state^the com-

ponent parts of the new manufacture claimed with clearness

and prrri'iinn j nnrl nnt Irnvc thr prPrm attempting to use the

d i scoveryJxDjijidit--et^^ ' 1 ft& law requires the

apj5Hcaritfor a patent-right to deliver a written description of

the manner and process of making and compounding his new-

discovered compound. The art is new ; and therefore persons

cannot be presumed to be skilled in it, or to anticipate the re-

sult of chemical combinations of elements not in daily use." 270

269 Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327.

270 In view of this last sentence it would seem as though the court were

evading a logical reversal of the case by a resort to mere technical lan-

guage ; that the description taken as a whole was in fact clear enough and

should have been given a broader interpretation. In Minerals Separation

Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327.
.
In view of this last sentence it would eem as though the court were
evading a logical rever al of the case by a resort to mere technical language; that the description taken as a whole was in fact clear enough and
should have been given a broader interpretation. In Minerals Separation
269
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MUST SEPARATE OLD AND NEW MATTER. In Order to de-

173

scribe an invention with such exactness and clarity as to satisfy

the requirements, it is often necessary to give it a background,

by describing other machines, arts, etc. When an invention

embraces in itself an entire machine or device, separate as an

entity from other devices, it can be described as an entity and

there is no necessity of describing anything whatsoever out-

side of the actual invention. A particular shape of nail, for

instance, could be described of itself without the necessity of

representing other nails or anything else in connection with the

nail. But even in such cases it is occasionally desirable to point

out the essence of the inventive idea by comparison of the

formal embodiment with other devices. More often the sub-

ject of the invention is not an absolute entity, totally uncon-

nected with any other device. It may be something not at all

novel in its absolute form, but, on the contrary, novel only in

its connection with other devices and its use therewith. Such,

for instance, would be the type of invention which, while neces-
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sarily complete in itself, is commonly known as an "improve-

ment" upon an existing device. Differently expressed, the

essence of the invention may be so related to an existing de-

Co, v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, the court said, "Equally untenable is the

claim that the patent is invalid for the reason that the evidence

shows that when different ores are treated preliminary tests must

be made to determine the amount of oil and the extent' of agitation neces-

sary in order to obtain the best results. Such variation of treatment must

be within the scope of the claims, and the certainty which the law re-

quires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their

subject matter. The composition of ores varies infinitely, each one pre-

senting its special problem, and it is obviously impossible to specify in a

patent the precise treatment which would be most successful and economi-

cal in each case. The process is one for dealing with a large class of sub-

stances and the range of treatment within the terms of the claims, while

MusT SEPARATE OLD AND NEW MATTER. In order to describe an invention with such exactness and clarity as to satisfy
the requirements, it is of ten neces.s ary to give it a background,
by describing other machines, arts, etc. When an inyention
embraces in itself an entire machine or device, separate as an
entity from other devices, it can be des·cribed as an entity and
there is no necessity of describing anything wl).atsoever out.side of the actual invention. A particular shape of nail, for
instance, could be described of itself without the · necessity of
representing other nails_or anything else in connection with the
nail. But even in such cases it is occasionally desirable to point
out the essence of the inventive idea by comparison of the
formal embodiment with other devices. More often the subject of the invention is not an absolute entity, totally unconnected with any other device. It may be something not at all
novel in its absolute form, but, on the contrary, npvel only in
its connection with other devices and its use therewith. Such,
for instance, would be the type oi invention which, while necessarily complete in itself, is commonly known as an "improvement" upon an existing device. Differently expressed, the
essence of the invention may be so related to an existing de-

leaving something to the skill of persons applying the invention, is clearly

sufficiently definite to guide those skilled in the art to its successful ap-

plication, as the evidence abundantly shows. This satisfies the law."

See also, Wood v. Underbill, 5 How. i ; Tannage Patent Co. v. Zahn, 66

Fed. 986; Schneider v. Lovell, 10 Fed, 666; The claim was alleged to be

too vague but held sufficiently definite, in Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent

Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 Fed. 145.

Co. v. ~yde, 242 U. S. 261, the court said, "Equally untenable is the
· claim that the patent is invalid for the reason that the evidence
shows that when · different ores are treated preliminary tests must
be made to determine the amount of oil and the exteut·of agitation necessary in order to obtain the best results. Such variation of treatment must
be within the scope of the claims, and the . certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having · regard to their
subject matter. .The composition of ores varies infinitely, each. one presenting its special problem, and it is obviot}sly impossible to. specify in a
patent the precise treatment which would be most successful and economical in each case. The process is one for dealing with a large class of substances and the range of treatment within the terms of the claims, while
leaving .something . to the skill of persons applying the invention, is ~learly
sufficiently definite to guide those skilled in
art to its successful application, as the evidence abundantly shows. This satisfies .the law."
See also, Wood v. Underhill,, S ·How . .I; Tannage . Patent co: v. Zahn, 66
Fed. 986 ;. ~chneider v. Lovell, IO F;e4. 666_; The cla~m was alleged to. be
;too vague but held sufficiently definite in Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent
Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 Fed .. 14s. :
.,
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vice, that both must be described if the invention is to be

vice, that both must be described if the invention is to be
comprehensible. It is therefore both necessary and permissible
for an inventor to set out in his specification, description which
covers matter not included within the invention itself. 271 The
validity of his patent is not affected by the mere fact that he
has included extraneous matter in his description, provided he
has not claimed it as part of his inv~ntion. But somewhere
in the specification the line of distinction between this matter
extraneous to the invention and what he claims as his invention
must be clearly pointed out. If this separation of the invention itself from the described background is not clearly made,
it is obvious that a valid patent can not be issued. The entire
matter described could not be covered by patent because part
of it is admittedly old. But if the inventor himself has not
separated that part of the description which constitutes his
invention from the description of what is old, neither the Commissioner of Patents nor the courts have power to do it for
him. It has even been said specifically, 212 "It is not enough to
give such a description of the machine patented as to show, by
comparing it with other machines, what part has been invented. . . . It is not enough that the thing designed to be
embraced by the patent should be made apparent on the trial,
by a comparison of the new with the old machine. . . . The
specification must be complete. No defects can be obviated
by extraneous evidence at the trial. " 273

comprehensible. It is therefore both necessary and permissible

for an inventor to set out in his specification, description which

covers matter not included within the invention itself. 271 The

validity of his patent is not affected by the mere fact that he

has included extraneous matter in his description, provided he

has not claimed it as part of his invention. But somewhere

in the specification the line of distinction between this matter

extraneous to the invention and what he claims as his invention

must be clearly pointed out. If this separation of the inven-

tion itself from the described background is not clearly made,

it is obvious that a valid patent can not be issued. The entire

matter described could not be covered by patent because part

of it is admittedly old. But if the inventor himself has not

separated that part of the description which constitutes his

invention from the description of what is old, neither the Com-

missioner of Patents nor the courts have power to do it for

him. It has even been said specifically, 272 "It is not enough to
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give such a description of the machine patented as to show, by

comparing it with other machines, what part has been in-

vented. ... It is not enough that the thing designed to be

embraced by the patent should be made apparent on the trial,

by a comparison of the new with the old machine. . . . The

specification must be complete. No defects can be obviated

by extraneous evidence at the trial." 273

2 Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568. "When a man supposes he has

made an invention or discovery useful in the arts, and therefore the

proper subject of a patent, it is, nine times out of ten, an improvement on

some existing article, process, or machine, and is only useful in connection

with it. It is necessary, therefore, for him, in his application to the

Patent Office, to describe that upon which he engrafts his invention, as

well as the invention itself ; and, in cases where the invention is a new

combination of old devices, he is bound to describe with particularity all

these old devices, and then the new mode of combining them, for which

he desires a patent. It thus occurs that, in every application for a patent,

the descriptive part is necessarily largely occupied with what is not new,,

in order to an understanding of what is new."

272 Brooks & Morris v. Jenkins & Bicknell, 3 McLean, 432, 442.

273 The acual holding of the case reads, "What is claimed as new and

27 ~

how is" it distinguished from the old? There is nothing on the face of

Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568. "When a man supposes he has
made an invention or discovery useful in the arts, and therefore the
proper subject ·of a patent, it is, nine times out of ten, an improvement on
some existing article, process, or machine, and is only useful in connection
with it. It is necessary, therefore, for him, in his application to the
Patent Office, to describe that upon which he engrafts his invention, as
well as the invention itself ; and, in cases where the invention is a new
combination of old devices, he is bound to describ~ with particularity all
these old devices, and then the new mode of combining them, for which
ne desires a patent. It thus occurs that, in every application for a patent,.
the descriptive part is necessarily largely occupied with what is not new,.
in order to an understanding of what is new."
212 Brooks & Morris v. Jenkins & Bicknell, 3 McLean, 432, 442.
27 3 The acual holding of the case reads, "What is claimed as new and
how is· it distinguished from the old? There is nothing on the face of
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SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION, BY WHOM DECIDED. Whether

or not the specification does set cut sufficiently the invention it

is alleged to describe, appears to be a question of fact, to be

left to the jury in actions of law, according to the opinion of

many courts. 274

Other judges have made a verbal distinction between the

province of the jury, in this respect, and that of the court,

which seems rather more in harmony with actual practice. Mr.

Justice McLean charged a jury upon this point as follows, 275

''A question is raised, whether the thing claimed to have been

invented is sufficiently described in the patent, is a matter for

the determination of the court or jury. In its nature it is a

question of law, for it depends upon the construction of a

written instrument. If technical terms be used peculiar to

mechanics in describing the invention, evidence may be heard

in explanation of those terms, and in such case a jury may be

necessary. If this point were ordinarily referable to a jury,

the decisions on the same instrument would be as variable as
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the names of the parties. To produce uniformity of decision,

the courts must give a construction to all written instruments.

In this mode, by the application of known rules of construc-

tion, the specifications of a patent are construed and settled

as regards the thing invented. Whether the description is so

particular as to enable a mechanic to construct the machine,

is a question for the jury. But unless the thing claimed to be

the patent or specifications, which can enable any one to say, what is new

and what is old. If he has added something to a machine which is new,

and which he claims as his improvement, he must describe it. But no

such description is given. ... He can then have no shadow of ground on

which to sustain his patent." Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568; Parks v.

Booth, 102 U. S. 96.

274 Wood v. Underbill, 5 How. i ; Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356, 428 ;

"It is not disputed, that the specification does contain a good and suffi-

cient description of the improved hopper-boy, and of the manner of con-

structing it; and if there had been any dispute on this subject, it would

have been a matter of fact for the jury and not of law for the court."

Tannage Patent Co. v. Zahn, 65 Fed. 986 ; Palmer v. McCormick, 2 Brock

(Ch. J. Marshall's Decisions) 298.

275 Brooks & Morris v. Jenkins & Bicknell, 3 McLran 442. .
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invented, is so described as to be known, in the language of
the statute, from every other thing, the patent is void. ·And
this must be determined by the court." Probably the true distinction is that whether or not the description is actually comprehensible as delimiting a definite idea or device, is a question
of fact; at just what poirit that device so described is marked
off ·from all other devices, is a question of construction for the
cot:lrt. What it is that the description does set forth is also a
question to be decided by the court; a question of construction
of the patent -and accompanying specifications. 276 The seeming confusion of statement arise-; out of the failure of courts to
distinguish, or their lack of precision in stating the distinction,
between the invention as it. is in formal expression and the
invention as it is in inexpressible essence, which may include
many substantial forms.
To the extent that the courts do themselves undertake to
decide the formal sufficiency of a spe~ification, the evident inclination is to be -liberal toward the inventor . . This is one _of
the issues in which the characterization of a patent as an odious
monopoly or as something less repugnant to the law; as discussed at the beginning of this book, is of importance. Were
it considered an objectionable monopoly, the patentee should
be held to the strictest precision of description. On the contrary, he is in practice favored, on the principle that his patent
is, at least, not an odious monopoly. 277
NEED NOT BE CLEAR TO THE . UNSKILLED.
It is consistent
with this that the courts do not require the description to be
SO full and clear and in such terms as tG be understood by every
intelligent reader. It is .sufficient if it is comprehensible at least
to persons particularly skilled in the branch of knowledge to
which the alleged in~ention appertains. "The purpose of the
specification, 278 as contradistinguished from a claim in letters
_patent, is to describe .clearly the invention sought to be protected by them, and the manner of making, using, and con-

invented, is so described as to be known, in the language of

the statute, from every other thing, the patent is void. And

this must be determined by the court." Probably the true dis-

tinction is that whether or not the description is actually com-

prehensible as delimiting a definite idea or device, is a question

of fact; at just what point that device so described is marked

off from all other devices, is a question of construction for the

court. What it is that the description does set forth is also a

question to be decided by the court; a question of construction

of the patent and accompanying specifications. 276 The seem-

ing confusion of statement arises out of the failure of courts to

distinguish, or their lack of precision in stating the distinction,

between the invention as it is in formal expression and the

invention as it is in inexpressible essence, \vhich may include

many substantial forms.

To the extent that the courts do themselves undertake to

decide the formal sufficiency of a specification, the evident in-

clination is to be liberal toward the inventor. This is one of
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the issues in which the characterization of a patent as an odious

monopoly or as something less repugnant to the law, as dis-

cussed at the beginning of this book, is of importance. Were

it considered an objectionable monopoly, the patentee should

be held to the strictest precision of description. On the con-

trary, he is in practice favored, on the principle that his patent

is, at least, not an odious monopoly. 277

NEED NOT BE CLEAR TO THE .UNSKILLED. It is consistent

with this that the courts do not require the description to be

so full and clear and in such terms as to be understood by every

intelligent reader. It is sufficient if it is comprehensible at least

to persons particularly skilled in the branch of knowledge to

which the alleged invention appertains. "The purpose of the

specification, 278 as contradistinguished from a claim, in letters

.patent, is to describe clearly the invention sought to be pro-

tected by them, and the manner of making, using, and con-

276 Merrill v. "Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568, Further discussion under "protec-

tion."

277 Brooks & Morris v. Jenkins & Bicknell, 3 McLean 442.

278 Tannage Patent Co. v. Zahn, 66 Fed. 986, 988.

~errill

v. -Yeo.mans, 94 U. S. 568, Further discussion under "protec·
211 BroO'ks & Morris v. Jenkins & Bicknell, 3 McLean 442.
218 Tannage --Patent Co. v. Zahn, 66 Fed. ~6, 988.
216
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structing the same. The letters pa.tent constitute a contract
between the patentee and the public. On the one hand is
granted an exclusive use of the invention for a specified term.
On the other, by \\ ay of consideration, a full disclosure of the
invention, in all its parts, must be made. -It is through the
instrumentality of -the specifications that this disclosure is
made, and the invention thereby, fully placed within the knowledge of the public. Necessarily, upon their thoroughness 1n
that respect, and upon their accuracy in statement, depends the
validity of the contract of the letters patent. If there be material failure in either respect~ there necessarily results such
failUre of consideration as must vitiate the contract. It follows, then, that a specification failing in any material respect
to make the invention fully known and accessible to the public must be held fatal~y defedive, and the patent based upon
·it, ipso facto, becomes void. Wayne v. Holmes, 2 Fish. Pat.
Cas. 20, Fed. C~s. No. 17,303. But it should be borne in
mind, in judging of the sufficiency of the spe~ifications of letters patent, that while the language and the methods of statement used by the inventor must be such as will fully place
the invention in the intelligible possession of the public
generally, it is not necessary that it should be so minutely and
exactly· described as to be readily understood by every person
going tq make up the public. The specifications of letters
patent ~re address~d primarily to those skilled . in the art to
which the invention relates, and not to those who are wholly
ignorant of the su~ject matter.
·
"In Plimpton v. Malcolmson, 3 Ch. Div . . 531, Sir George
Jessel, the master of t.he rolls, thus states the principle: ~In the
first place, it is plain that the specification of a patent is not
addressed to people w~o are ignorant o·f the subjeCt-matte.r.
It is addressed to people who know something about it. If it is
mechanical invention, a·s this is, you have, first of all, the scientific mechanicians of the first class,-eminent engineers. Then
you have scienf tic mechanicians of the second class,-manag-trs of great manu.facturies; great employe~s of lal;>0r.; persons
wh~ have studied mech~nics., not .t~ th.e same exte.n t as those of

structing the same. The letters patent constitute a contract

between the patentee and the public. On the one hand is

granted an exclusive use of the invention for a specified term.

On the other, by way of consideration, a full disclosure of the

invention, in all its parts, must be made. It is through the

instrumentality of the specifications that this disclosure is

made, and the invention thereby, fully placed within the knowl-

edge of the public. Necessarily, upon their thoroughness in

that respect, and upon their accuracy in statement, depends the

validity of the contract of the letters patent. If there be ma-

terial failure in either respect, there necessarily results such

failure of consideration as must vitiate the contract. It fol-

lows, then, that a specification failing in any material respect

to make the invention fully known and accessible to the pub-

lic must be held fatally defective, and the patent based upon

it, ipso facto, becomes void. Wayne v. Holmes, 2 Fish. Pat.

Cas. 20, Fed. Cas. No. 17,303. But it should be borne in

mind, in judging of the sufficiency of the specifications of let-
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ters patent, that while the language and the methods of state-

ment used by the inventor must be such as will fully place

the invention in the intelligible possession of the public

generally, it is not necessary that it should be so minutely and

exactly described as to be readily understood by every person

going to make up the public. The specifications of letters

patent are addressed primarily to those skilled in the art to

which the invention relates, and not to those who are wholly

ignorant of the subject matter.

"In Plimpton v. Malcolmson, 3 Ch. Div. 531, Sir George

Jessel, the master of the rolls, thus states the principle : 'In the

first place, it is plain that the specification of a patent is not

addressed to people who are ignorant of the subject-matter.

It is addressed to people who know something about it. If it is

mechanical invention, as this is, you have, first of all, the scien-

tific mechanicians of the first class, eminent engineers. Then

you have scient'fic mechanicians of the second class, mana-

gers of great manuf acturies ; great employers of labor; persons

who have studied mechanics, not to the same extent as those of
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the first class, the scientific engineers, but still to a great extent,

for the purpose of conducting manufactories of complicated

and unusual machines. . . . And then the third class, consisting

of the ordinary workman, using that amount of skill and in-

telligence which is fairly to be expected from him, not a care-

less man, but a careful man, though not possessing that great

scientific knowledge or power of invention which would enable

him by himself, unaided, to supplement a defective description

or correct an erroneous description. Now, as I understand, to

be a good specification it must be intelligible to the third class I

have mentioned, and that is the result of the law. It will be

a bad specification if the first two classes only understand it,

and if the third class do not.' And in the case of Morgan v.

Seward, i Webst. Pat. Cas. 174, Mr. Baron Anderson used

this language : 'The specification ought to be framed so as

not to call on a person to have recourse to more than those

ordinary means of knowledge (not invention) which a work-

man of competent skill in his art may be presumed to have.
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You may call upon him to exercise all the actual existing

knowledge common to the trade, but you cannot call upon him

to exercise anything more. You have no right to call upon

him to tax his ingenuity or invention.'

"From which it seems to follow that persons skilled in the art

to which the specification is addressed are in fact those of or-

dinary and fair information, but not those having very great

technical knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the inven-

tion. And if, to them, the specification sufficiently and well

describes the invention or process, it is quite sufficient. Now,

the courts have always been generous towards inventors, in

their application of these princ'phs of the law, and their conse-

quent judgment of the validity of a specification. Although

the specification may be in some degree incorrect, or vague or

incomplete, if from it, taken in connection with accompanying

drawings and models and plans and formula, and especially the

rest of the letters patent, one skilled in the art, as above defined,

can, by exercise of purely non-inventive powers, succeed in con-

structing a machine or in following the process, or in combining

the ingredients cf matter mentioned into one whole, it is suffi-

the first clas , the scientific engineers, but still to a great extent,
for the purpose of conducting manufactories of complicated
and unu ual machine .... And then the third class, consisting
of the ordinary workman, using that amount of skill and intelligence which is fairly to be expected from him,-not a careless man, but a careful man, though not possessing that great
cientific knowledge or power of invention which would enable •
him by himself, unaided, to supplement a defective description
or correct an erroneous description. Now, as I understand, to
be a good specification it must be intelligible to the third class I
have mentioned, and that is the result of the law. It will be
a bad specification if the first two classes only understand it,
and if the third dass do not_.' And in the case of Morgan v.
Seward, I W ebst. Pat. Cas. I 74, Mr. Baron Anderson used
this language: 'The specification ought to be framed so as
not to call on a person to have recourse to more than those
ordinary means of knowledge (not invention) which a workman of competent skill in his art may be presumed to have.
You may call upon him to exercise all the actual existing
knowledge common to the trade, but you cannot call upon him
to exercise anything more. You have no right to call upon
, him to tax his ingenuity or invention.'
"From whi~h it seems to follow that persons skilled in the art
to which the specification is addressed are in fact those of ordinary and fair information, but not those having very great
technical knowledge relating tQ the subject-matter of the :nvention. And if, to them, the specification sufficiently and well
describes the invention or process, it is quite sufficient. Now,
the courts have always been generous towards inventors, in
their application of these princ.pl:s of the law, and their consequent judgment of the validity of a specification. Although
the specification may be in some degree incorrect, or vague or
incomplete, if from it, taken in connection with accompanying
drawings and models and plans and formula, and especially the
rest of the letters patent, one skilled in the <l:rt, as above defined,.
can, by exercise of purely non-inventive powers, suc-ceed in contructing a machine or in following the process, or in combining
the ingredients of matter mentioned into one whole, it is suffi-
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cient. On the other hand, if experiment and inventive skill

on the part of a skilled operator or user is necessary, in addi-

tion to the instructive statements of the specification, to render

the invention available and the use successful, then the specifica-

tion is fatally defective, and the patent based thereon is void.

Lockwood v. Faber, 27 Fed. 63 ; McNamara v. Hulse, 2 Webst.

Pat. Cas. 128; Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327."

The particular phraseology and syntax of the description do

not affect its validity. If it is a full, clear and exact descrip-

tion, it is, so far as its language is concerned, sufficient. In

one case 279 it was actually "argued by the defendant that the

specifications are ungrammatically expressed, prolix, mislead-

ing, and are erroneous in their statement of the scientific prin-

ciples which govern the movements of the currents of air.

Nevertheless," said the court, "I can see no reason why a

skilled person, attempting to construct a kiln according to the

specifications and the drawings of the patent should not be

able to do it." The patent was accordingly upheld.
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STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE. A statement of the principle of

the invention is required in the specification by rule No. 36

which reads, "The specification must set forth the precise in-

vention for which a patent is solicited, and explain the prin-

ciple thereof, and the best mode in which the applicant has

contemplated applying that principle, in such manner as to

distinguish it from other inventions." But where the principle

is not an essential element in the differentiation of the device

from other inventions, a statement of it is not necessary to

constitute a sufficient description, and the fact that in such

case it is not set forth does not invalidate the patent. If some

principle is set forth, and is in truth incorrect, the mistake is

immaterial ; it can be treated as mere surplusage. 280

279 Emerson Co. v. Nimocks, 99 Fed. 737.

280 Emerson v. Nimocks, 99 Fed. 737. An incorrect theory was actually

assigned to account for the operation of the invention, but the court said,

"The scientific principle is not part of the process, is not patentable and

need not be set forth." Eames v. Andrews, 122 U. S. 40, 55, quoting An-

drews v. Cross, 19 Blatch. 294, 305, "It may be that the inventor did not

know what the scientific principle was, or that, knowing it, he omitted,

cient. On the other hand, if experiment and inventive skill
on the part of a skilled operator or user is necessary, . in addition to the instructive statements of the specification, to render
the invention available and the use successful, then the specification is fatally defective, and the patent based thereon is void.
Lockwood v. Faber, 27 Fed. 63; McNamara v. Hulse, ·2 Webst.
Pat. Cas. 128; Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327."
The particular phraseology and syntax of the description do
not a_ffect its validity. If it is a full, clear and exact description, it is, so far as its language is concerned, sufficient. In
one case 279 it was actually "argued by the defendant that the
specifications are ungrammatically expressed, prolix, misleading, and are erroneous in their statement of the scientific prin~
ciples which govern the movements of the currents of air.
Nevertheless," said the court, "I can see no reason. why a
skilled person, attempting to con?truct a kiln according to the
specifications and the drawings of the patent should not be
able to do it." The patent was accordingly upheld.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE. A statement of the principle of
the invention is required in the specification by rule No. 36
which reads, "The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a patent is solicited, and explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which the applicant has
contemplated applying that principle, in such manner as to
distinguish it from other inventions." But where the principle
is not ari essential element in the differentiation of the device
from other inventions, a statement of it is not necessary to
constitute a sufficient description, and the fact that . in such
case it is not s·et forth does not invalidate the patent. If some
principle is set forth, and is in truth incorrect, the mistake is
immaterial; it can be treated as mere surplusage. 280
Emerson Co. v. Nimocks, 99 Fed. 737.
Emerson v. Nimocks, 99 Fed. 737. An incorrect theory was actually
assigned to account for the operation of the invention, but the court said,
"The scientific principle is not part of the process, is not patentable and ·
need not be set forth." Eames v. Andrews, 122 U. S. 40, 55, quoting Andrews v. Cros~, 19 Blatch. 294, 305, ''It may be that the inventor d:d not
know ·what the scientific principle was, or that. knowing it, he omitted,
219
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It is highly desirable, however, for the inventor, or, more

particularly, the draftsman of the application, to know and

It is highly desirable, however, for the inventor, or, more
particularly, the draftsman of the application, to know and
understand the particular mechanical principle, or the principle
of nature, involved in the invention. As we have seen, no
matter what a man may have invented, he is protected only
as to what he actually claims protection for. He can not claim
eithe~ the mechanical principle on which his invention is based,
nor the natural principle which it utilizes. But it must be remembered that both the mechanical principle and the principle
of nature involved in a device may serve as the characteristic

understand the particular mechanical principle, or the principle

of nature, involved in the invention. As we have seen, no

matter what a man may have invented, he is protected only

as to what he actually claims protection for. He can not claim

either the mechanical principle on which his invention is based,

nor the natural principle which it utilizes. But it must be re-

membered that both the mechanical principle and the principle

of nature involved in a device may serve as the characteristic

from accident or design, to set it forth. That does not vitiate the patent.

He sets forth the process or mode of operation which ends in the result,

and the means for working out the process or mode of operation. The

principle referred to is only the why and the wherefore. That is not re-

quired to be set forth. Under 26 of the act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat.

201, under which this reissue was granted, the specification contains a

description of the invention and of 'the manner and process of making,

constructing, compounding, and using it/ in such terms as to enable any

from accident or design, to set it forth. That does not vitiate the patent.
He sets forth the process or mode of operation which ends in the result,
and the means for working out the process or mode of operation. The
principle referred to is only the why and the wherefore. That is ~ot required to be set forth. Under § 26 of the act of July 8, 1870, . 16 Stat.
201, under which this reissue was granted, the 5pecification contains a
description of the invention and of 'the manner and process of making,
constructing, compounding, and using it,' in such terms as to enable any
person skilled in the. art to which it appertains to make, con truct, compound, arid use it ; and, even regarding the case as one of a machine, the
specification explains the principle of the machine, within the meaning
of that section, although the scientific or physical prin~iple on which the
process acts when the pump is. used with the air-tight tube, is not explained. An inventor may be ignorant of the scientific principle, or he
may think he knows it and yet be uncertain, ~r he may be confident as
to what it is, and others may think differently. All this is immaterial,
if by the specification the thing to be done is o et forth that it _can be
reproduced." "It is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able
to state the scientific principles underlying his invention, and it i immaterial whether he can stand a successful examination as to the peculative
ideas involved." Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S.
428, "He must, indeed, make such disclosure and description of his invention that it may be put into practice. In this he must be clear. He must
not put forth a puzzle for invention or experiment to solve but ·the· description is sufficient if those skilled in the art can . under tand it. Thi
satisfies the law, which only requires as a condition of its protection that
the world be given something new· and that the world be taught how to
use it. It is no concern of the world whether the principle upori which
the new construction acts be obvious or ob cure, so that it inhetes ih the
new construction." "Of course a mechanical device may be patentable' although the true tory of it is not understood.'-' Steward v. Am. Lava Co.,
215 U. S. 161, 166; Toch v. Zibell, etc., Co., 233 Fed. 993 .
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person skilled in the art to which it appertains to make, construct, com-

pound, and use it; and, even regarding the case as one of a machine, the

specification explains the principle of the machine, within the meaning

of that section, although the scientific or physical principle on which the

process acts when the pump is "used with the air-tight tube, is not ex-

plained. An inventor may be ignorant of the scientific principle, or he

may think' he knows it and yet be uncertain, or he !nay be confident as

to what it is, and others may think differently. All this is immaterial,

if by the specification the thing to be done is so set forth that it can be

1

reproduced." "It is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able

to state the scientific principles underlying his invention, and it is imma-

terial whether he can stand a successful examination as to the speculative

ideas involved." Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S.

428, "He must, indeed, make such disclosure and description of his inven-

tion that it may be put into practice. In this he must be clear. He must

not put forth a puzzle for invention or experiment to solve but the de-

scription is sufficient if those skilled in the art can understand it. This

satisfies the law, which only requires as a condition of its protection that

the world be given something new and that the world be taught how to

use it. It is no concern of the world whether the principle upon which

the new construction acts be obvious or obscure, so that it inheres in the

new construction." "Of course a mechanical device may be patentable al-

though the true story of it is not understood." Steward v. Am. Lava Co.,

215 U. S. 161, 166; Toch v. Zibell, etc., Co., 233 Fed. 993.

Di itize by
~N

ER E

I

CH

E

Li IVE S

IA.

Securing a Pa.tent

Securing a Patent 181

which above all other characteristics distinguishes it from other

devices similar in mere tangible form. Therefore, while an in-

ventor can not patent the particular principle which he has

net created : he may validly claim all devices involving tha.t

principle, which differ from the device described by hi-m only

as the result of mere mechanical skill. But a draftsman who

does not understand the principle involved might so formulate

the description and claims as unwittingly to eliminate the

principle as a characteristic of the invention, and by the pre-

cision of his words confine the patent to the single tangible

form characterized by the description. A very pointed illus-

tration is the case of Steward v. American Lava Co. 281 The

patentee had described a form of tip for burning acetylene

gas. As described, it was not materially different from those

in use. At the trial, however, it was urged that the particular

form of tip accomplished the purpose of the other forms by

the utilization of an entirely different natural principle. Jus-

tice Holmes intimated that if this were true the patent would
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be upheld. But there was conflicting evidence as to whether

the burner did really involve that principle, and the scale was

turned against the patentee by the fact that he had indicated no

realization of such a principle in his description. The court

also said in criticizing the indefiniteness of the claim, "Vacil-

lation in theory led to uncertainty of phrase." 2813

281 215 U. S. 161.

28ia A further, and very precise, illustration is found in the recent case of

Minerals Separation Co. v. Butte, etc., Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496 (June,

1919). The patent was for the process of separating minerals from the

crushed ore by agitating the mass in a mixture of oil and water. The

essence of the invention was the use of less than i% of oil. The defend-

ants in this case used more than 1% of oil, which was, superficially, not

an infringement. But the oil which they used was a mixture of pine oil

and petroleum oils. The pine oil itself was less than i%. The patentees

contended that the pine oil was the only kind that had any effect ; that the

petroleum oil was worse than useless and was added only to make a pre-

tense of non-infringement through the apparent use of more than i% of

oil. The Supreme Court refused relief to the patentees on the ground that

their patent did not refer to any particular kind of oil, but claimed only

the use of less than i% of "oils having a preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter'' or "oily substance." They said that the petroleum product

which above all other characteristics distinguishes it from other
devices similar in mere tangible form. Therefore, while an inventor can not patent the particular principle-which he has
net created-·he may validly claim all devices involving tha.t
principle, which differ from the device described by him only
as the result of mere mechanical skill. . But a draftsman who
does not understand the principle involved might so formulate
the description and claims as unwittingly to eliminate the
principle as a characteristic of the invention, and by the precision of his words confine the patent to the single tangible
form characterized by "the · description. A very pointed illustration .is the case of Steward v. Amerfcan Lava Co. 2 1 The
patentee had described ~ form of tip for burning acetylene
gas. As described, it was not materially different from those
in use. At the trial, however, it was urged that the particular
form of tip accomplished the purpose of the other forms by
the utilization of an entirely different natural principle. Justice Holme intimated that if this were true the patent would
be upheld. But there was conflicting evidence as to whether
the burner did really involve that principle, and the scale was
turned against the patentee by the fa~t that he had indicated no
realization of such a principle in his description. The court
also said in criticizing the indefiniteness of the claim, "Vacillation in theory led to uncertainty of phrase."~ ia
215 U. S. l6r.
A further, and very preci:;e, illustration is found in the recent case of
Minerals Separation Co. v. Butte, etc., Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496 (June,
1919). The patent wa for the process of separating minerals from the
cru hed ore by agitating the mas in a mixture of oil and water.
The
essence of the invention was the use of less than 1% of oil. The defendan ts in this case used more than 1% of oil, which was, superficially, not
an infringement. But the oi] which they u ed was a mixture of pine oil
and petroleum oils. The pine oil itself was less than l %. The patentees
contended that the pine oil was the only kind that had any effect; that the
petroleum oil was wor e than usele s and was added only to make a pretense of non-infringement through the apparent iLe of more than 1% of
oil. The Supreme Court refused relief to the patentees on the ground that
their patent did not refer to any particular kind of oil, but claimed only
the u e of le s than 1% of "oils having a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter'' or "oily ubsta.nce." They said that the petroleum product
2 1
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INCLUDES ALL DESCRIPTIVE PARTS. When it is said that the

"specification" or "description" must set forth the invention,

INCLUDES ALL DESCRIPTIVE PART . When it is said that the
"specification' or "description ' must set forth the invention,
the words are not confined to the nominally descriptive part
of the application only, but are used, evidently, as including all
of the application from which an understanding of the invention can be obtained. 2 2 "The word 'specification' when used
separate! y from the word 'claim' in section 29 r 6, ·means the
entire paper referred to in section 4888, namely, the written
description of the .invention, 'and of the manner and proces
of making, constructing, compounding, and using it,' and the
claims made. The word 'specification,' meaning description
and claims, is used in that sense in sections 4884, 4895, 4902,
4903, 4917, 4920 and 4922. In some cases, as in sections 4888
and 4916, the words 'specification and claim' are used, and in
section 4902 the word 'description' and the word 'specification'
are used. But it is clear that the word 'specification,' when
used with~ut the word 'claim,' means description and claim."
In the rules of practice 'specification' is undoubtedly used a
inclusive of the claim. Indeed rule 37 reads, "The specification must conclude with a specific and distinct claim or claims
of the part . . . which the applicant regards as his invention
or discovery." It is a perfectly logical assumption therefore
that the rule requiring the "specification" to set forth the invention includes the claim within the term, and that the latter
may properly be looked to, if necessary, to aid in describing
the invention and giving it the comprehensibility required.
This is the view taken by the courts. 283

the words are not confined to the nominally descriptive part

of the application only, but are used, evidently, as including all

of the application from which an understanding of the inven-

tion can be obtained. 28: "The word 'specification' when used

separately from the word 'claim' in section 2916, means the

entire paper referred to in section 4888, namely, the written

description of the invention, 'and of the manner and process

of making, constructing, compounding, and using it/ and the

claims made. The word 'specification/ meaning description

and claims, is used in that sense in sections 4884, 4895, 4902,

4903, 4917, 4920 and 4922. In some cases, as in sections 4888

and 4916, the words 'specification and claim' are used, and in

section 4902 the word 'description' and the word 'specification'

are used. But it is clear that the word 'specification/ when

used without the word 'claim,' means description and claim."

In the rules of practice 'specification' is undoubtedly used as
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inclusive of the claim. Indeed rule 37 reads, "The specifica-

tion must conclude with a specific and distinct claim or claims

of the part . . . which the applicant regards as his invention

or discovery." It is a perfectly logical assumption therefore

that the rule requiring the "specification" to set forth the in-

vention includes the claim within the term, and that the latter

may properly be looked to, if necessary, to aid in describing

the invention and giving it the comprehensibility required.

This is the view taken by the courts. 283

was an "oily substance" and did not have a preferential affinity for the

metallifferous matter, and thus met the terms of the patent. As it was

used in quantities exceeding i% its use did not infringe. The court's

decision was that if the patentees had intended to patent the use in small

quantities of particular kinds of oil, they should have specified those

particular kinds in the description of their process. One gathers from the

evidence that the reason the patent was not so limited is because the

patentees did not themselves realize that there was a difference in effect

of the different oils.

282 Wilson v. Coon, 6 Fed. 611, 615.

283 Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 102 Fed. 618,

629, "If a claim, uncertain when considered apart from the description,

>

was an "oily substance" and c!id not have a preferential affinity for the
metallifferous matter, and thus met the terms of the patent. A it was
used in quantities exceeding I% it use did not infringe. The court's
decision was that if the patentees had intended to patent the use in small
quantities of particular kinds of oil, they should have specified tho e
particular kinds in the description of their proces . One gather from the
evidence that the reason the patent was · not so limited i becau e the
patentees did not themselves realize that there wa a difference in effect
of the different oils.
282 Wilson v. Coon, 6 Fed. 6I I, 615.
2 s Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 102 Fed. 61~,
629, "If a claim, uncertain when considered apart from the description,
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INCLUDES DRAWINGS. Even the drawings may be referred

Securing a Pa.t ent

to for the purpose of rendering intelligible the verbal descrip-

tion of the invention and giving to it the exactness and clarity

necessary to its validity. In Earle v. Sawyer, 284 one ground

of alleged error was "that the Court directed the jury, that

the drawings annexed, and referred to in the specification,

constituted a part thereof ; and that they might be resorted to,

to aid the description, and to distinguish the thing patented

from other things known before. In point of fact, the draw-

ings were annexed to the specification in the patent, and it

made perpetual references to them, distinguishing thereby the

new parts from the old, so that it was unintelligible without

them. The Court, therefore, in the first part of the direction,

did no more than state the fact, as it was ; and the other part

was correct, unless the description must be wholly in writing.

The argument now is, that by the very terms of the patent act,

there must be a written description (without any reference to

drawings), in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distin-
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guish the things patented from all other things; and that, in

case of a machine, the act requires drawings in addition

can by reference to the latter be rendered so clear as to satisfy the re-

quirement of the statute, that the inventor "shall particularly point out

and distinctly claim" his invention, by parity of reasoning a doubtful

point in the description, when considered apart from the claims, can by

reference to the latter, when in themselves unambiguous, be rendered so

clear as to satisfy the other requirement of the statute that the inventor

shall fully and clearly set forth his invention in the description. That

under such circumstances a description uncertain or indefinite when con-

sidered alone, but not inconsistent with the claims, may be rendered cer-

tain and sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute by reading the

whole specification together has frequently been recognized and is, we

think, a sound rule of law. Battin v. Taggert, 17 How. 74 85, 15 L. Ed.

INCLUDE$ DRAWINGS. Even the drawings may be referred
to for the purpose of rendering intelligible the verbal description of the invention and giving to it the exactness and clarity
necessary to its validity. In Earle v. Sawyer, 284 one ground .
of alleged error was "that the Court directed the jury, that
the drawings annexed, and referred to in the specification,
constituted a part thereof; and that they might be resorted to,
to aid the description, and to distinguish the thing patented
from other things known before. In point of fact, the drawings were annexed to ·the specification in the patent, and it
made perpetual references to them, distinguishing thereby the
new parts from the old, so that it was unintelligible without
them·. The Court, therefore, in the first part of the direction,
did no more than state the fact, as it was; and the other part
was correct, unless the description must be wholly in writing.
The argument now is, that by the very term~ of the patent act,
there must be a written description (without any reference to
drawings), in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the things patented from all other things ; and that, in
case of a machine, the act requires drawings in addition

37; The Corn-Planter Patent, 23 Wall. 181, 224, 23 L. Ed. 161 ; Carver v.

Manufacturing Co., 2 Story, 432, 446 ;Howes v. Nutes 4 Cliff. 173 174,

Fed. Cas. No. 6,790; Ryan v. Goodwin, 3 Sumn. 514, 520, Fed. Cas. No. 12,

186 ; Myers v. Frame, 8 Blatchf . 446, 457, Fed. Cas. No. 9,991 ; Parker v.

Stiles, 5 McLean, 44, 56, Fed. Cas. No. 10,749; Lowell v. Lewis, i Mason,

182, 188, Fed. Cas. No. 8,568; i Robb's Pat. Case 131." Am. Automotoneer

Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456.

284 4 Mason i, 9.

.

can by reference to the latter be rendered so clear as to satisfy the requirement of the statute, that the inventor "shall particularly point out
and distinctly claim" his invention, by parity of reasoning a doubtful
point in the description, when considered apart from the daims, can by
reference to the latter, when in themselves unambiguous, be rendered so
clear as to satisfy the other requirement of the statute that the inventor
shall fully and clearly set forth his invention in the description. That
under such circumstances a description uncertain or indefinite when considered alone, but not inconsistent with the claims, mC.ly be rendered certain and sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute by reading the
whole specification together has frequently been recognized and is, we
think, a sound rule of law. Battin v. Taggert, I7 How. 74 85, IS L. Ed.
37; The Corn-Planter Patent, 23 Wall. I8I, 224, 23 L. Ed. I6I; Carver v.
Manufacturing Co., 2 Story, 432, 446 ;Howes v. N utes 4 Cliff. 173 174,
Fed. Cas. No. 6,790; Ryan v. Goodwin, 3 Sumn. 514, 520, Fed. Cas. No. 12,
186; Myers v. Frame, 8 Blatchf. 446, 457, Fed. Cas. No. 9,991 ; Parker v.
Stiles, S ' McLean, 44, 56, Fed. Cas. No. 10,749; Lowell v. Lewis, l Mason,
182, 188, Fed. Cas. No. 8,568; l Robb'·s Pat. Case l3I." Am. Automotoneer
Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456.
284 4 Mason l, 9.
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thereto. For this position, the case, Ex parte Fox (i Ves. &

Beames, 67), before Lord Eldon, has been cited. It was a

thereto. Fer this position, the case, Ex parte Fox ( r Ves. &
Beame , 67), before Lord Eldon, has been cited. It was a
petition to the Lord Chancello1 for the grant of a patent,
against which a caveat had been entered. On hearirig the
parties, Lord Eldon grant~d the patent, and on. that occasion
is reported to have said, 'I take it to be clear, that a man may,
if he chooses, annex to his specification a picture or a model,
descriptive of it; but his specification must in itself be sufficient, or I apprehend it will be bad.' As I understand this
language, it is not intended to assert the doctrine for which
it is cited. It means, that the specification must in itself be
sufficient, and that the mere annexation of a picture or model
will not help any defect in the specification. This may be true,
where such picture or model is not referred to, as constituting
a part of the specification itself. But if the explanations of the
specification call for drawings, and refer to them as a component part in the description, they are just as much a part
of the specification, as if they were placed in the body of the
specification. Indeed, in many cases it would be impracticable
to give a full and accurate description of the form, adjustments, and apparatus of very nice and delicate machinery,
without drawings of some of the parts, as everything might
depend on size, position, and peculiar shape. Lord Eldon
could not have meant, that if drawings and figures were
necessary to a full description of a machine in the specificatjon, there was still some stubborn rule of law prohibiting it.
That would be to require the end, and yet to refuse the means.
On~ of. the objections in Boulton vs. Bull ( 2 H. Bl. 463)
was, that the specification was imperfect, and it was pressed,
that there ought to ha ~e been drawings to explain the machinery. How was this objection met? Not by stating, that
by law no explanatory drawings would help a specificat~on,
even if referred to in it, but by showing the specification sufficient without them. Mr. Justice Rooke said ( p. 480), 'As to
the objection of a want of a drawing or model, that at first
struck me a of o-reat wei o-ht. I thought it would be difficult
to ascertain, what wa an infrino-ement of a method, if there

petition to the Lord Chancelloi for the grant of a patent,

against which a caveat had been entered. On hearing the

parties, Lord Eldon granted the patent, and on. that occasion

is reported to have said, 'I take it to be clear, that a man may,

if he chooses, annex to his specification a picture or a model,

descriptive of it; but his specification must in itself be suffi-

cient, or I apprehend it will be bad.' As I understand this

language, it is not intended to assert the doctrine for which

it is cited. It means, that the specification must in itself be

sufficient, and that the mere annexation of a picture or model

will not help any defect in the specification. This may be true,

where such picture or model is not referred to, as constituting

a part of the specification itself. But if the explanations of the

specification call for drawings, and refer to them as a com-

ponent part in the description, they are just as much a part

of the specification, as if they were placed in the body of the
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specification. Indeed, in many cases it would be impracticable

to give a full and accurate description of the form, adjust-

ments, and apparatus of very nice and delicate machinery,

without drawings of some of the parts, as everything might

depend on size, position, and peculiar shape. Lord Eldon

could not have meant, that if drawings and figures were

necessary to a full description of a machine in the specifica-

tion, there was still some stubborn rule of law prohibiting it.

That would be to require the end, and yet to refuse the means.

One of the objections in Boulton vs. Bull (2 H. Bl. 463)

was, that the specification was imperfect, and it was pressed,

that there ought to have been drawings to explain the ma-

chinery. How was this objection met? Not by stating, that

by law no explanatory drawings would help a specification,

even if referred to in it, but by showing the specification suffi-

cient without them. Mr. Justice Rooke said (p. 480), 'As to

the objection of a want of a drawing or model, that at first

struck me as of great weight. I thought it would be difficult

to ascertain, what was an infringement of a method, if there
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was no additional representation of the improvement, or thing

methodized.' 'If they (the jury) can understand it without a

model, I am not aware of any rule of law, which requires a

model or drawing to be set forth, or which makes void an in-

telligible specification of a mechanical improvement, merely

because no drawing or model is annexed. It seems to me then

there is no ground for this objection to the charge, even upon

the law of patents in England, where the specification consti-

tutes no part of the patent itself, but is required by a proviso

in every grant, to be enrolled in the Court of Chancery, within

a limited time, and particularly to describe and ascertain the

nature of the invention, and in what manner the same is to be

performed. But how stands our own law on this subject; for

by this the question must, after all, be decided? The patent

act requires, that the inventor 'shall deliver a written descrip-

tion of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process

of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms,

as to distinguish the same from all other things before known,
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&c., &c. ; and in the case of a machine, he shall fully explain

the principle and the several modes, in which he has contemp-

lated the application of that principle or character, by which

it may be distinguished from other invention; and he shall

accompany the whole with drawings and written references,

where the nature of the case admits of drawings,' &c. This is

an explicit direction to annex drawings, where the nature of

the case admits of them, with written references; and when

so annexed, they become part of the written description re-

quired by the act. They may be indispensable to distinguish

the thing patented from other things before known. Surely,

then, the act could not intend studiously to exclude them as

part of the written description. That would be to require the

end and deny the means." 285

285 Accd. Schneider v. Lovell, 10 Fed. 666; Banker v. Bostwick, 3 Fed.

517; Hogg v. Emerson. 11 How. 587, 606, "Under the instructions of the

court the jury found that it (the description) was clear enough to be un-

derstood by ordinary mechanics; and that machines and wheels could be

readily made from it, considering the specifications as a whole, and ad-

verting to the drawings on file. This is all which the law requires in re-

spect to clearness. . . ." Tannage Patent Co. v. Zahn, 66 Fed. 984, 990.

was no additional representation of the improvement, or thing
methodized.' 'If they (the jury) can understand it without a
model, I am not aware of any rule of law, which requires a
model or drawing to be set forth, or which makes void an intelligible specification of a mechanical improvement, merely
because no drawing or model is annexed. It seems to me then
there is no ground for this objection to the charge, even upon
the law of patents in England, where the specification constitutes no part of the patent itself, but is required by a proviso
in every grant, t<? be enrolled in the Court of Chancery, within
a limited time, and particularly to describe and ascertain the
nature of the invention, and in what manner the same is to be
performed. But how stands our own law on this subject; for
by this the question must, after all, be decided? The patent
act requires, that the inventor 'shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process
of compounding the same, in such full, clear, ?-nd exact terms,
as to distinguish the same from all other things before known,
&c., &c.; and in the case of a machine, he shall fully explain
the principle and the several modes, in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by which
it may be distinguished from other invention; and he shall
accompany the whole with drawings and written references,
where the nature of the case admits of drawings,' &c. This is
an explicit direction to annex drawings, where the nature of
the case admits of them, with written references; and when
so annexed, they become part of the written ·description required by the act. They may be indispensable to distinguish
the thing patented from other things before known. Surely,
then, the act could not intend studiously to exclude them as
part of the written description. That would be to require the
end and · deny the means." 285
285 Aced. Schneider v. Lovell, IO Fed. 666; Banker v. Bostwick, 3 Fed.
517; Hogg v. Emerson. I I How. 587, 006, ''Under the instructions of the
court the jury found that it (the description) was clear enough to be understood by ordinary mechanics; - and that machines and wheels could be
readily made from it, considering the ·specifications as a whole, and adverting to the drawings on file. This is all which the law requires in repect to clearness . . . ." Tannage Patent Co. v. Zahn, (i6 Fed. g84, gg0.

'E

UNIVE -S

186 '

i86 Patents and Inventions

Patents and Inventions

But while the drawings may be adverted to in connection

with the written description to give it exactness sufficient to

But while the drawings may be adverted to in connection
with the written description to give it exactness sufficient to
enable one skilled in the art to understand the invention and
to construct or use it; while they may be used to explain and
interpret it, they may not be considered · for the purpose of
amplifying or supplementing a description which is not in itself complete. They can not be used to extend the scope of
the written description. The propriety of such use was explicitly denied in the case of Caverly v. Deere. 286 The patent
there sued on could be saved from a change of anticipation
only by holding that the device described had certain knifeblade parts set at an angle 9£ 45 °. It was admitted that this
at least might constitute patentable novelty. The drawings
showed these parts set at that angle, but nothing whatever
was said in the specification to indicate that the inventor intended them to be set e~pecially at such an angle, or at any
particular angle except such a one as would produce the best
results, and the court held the patent invalid. 287

enable one skilled in the art to understand the invention and

to construct or use it; while they may be used to explain and

interpret it, they may not be considered for the purpose of

amplifying or supplementing a description which is not in it-

self complete. They can not be used to extend the scope of

the written description. The propriety of such use was ex-

plicitly denied in the case of Caverly v. Deere. 286 The patent

there sued on could be saved from a change of anticipation

only by holding that the device described had certain knife-

blade parts set at an angle of 45. It was admitted that this

at least might constitute patentable novelty. The drawings

showed these parts set at that angle, but nothing whatever

was said in the specification to indicate that the inventor in-

tended them to be set especially at such an angle, or at any

particular angle except such a one as would produce the best

results, and the court held the patent invalid. 287
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3. CLAIM

CLAIM AN IMPORTANT PART. The claim itself f while only

a part of the whole application, is an extremely important part.

By the claim the extent of the monopoly covered by the patent

is^ejertmjied. 288 The statute provides, precisely, that the ap-

plicant must, in his specification, "particularly point out and

distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which

he claims as his invention or discovery." 289 The purpose of

286 66 Fed. 305.

287 Tinker v. Wilber Eureka etc. Co., i Fed. 138, 'The drawing could

and should be looked at, if necessary, in order to explain ah ambiguous

or doubtful specification, and to make the invention capable of being un-

§ 3.

derstood and used. But it can not supply an entire want of any part of

CLAIM

a specification or claim in a suit upon a patent, although it might afford

while only
a part of the wh_gl~ applicatio~, is an extremely im ortant part.By the claim the
the.manopoly cove ed y the patent
288
The statute provides, precisely, that the apis determined.
plicant must, in his specification, "particularly point out and
distinctly claim the part; improvement, or combination which
he claims as his invention or discovery. " 289 The purpose of
CLAIM AN IMPORTANT PART.

ground for a re-issue covering the part shown by it.''

288 Description extraneous to the claim itself is necessary, because while,

as said above, the claim may be used to explain the description, the claim

can not be utilized for expanding the description. Nothing can, there-

fore be effectively claimed which is not described.

28 4888.

66 Fed. 305.
Tinker v. Wilber Eureka etc. Co., 1 Fed. 138, "The drawing could
and should be looked at, if necessary, in order to explain an ambiguous
or doubtful specification, and to make the invention capable of being understood and used. But it can not supply an entire want of any part of
a specification or claim in a suit upon a patent, although it might afford
ground for a re-issue covering the part shown by it.''
288 Description extraneous to the claim itself is netessary, because while,
as said above, the dai~ may be used to explain the description, the claim
can not be utilized for expanding the description. Nothing can, therefore be effectively claimed which is not described.
286

287

289 ~
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the statute is primarily to benefit the public, not the individual.

It gives to the individual a monopoly for a limited time, as

an inducement for him to reveal his invention to the public.

If he chooses to give his invention to the public without the

recompense of a monopoly he is as free to do so as ever he

was, and he may make his revelation by describing it and mak-

ing it public in any way he wishes. For him to describe it in

a written instrument filed with the Commissioner of Patents

has no other effect, so far as he is concerned, than if he had

sent his writing to the editor of a magazine. He must ask for

a patent to receive one, and his request is the claim. .With-

out any claim, he asks for nothing; what he does ask for is

what he hasjncluded ifl hlft dfr** 1 " Only~that which he claims,

therefore, is granted to him by the patent. The descriptive

part of the application may set out with clarity and exactness

a device which constitutes an invention and would be patent-

able, but the patentee does not acquire by that particular part

a monopoly of the described device unless he has claimed it.
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The phrase "by that particular patent" is inserted in the pre-

ceding sentence because it seems clear that he might later pro-

tect himself by a new application containing a proper claim.

(This question, whether failure to claim a described device

amounts to an actual loss of the right or merely to a presump-

tive abandonment which can be rebutted by a proper showing,

is discussed above. ) But, at any rate, no protection is given by

the particular patent issued on the application. This is well

illustrated by the case of Merrill v. Yeomans. 290 The claim-

ant sued for infringement of an improved manufacture of

heavy hydro-carbon oils. The defendants were dealers in oils

and not manufacturers of them. The court found as an issue

that, "If the appellant's patent was for a new oil, the product

of a mode of treating the oils of that character which he de-

scribes in his application, the defendants may be liable; for

they bought and sold, without license or other authority from

him, an oil which is proved to be almost if not quite identical

with the one which he produced. If, however, appellant's

290

94 U. S. 568.

the statute is primarily to benefit the public, not the individuaL
It gives to the individual a monopoly for a limited time, as
an inducement for him to reveal his invention to the public.
If he chooses to give his invention to the public without the
recompense of a monopoly he is as free to do so as ever he
was, and he may make his revelation ·by describing it and making it public in any way he wishes. For him to describe it in
a written instrument filed with the Commissioner of Patents
has no other effect, so far as he is concerned, than if he had
sent his .writing to the editor of a magazine. He must ask for
a patent to receive one, ··a nd his request is the claim. Without an clai
o ing · what he does ask for is
what he has included in hi cl ·
Onl t at w 1c e c aim-s,
therefore, is granted to him b~ the atent. The descriptive
part of t e app1ication may set out with clarity and exactness
a device which constitutes an invention and would be patentable, but the patentee does not acquire by that particular part
a monopo o t e aescn ed ev ·ce uole_ss he has claimea it.
e p rase "by that particular patent" is inserted in the preceding sentence because it seems clear that he might later protect himself by a new application containing a proper claim.
(This question, whether failure to claim a described device
amounts to an actual loss of the right or merely to a presumptive abandonment which can be rebutted by a proper showing,
is discussed above.) But, at any rate, no protection is given by
the particular patent issued on the application. This is well
illustrated by ·the case of Merrill v. Yeomans. 290 The claimant sued fo~ infringement of an improved manufacture of
heavy hydro.:.carbon oils. The defendants were dealers in oils
and not manufacturers of them. The court found as an issue
that, "If the appellant's patent was for a nevv oil, the product
of a mode of treating the oils of that character which he describes in his application, the defendants may be liable; for
they bought and sold, without license or other authority from
him, an oil which is proved to be almost., if not quite identical
with the one which he produced. If, however, appellant's
290

94 U. S. 568.
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described by him, in other words, for his new process of

making this new article of hydro-carbon oil, then it is clear

the defendants have not infringed the patent, because they

never used that process, or any other, for they manufactured

none of the oils which they bought and sold." The appellant

contended that his patent was in fact for the product. The

defendant urged that it was for the process of manufacture

only. It was admitted by all parties that the product as well

as the process was sufficiently described in the specification,

and the court found that on' the description as it stood the

inventor might have had a valid patent for both the product

and the process. But the court came to the conclusion that he

had not in fact claimed the product and that his patent, there-

fore, gave him no monopoly of anything but the use of the

process of manufacture. Mr. Justice Clifford dissented on the

ground that the claim, as properly construed, did cover the

product as well as the process. 291
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291 It might be noted that the laborious and unsatisfactory reasoning of

the decision as made was unnecessary; the same evidently desired result

might have been reached on the ground that the oil sold by the defendants

was not the same as the product which the complainants claimed to have

patented. The cases consistently accord with the principle that the meth-

. I

od of manufacture is one of the distinguishing elements of a product.

In this case the court had distinctly found "that the oils sold by defendants

were produced by a process very different from that described by appel-

lant." This being so, the claimant could not have hoped to cover it, no

matter what his claim. Accord, that nothing is protected which is not

claimed ; "He cannot go beyond what he has claimed and insist that his

patent is only for the mode of treating these oils invented and
described by him,-in other words, for his new process of
making this new article of hydro-carbon. oil,-then it is clear
the defendants have riot infringed the patent, because they
never used that process, or any other, for they manufactured none of the oils which they bought and sold." The appellant
contended that his patent was in fact for the product. The
defendant urged that it was for the process of manufacture
only. It was admitted by all parties that the product as well
as the process was sufficiently described in the specification,
and the court found that on· the description as it stood the
inventor might have had Cl: valid patent for both the product
and the process. But the court came to the conclusion that he
had not in fact clq,imed the product and that his patent, therefore, gave him no monopoly of anything but the use of the
process of manufacture. Mr. Justice Clifford dissented on the
ground that the claim, as properly construed, did cover the
product as well as the process. 291
291 It might be noted that the laborious and unsatisfactory reasoning of
the decision as made was unnecessary; the same evidently desired result
might have been reached on the ground that the oil sold by the defendants
was not the same as the product which the complainants claimed to have
patented. The cases consistently accord with the principle that the method of manufacture is one of the distinguishing elements of a product.
In this case the court had distinctly found "that the oil5 sold by defendants
were produced by a process very different from that described by appellant." This being so, the claimant could not have hoped to cover it, no
matter what his claim. Accord, that nothing is ·protected which is not
claimed; "He cannot go beyond what he has claimed and insist that his
patent covers something not claimed, merely because it is to be found in
the descriptive part of the specification." Railroad Co. v. Mellon, 104 U. S.
n2, u8; Stirrat v. Excelsior Mfg. Co., 6I Fed. g8o; Wells v. Curtis, 66
Fed. 318; '~The -claims measure the ir.vention," Paper Bag Patent Case,
210 U.S. 405, 419; Anderson, Foundry & Mach. Wks. v. Potts. 108 Fed. 379.
It is pertinent to note the remark of the court that, "no such question
(of construction) could have arisen if the appellant had used language
which clearly and distinctly points ou~ what it is that he claims in his
invention."
The necessity of determining just what it is that a f;atentee has claimed
and been awarded thereon by the patent office, arises out of the question
whether the idea of means, for the unauthorized use of which suit has

patent covers something not claimed, merely because it is to be found in

the descriptive part of the specification." Railroad Co. v. Mellon, 104 U. S.

112, 118; Stirrat v. Excelsior Mfg. Co., 61 Fed. 980; Wells v. Curtis, 66

Fed. 318; "The claims measure the invention," Paper Bag Patent Case,

210 U. S. 405, 419; Anderson, Foundry & Mach. Wks. v. Potts. 108 Fed. 379.

It is pertinent to note the remark of the court that, "no such question

(of construction) could have arisen if the appellant had used language

which clearly and distinctly points out what it is that he claims in his

invention."

The necessity of determining just what it is that a patentee has claimed

and been awarded thereon by the patent office, arises out of the question

whether the idea of means, for the unauthorized use of which suit has
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MULTIPLICITY OF CLAIMS. Applications for patents, and the

patents issued thereon, frequently contain more than one claim

as to the part, improvement or combination which constitutes

the invention. In part this arises from the recognized custom

of joining two or more distinct inventions in one patent.

Several inventions. Whatever may be the theory, it is in-

disputably the fact that single patents are, in certain cases,

issued for more than a single invention. As an illustration, a

combination which is itself patentable as a means to an end

may contain elements which are themselves inventions. An

explosion turbine for instance might be patentable as a novel

combination of parts, and the particular form of valves used,

or the combination of parts of the rotor element, might in

themselves be new. In such cases, a single patent can legiti-

mately be issued to cover the entire combination, as an inven-

tion, and to cover also the new parts or sub-combinations as

inventions. In the same way, an idea of static means for ac-

complishing a result, a peculiar shaped collar button for in-
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stance, might be of inventive quality, and the idea of dynamic

means for making such a button might also be the novel result

of inventive genius. Each of these ideas of means is an in-

vention in itself, but the courts seem to permit the patenting

of them both through one application and under a single patent.

The right to join distinct inventions in a single application

been brought, is covered by the claim. It is simply a way of stating the

issue of infringement. If the alleged infringer has used a device pre-

cisely described in the claim, the infringement is evident, and there is no

necessity for construing the claim. But the scope of the protection given

"by a patent is not limited to the precise substantial device described and

claimed therein. As we have already said, it covers the idea of means set

forth, as well as the particular substantial means actually described. It

covers every thing which is essentially identical with the means described.

When the alleged infringer has used a device different from the means

particularly described in the patentee's claim, he is guilty of infringement

only if his device was essentially described in the claim. It becomes,

therefore, necessary to determine whether the claim does set out an idea

of means broad enough to include the defendant's device. In a sense,

Applications for patents, and the
patents issued thereon, frequently contain more than one claim
as to the part, improvement or combination which constitutes
the invention. In part this arises from the recognized custorri
of joining two or more distinct inventions in one patent.
Several inrventions. Whatever may be the theory, it is indisputably the fact that single patents are, in certain cases,
issued for more than a single invention. As an illustration, a
means to an end
combination which is itself patentable as
may contain elements which are themselves inventions. An
explosion turbine for instance might be patentable as a novel
combination of parts, and the particular form of valves used,
or the combination of parts of the rotor element, might in
themselves be new. In such cases, a single patent can legitimately be issued to cover the entire combination, as an invention, and to cover also the new parts or sub-combinations as
inventions. In the same way, an idea of static means .for accomplishing a result, a peculiar shaped collar button for instance, might be of inventive quality, and the idea of dynamic
means for making such a button might also be the novel result
of inventive genius. Each of these ideas of means is an in_vention in itself, but the courts seem to permit the patenting
of them both through one application and under a single patent.
The right to join distinct inventions in a single application
MULTIPLICITY OF CLAIMS.

a

the claim must be construed. A discussion of this construction and in-

terpretation of claims will be found under the subject of infringement.

been brought, is covered by the claim.
It is simply a way of stating the
issue of infringement. If the alleged infringer has used a device precisely described in .the claim, the infringement is evident, and there is no
necessity for construing the claim. But the scope of the protection given
• by a patent is not limited to the precise substantial device described and ·
claimed therein. As we have already said, it covers the idea of means set
forth, as well as the particular substantial means actually described. - It
covers every thing which is essentially identical with the means described.
When the alleged in £ringer has used a device different from the means
particularly described in the patentee'3 claim, he is guilty of infringement
only if his device was essentially described in the claim. It becomes,
therefore, necessary to determine whether the ciaim does set out an idea
of means broad enough to include the defendant's device. In a sense,
the claim must be construed. A discussion of this construction and interpretation of claims will be found under the subject of infringement.
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patent k myptWI by rules of the Patent Office. 292 "Two

or more independent inventions can not be claimed in Qfte ap-

~~--

~JJ ered

by rules of the Patent Office. 292 ' Two
or more independent inventions can not be claimed in one a -_- pJica 10n; ut where several distinct · vention
e de
ent
u on each oth
utually contribute to p
c
· gle
aim
pplication. If several inresu . they ma b
ven 10ns, claimed in a single application, be of such a nature
that a single patent may not be issued to cover them, the inventor will be required to limit the desc·ription, drawing, and
dairp. of the pendirig application to whichever invention he may
elect. The other inventions may be made the subject of separate applications, which must conform to the rules applicable
to original applications. If the independence of the inventions
be clear, such limitation will be made before any action upon
the merits; otherwise it may be made at any time before final
action thereon, in the discretion of the examiner. A requirement of division will not be repeated without the written approval of a law examiner. After a final requirement of division, the applicant may elect to prosecute one group of cla.ims,
retaining the remaining claims in the case with the privilege of
appealing from the requirement of division after final action
by the examiner on the group of claims prosecuted."
These rules are discussed by the court in the case of Stein1
·
th@ rule -0£ the Pa-tent Office
metz v. Allen. 293 At t
ten
nd its
for bade the inclusion in
p oduct, or of a machine and the process in the performance
of which it wa
or of a process and its product. The
petit10ner had been required by the Commissioner of Patents
.to eliminate certain daims from his application on the ground
that · they shbuld be the subject matter of a separate application. The court's discussion of the law is worth quoting, and
is as fallows : "There is nothing in the language of the section (R. S. 4886) which necessarily precludes the joinder of
two or more inventions in the same application. But the section does' distinguish inventions into arts (processes) machines, manufactures and compositions of matter, and the
earliest construction of the law denied the right of joihder.

pHcanflrrnto where several ^distinct inveaiions^re depejj^ent

....................

each other and mutually contribute to produce a single

they may be claimed in one application. If several in-

venfionsT^laimed in a single application, be of such a nature

that a single patent may not be issued to cover them, the in-

ventor will be required to limit the description, drawing, and

claim of the pending application to whichever invention he may

elect. The other inventions may be made the subject of sep-

arate applications, which must conform to the rules applicable

to original applications. If the independence of the inventions

be clear, such limitation will be made before any action upon

the merits ; otherwise it may be made at any time before final

action thereon, in the discretion of the examiner. A require-

ment of division will not be repeated without the written ap-

proval of a law examiner. After a final requirement of divi-

sion, the applicant may elect to prosecute one group of claims,
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retaining the remaining claims in the case with the privilege of

appealing from the requirement of division after final action

by the examiner on the group of claims prosecuted."

.These rules are discussed by the court in the case of Stein-

metz v. Allen. 293 At that time the rule of the Patent Office

forbade the ^inclusion *ip a. singrte p^tfflt nf . a machine and its

product, or oj a machine and the process in the performance

of ^which Jt_wjjfi n-wlj ^>r of a process and its product. The

petitioner had been required by the Commissioner of Patents

to eliminate certain claims from his application on the ground

that they should be the subject matter of a separate applica-

tion. The court's discussion of the law is worth quoting, and

is as follows: ''There is nothing in the language of the sec-

tion (R. S. 4886) which necessarily precludes the joinder of

two or more inventions in the same application. But the sec-

tion does distinguish inventions into arts (processes), ma-

chines, manufactures and compositions of matter, and the

earliest construction of the law denied the right of joinder.

292 Rules of Practice No. 41 and 42.

2 3 192 U. S. 543-

2 92

Rules of Practice No. 41

2 93
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An exception, however, came to be made in cases of depend-

ent and related inventions. In Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 437,

it was said : 'The next objection is, that this description in

the letters thus considered covers more than one patent and is

therefore void. There seems to have been no good reason at

first, unless it be a fiscal one on the part of the government

when issuing patents, why more than one in favor of the same

inventor should not be embraced in one instrument, like more

than one tract of land in one deed or patent for land. Phil.

Pat. 217. Each could be set out in separate articles or para-

graphs, as different counts for different matters in libels in

admiralty or declarations at common law, and the specifica-

tions could be made distinct for each and equally clear. But

to obtain more revenue, the public officers have generally de-

clined to issue letters for more than one patent described in

them. Renouard, 293; Phil. Pat. 218. The courts have been

disposed to acquiesce in the practice, as conducive to clearness

and certainty. And if letters issue otherwise inadvertently to
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hold them, as a general rule, null. But it is a well established

exception that patents may be united, if two or more, included

in one set of letters, relate to a like subject, or are in their

nature or operation connected together. Phil. Pat. 218, 219;

Barret v. Hall, i Mason, 447; Moody v. Fiske, 2 Mason, 112;

Wyeth et al. v. Stone et al., i Story, 283.'

'This language would seem to imply that not the statute

but the practice of the Patent Office required separate appli-

cations for inventions, but the cases cited were explicit of the

meaning of the statute. Mr. Justice Story, in, Wyeth v. Stone,

said : Tor, if different inventions might be joined in the same

patent for entirely different purposes and objects, the patentee

would be at liberty to join as many as he might choose, at his

own mere pleasure, in one patent, which seems to be inconsis-

tent with the language of the patent acts, which speak of the

thing patented, and not of the things patented, and of a patent

for invention, and not of a patent for inventions ; and they di-

rect a specific sum to be paid for each patent.' But he con-

fined the requirement to independent inventions, and his il-

An exception, however, came to be made in cases of dependent and related ipventions. In Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 437,
it was said: 'The next objection is, that this description in
the letters thus considered covers more than one patent and is
therefore void. There seems to have been n0 good r~ason at
first, unless it be a fiscal one on the part of the government
when issuing patents, why more than one in favor of the same
inventor sliould not be embraced in one instrument, like more
than one tract of land in one deed or patent for land. Phil.
Pat. 2 l 7. Each could be set out in separate articles or paragraphs, as different counts for different matters in libels in
admiralty or declarations at com~on law, and the specifications could be made distinct for each and equally clear: But
to obtain more revenue, the public officers have generally declined to issue letters for more than one patent described in
them. Renouard, 293; Phil. Pat. 218. The courts have been
disposed to acquiesce in the practice, as conducive to clearness
and certainty. And if letters issue otherwise inadvertently to
hold them, as a general rule, null. But it is a well established
exception that patents may be united, if two or more, included
in one set of letters, relate to a like subject, or are in their
nature or operation connected together. Phil. Pat. 218, 219;
-Barret v. Hall, I Mason, 447; Moody v. Fiske, 2 Mason, 112;
Wyeth et al. v. Stone et al., r Story, 283.'
"This language would seem to imply that not the statute
but the practice of the Patent Office required ·separate applications for inventions, but the cases cited were explicit of the
meaning of the statute. · Mr. Justice Story, in.Wyeth v. Stone.
said: 'For, if different inventions might be joined in the same
patent for entirely different purposes and objects, the patentee
would be a.t liberty to join ·a s many as he might choose, at his
own mere pleasure, in one patent, which seems to be inconsistent with the language of the patent acts, which speak of the
thing patented, and not of the things patented, and of a patent
for invention, and not of a patent for inventions; .and they direct a specific sum to be paid for each patent.' But he confined the requirement to independent inventions, and his il-
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lustrations indicated that he meant by independent inventions

not those which, though distinct, were 'for the same common

purpose and auxiliary to the same common end.' Hogg v.

Emerson came to this court again, and is reported in 1 1 How.

587. Of one of the objections to the patent the court said:

'It is that the improvement thus described is for more than

one invention, and that one set of letters patent for more than

one invention is not tolerated by law. But grant that such is

the result when two or more inventions are entirely separate

and independent, though this is doubtful on principle, yet it

is well settled in the cases formerly cited, that a patent for

more than one invention is not void if they are connected in

their design and operations. This last is clearly the case here.'

Many other cases are to the same effect."

The court went on to say that the line between independent

and related inventions is vague and implacable, and that "It is

difficult, perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule by

which to determine when given inventions or improvements
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shall be embraced in one, two, or more patents. ... It is often

a nice and perplexing question. The discretion which must

necessarily therefore, reside in the Commissioner of Patents,

is not final, in him, but is reviewable." "The Patent Office has

not been consistent in its views in regard to the division of in-

ventions. At times convenience of administration has seemed

to be of greatest concern; at other times more anxiety has

been shown for the rights of inventors. The policy of the

office has been denominated that of battledore and shuttlecock,

and rule 41 as it now exists was enacted to give simplicity and

uniformity to the practice of the office. Its enactment was

attempted to be justified by the assumption that the patent

laws gave to the office a discretion to permit or deny a joinder

of inventions. But, as we have already said, to establish a rule

applicable to all cases is not to exercise discretion. Such a

rule ignores the differences which invoke discretion, and which

can alone justify its exercise, and we are of opinion therefore

that rule 41 is an invalid regulation." In this particular case

the court held that a process and an apparatus might be such

lustrations indicated that he meant by independent inventions
not those which, though di tinct were 'for the ame common
purpose and auxiliary to the ame common end.' Hoo-g v.
Emerson came to this court again, and is reported in r I How.
587. Of one o·f the objection to the patent the court said:
'It is that the improvement thu described is for more than
one invention, and that one set of letters patent for more than
one invention is not tolerated by law. But grant that such i
the result when two or more inventions are entirely separate
and independent, though this is doubtful on principle, yet it
is well settled in the cases formerly cited, that a patent for
more than one invention is not void if they are connected in
their design and operations. This last is clearly the case her~. '
Many other cases are to the same effect."
The court went on to say that the line between independent
and related inventions is vague and unplacable, and that "It is
difficult, perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule by
which to determine when given inventions or improvements
shall be embraced in one, two, or more patents . . . . If is often .
a nice and perplexing question. The discretion which must
n ~cessar]y therefore, reside in the Commis ioner of Patent .
is not final, in him, but is reviewable." "The Patent Office has
not been consistent in its views in regard to the division of inventions. At times convenience of administration has seemed
to be of greatest concern; at other times more anxiety has
been shown for the rights of inventors. The policy of theoffice has been denominated that of battledore and shuttlecock,
and rule 41 as it now exists was enacted to give simplicity and
uniformity to the practice of the office. It-- enactment was
attempted to be justified by the assumption that the patent
laws gave to the office a discretion to permit or deny a joinder
of inventions. But as we have already said, to establish a rule
applicable to all cases is not to exercise discretion. Such a
rule ignores the differences which invoke discretion, and which
can alone justify its exerci e, and we are of opinion therefore
that rule 41 i an invalid regulation." In this particular case
the court held that a process and an apparatu might be such
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related inventions as to be capable of inclusion in a single

patent, and that inasmuch as the rule purported rigidly to pre-

clude such a combination it was invalid. 29 '

It is often desirable to take advantage of this right to join

inventions, both because it is a monetary saving so to do, and

because the failure to claim one of the inventions might be

construed as showing an intent to abandon it.

Repetition of claims. Another cause for a multiplicity of

claims is found in the difficulty of making clear to all minds,

by mere words, precisely what it is that is claimed. As one

court expressed it, 295 "While, according to strict rules of law,

two distinct claims for the same substantial matter, differing

only in nonessentials, cannot both be sustained, yet, out of

regard to the frailty of human methods of expression, and

the variety of views among different legal judicial tribunals as

to the construction of instruments of the character of letters

patent, and conceding, also, the difficulty of always correctly

defining what one's invention really is, the practice has become
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settled to allow the same substantial invention to be stated in

different ways, very much as the same cause of action, or the

same offense intended to be covered by indictment, are per-

29 * Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, 318,

"A process and an apparatus by which it is performed are distinct things.

They may be found in one patent; they may be made the subject of dif-

ferent patents. So may other dependent and related inventions." Ben-

et v. Fowler, 8 Wall. 445; DuBois v. Kirk, 158 U. S. 58; Thomson-

Houston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H. Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 396; Benj. Elec. Mfg.

Co. v. Dale Co., 158 Fed. 617. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568. The

patent in this case was for the process of making certain hydro-carbon

oils. The defendants were charged with selling oils similar to those made*

by the patented process but in fact made by an entirely different process.

The court held that the patent had not been infringed because the oils

had not been made by the defendants, nor even by the same process and

related inventions as to be capable of inclusion in a single
patent, and that inasmuch as the rule purported rigidly to preclude such a combination it was invalid. 294
. It is often desirable to take advantage of this right to join
inventions, both because it is a monetary saving so to do, and
because the failure to claim one of the inventions might be
construed as showing an intent to abandon it.
Rep·e tition of claini.S. Another cause for a multiplicity of
claims is found in the difficulty of making clear to all minds,
by mere words, precisely what it is that is claimed. As one
court expressed it, 295 "While, according to strict rules of law,
two disbnct claims for the same substantial matter, differing
only ·in nonessentials, cannot both be sustained, yet, out of
regard to the frailty of human methods of expression, and
the variety of views among different legal judicial tribunals as
to the construction of instruments of the character of letters
patent, and conceding, also, the difficulty of always correctly
defining what one's invention really is, the practice has become
settled to allow the same substantial invention to be stated in
different ways, very much as the same cause of action, or the
same offense intended to be covered by indictment, a re per-

because the right to use and vend the oils as a product had not been cov-

ered by the patent. This case contains the strongest sort of intimation

that two distinct things, namely, the process and the product, could have

been and should have been claimed in the one patent. In another case,

Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, syll. 7 reads, "A process and the

product of a process may be both new and patentable, and are wholry

disconnected and independent of each other."

295 Dececo Co. v. Geo. E. Gilchrist Co., 125 Fed. 293, 300.

294 Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, 318,
"A process and an apparatus by which it is performed are distinct things.
They may be found in one patent; they may be made the subject of different patents. So may other dependent and related inventions." Benet v. Fowler, 8 Wall. 445; DuBois v. Kirk, 158 U. S. 58; ThomsonHouston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H. Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 396; Benj. Elec. Mfg.
Co. v. Dale Co., 158 Fed. 617. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568. The
patent in this case was for the process of making certain hydro-carbon
oils. The defendants were charged with selling oils similar tO those made ·
by the patented process but in fact made by an entirely different process.
The court held that the pateµt had not been infringed because the oils
had not been made by the defendants, nor even by the same p~ocess and
because the right to use and vend the oils as a product had not been covered by the patent. This case contains the strongest sort of intimation
that two distinct things, namely, the process and the product, could have
been and should have been claimed ln the one patent. In another case,
Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 VJall. 788, syll. 7 reads, "A process and the
product of a process may be both new and patentable and are wholly
disconnected and independent of each other."
295 Dececo Co. v. Geo. E. Gilchri t Co., 125 Fed. 293, 300.
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verdict on all of them."

The fact that one or more of these claims covers matter to

which the pflfenfcg j<s not r in the court's opinion, entitled, and

is therefore void, does not necessarily invalidate the entire

patent. A notable example of this is the patent issued for the

Morse telegraph concept. 296 It contained eight claims, of

which seven were held valid and the eighth so broad as to be

invalid. While the court would not go so far as to concede

the contention that this void claim might be treated as a nullity

and of no effect at all upon the patent, it didhpld that it might,

before or after the conclusion of the suit, be disclaimed, and

the rest of the patent thereby be rendered valid and effective.

In tHeTTater case of Carleton v. Bokee 297 the fourth claim of

the patent was held void because of anticipation. "One void

claim, however," said the court, "does not vitiate the entire

patf>ntij na^ fry miytaif* ft*- ^advertence and without any

willful default ^.intent to defraud^ or mislead thejgublic." It
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is evident from the case that the court did not consider the

claiming of too much, under a real belief that he might be en-

titled to it all, to show an intent to defraud or mislead the

public. 298

It has grown, therefore, to be a legitimate practice to claim

not only all that the inventor may seem entitled to, but, lest

this be too much, or the claim be misunderstoodj to claim also

narrower and surer degrees of comprehensiveness. 299

296 O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62.

297 I7 \Vall. 463.

298 Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, syll.

"Separate claims in the same patent are independent inventions, and the

infringement of one is not the infringement of the others, and the redress

of the patentee is limited to the injury he suffers; nor is the validity and

duration of valid claims affected by the invalidity or expiration of any

other claim."

The English rule seems to be otherwise. The United Horsenail Co. v.

Stewart, 2 R. P. C. 132. Also 59 Law Times 561. 13 Att. Cases 401.

299 The course of "multiplying claims unnecessarily" was criticized by

the court in Westinghouse Air-brake Co. v. N. Y. Air-brake Co., 112

Fed. 424. Criticism is justly due the too frequent practice of multiplying

mitted to be propounded in different counts, with a general
verdict on all of them."
The fact t at one or more of these claims covers matter to
which the at tee is not in the court's opinion, entitled, and
is therefore void, does not nece~sarily invalidate the entire
atent. A notable example of this is t e patent issued for the
Morse telegraph concept. 296 It contained eight claims, of
which seven were held valid and the eighth so broad as to be
invalid. While the court would not go so far as to concede
the contention that this void claim might be treated as a nullity
and of no effect at all upon the patent, it di hold th t it might,
before or after the conclusiqn of the suit, be disclaimed, and
the rest of the patent thereby be rendered valid and eff . ·ve.
In the ater case of Carleton v. Bokee 297 the fourth claim of
the patent was held void because of anticipation. ~'One void
claim, however," said the court, "does not vitiate the entire
patent, TI
d
· take or inadvertence and wit out any
wil ul default or i tent to defraud or m·
the ublic." It
is evi ent from the case that the court did not consider the
claiming of too much, under a real belief that he might be entitled to it all, to show an intent to defraud or mislead the
public. 298
It has grown, therefore, to be a legitimate practice to claim
not only all that the inventor may seem entitled to, but~ lest .
this be too much, or the · claim be misunderstood~ to claim also
n~rrower and surer degrees of comprehensiveness. 299
O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62.
17 Wall. 463.
• 298 Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, syll.
"Separate claims in the same patent are independent inventions, and the
infringement of one is not the infringement of the others, and the redress ·
of the patentee is limited to the injury he suffers; nor is the validity and
duration of valid claims affected by the invalidity or expiration of any
other claim."
. The English rule seems to be otherwise. The United Horsenail Co. v.
Stewart, 2 R. P. C. 132. Also 59 Law Times· 561. 13 Att. Cases 401.
299 The course of "multiplying claims unnecessarily" was criticized by
the court in Westinghouse Air-brake Co. v. N. Y. Air-brake Co., II2
Fed. 424. Criticism ·is just1y due the too frequent practice of multiplying
296
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A multiplicity of claims may be of -value for its effect upon

the courts under certain circumstances. A patent for a com-

bination is of such narrow credit that its use, with the omis-

sion of a single element, is often held not to be an infringe-

ment. Technically the claimant of a combination, who has

not expressly and explicitly limited himself to the one precise

form, should be given a scope of equivalents appropriate to the

deserts of his invention. This breadth of scope should be

given him, theoretically, and in harmony with other decisions,

whether he has mentioned the particular equivalents or not.

In other words, if he has not explicitly limited himself, his

invention entitles him to protection against all merely formal

evasions of it; and if a later device is not a mere formal

evasion, it could not properly have been included under the

patent for the first invention had the patentee thought of in-

cluding it. Therefore, the recital of various forms of the

combination is, theoretically, either mere surplusage such

forms being included in the one combination as stated in its
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broadest form or they are distinct and independent of the

invention and not properly included in the patent.

It is possible, however, that such variant claims do have a

practical value, owing to the effect upon the courts' opinions,

of matters extraneous to the mere merits of the invention. A

court which, because of the narrowness of an invention, might

refuse it any range of unexpressed equivalents, may perhaps

be induced to hold it broad enough to cover mere mechanic-

ally skillful variations which have been actually expressed in

the patent.

claims because of the solicitor's own tmcomprehension of the law. Many

patent attorneys, as well as some courts, are still obsessed by the notion

that nothing can be property that is not tangible, or represented by some-

thing tangible. They fail, therefore, to realize that it is_jthe jdea of

means which is patented and not merely the means literally described. In

order to secure the protection to which they feel the inventor is entitled,

they literally describe as many variations in the embodiment of the idea

as they can think of. The actual result is that they often, by the very

extent and prolixity of their descriptions limit the scope of protection un-

necessarily, and they always confuse the records of the patented art.

A multiplicity of claims i:nay be of value for its effect upon
the courts under certain circumstances. A patent for a combination is of such narrow credit that its use, with the omission of a single element, is often held not to be an infringement. Technically the claimant of a combination, who has
not expressly and explicitly limited himself to t,he one precise
form, should be given a scope of equivalents appropriate to the
deserts of his invention. This breadth of scope should be
given him, theoretically, and in harmony with other decisions,
whether he has mentioned the particular equivalents or not.
In other words, if he ·has not explicitly limited himself, his
invention entitles him to protedion against all merely formal
evasions of it; and if a later device is not a mere formal
evasion, it could not properly have been included under the
patent for the first invention had the patentee thought of inc~uding it.
Therefore, the recital of various forms of the
combination is, theoretically, either mere .surr>lusage-such
· forms being included in the one combination as stated in its
broadest form-or they are distinct and independent of the
invention and not properly included in the patent.
It is possible, however, that such variant claims do have a
practical value, owing to the effect upon the courts' opinions,'
of matters extraneous to the mere merits of the invention. A
court which, because of the narrowness of an invention, might
refuse it any range of unexpressed equivalents, may perhaps
be induced to hold it broad enough to cover mere mechanically skillful variations which have been actually expressed in
the patent.
claims because of the solicitor's own uncomprehension of the law. Many
patent attorneys, as well as some courts, are still obsessed by the notion.
that nothing can be property that is not tangible, or represented by something tangible. They fail, therefore, to realize that it is th idea of
means which is patented and not merely the means literally described. In
orderto secure the protection to which they feel the inventor is entitled,
they literally describe as many variations in the embodiment of the idea
as they can think of. The actual result is that they often, by the very
eX:tent and prolixity of their descriptions limit the scope of protection unnecessarily, arrd they always confuse the records of the patented art. ·
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4. DISCLAIMER

With these possible exceptions, the necessity for including

§ 4.

several claims, and even the value of so doing is dubious. The

practice is not essential in preventing harm when it appears

that too much has been claimed in the effort to get all

that is allowable. The statute 300 provides, "Whenever, through

inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent

or deceptive intention, a patentee has claimed more than that

of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer,

his patent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and

j ustly his own, jprovidLecLlhe same is a material or substantial

part^of_the things patented and any such patentee, his heirs or

assigns, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein,

may, on payment of the fee required by law. make disclaimer

of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to

claim or to hold by virtue of the patent or assignment stating

therein the extent of his interest in such patent. Such dis-

claimer shall be in writing, attested by one or more witnesses,
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and recorded in the Patent Office; and it shall thereafter be

considered as part of the original specification to the extent

of the interest possessed by the claimant and by those claiming

under him after the record thereof. But no such disclaimer

shall affect any action pending at the time of its being filed,

except so far as may relate to the question of unreasonable

neglect or delay in filing it." This is a specific statement to

the effect that the "patent shall be valid for all that part which

is truly and justly his own," without limitation to such part

as has been stated in a separate claim, valid in itself. In the

words of the statute, a claim would appear to be equally valid

whether it is that part of a single claim which is left after

pruning off the surplus and invalid parts, or is a claim, origi-

nally complete in itself, left after other excessive claims have

been removed. 301

300 R. s. ? 4917.

301 "Matters properly disclaimed cease to be a part of the invention;

and it follows that the construction or"tKeTpatent must be the same as it

would be if such matters had never been included in the description of

DISCLAIMER

With these possible exceptions, the necessity for including
several claims, and even the value of so doing is dubious. The
practice is not essential in preventing harm when it appears
that too much has been claimed in the effort to get all
that is allowable. The statute 300 provides, "Whenever, through
inadvertence, accident or mistake and without any fraudulent
or dece ti intention, a patentee has claimed more than that
of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer,
his atent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and
just his own rov· ed the same is a material or substantial
part of the thin s atented; and any such patentee, his heirs or
assi ns whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein,
may, on payment of the fee required by law: make disclaimer
of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to
claim or to hold by virtue of the patent or assignment stating
therein the extent of his interest in such patent. Such di claimer shall be in writing, attested by one or more witnes es,
and recorded in the Patent Office; and it shall thereafter be
considered as part of the original specification to the extent
of the interest possessed by the claimant and by those claiming
under him after the record thereof. But no such disclaimer
shall affect any action pending at the time of its being filed,
except so far as may relate to the question of unreasonable
neglect or delay in filing it." This 1s a specific statement to
the effect that the "patent shall be valid ,for all that part which
is truly and justly his own," without limitation to such part
as has been stated in a separate claim, valid in itself. In the
words of the statute, a claim would appear to be equally valid
whether it is that part of a single claim which is left after
pruning off the surplus and invalid parts, or is a claim, originally complete in itself, left after other excessive claims have
been removed. 301
300

s. :

R.
4917.
ao1 "Matters properly di claimed cease to be a part of the invention;

and it follows t at the construction of the patent must be the same as it
would be if such matters had never been included in the description of
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Even when a disclaimer has not been filed before suit, the

Even when a disclaimer has not been filed before suit, the
statute provides 302 that "Whenever, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any willful default, or intent
to defraud or mislead the public, a patentee has, in his specification, claimed to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part of the thing patented,
of which he was not the original and first inventor or discoverer, ever · such patentee, his executors, administrators,
and assigns, whether of the who e or an sectional interest in
the patent, may maintain a suit at law or i
·
infringement of any part~t::
h:.;
er:..:e:.:o:..:f~w:..:h.:.:i.ch
__.w_a~~lil&M\.-~-~~"-
i f it is a material an substantial part of the thing patented_,
and definitely distinguishaple from the parts claimed without
right, notwithstanding the specifications may embrace more
than that of which the patentee was the first inventor or discoverer. But in ever such case in which a jud ment or dee shall be rendered for the plaintt
no cost ha 1 be recovered .unless the ro er disclaimer has been entered at the
Patent Office before the commencement of the suit. But no
patentee s all be entitled to the benefits of this section if he
has unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter a disclaimer." 303
Failure to claim all that the patente.e might have been entitled to can not be corrected by means of disclaimer. That
is to say, a patentee can not under pretense of disclaiming

statute provides 302 that "Whenever, through inadvertence, ac-

cident, or mistake, and without any willful default, or intent

to defraud or mislead the public, a patentee has, in his specifi-

cation, claimed to be the original and first inventor or discov-

erer of any material or substantial part of the thing patented,

of which he was not the original and first inventor or dis-

coverer, every such patentee, his executors, administrators.

and assigns, whether of the whole or any sectional interest in

the patent, may maintain a suit at law or in equity, for the

infringement of any part thereof, which was bona fide, his own r

if it is a material and substantial part of the thing patented,

and definitely distinguishable from the parts claimed without

right, notwithstanding the specifications may embrace more

than that of which the patentee was the first inventor or dis-

coverer. But in every such case in which a judgment or de-

cree shall be rendered for the plaintiff, no costs shall be re-

covered unless the proper disclaimer has been entered at the
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Patent Office before the commencement of the suit But no

patentee shall be entitled to the benefits of this section if he

has unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter a disclaimer." 303

Failure to claim all that the patentee might have been en-

titled to can not be corrected by means of disclaimer. That

is to say, a patentee can not under pretense of disclaiming

the invention or the claims of the specification." Dunbar v. Meyers, 94

U. S. 187 ; Schwartzwalder v. New York Filter Co., 66 Fed. 152.

An interesting instance in which the patentee, in fear of proof of antici-

pation, disclaimed the only feature on which his patent could be upheld,

and thereby worked his own defeat is found in Brunswick, Balke, Col-

lender Co. v. Klumpp, 131 Fed. 255. Disclaimer not allowed to be'cor-

rected account of mistake, Hillborn v. Hale & Kilborn Mfg. Co., 66

302 R. S. 4922.

303 Failure to file a disclaimer does not become unreasonable until it is

evident on the face of the patent that it is too broad or until the decision

of a court has shown it to be necessary. Seymour v. McCormick, 19 How.

96; O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62; Gage v. Herring, 107 U. S. 640.

the invention or the claims of the specification." Dunbar v. Meyers, 94
U. S. 187; Schwartzwalder v. New York Filter Co., 66 Fed. 152.
-An interesting instance in which the patentee, in fear of proof of anticipation, disclaimed the only feature on which his patent could be upheld,
and thereby worked his own defeat is found in Brunswick, Balke, Collender Co. v. Klumpp, 131 Fed. 255. Disclai
ed to be corrected account of mistake, Hillborn v. Hale & Kilborn Mfg. Co., 66
Fed. 95 .
302 R. s. ~ 4922.
303 Failure to file a disclaimer does not become unreasonable until it is
evident on the face of the patent that it is too broad or until the decision
of a court has shown it to be necessary. Seymour v. McCormick, 19 How.
g6; O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62; Gage v. Herring, 107 U. S. 640.
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than it would have done in its original form. 304

5. REISSUE

Such failure to claim all that the invention included can be

corrected only by a reissue such as the statute provides for. 305

part of his claim so alter the rest a· to make it include more
than it would have done in its original form. 304

This provision is, "Whenever any patent is inoperative or in-

§ 5.

valid, by reason of a defective or insufficient specification, or

REISSUE

by reason of the patentee claiming as his own invention or dis-

covery more than he had a right to claim as new, if the error

has arisen by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without

any fraudulent or deceptive intention, the Commissioner shall,

on the surrender of such patent and the payment of the duty

required by law, cause a new patent for the same invention,

and in accordance with the corrected specification, to be issued

to the patentee, or, in case of his death or of an assignment

of the whole or any undivided part of the original patent, then

to his executors, administrators, or assigns, for the unexpired

part of the term of the original patent. Such surrender shall
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take effect upon the issue of the amended patent. The Com-

missioner may, in his discretion, cause several patents to be

issued for distinct and separate parts of the thing patented,

upon demand of the applicant, and upon payment of the re-

quired fee for a reissue for each of such reissued letters patent.

The specifications and claim in every such case shall be sub-

ject to revision and restriction in the same manner as original

applications are. Every patent so reissued, together with the

corrected specifications, shall have the same effect and opera-

tion in law, on the trial of all actions for causes thereafter

arising, as if the same had been originally filed in such cor-

rected form; but no new matter shall be introduced into the

specification, nor in case of a machine patent shall the model

or drawings be amended, except each by the other; but when

there is neither model nor drawing, amendments may be made

30 * Albany Steam Trap Co. v. Worthington, 76 Fed. 966; Hailes v. Al-

bany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582; Collins Co. v. Coes, 130 U. S. 56; Carnegie

Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403.

sos R. S. 4916.

Such failure to claim all that the invention included can be
corrected only by a reissue such as the statute provides for. 305
This provision is, "Whenever any patent is inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective or insufficient specification, or
by reason of the patentee claiming as his own invention or discovery more than he had a fight to claim as new, if the error
has arisen by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without
any fraudulent or deceptive intention, the Commissioner shall,
on the surrender of such patent an~ the payment of the duty
required by law, cause a new patent for the same invention,
and in accordance with the corrected specification, to be issued
to the patentee, or, in case of his death or of an assignment
of the whole or any undivided part of the original patent, then
to his executors, administrators, or assigns, for the unexpired
part of the term of the original patent. Such surrender shall
take effect upon the issue of the amended patent. The Commissioner may, in his discretion, cause several patents to be
issued for distinct and separate parts of the thing patented,
upon demand of the applicant, and upon payment of the required fee for a reissue for each of such reissued letters patent.
The specifications and claim in every such case shall be subject to revision and restriction in the same manner as original ·
applications are. Every patent so reissued, together with the
corrected specifications, shall have the same effect and operation in law, on the trial of all actions for causes thereafter
arising, as if the same had been originally filed in such corrected form; but no new matter shall be introduced into the
specification, nor in case of a machine patent shall the model
or drawings be amended, except each by the other; but when
there is neither model nor drawing, amendments may be made
304 Albany Steam Trap Co. v. Worthington, 76 Fed. 9(56; Hailes v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582; Collins Co. v. Coes, 130 U. S. 56; Carnegie
Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403.
305 R. s. § 4916.

E

u

'E S

IA

Correcting Patent

Correcting Patent 199

199

upon proof satisfactory to the Commissioner that such new

matter or amendment was a part of the original invention, and

was omitted from the specification by inadvertence, accident,

or mistake, as aforesaid."

It will be observed that this section provides for a reissue

only when an existing patent is "inoperative or invalid," by

reason of the deficiency in specification, etc. It does not, in

terms, cover the case of a patent which is perfectly valid and

effective, but which, because of the mistake in specification,

etc., does not give the patentee all of the protection which he

might have had if he had properly claimed it. The right to

a reissue originated, however, prior to any specific statutory

provision, as a judicial interpretation of the spirit of the law

as a whole. This appears in the case of Grant v. Raymond. 306

Grant had secured a patent which, through inadvertency, was

so vague and inaccurate in its specification as to be ineffective.

On discovering this he petitioned the Secretary of State to

issue a new patent, containing a correct description of his in-
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vention and a valid claim which should protect him for the

unexpired part of his term, and to cancel the old patent. This

the Secretary did although no part of the Patent Statute spe-

cifically authorized it. Grant then sued Raymond for in-

fringement of his reissued patent, and the defense was that

there was no authority for the second, the corrected patent,

and that it was void. A number of very practical objections

to even authorized reissue were also raised. The court held,

however, that although there was no specific authority, the

reissued patent was good. Chief Justice Marshall, in deliver-

ing the opinion, said, "If the mistake should be committed in

the. department of state, no one would say that it ought not to

be corrected. All would admit that a new patent, correcting

the error, and which would secure to the patentee the benefits

which the law intended to secure, ought to be issued. And yet

the act does not in terms authorize a new patent, even in this

case. Its emanation is not founded on the words of the law,

but is indispensably necessary to the faithful execution of the

306 6 Peters 218 (1832).

upon proof satisfactory to the Commissioner that such new
matter or amendment was a part of the original invention, and
was omitted from the specification by inadvertence, accident,
or mistake, as aforesaid. '
It will be observed that this section provides for a reissue
only when an existing patent i:s "inoperative or invalid," by
reason of the deficiency in specification, etc. It does not, in terms, cover the case of a patent which is perfectly valid and
effective, but which, because of the mistake in specification,
etc., does not give the patentee all of the protection which he
might have had if he had properly claimed it. The right to
a reissue originated, however, prior to any specific statutory
provision, as a judicial interpretation of the spirit of the law
as a whole. This appears in the case of Grant v. Raymond. 306
Grant had secured a patent which, through inadvertency, was
so vague and inaccurate in its specification as to be ineffective.
On discovering this he petitioned the Secretary of State to
issue a new patent, containing a correct description of his invention and a valid claim which should protect him for the
unexpired part of his term, and to cancel the old patent. This
the Secretary did although no part of the Patent Statute spe~
cifically authorized it. Grant then sued Raymond for infringement of his reissued patent, and the defense was that
there was no authority for the second, the corrected patent,
and that it was void. A number of very practical objections
to even authorized reissue were also raised. The court held,
however, that although there was no specific authority, the
reissued patent was good. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion, said, "If the mistake should be committed in
the .department of state, no one would say that it ought not to
be corrected. All would admit that a new patent, correcting
the error, and which would secure to the patentee the benefits
which the law intended to secure, ought to be issued. And yet
the act does not in terms authorize a new patent, even in this
case. Its emanation is not founded on the words of the law,
but is indispensably rn:cessary to the faith£ ul execution of the
306

6 Peters 218 ( 1832).
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solemn promise made by the United States. Why should not
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the same step be taken for the same purpose, if the mistake

solemn promise made by the United States. Why should not
the same step be taken for the same purpose, if the mistake
has been innocently committed by the inventor himself? . . .
The great object and intention of the act is to secure to the
public the advantages to be derived from the discoveries of
individuals, and the means it employs is the compensation
made to those individuals for the time and labor devoted to
these discoveri~s, by the exclusive right to make, use and sell,
the things discovered for a limited time. That which gives
complete effect to this object and intention, by employing the
same means for the correction of inadvertent error which are
direc..ted in the first instance_, cannot, we think, be a departure
from the spirit and character of the act. . . . The communication of the discovery has been made in pursuance of law,
with the intent to exercise a privilege which is the consideration paid by the public for the future use of the machine. If,
by an innocent mistake, the instrument introduced to secure
this privilege fails in its object, the public ought not to avail
itself of this mistake, and to appropriate the discovery without paying the stipulated consideration. The attempt would
be disreputable in an individual, and a court of equity might
interpose to restrain him." 307
The original patent in that case appears to have been actually inoperative and ineffective to give any protection. But
the reasoning on which the court proceeded would equally well
sustain the correction of a patent which, while in fact operative, did not protect the inventor as fully as his invention entitled him to be protected. And the courts do extend it to
just such cases. Thus in Wilson v. Coon 308 it was contended
that the reissued patent was void because the origjnal was in

has been innocently committed by the inventor himself? . ,,

The great object and intention of the act is to secure to the

public the advantages to be derived from the discoveries of

individuals, and the means it employs is the compensation

made to those individuals for the time and labor devoted to

these discoveries, by the exclusive right to make, use and sell,

the things discovered for a limited time. That which gives

complete effect to this object and intention, by employing the

same means for the correction of inadvertent error which are

directed in the first instance, cannot, we think, be a departure

from the spirit and character of the act. . . . The communi-

cation of the discovery has been made in pursuance of law,

with the intent to exercise a privilege which is the considera-

tion paid by the public for the future use of the machine. If,

by an innocent mistake, the instrument introduced to secure

this privilege fails in its object, the public ought not to avail
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itself of this mistake, and to appropriate the discovery with-

out paying the stipulated consideration. The attempt would

be disreputable in an individual, and a court of equity might

interpose to restrain him." 307

The original patent in that case appears to have been actu-

ally inoperative and ineffective to give any protection. But

the reasoning on which the court proceeded would equally well

sustain the correction of a patent which, while in fact opera-

tive, did not protect the inventor as fully as his invention en-

titled him to be protected. And the courts do extend it to

just such cases. Thus in Wilson v. Coon 308 it was contended

that the reissued patent was void because the original was in

307 The court also answers the practical objections that to allow a reissue

for mistake would vest judicial power in the Secretary of State, and that

the reissue would retroact upon persons who had lawfully taken ad-

vantage of the failure to protect the invention. That a reissue may be

granted to correct a mistake of the Patent Office itself, as suggested in

Grant v. Raymond, see, Railway Register Co. v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed.

593. In Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 383, a reissue was allowed to correct

a mistake, not in the specification but in the drawings.

3086 Fed. 611.

3o1 The court also answers the practical objections that to allow a reissue
for mistake would vest judicial power in the Secretary of State, and that
the reissue would retroact upon persons who had lawfully taken advantage of the failure to protect the invention. That a reissue may be
granted to correct a mistake of the Patent Office itself, as suggested in
Grant v. Raymond, see, Railway Register Co. v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed.
593. In Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 383, a reissue W'.lS allowed to correct
a mistake, not in the specification but in the drawings.
3 0 8 6 Fed. 6n.
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fact valid and operative. But the court rejected the proposi-

tion, saying, "a patent may be inoperative from a defective or

insufficient description, because it fails to claim as much as

was really invented, and yet the claim may be a valid claim,

sustainable in law, and there may be a description valid and

sufficient to support such claim. In one sense such patent is

operative and is not inoperative. Yet it is inoperative to ex-

tend to or claim the real invention, and the description may

be defective or insufficient to support a claim to the real in-

vention, although the drawings and model show the things in

respect to which the defect or insufficiency of description ex-

ists, and show enough to warrant a new claim to the real in-

vention. It can never be held, as it never has been held, in a

case where the point arose for decision; that a patent can not

be reissued where a suit could be sustained on the specifica-

tion and claim as they are." 309

INADVERTENCE, ACCIDENT, OR MISTAKE are essential in the

justification for a reissue. The whole theory of a reissue is
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the correction of such an error only. If the inventor has_de-

liberately omitted matter \vhich he knew belonged in his speci-

fication and claim, he will be presumed to have intended not

to clairnjt and to have abandoned it to the public. 310 "A clear

mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording of the claim

is necessary.'" 311 What amounts to inadvertence or mistake

depends upon the circumstances. It should be noted however

that the question will be much more strictly examined when

the attempt is to expand the claim (as discussed in the follow-

309 "TO justify a reissue it is not necessary that the patent should be

wholly inoperative or invalid. It is sufficient if it fail to secure to the

patentee all of that which he has invented and claimed," Hobbs v. Beach,

180 U. S. 383, 394; Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350; American etc. Co.

v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456.

310 For further discussion of this point see the topic Abandonment.

311 Parker, etc. Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87, 103 ; "Where it is

apparent on the face of the patent, or by contemporary records, that no

such inadvertence, accident, or mistake, as claimed in a reissue of it,

could have occurred, an expansion of the claim cannot be allowed or sus-

tained," James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 371 ; Stafford Co. v. Coldwell

Co., 202 Fed. 744. See also the cases cited in the following paragraphs.

fact valid and operative. But the court ~ejected the proposition, saying, "a patent may be inoperative from a defective or
insufficient description, because it fails to claim as much as
was really invented, and yet the claim may be a valid claim,
sustainable in law, and there may be a description valid and
sufficient to . support such claim. In one sense such patent i's
operative and is not inoperative. Yet it is inoperative to extend to or daim the real invention, and the description may
be defective or insufficient to support a claim to the real invention, although the drawings and model show the things in
respect to which the defect or insufficiency of description exists, and show enough to warrant a new claim to the real invention. It can never be held, as it never has been held, in a
case where the point arose for decision; tliat a patent can not
be reissued where a sult could be sustained on the specifica·
tion and claim as they are." 309
INADVERTENCE, ACCIDENT, OR MISTAKE are essential in the
justification for a reissue. The whole theory of a reissue is
the correction of such an error only. If the inventor has deonged in his speciliberately omitted matter which he .knew
ficat10n an·d claim, he will be presumed . 0 ave mten ea not
to claim it and t have aban oneCi 1t to fhe public. 310 "A clear
mistake, inadvertently committed, in the wording o·f the claim
is necessary. " 311 What amounts to inadvertence or mistake
depends upon the circumstances. It should be noted however
that the question will be much more strictly examined when
the attempt is to expand the claim (as discussed in the follow309 "To justify a reissue it is not necessary that . the patent should be
wholly inoperative or invalid. It is sufficient if it fail to secure to the
patentee all of that which he has invented and claimed," Hobbs v. Beach,
18o U. S. 383, 394; Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350; American etc. Co.
v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456.
3lO For further discussion 0f this point see the topic Abandonment.
311 Parker, etc. Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87, 103; "Where it is
apparent on the face of the patent, or by .contemporary records, that no
such inadvertence, accident, or mistake, as claimed in a reissue of it,
could have occurred, an expansion of the claim cannot be allowed or sustained," James ·V. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 371; Stafford Co. v. Coldwe11
Co., 202 Fed. 744. See also the cases cited in the following paragraphs.

Ori inal fr m

E

ll IVE S

0

CAU 0

ft.J

fo.

2O2 Patents and Inventions

202

ing paragraphs) than when it is only to perfect, without broad-
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ening, an existing patent. 312

ing paragraphs) thap when it is only to perfect, without broadening, an existing patent. 312
It seems to be a generally accepted rule that courts will not
a tents that the
review the dee · oi ·the Commissioner o
d feet was it?- act the result of mistake and inadvertence, if
the pur ose of the reissue is only to pe
ction
which the original purported to grant and not to enlarge the
scope of the protection. There is a great deal of conflict and
more confusion upon the question of review. Many cases say
specifically that the Commissioner's finding of mistake, etc.,
will not be reviewed; many more say that, on one ground or
another, it will be reviewed. So far as the confusion can be
cleared at all, the weight of opinion seems to be that where the
reissue does not ive any wider scope of protection than the
ori inal claimed, the decision will not be reviewed; but if the
reissue enlarges the claimed protection the courts will review
the question of mistake etc. if there seems to be any real
oubt of the matter. 313
PURPOSE OF REISSUE. The statute authorizes a reissue only
in cases where the specification is defective or ins~fficient, or
the c aim is for more than t e Inventor is entlt e o.
ut the
reasonmg o
e ec1sion in Grant v. Raymon , supra, that a
reissue might be had independently of statute, justifies it for
purposes other than those stated in the statute. It has become a settled rule that reissues may be had for the purpose
of expanding original patents which, through mistake and inadvertence, claimed less than the inventor was entitled to. "If
a patentee who has no corrections to suggest in his specification except to make his claim broader and more comprehen-

It seems to be a generally accepted rule that courts will not

review the decision of -the Commissioner of Patents that the

defect was in fact the result of mistake and inadvertence, if

the purpose of the reissue is only to perfect the protection

which the original purported to grant and not to enlarge the

scope of the protection. There is a great deal of conflict and

more confusion upon the question of review. Many cases say

specifically that the Commissioner's finding of mistake, etc.,

will not be reviewed; many more say that, on one ground or

another, it will be reviewed. So far as the confusion can be

cleared at all, the weight of opinion seems to be that where the

reissue does not give any wider scope of protection than the

original claimed, the decision will not be reviewed ; but if the

reissue enlarges the claimed protection the courts will review

the question of mistake, etc., if there seems to be any real

douBt of lhe~matter. 313
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PURPOSE OF REISSUE. The statute authorizes a reissue only

in cases where the specification is defective or insufficient, or

the claim is for more than the inventor is entitled to. But the

reasoning of the decision in Grant v. Raymond, supra, that a

reissue might be had independently of statute, justifies it for

purposes other than those stated in the statute. It has be-

come a settled rule that reissues may be had for the purpose

of expanding original patents which, through mistake and in-

advertence, claimed less than the inventor was entitled to. "If

a patentee who has no corrections to suggest in his specifica-

tion except to make his claim broader and more comprehen-

312 As to what constitutes mistake, etc., see Autopiano Co. v. American

Player Co., 222 Fed. 276; Morey v. Lockwood, 8 Wall. 230; James v.

Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Yale Lock Co. v. James, 125 U. S. 477; American

etc. Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456; Money weight Co. v. Toledo Scale Co.,

187 Fed. 826.

sis "This court will not review the decision of the Commissioner upon

the question of inadvertence, accident or mistake, unless the matter is

manifest from the record," Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 383, 395, quoting

from ToplifT v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 171; Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S.

354-

312 As to what constitutes mistake, etc., see Autopiano Co. v. American
Player Co., 222 Fed. 276; Morey v. Lockwood, 8 Wall. 230; James v.
Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Yale Lock Co. v. James, 125 U. S. 477; American
etc. Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456; Moneyweight Co. v. Toledo Scale Co.,
187 Fed. 826.
31 3 "This court will not review the decision of the Commissioner upon
the question of inadvertence, accident or mistake, unles s the matter is
manifest from the record," Hobbs v. ~·each, l8o U. S. 383, 395, quoting
from Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. i56, 171 ; 'Mahn v. Harwood, l 12 U. S.
354.
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sive, uses due diligence in returning to the Patent Office, and

says, 'I omitted this/ or, 'my solicitor did not understand that,'

his application may be entertained, and, on a proper showing,

correction may be made." 314

It is this right to have a reissue for the purpose of enlarging

the scope of protection afforded, as well as for perfecting that

originally claimed, which has caused much of the confusion

of statement in regard to reissues. If the original patent actu-

ally claimed a certain breadth of protection, but the specifica-

tion upon which the claim was based was inaccurate, or de-

scribed so much as to be vague, or had some such defect, there

could not be the objection, and the necessity for close scrutiny

in allowing a reissue, that there would be if the patentee were

trying to secure something which he did not even attempt to

claim in the original. In the latter case the courts will scrutin-

ize the grounds for the reissue most carefully. To quote fur-

ther from Miller v. Brass Co. 315 -"We think it clear that it

was not the special purpose of the legislation on this subject
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to authorize the surrender of patents for the purpose of re-

issuing them with broader and more comprehensive claims,

although, under the general terms of the law, such a reissue

may be made where it clearly appears that an actual mistake

has inadvertently been made. But by a curious misapplication

of the law it has come to be principally resorted to for the

purpose of enlarging and expanding patent claims. And the

evils which have grown from the practice have assumed large

proportions. Patents have been so expanded and idealized,

years after their first issue, that hundreds and thousands of

mechanics and manufacturers, who had just reason to suppose

that the field of action was open, have been obliged to dis-

314 Miller v. Brass Co. 104 U. S. 350, 352; Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S.

156, 170; while it is clear that a reissue for the purpose of broadening

claims would be permissible on the authority of Grant v. Raymond, supra,

and this seems the real authority, the case of American etc. Co., v. Porter,

232 Fed. 456, brings such a re-issue under the statute by saying that

"specification" includes "claim" and therefore a too limited claim is an

"insufficient specification."

315 104 U. S. 350.

sive, uses due diligence in returning to the Patent Office, and
says, 'I omitted this,' or, 'my solicitor did not understand that,'
his application may be entertained, and, on a pr.aper showing,
correction may be made. " 314
. It is this right to have a reissue for the purpose of enlarging
the scope of protection afforded, as well as for perfecting that
originally claimed, which has caused much of the confusion
of statement in regard to reissues. If the original patent actually claimed a certain breadth of protection, but the specification upon which the claim was based was inaccurate, or described so much as to be vague, or had some such defect, there
could not be the objection, and the necessity for close scrutiny
in allowing a reissue, that the~e would be if the pateritee were
trying to secure something which he did not even attempt to
claim in the original. In the latter case the courts will scrutinize the grounds for the reissue most carefully. To quote further from Miller v. Br-ass Co. 315 . "We think it clear that it
was not the special purpose of the legislation on this subject
to authorize the surrender of patents for the purpose of reissuing them with broader and mor:e comprehensive claims,
although, under the general terms of the law, such a reissue
may be made where it clearly appears that an actual mistake
has inadvertently been made. But by a curious misapplication
of the law i~ has come to be principally resorted to for the
pu~pose of enlarging and expanding patent claims. And the
evils which have grown from the practice have assumed large
proportions. Patents have been so expanded and idealized,
years after their first issue, that hundreds and thousands of
mechanics and manufacturers, who had just reason to· suppose
that the field of action was open, have been obliged to disMiller v. Brass Co. 104 U. S. 350, 352; Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S.
156, 170; while it is clear that a reissue for the purpose of broadening
claims would be permissible on the authority of Grant v. Raymond, supra,
and this seems the real authority, the case of American etc. Co., v. Porter,
232 Fed. 456, brings such a re-issue under the statute by saying that
"specification" includes "claim" and therefore a too limited claim is an
"insufli<;ient specification."
315 104 u. s. 350.
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continue their employments, or to pay an enormous tax for
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continuing them. Now whilst, as before stated, we do not

continue their employments, or to pay an enormous tax for
continuing them. Now whilst, as before stated, we do not
deny that a claim may be enlarged in a reissued patent, we
are of opinion that this can only be done when an actual mistake has occurred; not from a mere error of judgment (for
that may be rectified by appeal), but a real bona fide mistake,
inadvertently committed· such as a Court of Chancery, in
cases within its ordinary jurisdidion, would correct. Reissues
for the enlargement of claims should be the exception and not
the rule.''
TlIE REISS
T .BE FOR THE SAME INVENTION as the
original. · It is no
patent but a correction of one already is ued wh~ch did not protect the invention for "' ich it
was issued. "Two leadino- and imperative requirements stand
in the path of a reissue; First, that the error must have arisen,
'b inadvertence accident, or mistake'; and, second, that the
new paten · to
ur the ' ame iuvenf n.' Consequently,
it must appear, in some manner provided by law, that the invention for which the reissue is granted was in the contempla..:
tion of the patentee at the outset. . . . " 316
That the new matter claimed in the reissue was really a part
of the original invention mvst be hown, said the same court,
by "clear and positive proof, in harmony with the universal
- rules of equity not to disturb the existing statu except by
proof of that character. No mere inference can take the
place of such proof. Ordinarily, ~hat is called for by the
words 'same invention' should appear in some way on the face
of the original patent, and it cannot be gathered from mere
inferences or suggestions with reference to what the patentee
might or might not have conceived. ' To determine just what
was the scope of the orio-inal invention, beyond what was originally claimed~ i an extremely difficult propo ition. The natt1ral tendency of the human mind is to look at any invention
in the light of later progress, and to ascribe to an inventor
that which to later and more completely educated minds seems

deny that a claim may be enlarged in a reissued patent, we

are of opinion that this can only be done when an actual mis-

take has occurred; not from a mere error of judgment (for

that may be rectified by appeal), but a real bona fide mistake,

inadvertently committed; such as a Court of Chancery, in

cases within its ordinary jurisdiction, would correct. Reissues

for the enlargement of claims should be the exception and not

the rule."

THE REISSUE M^JST BE FOR THE SAME INVENTION as the

original. " It is not a new patent, but a correction of one al-

ready issued w^h'.ch did not protect the invention for which it

was issued. "Two leading and imperative requirements stand

in the path of a reissue ; First, that the error must have arisen,

'by inadvertence, accident, or mistake' ; and, second, that the

new patent is to be for the 'same invention/ Consequently,

it must appear, in some manner provided by law, that the in-
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vention for which the reissue is granted was in the contempla-

tion of the patentee at the outset. . . ," 316

That the new matter claimed in the reissue was really a part

of the original invention must be shown, said the same court,

by "clear and positive proof, in harmony with the universal

rules of equity net to disturb the existing status except by

proof of that character. No mere inferences can take the

place of such proof. Ordinarily, what is called for by the

words 'same invention' should appear in some way on the face

of the original patent, and it cannot be gathered from mere

inferences or suggestions with reference to what the patentee

might or might not have conceived." To determine just what

was the scope of the original invention, beyond what was origi-

nally claimed^ is an extremely difficult proposition. The nat-

ural tendency of the human mind is to look at any invention

in the light of later progress, and to ascribe to an inventor

that which to later and more completely educated minds seems

316 Stafford Co. v. Coldwell Co., 202 Fed. 744 ; McDowell v. Ideal Con-

crete Co., 187 Fed. 814; Parker v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87, citing

much authority.

ai Stafford Co. v. Coldwell Co., 202 Fed. 744; McDowell v. Ideal Concrete Co., 187 Fed. 814; Parker v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87, citing
much authority.
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so obvious that he could not but have known it. The inventor

himself is still more inclined to believe that he knew and fore-

saw at the time of his invention all that subsequent experience

has taught him. Therefore, "if enlargement is to come, not

from evidence contained in the original patent (or in the pro-

ceedings to obtain it), but from what the inventor subsequently

says (truthfully or untruthfully) was in his mind prior to

filing the original application, a region of danger, of tempta-

tion to fraud and deception, would be opened wide. . . ." ?17

The statement of the court first quoted is, that "ordinarily" all

that is covered by the reissue "should appear in some way on

the face of the original patent." While there are a number of

decisions which do not absolutely require this, the later Su-

preme Court decisions refuse to allow any claim in a reissue,

the substance of which is not at least shadowed in the original

application. 318 A real workable understanding of what the

317 M'Dowell v. Ideal etc. Co., 187 Fed. 814, 821.

318 A full discussion of this matter is found in Parker v. Yale Clock
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Co. 123 U. S. 87; Yale Lock Co. v. James, 125 U. S. 447; "If the claims of

the reissue are limited, as they must be, to the specific mechanism de-

scribed in the specification . . ." Electric Gas Co. v. Boston Elec. Co.,

139 U. S. 481, 503; Freeman v. Asmus, 145 U. S. 226; "It is settled by

the authorities that to warrant new and broader claims in a reissue, such

claims must not be merely suggested or indicated in the original specifi-

cation, drawings or models, but it must further appear from the original

patent that they constitute parts or portions of the invention which were

intended or sought to be covered or secured by such original patent. It

is also settled by the authorities that in applications for reissue the patentee

is not allowed to incorporate or secure claims covering or embracing

what had been previously rejected upon his original application," Corbin

Lock Co. v. Eagle Co., 150 U. S. 38, 42; American etc. Co. v. Porter,

232 Fed. 456, "The further and last statutory condition is that the reissue

must be for "the same invention." It is true that, for purposes of de-

termining infringement, the identity of the patented invention is fixed by

the claims ; but to apply the same test to identity of invention as between

original and reissue loses sight of the difference between the real inven-

tion and the originally patented invention, and unless there is such a dif-

ference, there is no occasion for reissue. To recognize that difference

and permit it to be corrected is the whole purpose of the reissue statute;

and so it seems quite destructive of the statute to assume that the identity

of the actual invention is permanently declared and fixed by the form

so obvious that he could not but have known it. The inventor
himself is still more inclined to believe that he knew and foresaw at the time of his invention all that subsequent experience
has taught him. Therefore, "if enlargement is to come, not
from evidence contained in the original patent (or in the proceedings to obtain it)' but from what the inventor subsequently
says (truthfully or untruthfully) was in his mind prior to
filing the original application, a region of danger, of temptation to fraud and deception, would be opened wide . . . . "P 7
The statement of the ·cou!t first quoted is, that "ordinarily '~ all
that is covered by the reissue "should appear in some · way on
the face of the original patent." While there are a number of
decisions which do not absolutely require this, the later Supreme Court decisions ref use to allow any claim in a reissue,
the substance of which is not at least shadowed in the original
application. 318 A real · workable understanding of what the
.
.
M'Dowell v. Ideal etc. Co., 187 Fed. 814, 821.
3 18 A full · discussion of this matter is found in Parker v. Yale Clock
Co. 123 U . .s. 87; Yale Lock Co. v. James, 125 U. S. 447; "If the claims of
the reissue are limited, as they must be, to the specific mechanism described in the specification ... " Electric Gas .Co. v. Boston Elec. Co.,
139 U. S. 481, 503; Freeman v. Asmus, 145 U. S. 226; "It is settled by
the authorities that to warrant new and broader claims in a . reissue, such
claims must not be merely suggested or indicated in the original specification~ drawings or models, but it must further appear from the original
patent that they constitute parts or portions of the invention which were
. intended or sought to be covered or secured by such original patent. It
is also settled by the authorities that in applications for reissue the patentee
is not allowed to incorporate or secure claims covering or embracing
what had been previously rejected upon his original application," Corbin
Lock Co. v. Eagle Co., 150 U. S. 38, 42; American etc. Co. v. Porter1
232 Fed. 456, "The further and last statutory condition is that the reissue
must be for "the same invention." It is true that, for purposes of determining infringement, the identity of the patented invention is. fixed by
the claims; but to apply the same test to identity of invention as between
original and reissue loses sight of the difference between the real invention and the originally patented invention, and · unless there is such a difference, there is · no occasion for reissue. To recognize that difference
and permit it to be corrected is the whole purpose of the reissue statute;
and so it seems quite destru€tive of the statute to assume that the identity
of the actual invention is permanently declared and fixed -by the , form
311
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can be had only in study and comparison of the cases them-

selves, much more fully than can be set out in a text book. The

presumption is in favor of the validity of the reissue, as it is

in favor of the validity of any patent, and the original must

be introduced in evidence as the basis of an attack. 319

THE TIME WITHIN WHICH A REISSUE MUST BE ASKED is not

limited by the statute in any way, although of course there

would be^iT>-porririn a reissue after the term of the original

had expired. Where the reissue is sought- for the purposes

specified in the statute, namely, to correct a defective or in-

sufficient specification, or to narrow the claim, there could be

no real objection to its being granted at any time. 320 But as we

have seen, the right to a reissue for the purpose of broadening

a claim appears to be founded on judicial interpretation of the

general law, not on specific statute. There might well be ob-

jection to broadening a patent after the lapse of time; and the

same judicial authority which inaugurates the right can of
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course limit it. The Supreme Court, accordingly, has limited

the time, within which a reissue for the purpose of broaden-

ing claims may be had, to what is reasonable under all the cir-

cumstances. In Miller v. Brass Co., 321 the court says, "Re-

issues lor the ejjlagement of claims should be the exception

and not-4h~rie. And when, if a claim is too narrow,' that

is, if it does not contain all that the patentee is entitled to,

the defect is apparent on the face of the patent, and can be dis-

which the original claims are inadvertently allowed to take. In the same

way as with reference to mistake, the question of identity is submitted to

the Patent Office, and for the same reason its conclusion is to be taken

as prima facie right. The last sentence of section 53 even permits the

Patent Office, in certain cases, to go entirely outside the record to de-

termine what the original invention was. It follows that only when it is

clear that the reissue is not for the same invention are the courts justified

in reaching that conclusion ; and we take this to be the rule of the decis-

ions hereinafter cited."

319 Seymour v. Osborne, n Wall. 516; Second reissue may be compared

directly with the original, Hoskin v. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217; But cf. post.

320 Accord, Sewing-Machine Co. v. Frame, 24 Fed. 596.

* 104 U. S. 350.

courts will recognize as indicated in the original application,
can be had only in study and comparison of the cases themselves, much more fully than can be set out in a text book. The
presumption is in favor of the validity of the reissue, as it is
in favor of the validity of any .patent, and the original must
be introduced in evidence as the basis of an attack. 319
THE TIME WITHIN WHICH A REISSUE MUST BE ASKED is not
limited by the statute in any way, although of course there
would be
· m a reissue after the term of the original
had expired. W ere t
Y
seught- for
poses
specifi
in the statute, namely, to correct a defective or insufficient specification, or to narrow the claim, there could be
no real obj ec ion to its being granted at any time. 320 But as we
have seen, the rig t to a reissue for the purpose of broa ening
a claim a ears to Ee founded on judicial interpretation of the
general law, not on specific .statu.te. There might well be objection to broadening a patent after the lapse of time; and the
same judicial authority which inaugurates the rig!it can of
course limit it. The Supreme Court, accordingly, ha·s limited
the time, within which a reissue for the purpose of broadening claims may be had, to what is reasonable under all the circumstances. In Miller v. Brass Co., 321 the court says, "Re~~-T-f'.'lf-"-f""l'+h-1-T--uement of claims hould be th exception
an
And when, if a claim is too narrow,.--that
is, if it does not contain all that the patentee is entitled to,the defect is apparent on the face of the: patent, and can .be diswhich the original claims are inadvertently allowed to take. In the same
way as with reference to mistake, the question of identity is submitted to
the Patent Office, and for the same reason its conclusion is to be taken
as prima facie right. The last sentence of section 53 even permits the
Patent Office, in certain cases, to go entirely outside the record to determine what the original invention was. It follows that only when it is
clear that the reissue is not for the same invention are the courts justified
in reaching that conclusion; and we take this to be the rule of the decisions hereinafter cited."
319 Seymour v. Osborne, II Wall. 516; Second reissue may be compared
direct]y with the original, Hoskin v. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217; But cf. post.
a20 Accord, Sewing-Machine Co. v. Frame, 24 Fed. 596.
321
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covered as soon as that document is taken out of its envelope

and opened, there can be no valid excuse for delay in asking

to have it corrected. Every independent 'inventor, every me-

chanic, every citizen, is affected by such delay, and by the issue

of a new patent with a broader and more comprehensive claim.

The granting of a reissue for such a purpose, after an un-

reasonable delay, is clearly an abuse of the power to grant re-

issues, and may justly be declared illegal and void. It will not

do for the patentee to wait until other inventors have pro-

duced new forms of improvement, and then, with the -new

light thus acquired, under pretence of inadvertence and mis-

take, apply for such an enlargement of his claim as to make

it embrace these new forms. Such a process of expansion

carried on indefinitely, without regard to lapse of time, would

operate most unjustly against the public, and is totally un-

authorized by the law. In such a case, even he who has rights,

and sleeps upon them, justly loses them. The correction of a

patent by means of a reissue, where it is invalid or inoperative
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for want of a full and clear description of the invention, can-

not be attended with such injurious results as follow from

the enlargement of the claim. And hence a reissue may be

proper in such cases, though a longer period has elapsed since

the issue of the original patent. But in reference to reissues

made for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the patent,

the rule of laches should be strictly applied ; and no one should

be relieved who has slept upon his rights, and has thus led the

public to rely on the implied disclaimer involved in the terms

of the original patent. And when this is a matter apparent

on the face of the instrument, upon a mere comparison of the

original patent with the reissue, it is competent for the courts

to decide whether the delay was unreasonable, and whether the

reissue was therefor contrary to law and void." 322

Since the matter depends upon circumstance, it is obvious

that there can be no arbitrary length of time after which the

right to a reissue will be automatically lost. A rule of pre-

322 Reiterated, Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354.

covered as soon as that document is taken out of its envelope
and opened, there can be no valid excuse for delay in asking
to have it corrected. Every independent "inventor, every mechanic, every citizen is affected by such delay, .and by the issue
of a new patent with a broader and more comprehensive claim.
The granting of a reissue for such a purpose, after an unreasonable delay, is clearly an abuse of the power to grant reissues, and may justly be declared illegal and void. It will not
do for the patentee to wait until other inventors have produced new forms of improvement, and then, with the· new
light thus acquired, under pretence of inadvertence and mistake, apply for such an enlargement of his claim as to make
it embrace these new forms. Such a process of expansion
carried on indefinitely, without regard to lapse of time, would
operate most unjustly against the public, and is totally ·unauthorized by the law. In such a case, even he who has rights,
and sleeps upon them, justly loses them. The correction of a
patent by means of a reissue, where it is invalid or inoperative
for want of a full and clear descripti.on of the invention, cannot be attended with such injurious results as · follow from
the enlargement of the claim. And hence a reissue may be
proper in such cases, though a longer period has elapsed since'
the issue of the original patent. But in reference to reissues
made for the purpo e of enlarging the scope of the patent,
the rule of !aches should be strictly applied; and no one should
be relieved who has slept upon his rights, and has thus led the
public to rely on the implied disclaimer involved in the terms
of the original patent. And when this is a matter apparent
on the face of the instrument, upon a mere comparison of the
original patent with the reissue, it is competent for the courts
to decide whether the delay was unreasonable, and whether the
reissue was therefor contrary to law and void. " 322
Since the matter depends upon circumstance, it is obvious
that there can be no arbitrary length of time after which the
right to a reissue will be automatically lost. A rule of pre3

22

Reiterated, Mahn v. Harwood,
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sumption was stated, however, in Topliff v. Topliff, 323 as fol-

lows : ''due diligence must be exercised in discovering the mis-

sumption wa stated, however in Topliff v. Topliff, 323 as follows: due diligence must be exerci ed in discovering the mistaJke in the original· patent and if it be sought for the purpose of enla.rging the claim, the lap e of two year will ordinarily, though not always be treated as evidence of an abandonment of the new matter to the public to the same extent
that a failure by the inventor to apply for a patent within two
years from the public u e or sale of his invention i regarded
by the statute as conclusive evidence of an abandonment of the
invention to the public. 324 But while it thu appears that the
presumption of invalidity does not begin to run until two years
have passed, a much shorter time than thi may demonstrate
such unjustified delay as will bar the r.ight to a rei ue. 32 5
THE INVENTIVE QUALITY of the matter covered by the reissue will as in the case of all invention , be con idered a of

take in the original'patent, and, if it be sought for the pur-

pose of enlarging the claim, the lapse of two years will ordi-

narily, though not always, be treated as evidence of an aban-

donment of the new matter to the public to the same extent

that a failure by the inventor to apply for a patent within two

years from the public use or sale of his invention is regarded

by the statute as conclusive evidence of an abandonment of the

invention to the public." 324 But while it thus appears that the

presumption of invalidity does not begin to run until two years

have passed, a much shorter time than this may demonstrate

such unjustified delay as will bar the right to a reissue. 321

THE INVENTIVE QUALITY of the matter covered by the re-

issue will, as in the case of all inventions, be considered as of

S23 145 U. S. 156, 171.

324 "Where a reissue expands the claims of the original patent, and it

appears that there was a delay of two years, or more, in applying for it,
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the delay invalidates the reissue, unless accounted for and shown to be

reasonable." Hoskin v. Fisher, 125 U. S. 217, quoting Wollensak v Reiher,

115 U. S. g6; American, etc. Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456. "By the issue of

a patent, the inventor dedicates to the public everything which he does not

"claim as his monopoly. Upon this dedication, the public has a right to rely,

and if members of the public devote time and money to the manufacture

of a device which the inventor has so dedicated, or to the devising, in-

a.23 145 U. S. 156, 171.
324 "Where a reissue expands the claims of the original patent, and it
appear that there was a delay of two years, or more, in applying for it,
the delay invalidates the reissue, unless accounted for and shown to be
reasonable." Hoskin v. Fis.her, 125 U. S. 217, quoting Wollensak v Reiher,
II5 U. S. ~6; American etc. Co. v. Porter, 232 Fed. 456. "By the is ue of
a patent, the inventor dedicates to the public everythin~ which he does not
'claim as his monopoly. Upon this dedication, the public has a right to rely,
and if members of the public devote time and money to the manufacture
of a device which the inventor ha so dedicated, or to the devising, inventing and patenting of structures which embody such a feature, it may
be presumed that this is done upon the faith of the dedication; and o
the inventor may not be permitted thereafter to enlarge hi monopoly to
the prejudice of these . new rights,-even though, except for them, the
reissue would be permissible. The ettled doctrine has come to' be that
from a delay of more than two years, and in the absence of any sufficient
contrary evidence, these fatal intervening rights (public or private) will
be pre urned; in the presence of less delay, they must be proved. But
see White v. Dunbar, n9 U. S. 47, 52, 7 Sup. Ct. 72, 30 L. Ed. 303, and
Milloy Co. v. Thompson Co. ( C. C. A.) 148 Fed. 843, 847, 78 C. C. A. 533."
3 2 5 The authorities on the matter of time allowed are not a
numerou.
as they appear to be. In many cases in which it is said that too long a
time has been allowed to pass, it is spedfically held that the reissue i
not for the same invention, and it would, therefore, have been invalid even.
if applied for within two hours. Cf. Haines v. Peck, 26 Fed. 625.
As instance of what will excuse a long delay, see Whitcomb v. Coal
Co., 47 Fed. 658; Cf. Wollensak v. Sargent, 151 U. S. 22r.

venting and patenting of structures which embody such a feature, it may

be presumed that this is done upon the faith of the dedication ; and so

the inventor may not be permitted thereafter to enlarge his monopoly to

the prejudice of these new rights, even though, except for them, the

reissue would be permissible. The settled doctrine has come to be that

from a delay of more than two years, and in the absence of any sufficient

contrary evidence, these fatal intervening rights (public or private) will

be presumed; in the presence of less delay, they must be proved. But

see White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 52, 7 Sup. Ct. 72, 30 L. Ed. 303, and

Milloy Co. v. Thompson Co. (C. C. A.) 148 Fed. 843, 847, "8 C. C. A. 533."

325 The authorities on the matter of time allowed are not as numerous

as they appear to be. In many cases in which it is said that too long a

time has been allowed to pass, it is specifically held that the reissue is

not for the same invention, and it would, therefore, have been invalid even

if applied for within two hours. Cf. Haines v. Peck, 26 Fed. 625.

As instance of what will excuse a long delay, see Whitcomb v. Coal

Co., 47 Fed. 658; Cf. Wollensak v. Sargent, 151 U. S. 221.

IT

E

A

Renewal of Applications

Renewal of Applications 209

209

the date of the invention. Since the reissue is only a correc-

tion of the original patent and covers only the original in-

vention, the date must be that of the original invention. Also

since the reissue is considered not as a new patent, standing

by itself, but as a correction of the old patent, the fact that

the device involved has been in public use or on sale more than

two years prior to the application for reissue does not neces-

sarily bar the reissue, as it would bar an original patent. That

fact will, however, have an important bearing on the question

of whether or not a reissue is lost through undue delay in ap-

plying for it. 326

6. AMENDMENT

When the defect is discovered before the patent has actu-

ally been issued, it may be corrected by amendment of the ap-

plication. There is no express provision of the statute upon

this subject, but it seems to follow as a matter of course. The

rules of practice of the Patent Office provide that 327 "the ap-

the date of the invention. Since the reissue is only a correction of the original patent and covers only the original invention, the date must be that of the original invention. Also
since the reissue is considered not as a new patent, standing
by itself, but as a correction of the old patent, the fact that
the device involved has been in public use or on sale more than
two years prior to the a.pplica.tion for reissue does not necessarily bar the reissue, as it would bar an original patent. That
fact will, however, have an important bearing on the question
of whether or not a reissue is lost through undue delay in applying for ~t. 326

plicant has a right to amend before or after the first rejection
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or action; and he may amend as often as the examiner pre-

§ 6.

sents new references or reasons for rejecting." The rules also

AMENDMENT

provide when and how the amendment shall be made.

The patentee can not by amendment make the application

cover a different device than the one claimed in his original

application. He may so correct the description, or even add to

it as to make it cover the entire invention, but he can not de-

scribe what would amount to another invention. He is re-

stricted to the remedying of defects in the description thereof

and in the claims. 328

326 Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters 218, 244 ; Stimpson v. Railroad Co., 4

How. 380; Coffield Co. v. Howe Co., 172 Fed. 668.

327 Rule No. 68. . '. .

328 Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. 5. 383, 395 holding the defense that the

claims had been unlawfully expanded before issue of the patent not sus-

tained. Eagleton Mfg. Co. v. West, etc. Mfg. Co., in U. S. 490; Kirch-

berger v. Am. Acetylene Burner Co., 128 Fed. 599; Cleveland Foundry

Co. v. Detroit Vapor Stove Co., 131 Fed. 853; American Lava Co. v.

Steward, 155 Fed. 731.

When the defect
atent has actual been issued, it ay
the a plication. There is no express provision of the statute upo-n
this subject, but it seems to follow as a matter of course. The
rules of practice of the Patent Office provide that 327 "the applicant has a right to amend before or after the first rejection
or action; and he may amend as of ten as the examiner presents new references or reasons for rejecting." The rules also
provide when and how the amendment shall be made.
The patentee can not by amendment make the application
cover a different device than the one claimed in his original
application. He may so correct the description, or even add to
it as to make it cover the entire invention, but he can not describe what would amount t.o another invention. He is restricted to the remedying of defects in the deseription thereof
and in the claims. 32.8
326

Grant v. Raymond, 6 Peters 218, 244; Stimpson v. Railroad Co., 4
How. 38o; Coffield Co. v. Howe Co., 172 Fed. 668.
a21 Rule No. 68.
328
Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 383, 395-holding the defense that the
claims had been unlawfully expanded before issue of the patent not sustained. Eagleton Mfg. Co. v. West, etc. Mfg. Co., III U. S. 490; Kirchberger v. Am. Acetylene Burner Co., 128 Fed. 599; Cleveland Foundry
Co. v. Detroit Vapor Stove Co., 131 Fed. 853; American .Lava Co: v.
Steward, 155 Fed. 731.
.
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If the change desired is such as would amount to the descrip-

Patents and Inventions ·

tion of another idea of means, a different invention, than the

If the change desired is such as would amount to the description of another idea of means, a different invention, than the
one actually though incompletely described and claimed, a new
application under oath must be made, as for a new and distinct
invention.

one actually though incompletely described and claimed, a new

application under oath must be made, as for a new and distinct

invention.

7. NEW APPLICATIONS

ABANDONED APPLICATIONS. All applications for a patent

must be completed so as to be ready for examination by the

Commissioner within one year from the time the application is

filed. 329 An application consists 330 of the petition, specifica-

tion, oath, fee of $15.00, and when required, drawings, model

§ 7.

and specimen. It is not complete until all these parts are re-

NEW APPLICATIONS

ceived by the Patent ofHce. 331 If it is not so completed within

applications for a patent
must be completed so as to be ready for examination by the
Commissioner within one year from the time the application is
filed. 329 An application consists 330 • of the petition, s ecificaI 5.00, and when required, d awings, model
tion, oath, fee 0
;;d s cimen. It is not complete until all these parts are received by the Patent office. 331 If it is not so com leted within
the year it will be regar<led as abandoned, unless it be shown
to t
satts action of the Commissioner of Patents that such
delay was unavoidable. 332
en the application is completed, if it has been acted upon
unfavorably and the applicant has been notified thereof, it is
his duty to take some further action to secure his patent. If
he fails to prosecute his application within one year from the
date of the adver e action 333 he i pre umed o a-ve: abandoned
it just a in case of ailuU! to com lete it.
The right to a patent may be abandoned to the public by the
inventor regardless of his actions in respect to securing a
patent: Such abandonment ' is a matter of his real if:ttent as
evinced by his conduct. The abandonment of an app,lica;tion>
and consequent possible loss of his patent, is quite another
matter, in that it has nothing whatever t9 do with his real
ABANDONED APPLICATIONS.

the year it will be regarded as abandoned, unless it be shown

to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Patents that such

delaywas unavoidable. 332

WHenthe application is completed, if it has been acted upon

unfavorably and the applicant has been notified thereof, it is
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his duty to take some further action to secure his patent. If

he fails to prosecute his application within one year from the

date of the adverse action 333 he is presumed to have abandoned

it ji^MiS J n ragp Pf ffJJh-irp to ynrnpjptp it.

The right to a patent may be abandoned to the public by the

. I/

inventor regardless of his actions in respect to securing a

patent. Such abandonment ' is a matter of his real intent as

evinced by his conduct. The abandonment of an application,

and consequent possible loss of his patent, is quite another

matter, in that it has nothing whatever to do with his real

329 R. S. 4894. Until amendment of 1897 the time limit was 2 years.

33 Rule No. 30.

331 "It is desirable that all parts of the complete application be de-

posited in the office at the same time, that all the papers embraced in the

application be attached together ; otherwise a letter must accompany each

part, accurately and clearly connecting it with the other parts of the-

application."

332 R. S. ? 4894-

333 Xwo years prior to amendment of 1897.

All

R. S. § 4894. Until amendment of 1897 the time limit was 2 years.
Rule No. 30.
331 "It is desirable that all parts of the complete application be deposited in the office at the same time, that all the papers embraced in the·
application be attached together; otherwise a letter rmist accompany each
part, accurately and clearly connecting it with the other parts of the·
application."
332 R. s. ~ 4894.
333 Two years prior to amendment of 1897.
32 9
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intent. The abandonment of an application, is an arbitrary

condition fixed by statute, and resulting from the mere lapse

of time. There is the ameliorating provision, however, that

this condition of abandonment shall not be deemed to exist if

the delay is excused to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.

This possibility of excuse should not be confounded with the

fact that when certain circumstances give rise to an appear-

ance of real intent to abandon, it is possible to refute that ap-

pearance by a showing of other facts which nullify the infer-

ence from the first ones. The arbitrary conclusion decreed by

the statute, and the conclusion of intent deduced- from the

facts, are, however, often enough confused in the opinion to

make some seeming conflict. 334 Real abandonment arising

from apparent intent thereto has already been discussed. 335

New applications. An important difference between aban-

donment of the invention, and abandonment of the applica-

tion is, that when the former is satisfactorily shown by the cir-

cumstances it is irretrievable. The abandonment of the ap-
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plication, however, cvgai if the delay bertlot excused^ does not

ipso facto preclude the inventor from later securing a patent. 336

Hernay file~another application and does not lose his right to

a patent unless, and until, such time has elapsed before the

filing of that application that the device has been in public use

or on sale more than two years prior thereto. 337

The two years dates from the filing of the new application

and not from the filing of the original one. This question has

come squarely before the court. 338 In 1894 an inventor filed

an application which was rejected, and notice given to him, the

same year. He failed to take further action for more than a

year. This delay he attempted to excuse, but the reasons

given were not satisfactory to the Commissioner. Accordingly

334 Beverly v. Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 1379, 9 Blatch. 50.

335 Commissioner's decision against sufficiency of excuse held to be final.

Hayes-Young Tire Plate Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 137 Fed. 80.

336 Western Electric Co. v. Sperry Elec. Co., 58 Fed. 186.

337 Western Elec. Co. v. Sperry Elec. Co., 58 Fed. 186; Hayes-Young

Tire Plate Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 137 Fed. 80.

338 Hayes etc. Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 137 Fed. 80.

intent. The abandonment of an application, is an arbitrary
condition fixed by statute, and resulting from the mere lapse
of time. There is the ameliorating provision, however, that
this condition of abandonment shall not be deemed to exist if
the delay is excused to the satisfaction of the Commissioner.
This possibility of excuse should not be confounded with the
fact that when certain circumstances give rise to an appearance of real intent to abandon, it is possible to refute that appearance by a showing of 9ther facts which nullify the inference from the first ones. The arbitrary conclusion decreed by
the statute, and the conclusion of intent deduced~ from the
facts, are, however, often enough confused in the opinion to
make some seeming conflict. 334 Real abandonment arising
from apparent intent thereto has already been discussed. 335
New applicalions. An important difference between abandonment of the invention, and abandonment of the application is, that when the former is satisfactorily shown by the circumstances it is irretrievable. The abandonment of the application, however, even if the delay b not excused, does not
i so f a:cto prec u e the inventor from later securin a patent. 336
He may e another application and does not lose his right to
a patent unless, and until, such time has elapsed before the
filing of that applicatiqn that the device has_been in public use
or on sale more than two years prior thereto. 337
The two years dates from the filing of the new application
and not from the filing of the original one. This question has
come squarely before the court. 338 In r 894 an inventor filed
an application which was rejected, and notice given to him, the
same y~ar. He failed to take further action for more than a
year. This delay he attempted to excuse, but the reasons
given were ·not satisfactory to the Commissioner. Accordingly
33 4

Beverly v. Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 1379, 9 Blatch. 50.
Commissioner's decision against sufficiency of excuse held to be final.
Hayes-Young Tire Plate Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 137 Fed. 8o.
336 Western Electric Co. v. Sperry Elec. Co., 58 Fed. 186.
337 Western Elec. Co. v. Sperry Elec. Co., 58 Fed. 186; Hayes-Young
Tire Plate Co. v. St. Louis Transit Co., 137 Fed. 80.
338 Hayes etc. Co. v. St. Louis Tran ~ it Co., 137 Fed. &>.
335
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he filed a new application in 1901. A question of pleading
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raised the issue whether the patent would be valid if the in-

vention had been in public use more than two years before this

later application, though not before the date of the first appli-

cation. The court said that the two years would date from

the application of 1894 if that of 1901 could be considered a

mere amendment and continuation of the former. But they

held that, "the abandonment of an application destroys the

continuity of the solicitation of a patent. After abandonment

a subsequent application institutes a new and independent pro-

ceeding, and the two years public use or sale which may in-

validate -the -patent issued upon it must be counted from the

filing of the later application." 339

As the public use or sale is effective to defeat patentability

regardless of the inventor's consent therein, it is wise, where

the time on which abandonment is predicated has passed, un-

less the inventor is certain there has been no such use with or

without his consent, to present excuse, if possible, for the de-
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lay, rather than to let the original application go and file a

new one.

FAILURE TO PAY FINAL FEE. If after an application has

been allowed and a patent ordered to issue, the patentee fails

to pay the final fee within six months after the sending of

notice to him, a new application becomes necessary. 34 ' It has

been held that such new application may contain more in

breadth of claim than the original one did, so long as the in-

vention itself is not exceeded. 341 A new application, in the

sense of a new petition, oath, description, etc., while it is ap-

parently allowable, is not necessary. The statute provides that

in such case of non-payment, "Any person who has an inter-

est in" the invention, "whether as inventor, discoverer or as-

signee" may make an application for a patent. It logically

follows that the statute does not here use "application" with

339 Citing, Beverly v. Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 1379, 9 Blatch. 50;

Mowry v. Barber, Fed. Cas. No. 9892 ; Lindsay v. Stein, 10 Fed. 907 ; Lay

v. Indianapolis Brush & Broom Mfg. Co., 120 Fed. 831.

"o R. S. ? 4897.

341 Bowers v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 69 Fed. 640.

he filed a new application in I90I. A que tion of pleading
raised the i ue whether the patent would be valid if the invention had been in public u e more than two year before thi
later application, though .n ot before the date of the first application. The court aid that the two years would date from
the application of I894 if that of I90I could be .considered a
mere amendment and continuation of the farmer. But they
held that, ' the abandonment of an application de troys the
abandonment
continuity of the solicitation of a patent.
a subsequent application in titute a new and independent proc~g, and the tw
ear public u e or sale which may invalid
eflt
t
upon it must be counted from the
filing of the later application." 339
As the public use or sale is effective to def eat patentability
regardless of the inventors con ent therein, it is wise, where
the time on which abandonment is predicated has passed, unless the inventor is certain there has been no such use with or
without his consent, to present excuse, if pos ible, for the delay, rather than to let the original application go and file a
new one.
FAILURE TO PAY FINAL FEE.
If after an application ha
been allowed and a patent ordered to issue, the patentee fail
i month after th ending of
to pay th~na fee wit ·
notice to him a new applica~ion becomes nece ary. 340 It ha
been held that such new application may contain more in
breadth of claim than the original one did, o long as the invention it elf is not exceeded. 341 A new application, in the
sense of a new petition, oath de cription, etc. while it is apparently allowable i not necessary. The statute proviaes that
in such ca e of non-payment, "Any per on who ha an interest in" the invention 'whether as inventor di coverer or a signee' may make an application for a patent. It loo-ically
follows that the statute doe not here use ' application with
339 Citing, Beverly v. Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 1379, 9 Blatch. 50;
Mowry v. Barber, Fed. Ca . No. 9892 · Lind ay v. · Stein, IO Fed. 907; Lay
v. Indianapolis Bru h & Broom Mfg. Co., 120 Fed. 8.31.
340 R. s. : 4&)7.
s41 Bowers v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 69 Fed. 640.
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the same meaning it has elsewhere, and requires only an ap-

plication for the issue of the patent already adjudged. 342

8. APPEAL IN CASE OF REJECTION

The statute 343 provides "Whenever, on examination, any

the same meaning it has elsewhere, and requires only an application for the issue of the patent already adjudged,342

claim for a patent is rejected, the Commissioner shall notify

§ 8.

the applicant thereof, giving him briefly the reasons for such

rejection, together with such information and references as

may be useful in judging of the propriety of renewing his ap-

plication or of altering his specification." The applicant may

then, if he chooses, alter his claims so as to eliminate there-

from matter which has in the opinion of the Commissioner

been anticipated and offer the altered claims for approval. If

they are again rejected as too broad, he may again correct

them, and this rejection, correction and resubmission may con-

tinue until limited by the subject matter itself. When, at any

stage in this procedure, the applicant does not believe that the

earlier patents, referred to fry the Commissioner as anticipa-

tions, necessitate a change in his claims, the statute provides,
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"And if, after receiving such notice, the applicant persists in

his claim for a patent, with or without altering his specifica-

tions, the Commissioner shall order a re-examination of the

case.''

If upon this re-examination, the application is again re-

jeted, the applicant may then, and then only, appeal. Al-

though the^sfatute reads as though these ^examinations and

rejections were made by the Commissioner, they are in fact

the wojk of_ "preliminary examiners." and the appeaHs^made

from their^decisions to a group of examiners, also subordi-

nate JXLlh_Cmnmissi^

chief. 344 If the applicant is 'ciiSsatistieri with foe derision of

trns^board he may, on .payment p f jthe jee ^prescribed,, 345 appeal

to the Commissioner in person. 346 If he is still dissatisfied,

342 Ex parte Livingston, 20 O. G. 1747.

3 R. S. ? 4903.

344 R. S. ^ 4909. The course of procedure is described by the court in

Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50.

345 $20.00, Rule 140.

346 R. S. 4910.

APPEAL IN CASE OF REJECTION

343

The statute
provides "Whenever, on examination, any
claim for a patent is rejected, the Commissioner shall notify
the applicant thereof, giving him briefly the reasons for such
rejection, together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging of the propriety of renewing his application or of altering his specification.'' The applicant may
then, if he chooses, alter his claims so as to eliminate therefrom matter which has in the opinion .of the Commissioner
been anticipated and offer the altered clairps for approval. If
they are again rejected as too broad, he may again correct
them, and this rejection, correction and resubmission may continue until limited by the subject matter itself. When, at any
stage in this procedure, the applicant does not believe that the
earlier patents, ref erred to by the Commissioner as anticipations., necessitate a change in his claims, the statute provides,
"And if, after receiving such notice, the applicant persists in
his claim for a patent, with or w1tfiout altermf1i1s spec1fis,ations,the Commissioner shalf order a re-examination of the
case."
- Ifupon this re-examination. the application is again rejected, the apphcant may then, and then only, appeal. Alth0t1gh the statute reads as though these exammations and
rej~ were made by the Commissioner, they are in fact
the wo..rk of "preliminary examiners/' and the appeal -is made
from th · decisions to a group of examiner{, also sub~di
nate to the Commissioner, calle t e oar of e:Xcimmers-inchief. 344 If the applicant is Ciissatisfied with the decision of
t~e may, o~ment of the fee prescribed, 345 appeal
to th~ Commissioner in P-erson. 346 If he is still dissatisfied,
Ex parte Livingston, 20 0. G. 1747.
R. s. ~ 4903.
844 R. S. ~ 4909.
The course of procedure is described by the court in
Butterworth v. Hoe, II2 U. S. 50.
345 $20.00, Rule 140.
346 R. 5. § 49IO.
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after the decision of the Commissioner he may carry his ap-
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peal to theCourtjpf Appeals of_the District of ColumBTaT* 7

A f avorable^decisTon by this court affects only the right to have

a patent issued and does not in an? way determmethe validity

of the patent after ifhas been issued^ 848

Th^~rn!e^6Tprocedure of appeals, the time for riling papers,

notices to be given, forms, etc. can be found in the Rules of

the Patent Office and in books upon the detail work of solicit-

ing patents, and are too technical to be discussed here. 349

If the decision of the Court of Appeals is adverse to the

claimant, or if 'he ctoes not choose to appeal to~that court at

all, he has still a further proceeding to compel issue of a patent

to him. 350 "Whenever a .patent on application-is refnggt^ either

by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme Court of

the District of Columbia upon appeal from the Cotiunissioner,

the applicatjTmayJiaye remedyjpy^bill in equity ; and the court

having cognizance thereof, on notice to adverse parties and

other jju"e""~proceedmgs haiL may adjudge that_such applicant
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is_^ntitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his inven-

tion, as^specified in his claim, or for any part thereof 7as~"ttre

347 Prior to the act of February 9, 1893 creating this court, the appeal

was to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, R. S. 4911. It

was changed by 9 of the act. By the act of March 3, 1911 (Judicial

Code S 250) the decision of the Court of Appeals is declared to be final

except in certain cases which do not include patent matters, subject to

certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States or certificate to it.

If the examiner or the Commissioner should refuse to act at all, a writ

of mandamus would undoubtedly be proper. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192

U. S. 543-

348 R. S. 4914, Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D. C. 73.

349 It has been held that there is no appeal from the Commissioner to

the Secretary of the Interior on his finding as to patentability. Butter-

after the decision of the Commissioner he may carry his appeal to the Court of A peals of the District of Columbia. sn
A favora e ecision b this court affects onl the rig t to have
a patent issued and does not in any way determine the vah 1ty
of the patent after it as een issued~
T e
es o procedure of appeals, the time for filing papers,
notices to be given, forms, etc. can be found in the Rules of
the Patent Office and in · books .upon the detail work of soliciting patents, and are too technical to be discussed here. 349
If the decision of the Court of Appeals is adverse to the
al to that court at
claimant, orjf e oes not c oose to a
all, he has still a further proceeding to compel issue of a patent
to him. a:ro- l'Whenever a
· ·
either
by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme Court of
the-Dis net of Columbia u on a eal from the Commissioner,
the app 1cant ma have med b bill in equity; and the court
having cognizance thereof, on n.otice to a verse parties (:l.nd
other
e roceedin s h
may a JU ge t at such a plicant
is~ed, according to law to receive a Qatent for his invention, a s ecifie m his claim or for any part thereof, as e
348

worth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50. The multiplicity of appeals and difficulty

of acquiring a patent is severely criticized by U. R. Lane, in Dilatory

Patent Procedure, 20 Green Bag 503.

350 R. S. 4915. By 24 of the Judicial Code, the action is within the

primary jurisdiction of the United States District Courts. In Butter-

worth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 128, it was held, without deciding where the action

should be brought, that it could not be brought in any other district than

the one of which the Commissioner was an inhabitant.

347 Prior to the act of February 9, 1893 creating this court, the appeal
was to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, R. S. § 491 I. It
was changed by ~ 9 of the act. By the ct of March 3, l9II (Judicial
Code ~ 250) the decision of the Court of Appeals is declared to be final
except in certain cases which do not include patent matters, subject to
certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States or certificate to it.
If the examiner or the Commissioner should refuse to act at all, a writ
of mandamus would undoubtedly be proper. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192

u. s.

543.
R. S. ~ 4914, Rousseau v. Brown, 21 App. D. C. 73.
349 It has been held that there is no appeal from the Commissioner to
the Secretary of the Interior on his finding as to patentability. Butterworth v. Hoe, I 12 U. S. 50. The multipiicity of appeals and difficulty
of acquiring a patent is severely criticized by U. R. Lane, in Dilatory
Patent Procedure, 20 Green Bag 503.
s5 o R. S. § 4915. By § 24 of the Judicial Code, the action is within the
primary jurisdiction of the United States District Courts. In Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 128, it was held, without deciding where the action
should be brought, that it could not be brought in any other district than
the one of which the Commissioner was an inhabitant.
348
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facts in the case may appear. And such adjudication, if it

be in favor of the right of the applicant,"sfiaIT authorize the

CommissipBexJta_issue_such patent on the^EEtJUiiiLJlliii^ in

the '"Patent Office a copy 7>T the^adjudication, and otherwise

complying with the requirements of law. In all cases7 where

there is no opposing party, a copy otlTie bill shall be served on

the Commissioner ; and all the expensesjj'T'the proceedmg^shall

be pafd by the applicant, whether the final decision is in his

favor~or~not7' THTs right has been held to be available only

when the application has been rejected on the ground that the

alleged invention is not, on its merits, entitled to a patent. 350 *

This proceeding must bej>rought within the one year limited

for the |>TOse^utionn^f^a^^icajionj_after adverse^actipn. 351 un-

less the delay is satisfactorily excused, 352 and to secure a de-

cision in its favor the alleged invention must not only be prior

in time to the one specifically set up in anticipation by the Com-

missioner, but must also be patentable on its own merits. 358

9. INTERFERENCES
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Whenever an application is filed, setting out an alleged in-

vention which the Commissioner feels is anticipated by an un-

expired patent or earlier application for a patent, and there is

a contention that the device for which application was last

made was in fact invented before the one already patented or

for which patent was first asked, the Commissioner is required

by the Statute to give notice to the parties and to try the

question of priority of invention. 35 * The statute reads, "When-

facts in the case may appear. And such adjudication, if it
be in favor of the right of the applican , s
authorize the
Commissioner
such patent on th a
m
the atent Office a copy o t e ad· udication, and otherwise
with the requirements of ~ In all cases, w ere
comp y·
there is no opposing party, a copy o · t e bill shall be served on
e procee mg3 all
the Commissioner; and all the e~enses o
be 1 by the applicant, w hetlier the final dec1s10n 1s in his
1s right has been held to be available only
favor or not.
when the application has been rejected on the ground that the
alleged invention is not, on its merits, entitled to a patent. 3 50 a
This proceeding must be brou ht within the one ear limited
for the rosecution o a plications after
erse action, 351 un3 52
less the de
oril excused, and to secure a decisi~i ts favor the alleged invention must not only be prior
in time to the one specifically set up in anticipation by the Comm1ss10ner, but must also be patentable on its own merits. 35 3

ever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion

of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending appli-

§ 9.

cation, or with any unexpired patent, he shall give notice there-

of to the applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the case may

be, and shall direct the primary examiner to proceed to de-

termine the question of priority of invention. And the Com-

3508 Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50.

35 1 R. S. 4894.

352 Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432.

353 Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693.

35* R. S. 4904-

INTERFERENCES

Whenever an application is filed, setting out an alleged in- .
vention which the Commissioner feels is anticipated by an unexpired patent or earlier application for a patent, and there is
a contention that the device for which application was last
made was in fact invented before the one already patented or
for which patent was first asked, the Commissioner is required
by the Statute to give notice to the parties and to try the
question of priority of invention. 35 4 The statute reads, "Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, he shall give notice thereof to the applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the case may
be, and shall direct the primary examiner to proceed to determine the question of priority of invention. And the ComButterworth v. Hoe, II2 u. s. 50.
R. s. § 48<)4.
352 Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432.
353 Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693.
3 54 R. s. § 4904.
35oa

351
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prior inventor, unless the adverse party appeals from the de-

cision of the primary examiner, or of the board of examiners-

in-chief, as the case may be, within such time, not less than

twenty days, as the Commissioner shall prescribe." Literally

taken, this covers all cases where the later application is, in

the opinion of the Commissions, anticipated by an earlier one,

for in all such cases one would interfere with the other. But

it is obvious that a question of priority does not arise, so as

to be triable, in all such cases. Even if the opinion of antici-

pation is not acquiesced in, the controversy may be solely over

the essential identity of the two devices, and priority of one or

the other be admitted. In such circumstance the statute would

not require notice and trial. When a trial as to priority is had

under the statute, the procedure, taking of testimony, etc., is

governed by the statutes and the rules of the office. Appeal

from the decision of the Commissioner is the same as in other

cases of unfavorable decision upon an application. 355
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10. PROTEST AGAINST ISSUE

One who is not a party in any way .to a patent, may, on learn-

ing that a patent is^ pending_in_the patent_ office^ file with- ^the

Commissioner^ajDrotest against its allowance, on the ground

of public useorsale morethan two years~prior....to tHefiling

of the appliclitTon/^ 9

355 The question of what constitutes priority of invention is discussed

supra.

359 In re National Phonograph Co., 89 O. G. 1669; U. S. ex rel. v. Allen,

TOI O. G. 1133; Ex parte Kephart, 103 O. G. 1914; Ex Parte Hartley, 136

O. G. 1767; Kneisely v. Kaisling, 174 O. G. 830; In re Lewthwaite, 176
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taken, this covers all cases where the later application is, in
the opinion of the Commissions, anticipated by an earlier one,
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not require notice and trial. When a trial as to priority is had
under the statute, the procedure, taking of testimony, etc., is
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CHAPTER VII

ACTIONS TO AVOID PATENTS

After a patent has once been issued by the patent office, in

proper form^'fls too late for that office to revoke it or other-

wise r ^ctively to attect its^ validity. It has passed bey oncf the

control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be

CHAPTER VII

revoked or concelled by the President or any other officer of

-~ ·

'

the Government. 360 It has become the property of the paten-

tee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as

ACTIONS TO Avorn p A TENTS

other property. 36 * The only authority competent to set a pat-

ent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason what-

ever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in

the department which issued the patent." 362

GOVERNMENT ACTION TO INVALIDATE. The government

may bring an action in the courts to have a patent that has

been issued annulled and set aside, and this may be done

"not only when it has a proprietary and pecuniary interest,

in the result, but also when it is necessary in order to en-

able it to discharge its obligation to the public, and some-
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times when the purpose and effect are simply to enforce the

rights of an individual." 3 Such suits must be based on the

ground that the patent has been improperly issued on account

of fraud, accident, mistake or the like, and the fraud or other

matter on which invalidity is predicated must be clearly

proved. 364

360 McCormick Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, citing U. S. v.

Schurz, 102 U. S. 378; U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315,

363.

361 Citing Seymouj v. Osborne, n Wall 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94

U. S. 225 ; U. S. v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 271.

362 Citing Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone

Co., 128 U. S. 315, 364; Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589,

593-

363 U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224, 264; Id. 128 U. S. 315.

364 U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224; in this case delay of

After a patent has onesb~~n !_§sued by_ the_natent~ce, in
proper form, it is too late for that office tQ revoke it or otherwise~ctively to affect its ~ity. "It has passedbeyond the
control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be
revoked or concelled by the President or any other officer of
the Government. 360 It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as
other property. ~ The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and not in
the department which issued the patent." 362
GOVERNMENT ACTION TO INVALIDATE.
The government
may bring an action in the courts to have a patent that has
been issued annulled and set aside, and this may be done
"not only when it has a proprietary and pecuniary interest.
in the result, but also when it is necessary in order to enable it to discharge its obligat:on to the public, and sometimes when the purpose and effect are simply to enforce the
rights of an individual.'' 363 Such suits must be based on the
ground that the patent has been improperly issued on account
of fraud, accident, mistake or the like, and the fraud or other
matter on which invalidity is predicated must be clearly
proved. 364
36

McCormick Machine Co. v. Aultman, 16g U. S. 606, citing U. S. v.
Schurz, 102 U. S. 378; U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315,
363.
aoi Citing Seymour v. Osborne, I I Wall 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94
U. S. 225; U. S. v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 271.
3s2 Citing Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone
Co., 128 U. S. 3r5, 36..i.; Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, r68 U. S. 589,
593.
363 U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224, 26..j.; Id. 128 U. S. 315.
364 U. S. v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224; in this case delay of
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INTERFERING PATENTS. When two patents have been issued,
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whether by oversight of the patent office, or for any other

reason, which one of the patentees believes to cover the same

invention, the question is ordinarily decided in the usual pro-

cedure of an infringement suit. The defense is made that the

plaintiff's patent is invalid, or if valid does not include the

device which the defendant is making, vending or using under

the second patent. A decision in favor of the defense, sus-

tains either the non-identity of the inventions or the invalidity

of the plaintiff's patent. As the decision may be in the defend-

ant's favor on either ground, it does not necessarily determine

the validity or invalidity of the plaintiff's patent unless the

court so specifies particularly. But a decision in the plaintiff's

favor settles the identity of the patents and the priority of the

plaintiff's patent, and thus indirectly, determines the defend-

ant's patent to be invalid. The statute provides in addition to

this procedure an action whereby one of the patents may be

directly declared void. The section reads, 356 "Whenever there
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are interfering patents, any person interested in any one of

them, or in the working of the invention claimed under either

of them, may have relief against the interfering patentee, and

all parties interested under him, by suit in equity against the

owners of the interfering patent; and the court, on notice to

adverse parties, and other due proceedings had according to the

course of equity, may adjudge and declare either of the pat-

ents void in whole or in part, or inoperative, or invalid in any

particular part of the United States, according to the interest

of the parties in the patent or the invention patented. But no

such judgment or adjudication shall affect the right of any

person except the parties to the suit and those deriving title

under them subsequent to the rendition of such judgment."

It is to be noted that the result of the decision affects only

the parties to the suit and those subsequently deriving title

from them. Its practical advantage is therefore not much

greater than that of the ordinary infringement action. The

the patent office from the time of application in 1877 to an issue in 1891

without any intermediate action was held not to invalidate the patent.

356 R. S. 4918.

INTERFERING PATENTS. When two patents have been issued,
whether by oversight of the patent office, or for any other
reason, which one of the patentees believes to cover the same
invention, the question 1s ordinarily decided in the usual procedure of an infringement suit. The defense is made that the
plaintiff's patent is invalid, or i~ valid does not include the
device which the defendant is making, vending or using under
the second patent. A decision in favor of the defense, sustains either the non-identity of the inventions or the invalidity
of the plaintiff's patent. As the decision may be in the ·defend·. ant s favor on either ground, it does not necessarily determine
the validity or invalidity o.f the plaintiff's patent unless the
court so .specifies particularly. But a decision in the plaintiff's
favor settles the identity of the patents and the priority of the
plaintiff's patent, and thus indirectly, determines the defendant's patent to be invalid. The stat~te provides in addition to ·
this procedure an adion whereby one of the patents may be
directly declared void. The section reads, 356 "Whenever there
are in!erfering patents, any person interested in any one of
them, or in the working of the invention claimed under either
of them, may have relief against the interfering patentee, and
all parties interested under him by suit in equity against the
owners of the interfering patent; and the court, on notice to
adverse parties, and other due proceedings had according to the
course of equity, may adjudge and declare eith~r of the patents void in whole or in part, or inoperative, or invalid in any
particular part of the United States, according to the interest
of the parties in the patent or the invention patented. But no
- such judgment or adjudication shall affect the right of any
person except the parties to the suit and those deriving title
under them subsequent to the rendition of such judgment."
It is to be noted that the result of the deci ion affects only
the parties to the suit and tho e subsequent!_' derivincr title
from them. Its practical advantage i therefore not much
greater than that of the ordinary infringement action. The
, the patent office from the time of application in 1877 to an i sue in 1891
without any intermediate action was held not to invalidate the patent.
356 R. s . . 4918.
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statute also provides that both patents may be declared in-

valid on a proper showing, so that there is a certain risk in

bringing the action to the plaintiff, unless he has, as in some

actions, something to gain and nothing to lose. It was actu-

ally held, in the case of Palmer Pneumatic-tire Co. v. Lozier, 351

that both patents were invalid. Counsel on both sides agreed

that the court could decide nothing but the priority of one or-

the other of the patents and such had been the opinion of the

court below, which decided that the patent later applied for and

issued really represented the prior invention and was there-

fore the valid one of the two. "On the contrary," said the

Appellate Court, "we think the court is bound to determine

\vhether, upon identifying the subject matter of the interfering

patents, the invention therein stated is patentable. If it is not,

and the court should go on and pronounce a decree of nullity

against one of the patents, it would do so at the instance of

one who has no right to protect, and consequently no standing

on which to assail his adversary. The parties would not stand
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on equal ground in such a litigation, and consequently the

power of the court would be perverted to the determination of

an unprofitable inquest as to who was the first discoverer of a

nullity. The outcome would be that, while one pretender

would be dislodged, the other would occupy the field unscathed.

We think that if, upon inspection of the patents, or in the

course of the investigation it must make in order to determine

the nature of the alleged invention, the court should see that

the patents are void for lack of patentable subject matter, it

ought not to proceed to an inquiry as to who first discovered

the thing which the court finds to be null, and decree thereon,

but should dismiss the bill." The general state of the art as

shown by evidence outside of the patents themselves is ad-

missible in this action as it is in others. 358

INSUFFICIENCY OF REMEDIES. It will be observed that neither

of these actions gives any remedy to the individual who be-

lieves an existing patent to be void and unenforcible, but who

is not certain of the fact. The statute authorizes an ac-

357 90 Fed. 732.

358 Simplex Ry. Appliance Co. v. Wands, 115 Fed. 517.

statute also provides that both patents may be· declared in~
valid on a proper showing, so that there is a certain risk in
bringing the action to the plaintiff, unless he has, as in some
actions, something to gain and nothing to lose . . It was actually held, in the case of Palmer Pneumatic-tire Co. v. Lozier, 357
that both patents were invalid. Counsel on both sides agreed
that the court could decide nothing but the priority of one or·
the other of the patents and such had been the opinion of the
court below, which decided that the patent later applied for and
issued really represented the prior invention and was therefore the valid one of the two. "On the contrary," aid the
Appellate Court, "we think the court is bound to determine
whether, upon identifying the subject matter of the interfering
patents, the invention therein stated is patentable. If it is not,
and the ·c ourt should go on and pronounce a decree of nullity
against one of the patents, it wou~d do so at the instance of
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90 Fed. 732.
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tion to question the validity of a patent only when the com-

plainant is himself the owner of another patent, or otherwise

tion to question the validity of a patent only when the complainant is himself the owner of another patent, or otherwise
interested in an existing patent. The action by the government, to have a patent declared void, may be started in the
interest of an individual, but it appears to be maintainable only
where the patent is attacked on the ground of fraud, or something more fundamental than the mere lack of invention in the
thing patented. Yet these seem to be the only cases in which
a patent can be attacked when the owner of the patent has not
himself started the action and will not do so.
The only way, there£ ore, that the validity and effectiveness
of a patent can be ascertained by one who wishes to enjoy the
use of the thing patented without the permission of the patentee, is for him to make use of the invention and take his .
chances either of not being sued by the patentee, or, if he is
sued, of being able to def eat the patt:nt. But such a course
involves unjust risk. :Many inventions require the investment
of considerable fixed capital for their utilization. If one
should make such investments in a mj.staken belief that the
patent was void, and th~n be successfully restrained by the
patentee from infringing what the courts should hold to be a
valid patent, his loss, through inability to utilize his fixed capital, would be far in excess ·6 f the compensatory damages which
might be recovered by the plaintiff. That is, he would riot only
have to pay damages to the patentee, but also would lose his ·
own investment. Even if no great initial investment were required, men might hesitate to go into the manufacture of a
patented article, even though advised by expert counsel that
the patent was invalid, knowing that if the patent should be
held good by the courts. all their profits would be swept away
and a carefully built up business destroyed.
Even when capitalists are perfectly willing. fo take .the risk
of operating in contravention of what they are convinced is an
improperly issued and ~orthless patent, they can not always
do so, successfully, on account of the patent. The patentee
may himself be too doubt£ ul of the validity .of his patent to
go into court where it can be attackeq, and yet he may neverthele s successfully prevent serious infringement. The Vac-

interested in an existing patent. The action by the govern-

ment, to have a patent declared void, may be started in the

interest of an individual, but it appears to be maintainable only

where the patent is attacked on the ground of fraud, or some-

thing more fundamental than the mere lack of invention in the

thing patented. Yet these seem to be the only cases in which

a patent can be attacked when the owner of the patent has not

himself started the action and will not do so.

The only way, therefore, that the validity and effectiveness

of a patent can be ascertained by one who wishes to enjoy the

use of the thing patented without the permission of the pat-

entee, is for him to make use of the invention and take his

chances either of not being sued by the patentee, or, if he is

sued, of being able to defeat the patent. But such a course

involves unjust risk. Many inventions require the investment

of considerable fixed capital for their utilization. If one
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should make such investments in a mistaken belief that the

patent was void, and then be successfully restrained by the

patentee from infringing what the courts should hold to be a

valid patent, his loss, through inability to utilize his fixed capi-

tal, would be far in excess of the compensatory d-amages which

might be recovered by the plaintiff. That is, he would riot only

have to pay damages to the patentee, but also would lose his

own investment. Even if no great initial investment were re-

quired, men might hesitate to go into the manufacture of a

patented article, even though advised by expert counsel that

the patent was invalid, knowing that if the patent should be

held good by the courts, all their profits would be swept away

and a carefully built up business destroyed.

Even when capitalists are perfectly willing to take the risk

of operating in contravention of what they are convinced is an

improperly issued and worthless patent, they can not always

do so, successfully, on account of the patent. The patentee

may himself be too doubtful of the validity of his patent to

go into court where it can be attacked, and yet he may never-

theless successfully prevent serious infringement. The Vac-

Ori:i ir I fro~-,

Digitize b

NTER

~ET

P.RCH

IE

J \J~VERS

n

OF CA WOR J A

lni•alidating Patents

Invalidating Patents 221

221

tium Cleaner Co., for instance, had patents covering certain

elements of the usual construction of vacuum cleaners. The

Electric Renovator Co. manufactured cleaners which the

Vacuum Co. asserted infringed its patents. As the Renova-

tor Co. denied that it was infringing a valid patent, the Vac-

uum Co. sent out circulars and threatening letters warning the

wholesale houses and other customers of the Renovator Co.,

that the Renovator Co. had no license and that whoever han-

dled its products would be prosecuted for infringement of the

Vacuum Co.'s patents. For two years it continued this practice

of frightening off the Renovator Co.'s customers, while at the

same time persistently refusing to bring suit against anyone,

in which the validity of its patents could be tried out. Finally,

the Renovator Co., in the absence of any other remedy, sued

for an order restraining the Vacuum Co. from continuing its

unfair practice. The court granted the injunction on the

ground that the allegation of infringement and the warnings

sent out were not made in good faith, and that the lack of
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good faith was indicated by the refusal to bring suit in which

the matter could be tried out. 3643 But even in this case the

validity of the patent itself was not tried out; the defendant

was merely enjoined from unfair practices. It is quite con-

ceivable that, without going so far as to be demonstrably un-

fair, the ow r ner of an invalid patent might make it almost im-

possible for any one successfully to invade his unjust monopoly.

It is a serious defect in the patent law that it does not fur-

nish any practical method by which the individual public can

protect itself against the menace and extortionate monopolies

of invalid patents. It may be that in time an action of some

form will be provided, whereby one who honestly doubts the

validity of an existing patent can get the judgment of a court,

without having to await the dangerous convenience of the

patentee. 364 "

364< Electric Renovator Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754, Ac-

cord, Adriance Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827.

364b For a discussion of "declaratory judgments" in general see the arti-

cle by E. R. Sunderland in 16 Michigan Law Rev. 69. See also that of

Borchard in 28 Yale Law Rev. i. The state of Michigan now provides for

such declaratory judgments, Pub. Acts of 1919, No. 150.

uum Cleaner Co., for instance, had patents CO\'ering certain
elements of the usual construction of \'acuum cleaners. The
Electric Renovator Co. manufactured cleaners which the
Vacuum Co. asserted infringed its patents. As the Renovator Co. denied that it was infringing a valid patent, the Vacuum Co. sent out circulars and threatening letters warning the
wholesale houses and other customers of the Renovator Co.,
that the Renovator Co. had no license and that whoever handled its products would be prosecuted for infringement of the
Vacuum Co. 's patents. For two years it continued this practice
of frightening off the Renovator Co.'s customers, while at the
same time persistently refusing to bring suit against anyone,
in which the validity 0£ its patents could be tried out. Finally,
the Renovator Co., in the absence of any other remedy, sued
for an order restraining the Vacuum Co. from continuing its
unfair practice. The court granted the injunction on the
ground that the allegation of infringement and the warnings
sent out were not made in good faith, and that the lack of
good faith was indicated by the refu al to bring suit in which
the matter could be tried out. 36'1" But even in this case the
validity of the patent itself was not tried out; the defendant
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It is a serious defect in the patent law that it does not furnish any practical method by which the individual public can
protect itself against the menace and extortionate monopolies
of invalid patents. It may be that in time an action of some
form will be provided, whereby one who honestly doubts the
validity of an existing patent can get the judgment of a court,
without having to await the dangerous convenience of the
patentee. 36 -ib
Electric Renovator Co. v. Vacuum Cl.e aner Co., 189 Fed. 754. Accord, Adriance Co. Y. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827.
asoib For a discussion of "declaratory judgments" in general see the article by E. R. Sunderland in 16 Michigan Law Rev. 69. See also that of
Borchard in 28 Yale Law Rev. I. The state of Michigan now provides for
such declaratory judgments, Pub. Acts of 1919, No. 150.
36-i•

ER

CHAPTER VIII

THE OWNERSHIP OF THE MONOPOLY

i. DURATION

The statute provides 365 that the owner of a valid patent shall

have the exclusve right, to make, use and vend the invention or

discovery covered by it throughout the United States and its

Territories. This exclusive right is given for a period of 17

years. The time begins to run from the date of issue of the

patent, and is unaffected by the date of invention or the date of

CHAPTER VIII

application. The right to acquire a monopoly dates from the

time of the invention, and the first inventor alone is entitled to

a patent, no matter if another has been the first applicant. The

THE OWNERSHIP OF THE MONOPOLY

duration of the monopoly, however, dates from the time the

patent" is issued. 3053 An extreme illustration of the materiality

§

of this difference is found in the case of United States v. Amer-

I. DURATION

ican Bell Telephone Co. 366 From about 1878 that Company

had been operating its phones with transmitters that Were

covered by patents issued at that time. In 1891 another patent

ses R. s. 4884.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

365a It is obvious, of course, that since the monopoly dates from the issue

of the patent, the inventor has no monopoly until then. He can not pre-

vent others from using his invention prior to the issue of his patent, nor

can he recover anything as damage. "A patentee can not recover damages

for the sale or use of his invention prior to the issuance of a patent but

the fact that articles embodying the invention were manufactured before

the patent was issued, unless by the patentee's consent, does not authorize

their use thereafter." (Syl.) Columbia & N. R. R. v. Chandler, 241 Fed.

261. See also cases cited infra.

One who has applied for a patent may, however, mark his product

"Patent Applied For" and this does have a practical deterrent effect, be-

cause it warns the user of the invention that his invested capital may be

rendered worthless by the granting of the patent.

366 167 U. S. 224. The "Oldfield Bill," H. R. 1700, April 1913, which

failed of passage in Congress, contained a provision limiting the monopoly

to a maximum period of 19 years from the date of application.

The statute provides 365 that the owner of a valid patent shall
have the exclusve right, to make, use and vend the invention or
discovery covered by it throughout the United States and its
Territories. This exclusive 'r ight is given for a period of 17
years. The f
be ins to run from the date of issue of the
.{?atent1 and is unaffected b the date of invention or
date of
a plication. The ri ht to acquire a monopoly dates from the
time of the invention, and the first inventor alone is entitled to
a patent, no matter if another has been the first applicant. The
duration of the monopoly, however, dates from- the time the
patent ts issue . 658 An extreme illustrat10n of tlre materiality
of this difference is found in the case of United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. 366 From about 1878 that Company
had been operating its phones with transmitters that were
covered by paten.ts issued at' that time. In 1891 another patent
365

R.

s.

~

4884.

It is obvious., of course, that since the monopoly dates from the issue
of the patent, the inventor has no monopoly until then. He can not prevent others from using his invention priOr to the issue of his patent, nor
can he recover anything as damage. "A patentee can not recover damage-s
for the sale or use of his invention prior to the issuance of a patent but
the fact that articles embodying the invention were manufactured before
the patent was issued, unless by the patentee's consent, does not authorize
their use thereafter." (Syl.) Columbia & N .. R. R. v. ChandJer, 241 Fed.
z61. See also cases cited infrCl;.
One who has applied for a patent may, however, mark his product
"Patent Applied For" and this does have a practical deterrent effect, because it warns the user of the invention that his invested capital may be
rendered worthless by the granting of the patent.
36 6 167 U. S. 224.
The "Olqfield Bill," H. R. 1700, April 1913, which
failed of passage in Congress, contained a provision limiting the monopoly
to a maximum period of 19 years from the date of application.
36 5 a
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was issued to them for precisely the same invention. On in-

vestigation it appeared that the invention on which this latter

patent was issued had been made prior to that of the patents

under which the Company had been securing protection. Ap-

plication for this patent had been made at the proper time, thus

saving the right to a patent, but the whole matter had been

neglected by the Patent Office, and no patent had been issued

till 1891. On suit to set aside this long delayed patent the

court decided that the delay was not the result of fraud in any

form and that the patent was valid and operative from the time

of its issue. The result was that the company, having operated

for many years under a very effective appearance of monopoly,

although without any actual right whatever thereto, now ac-

quired a valid and actually enforcible monopoly for another 17

years longer.

Conversely, the inventor has no right to the exclusive enjoy-

ment of his invention, no monopoly of it at all, until a patent

has actually been issued to him. 366a
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The patent must be issued by the Patent Office within three

months from the date of payment of the final fee, which must

itself take place not later than 6 months from the date on

which notification that the application was passed and the

patent allowed, was sent to the applicant. If this fee is not

paid within the proper time the statute provides that the patent

shall be withheld. A new application must then be made in

order to secure the issue of the patent. 367

THE MONOPOLY is ABSOLUTE. After the patent has been

3668 Standard Scale Co. v. McDonald, 127 Fed. 709 ; D. M. Steward Co.

v. Steward, 109 Tenn. 288.

367 Patents for designs are granted for the term of 3 years and 6 mo.,

or for 7 years, or for 14 years, as the applicant may in his application

elect." ? 4931 R. S. The statute prior to the amendment of March 3, 1897,

provided that patents issued in this country for inventions already pat-

ented in a foreign country, should expire coincidentally with the expira-

tion of the shortest of the foreign patents, but thi's phraseology was

changed by the amendment, R. S. 4887. See the statement, in 1915, in

regard to this in Fireball Gis Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239

U. S. 156; and in Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227

U. S. 39-

was issued to them for precise} y the same invention. On investigation it appeared that the invention on which this latter
patent was issued had been made prior to that of the patents
under which the Company had been securing protection. Ap- ,
plication for this patent had been made at the proper time, thus
saving the right to a patent, but the whole matter had been
neglected by the Patent Office, and no patent had been issued
till 189i. On suit to set aside this long delayed patent the
court decided that the delay was not the result of fraud in any
form and that the patent was valid and operative from the time
of its issue. The result was that the company, having operated
for many years under a very effective appearance of monopoly,
although without any actual right whatever thereto, now acquired a valid and actually enforcible monopoly for another 17
years longer.
Conversely, the inventor has no right to the exclusive enjoyment of his invention, no monopoly of it at all, until a patent
has actually been issued to him. 366 •
The patent must be issued_by the ;Patent Office within three
~nths from the date of _payment of the final _fee, which must
itseft fake p1ace not later th:an 6 months frQm the date on
which notification that the application was passed and tne
patent allowed, was sent to the applicant. If this fee is not
paid within the proper time the statute provides that the patent
shall be withheld. A ~ew application must then be made in
order to secure the issue of the patent. 867
THE MONOPOLY 1s ABSOLUTE. After the patent has been
assa Standard Scale Co. v. McDonald, 127 Fed. 709; D. M. Steward Co.
v. Steward, 109 Tenn. 288.
ao1 Patents for designs are granted for the term of 3 years and 6 mo.,
or for 7 years, or for 14 years, as the applicant may in his application
elect." ~ 4931 R. S. The statute prior to the amendment of March 3, 18g7,
provided that patents issued in this country for inventions already patented in a foreign country, should expire coincidentally with the expiration of the shortest of the foreign patents, but thls phraseology was
changed by the amendment, R. S. ~ 4887. See the statement, in 1915, in
regard to this in Fireball G1.s Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239
U. S. 156; and in Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227

u. s. 39.
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issued the right which it confers is absolute. The right is not
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the invention nor the enjoyment of the invention. It is the

monopoly of the right to enjoy it. The patentee may utilize

the invention, may make, use and vend the things covered by

it if he chooses, but whether he does exercise his privilege of

enjoyment or not, his right to exclude others is absolute, and

is not affected by his own non-use of the privilege. This is

established beyond doubt by the cases. In the Paper Bag

Patent case 368 the question was passed upon in actual decision,

not as mere dictum. It was contended in the case that a court

of equity had no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction the in-

fringement of letters patent, the invention covered by which,

had ''long and always and unreasonably been held in non-

use . . . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which

it belongs." It was conceded, the court said, even by the

claimant, that the monopoly was not defeated by the non-user

of the privilege; that an action at law for infringement would

still lie. The only contention was that the right to an injunc-
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tion was lost; that, for the good of the public, unauthorized

persons should be allowed to make, use and vend the inven-

tion without restraint by the courts, if the patentee would not

exercise the privilege himself, and that the patentee should be

left to his legal remedy of damages. This contention the court

absolutely rejected, on the ground that Congress had given

to a patentee not merely the right to make, use and vend his

invention himself, but the absolute right of keeping others

from so doing, and that this monopoly was not lost by neglect

to put the invention into use. 365

368 210 U. S. 405-

369 Button Fastener Cases, 77 Fed. 288, 35 L. R. A. 728, cited with ap-

proval Henry v. Dick, 224 U. S. I, 28: "If he will neither use his device

nor permit others to use it, he has but suppressed his own. That the

grant is made upon the reasonable expectation that he will either put

his invention to practical use or permit others to avail themselves of it

upon reasonable terms, is doubtless true. This expectation is based alone

upon the supposition that the patentee's interest will induce him to use,

or let others use, his invention. The public has retained no other security

to enforce such expectations. A suppression can endure but for the life

of the patent, and the disclosure he has made will enable all to enjoy the

issued the right' which it confer is absolute. The right is not
the invention nor the enjoyment of the invention. It is the
monopoly of the right to enjoy it. The patentee may utilize
the invention, may make, use and vend the things covered by
it if he chooses, but whether he does exercise his privilege of
enjoyment or not his right to exclude others is absolute, and
is not affected by his own non-use of the privilege. This i
established beyond doubt by the cases. In the Paper Bag
Patent case36 the question was pas ed upon. in actual deci ion,
not as mere dictum. It was contended in the case that a court
of equity had no jurisdiction to re train by injunction the infringement of letters patent, the invention covered by which,
had "long and always_ and unreasonably been held in nonuse . . , . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which
it belongs. ' It was conceded, the court said, even by the
claimant, that the monopoly was not defeated by the non-user
of the privilege; that an action at law for infringement would
still lie. The only contention was that the right to an injunction v\ as lost; that, for the good of the public, unauthorized
persons should be allowed to make, use and vend the invention without restraint by the courts, if the patentee would not
exercise the privilege himself, and that the patentee should be
left to his legal remedy of ·damages. This contention the court
absolutely rejected, on the ground that Congress had given
to a patentee not merely the right to make, use and vend his
invention himself, but the absolute right of keeping others
from so doing, and that this monopoly was not lost by neglect
to put the invention into use. 369
368 210

U. S. 405.

Button Fastener Cases, '17 Fed. 288, 35 L. R. A. 728, cited with approval Henry v. Dick, 2~4 U. S. I, 28: "If he will neither use his device
nor permit others to u e it, he has but suppressed his own. That the
grant i made upon the reasonable expectation that he will either put
his invention to practical use or permit others to avail themselve of it
upon reasonable terms, i doubtless true. This expectation i ba ed alone
upon the suppo ition · that the patentee' interest will induce him to u e, .
or let others use, his invention. The public ha retained no other security
to enforce such expectations. A suppression can endure but for the life
of the patent, and the di closure he ha made will enable all to enjoy the
369
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2. TRANSFER OF THE RIGHT

The monopoly conferred by the patent may be transferred

§2. TR_ANSFER OF THE RIGHT

to others ~aT~~tEe^ will of the patentee as freely as any other

form of incorporeal personal property. It is personal prop-

erty and descends to the personal representatives of a deceased

owner, rather than to his heirs. 369 " The owner may also enter

into agreements in respect to the enjoyment of the right,

which agreements may, like other contracts, be either written

or oral. The transfer of the title to the patent, that is to say,

the complete ownership of the monopoly itself, can be made

only by an instrument in writing, as the statute is interpreted.

The statute provides that "every patent or any interest therein

shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing," 370 and

the conveyance, to be effective, is apparently limited to this

method. 371

fruit of his genius. His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the con-

stitutional provisions in respect of private property that he is neither

bound to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it." Victor
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Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424. An attempt was made

to change this rule by a bill introduced in Congress, April 7, 1913 H. R.

1700 called the "Oldfield Bill." It provided, among other minor changes,

that when it should be proved that the owner of a patent was withholding

or suppressing all benefit to the public, from the invention, he might be

compelled, by court action, to license others to make use of it upon proper

terms of recompense. The bill failed to pass and prominent patent at-

torneys and inventors were reported as having testified that deliberate

suppression of marketable inventions was practically non-existant. The

act of July 13, 1832 provided that in case of patents issued to aliens, they

should become void in the event of failure to introduce the invention into

public use within one year and to continue such use. This was repealed

four years later.

A commendation, on economic grounds, of the fact that inventions need

not be put into use in this country, is uttered by O. C. Billman in The

Compulsory Working of Patents, 24 Green Bag 513, 21 Case & Com. 276.

369 Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 674 ; De la Vergne Mach. Co. v.

Featherstone, 147 U. S. 209.

370 R. S. 4898.

371 Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 492; Blakeney v. Goode, 30 O. S. 350;

But see dictum, Paulus v. Buck, 129 Fed. 524. An oral contract to assign

future inventions will be enforced in equity, Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co.,

149 U. S. 315-

The monopoly conferred b the atent may be transferred
to othe a t e -will of the patentee as freel as any other
fo
of incorporeal personal property. It is persona property and descends to the personal representatives of a deceased
owner, rather than to his heirs. 369 n The owrier may also enter
into agreements in respect to the enjoyment of the right,
wl:iich agreements may, like other contracts, be either written
or oral. The tra~sfer of the title to the Qatent, that is to say,.
the complete ownership _of the monopoly itself, can be made
only by an instrument in writing, as the statute is interpreted.
The statute provides that "every patent or any interest therein
shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing," 3 7 0 and
the conveyance, to be effedive, is apparently limited to this
method. 371
I

fruit of his genius. His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect of private property that he is neither
bound to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it." Victor
Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424. An attempt was made
to change this rule by a bill introduced in Congress, April 7, 1913-H. R.
1700-called the "Oldfield Bill." It provided, among other minor changes,
that when it should be proved that the owner of a patent was withholding
or suppressing all benefit to the public, from the invention, he might be
compelled, by court action, to license others to make use of it upon proper
terms of' recompense. The bill failed to pass and prominent patent attorneys and inventors were reported as having testified that deliberate
suppression of marketable inventio~s was practically non-existant. The
act of July 13, 1832 provided that in case of patents issued to aliens, they
should become void in the. event of failure to introduce the invention into
public use within one year and to continue such use. ·T his was repealed
four years later.
A commendation, on economic grounds, of the fact that inventions need
not be put into use in this country, is uttered by 0. C. Billman in The
Compulsory Working of Patents, 24 Green Bag 513, 21 Case & Com. 276.
36 911 Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 Ho~. 646, 674; De la Ver,g ne Mach. ·Co. v.
Featherstone, 147 U. S. 209.
370 R. s. § 4898.
371 Gayler v. Wilder, IO How. 477, 492; Blakeney v. Goode, 30 0. S. 350;
But see dictum, Paulus v. Buck, 129 Fed. 524. An oral contract to assign
future inventions will be enforced in equity, Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co.,
149 u. s. 315.
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Such a transfer of the ownership of the patent right vests
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in the assignee all the rights which the assignor has under the

patent. It is in eff ect_Jjke__any jQlhe.r . sale of property. The

"hew ownei^by virtue of the transfer, may sue for infringe-

ment, may resell the monopoly, or in any other way exercise

the same power that his assignor could have used. 372

The transfer is, "void as against any subsequent purchaser

or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, un-

less it is recorded in the Patent Office within three months

froqQhe date thereof." 373 Such recording is not obligatory

and does not affect the validity of the assignment except as

against subsequent purchasers without notice. The usual rules

as to what constitutes actual notice are applicable in respect to

these assignments.

Although the patent monopoly itself is created by Federal

law, its sale, and other contracts concerning it, are subject to

regulation by State law in the same way that other personal

property is. A number of states have exercised this power in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

requiring such sales to be recorded, or in declaring promissory

notes given for the purchase price to be void, unless they show

on their face that they are so given. It behooves the pur-

chaser, as well as the seller, of a patent right, therefore, to

examine the statutes of the particular state upon the matter. 37311

No SPECIAL FORM OF ASSIGNMENT is set out or suggested by

the statute, nor is any particular form requisite. Anything

that would be sufficient at the Common Law to indicate a clear

intention to transfer the patent right, properly executed, would

372 Assignee may sue his assignor, if the latter infringes, just as he

could any one else. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 205. In short,

he is the "owner" of the patent, in place of the original patentee.

373 R. S. 4898. Compare, National Cash Reg. Co. v. New Columbus

Co., 129 Fed. 114.

373a A Kansas statute, (Gen. Stat. of 1901, 4356 ff.) requiring the seller

to file affidavits of ownership, etc, was held valid, in Allen v. Riley, 203

U. S. 347 ; John Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358. A somewhat similar

statute had been held not valid in Hollida v. Hunt, 70 111. 109. Parish v.

Smith, (Ark.) 204 S. W. 415.

This should not be confused with the power of the state, which also

exists, to regulate the sale of articles embodying a patented invention.

· Such a transfer of the ownership of the patent right vests
in the assignee all the righ~s which the assignor has under the
h
of roperty. The
. patent. It is in effect lik
new owner b virtue of the trans£ er, may sue for infringement, may resell t e mono_Qoly, or in any other way exercise
the same po"Wer tha 1s assignor could have used. 372
The tr sfer is, "void as against any subsequent purchaser·
or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without hotice, unles~orded in the Paten Office within three months
ro the date thereof." 373 Such recording is not obligatory
and does not affec the validity of the assignment except as
against subsequent purchasers without notice. The usual rules
as to what constitutes actual notice are applicable in respect to
these assignments.
Althqugh the patent . monopoly itsel_f is created by Federal
law, its sale, and other contracts concerning it, are subject to
·regulation by State law in the same way that other persqnal
property is. A number of states have exercised this power in
requiring such sales to be recorded, or in declaring promissory
notes given for the purchase price to be void, unless they show
on their face that they are so given. It behooves the purchaser, as well as the seller, of a patent right, therefore, to
examine the statutes of the particular state upon the matter. 373 a
N 0 SPECIAL FORM OF ASSIGNMENT is set out or suggested by
the statute, nor is any particular form requisite. Anything
that would be sufficient at the Common Law to indicate a clear
intention to trans£ er the patent right, properly executed, would
a12 Assignee may sue his ass ignor, if the latter infringes, just as he
could any one else. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 205. In short,
he is the "owner" of the patent, in place of the original patentee.
373 R. S. § 4898.
Compare, National Cash Reg. Co. v. New Columbus
Co., 129 Fed. 114.
.
373a A .Kansas statute, (Gen. Stat. of 1901, 4356 ff.) requiring the seller
to file affidavits of ownership, etc, was held valid, in Allen v. Riley, 203
U. S. 347; John Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358. A somewhat imilar
statute had been held not valid in Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109. Parish v.
Smith, (Ark.) 204 S. W. 415.
This should not be confused with the power of the state, which also
exists, to regulate the sale of ar:ticle · embodying a patented invention.
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undoubtedly be sufficient. 374 A seal upon the assignment is

not necessary to its validity. 375

An acknowledgment before a notary or o-ther official is un-

necessary to the effectiveness of the instrument. It is how-

ever provided in the statute that 376 "If any such assignment,

grant, or conveyance of any patent shall be acknowledged be-

fore any notary public of the several States or Territories or

the District of Columbia, or any commissioner of the United

States circuit court, or before any secretary of legation or

consular officer authorized to administer oaths or perform no-

tarial acts under section seventeen hundred and fifty of the

Revised Statutes, the certificates of such acknowledgment, un-

der the hand and official seal of such notary or other officer,

shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of such assign-

ment, grant, or conveyance." 377 It would seem a wise policy

therefore to have it acknowledged and recorded, both because

of the evidentiary effect of the acknowledgment and because of

the protection which the record gives against a fraudulent
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second sale by the assignor.

EFFECT OF THE TRANSFER. The sale and transfer of a patent

monopoly has the same effect, and creates only the same rights

and liabilities as does the sale of any personal property. The

seller, for instance, gives up all property interest in the^ mo-

nopoly. He has no lien upon the patent right for payment,

and if the buyer resells, the sub-buyer is not liable to the

original seller if the first buyer fails to pay. The recent Eng-

lish case of Barker v. Stickney, 377 " although it arose out of the

374 Campbell v. James, 18 Blatch. 92; Siebert Cylinder Oil-Cup Co., v.

Beggs, 32 Fed. 790; Delaware Seamless Tube Co. v. Shelby Steel Tube

Co., 160 Fed. 928; Myers v. Turner, 17 111. 179; Hill v. Thuermer, 13 Ind.

351. Forms of assignment whose use is recommended are given in the

Rules of Practice of the Patent Office.

375 Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521.

376 R. S. 4898.

377 It is not necessary that the acknowledgment be made at the same

time the assignment is executed. It will be effective as prima facie proof

of the execution whenever made. Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Brown, 115 Fed.

150; Murray Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 149 Fed. 989.

3773 (1918)2 K. B. Div. 356, citing many other English decisions.

undoubtedly be sufficient. 374 A seal upon the assignment is
not necessary to its validity. 375
An acknowledgment before a notary or other official is unnecessary to the effectiveness of the instrument. It is however provided in the statute that3 76 "If any such assignment,
grant, or conveyance of any patent shall be acknowledged before any notary public of the several States or Territories or
the District of Columbia, or any commissioner of the United
States circuit court, or before any secretary of legation or
.consular officer authorized to administer oaths or perform notarial acts under section ·seventeen hundred and fifty of the
Revised Statutes, the certificates of such acknowledgment, under the hand and official seal of such notary or other officer~
shall be prima facie evidence of the execution of such assignment, grant, or conveyance. " 377 It would seem a wise policy
therefore to have it acknowledged and recor ea, both because
of the evidentiary effect of the acknowledgment and because of
the protection which the record gives against a fraudulent
second sal~ by the assignor.
EFFECT OF THE ~RANSFER. The sale and tran er of a patent
monopoly has the same effec~ and creates only the same ri hts
and 1iabilities as does the sale of any per~o~al property. The
seller, -for instance, gives up all property interest ,in the monopo1y. He has no lien upon the patent right for payment,
and if the buyer resells, the sub-buyer is not liable to the
original seller if the first buyer fails to pay. The recent Englisn case of Barker v. Stickney, 377 a although it arose out of the
Campbell v. James, 18 Blatch. 92; Siebert Cylinder Oil-Cup Co., v.
Beggs, 32 Fed. 790; Delaware Seamless Tube Co. v. Shelby Steel Tube ..
Co., 100 Fed. 928; Myers v. Turner, 17 Ill. 179; Hill v. Thuermer, 13 Ind.
351. Forms of assignment whose use is recommended are given i'n the
Rules of Practice of the Patent Office.
375 Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U. S. 521.
376 R. s. § 4898.
377 It is not necessary that the acknowledgment be made at the same
time the assignment is executed. It will be effective as prima facie proof
of the execution whenever made. Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Brown, IIS Fed.
150; Murray Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 149 Fed. 989.
377a (1918)2 K. B.. Div. 356, citing many other English decisions.
374
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transfer of a copyright, is a precise analogy on this point.

22
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The plaintiff was author of a book. He had granted to a pub-

lisher the exclusive right "to publish the book, and the owner-

ship of the copyright when procured. The publisher agreed,

in consideration, to pay a certain royalty and not to dispose of

the copyright to others except, "subject to the terms of this

agreement, so far as the same is applicable." This publishing

company fell into financial difficulties, and a receiver was ap-

pointed, who sold the coypright, and other assets, to the de-

fendant. The defendant knew of the terms on which the

copyright had been sold by plaintiff to the publishing com-

pany, and, indeed, bought the assets from the receiver, "sub-

ject to all equities or other claims thereon." Plaintiff sued to

recover the. agreed royalties upon volumes published by the

defendant, and also for the amount of royalties which had not

been paid on volumes published by the first company. The

court held, that the defendant was not liable either for unpaid

royalties on volumes published by the first company nor on
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those published by itself; that such liability could be founded

only on contract between the defendant and plaintiff, or on the

theory of some sort of lien attaching to the property, i.e. the

copyright; and that neither a contract nor a lien existed. 3T7b

It is not impossible, that by express provisions in the con-

tract of sale a right in favor of the seller could be attached to

the patent, so as to bind subsequent purchasers with knowl-

edge thereof. The court, in the decision just referred to,

strongly intimates that it could be done, and, indeed, says as a

matter of dictum, that "the assignment will create a vendor's

lien for royalties if some of the provisions of the document

fairly, though impliedly, point to a reservation of such a lien

by the patentee or author, provided that the effect of such pro-

visions is not negatived by the other terms of the bargain." 3770

377b In Dancel v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 839, it was held with-

out discussion that the successor in ownership of the assignee of a patent

right was not liable to the seller, in law, but that he might be liable, under

certain conditions, in equity.

3770 In Bagot Pneumatic Co. v. Clipper Co. (1902), i Ch. Div. 146, 157,

is a dictum to the effect that, "If you had notice of a contract between

trans£ er of a copyright, is a preci e analogy on this point.
The plaintiff wa author of a book. He had granted to a publisher th7 exclusive rio-ht to _publish the book, and the ownership- of the copyrio-ht when proc;ured. The ublisher agreed,
in consideration, to ay a certain royalty and not to dispose of
the copyright to others · except, "subject to the terms of this
agreement, so far as the same 1s applicable." This publishing
company fell into financial difficulties, and a receiver was ap-·
pointed, "ho sold the coypright, and other assets, to the defendant. The def enda.n t knew of the terms on i hich the
cop'yright had been sold by plaintiff to the publi hing company, and, indeed, bought . the assets from the receiver, "subject to all equities or other claims thereon.
Plaintiff sued to
r~cover the. agreed royalties upon volumes published by the
defendant, and also for the amount of royalties which had not
been paid on volumes published by the first company. The
court held, that the defendant was not liable either for unpaid
royalties on volumes published by the first company nor on
those published by itself; that such liability could be founded
•
only on contract between the defendant and plaintiff, or on the
theory of some sort of lien attaching to the property, i.e. the
copyright; and that neither a contract nor a lien existed. 377 b
It is not impossible, that by express provisions in the con- tract of sale a right in favor of the seller could be attached to
the patent, so as to bind subsequent purchasers with knowledge thereof. The court, in the decision just referred to,
strongly intimate that it could be done, and, indeed, says as a
matter of dictum, that "the assignment will create a vendor's
lien for royalties if some of the provisions of the document
fairly, though impliedly, point to a reservation of such a lien
by the patentee or author, provided that the effect of such provi ions is not negatived by the other term of the bargain. " 377 c
a11b In Dancel v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 839, it wa held without discus ion that the uccessor in ownership of the assignee of a patent
right was not liable to the seller, in law but that he might be liable, under
certain condition , in equity.
s11c In Bagot Pneumatic Co. v. Clipper Co. (1902), l Ch. Div. · 146, 157,
is a dictum to the effect that, "If you had notice of a contract between
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The question of how far legal or equitable servitudes can be

imposed upon personal property seems never to have been

very positively settled, however. Instances are not infrequent

of patentees having sold their patents, without payment in

cash, to corporations which have later become bankrupt and

whose assets, including the patent, have been sold to pay debts.

By virtue of the rule just stated, the inventor, having trans-

ferred the title to his patent to the corporation, would have no

right whatever against the purchasers from the corporation or

from the trustee in bankruptcy. There is no doubt but that

such transactions have occasionally been brought about with

deliberate intent to "freeze out'' the original owner of the

patent. It is possible that the terms of the original sale might

be so made as to provide for a revesting of title in the seller in

case of the buyer's subsequent bankruptcy, etc. The safest

method, however, for a patentee to protect himself against such

a contingency would be to sell not to the corporation itself, but

to a trustee to hold for the corporation on stated terms.
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The seller having transferred the ownership of the right to

the buyer, can not take it back again merely because the buyer

fails to pay as agreed, or has become insolvent, nor because the

buyer has failed to do other things agreed upon. 3778 But the

actual fraud of the buyer, in the inducement of the contract,

will, of course, permit the seller to rescind the contract, as

against the buyer, and take back the title. And the parties may

effectually provide by express stipulation that the title shall

revert to the seller on the buyer's failure to perform certain

conditions, or on the occurrence of certain extraneous

events. 37711

the person under whom you claim property, real or personal, and a former

owner of the property, whereby a charge or incumbrance was imposed

upon the property of which you thus take possession, and have the en-

joyment, you take the property subject to that charge or incumbrance, and

can only hold it subject thereto." The real decision, however, was: that

the sub-licensee of the right to enjoy a patent was not liable in any way

to the owner of the patent.

377g Morgan v. National Pump Co., 74 Mo. App. 155; Barclay v. C. R.

Parmele Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 218; Comer v. Byers, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 239.

377" Pierpoint Boiler Co. v. Penn etc. Co., 75 Fed. 289; Janney v. Pan-

coast etc. Co., 122 Fed. 535; Van Tuyl v. Young, 13-23 Ohio C. C. 15.

The question of how far legal or equitable servitudes can be
imposed upon personal property seems never to have been
very positively settled, however. Instances are not infrequent
of patentees having sold their patents, without payment in
cash, to corporations which have later become bankrupt and
whose assets, including the patent, have been sold to pay debts.
By vir.tue of the rule just stated, the inventor, having transferred the title to his patent to the corporation, would have no
_ right whatever against the purchasers from the corporation or
from the trustee in bankruptcy. There is no doubt but that
such transactions have occasionally been brought about with
deliberate intent to "freeze out" the original owner of the
patent. It is possible that the terms of the original sale might
be so made as to provide for a revesting of title in the seller in
case of the buyer's subsequent bankruptcy, etc. The safest
method, however, for a patentee to protect himself against such
a contingency would be to sell not to the corporation itself, but
to a trustee to hold for the corporation on stated terms.
T_he seller having trans£ erred the ownership of the right to
the buyer, can not take it back again merely because the buyer
fails to pay as agreed, or has become insolvent, nor because the
buyer has failed to do other things agreed upon. 377 g But t~e
actual fraud of the buyer, in the inducement of the contract,
will, of course, permit the seller to rescind the contract, as
against the buyer, a d .take back the tiile. And the parties may
effectually provide by express stipulation that the- title shall
revert to the seller on the buyer's failure to perform certain
·conditions, or on the occurrence of certain extraneous
,
events. 37711
the person under whom you claim property, real or personal, and a former
owner of the property, whereby a charge or incumbrance was . imposed
upon the property of which you thus take -possession, and have the enjoyment, you take the property subject to that charge or incumbrance, and
can only hold it subject thereto." The real decision, however, was: that
the sub-licensee of the right to enjoy a patent was not liable in any way
to the owner of the patent.
377 g Morgan v. National Pump Cq., 74 Mo. App. I55; Barclay v. C. R~
Parmele Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 218; Comer v. Byers, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 239.
377 h Pierpoint Boiler Co. v. Penn etc. Co., 75 Fed. 289; Janney v. Pancoast etc. Co., 122 Fed. 535; Van Tuyl v. Young, 13-2:~ Ohio C. C. 15.
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Conversely, it appears that, in the absence of fraud, the

buyer can not rescind the agreement and get his money back,

or refuse to complete his payment, merely because the patent

turns out to be worthless. 377 ' But, like any other contract of

sale, it may be rescinded if it was induced by the fraud of the

seller. 377J

Although a buyer of the title to a patent right is not af-

fected by prior sales of which he has no knowledge, actual or

constructive, he does take the monopoly subject to the prior

rights of those to whom his seller has given licenses. And this

seems to be true even though the buyer had not even construc-

tive knowledge of the existence of such licenses. 3T7d But the

buyer does not necessarily assume the personal obligations of

his seller toward the licensee. 3776

Furthermore, the mere sale of the patent right, without also

an assignment of the seller's contracts under it, does not vest

in the buyer any right to the royalties due from licensees of

his seller. Thus, in Carlton v. Bird 377 ' it appeared that G. E.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Carlton had been the owner of a certain patent and that while

owner he had given the defendant a license to use the inven-

tion, for which the defendant had agreed to pay certain, yearly

royalties. Thereafter, he sold the patent to his wife. The sale

377' Xilsson v. De Haven, 47 X. Y. App. Div. 537, affd. 168 N. Y.

656; United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310; Eclipse Bicycle Co.

v. Farrow, 199 U. S. 581.

377^ Pratt v. Hawes, 118 Wis. 603; Holmes v. Bloomingdale, 76 N. Y. S.

182; Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77; Rice v. Gilbreath, 119 Ala. 424; Swinney

v. Patterson, 25 Nev. 411. There is conflict on this point, however. Thus

in Marston v. Swett, 66 N. Y. 206, the court says, by way of dictum, "It

is the settled law of this and several other states that the invalidity of a

patent is a defense to an action for the purchase price of the same, on the

ground of a failure of consideration," citing, Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H.

311; Geiger v. Cook, 3 Watts & Serg. 266; Dorst v. Brockway, 11 Ohio

471 ; McClure v. Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79 ; Mullikin v. Latchen, 7 Blatchf . 136.

3771 p or t Wayne etc. Rr. v. Haberkorn, 15 Ind. App. 479 ; Pratt v. Wil-

cox Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. 589; Whitson v. Phonograph Co., 18 App. D. C.

Conversely, it appear that in the absence of fraud the
buyer can not rescind the agreement and get his money back,
or re use- to complete his payment, merely because the patent
turns out to be worthless. 3771 But, like any other contract of
sale,it may be rescinded if it was induced by the fraud of the
seller. 377 j
Although a buyer of the title to a patent right is not affected by prior sales of which he has no knowledge, actual or
constructive, he does take the monopoly subject to the prior
rights of those to whom his seller has given licenses. And thi . .
seems to be true even though the buyer had not even constructive knowledge of the existence of such licenses. 377 d But the
buyer does not necessarily assume the personal obligatiotis of
his seller toward the licensee. 377 e
Furthermore, the mere sale of the patent right, without also
an assignment of the seller's contracts under it, does not vest
in the buyer any right to the royalties due from licensees of
his seller. Thus, in Carlton v. Bird 377 r it appeared that G. E.
Carlton had been the owner of a certain patent and that while
owner he had given the defendant a license to use the invention, for which the. defendant had agreed to pay certain yearly
royalties. Thereafter, he sold the patent to his wife. The sale

565: X. Y. Phonograph Co. v. Xational Phonograph Co., 144 Fed. 404;

McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. 202, 206.

377* Bradford Belting Co. v. Kisinger-Ison Co., 113 Fed. 811.

377' 94 Me. 182.

~ilsson v. De Haven, 47 N . Y . App. Div. 537, affd. 168 N. Y.
656; United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310; Eclipse Bicycle Co.
v. Farrow, 199 U. S. 58I.
377J Pratt v. Hawes, n8 Wis. 6o3; Holmes v. Bloomingdale, 76 N. Y. S.
182; Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77; Rice v. Gilbreath, II9 Ala. 424; Swinney
v. Patterson, 25 Nev. 41 I. There is conflict on this point, however. Thus
in Marston v. Swett, 66 N. Y. 2o6, the court says, by way of dictum , "It
is the settled law of this and several other states that the invalidity of a
patent is a defense to an action for the purchase price of the same, on the
ground of a failure of consideration," citing, Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H.
3II; Geiger v. Cook, 3 Watt & Serg. 266 · Dorst v. Brockway, I I Ohio
471; McClure v. Jeffrey, 8 Ind. 79; Mullikin v. Latchen, 7 Blatchf. 136.
37 7 d Fort Wayne etc. Rr. v. Haberkorn, rs Ind. App. 479 ; Pratt V. Wilcox Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. 589; Whit on v. Phonograph Co., 18 App. D. C.
565; N. Y. Phonograph Co. v. National Phonograph Co., 144 Fed. 404;
McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. 202, 2o6.
a11e Bradford Belting Co. v. Kisinger-Ison Co., II3 Fed. 8II.
3 77 t 94 Me. 182.
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was of "all the right, title and interest I have in the above de-

scribed invention. ..." The grantee thereafter started this

suit, as an action in debt for the royalties due since she had be-

come owner of the patent. The court dismissed the action

because "the case does not show any assignment of the con-

tract (to pay royalties) to her, except in so far as the deeds

of the patent rights, already quoted from, may have the effect

of an assignment. . . . We are, therefore, of the opinion that

a suit for the breach of a purely personal covenant, such as the

one in suit, must be brought in the name of the convenantee,

and that this action, for that reason can not be maintained."

These rules make it incumbent upon the buyer of a patent

to examine the character of the seller as well as the value of

the patent itself. If the seller has no title, this fact will show

on the records of the Patent Office, or else the buyer will not

be affected by prior sales. But if the seller has theretofore

granted licenses to use the invention, these grants may not

show on the records, but nevertheless will be effective even
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against the innocent buyer. It may happen therefore that in-

stead of getting an absolute monopoly in respect to the inven-

tion the buyer will find himself subject to the competition of

one or more licensees, from whom he is not even entitled to

collect the royalties they have contracted to pay. His only

safety lies in the honesty and financial reliability of the seller,

although he may find some advantage in having the seller

make affidavit that there are no licensees, or in taking from

him an assignment of his rights against all possible licensees.

The sale of the monopoly transfers the ownership of the

monopoly only, and does not invest the buyer with any right

to recover damage suffered by the prior owner. The buyer,

therefore, acquires no right to sue on account of infringement

which took place before his purchase. 377 "

ANT>-ftTHFP PROVISIONS may be put into the as-

signment to the same extent as in any other instrument of

sale, and will be given effect to the same extent, provided they

37Tk "Claims for damages for past trespasses do not pass by any convey-

ance of the thing trespassed upon." Superior Drill Co. v. Ney Mfg. Co.,

98 Fed. 734-

was of "all the right, title and intere t I have _in the above deThe grantee thereafter started this
scribed invention. . . .
suit, as an action in debt for the royalties due since she had become owner of the patent. The court dismissed the action
because "the case does not show any assignment of the contract (to pay royalties) to her, except in so far as the deeds
of the patent rights, already quoted from, may have the effect
of an assignment. . . . We are therefore, of the opinion that
a suit for the breach of a purely per on~l covenant such as the
one in suit, must be brought in the name of the convenantee,
and that this action, for that rea on can not be maintained."
These rules make it incumbent upon the buyer of a patent
to examine the character of the seller as well as the value of
the patent itself. If the seller has no title, this fact will show
on the records of ~he Patent Office or else the buyer will_ not
be affected by prior sales. But if the seller has theretofore
granted licenses to u e the invention these grants may not
show on the records, but nevertheless will be effective even
against the innocent buyer. It may happen therefore that instead of getting an ab olute monopoly in respect to the invention the buyer will find himself ubject to the competition of
one or more licensees, from whom he is not even entitled to
collect the royalties they have contracted to pay. His only
safety lies in the honesty and financial reliability of the seller,
although he may find some advantage in having the seller
make affidavit that there are no licensees, or in taking from
him an assignment of his rights against all possible licensees.
The sale of the monopoly trans£ ers the ownership of the
monopoly only, and does not invest the buyer with any right
to recover damage suffered by the prior owner. The buyer,
therefore acquires no right to sue on account of infringement
which took place before his purchase. 377 k
C.QNDITJONS 4 NP eTHER PROVISIONS may be put into the assignment to the same extent as in an other instrument of
sale, and will be given effect to the same extent, provi e they
"Claims for damages for past trespasses do not pass by any conveyance of the thing trespassed upon.'' Superior Drill Co. v. Ney Mfg. Co.,
98 Fed. 734.
a11k
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do not so limit the quantity of the interest passed as to prevent

the transaction from being in fact an assignment of the owner-

232
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ship ofthe_^atent right. In such case the transfer would not be

entirely void, but the assignee could not sue in his own name,

or otherwise act as owner. 378

PARTIAL ASSIGNMENTS. It is occasionally said by courts, that

the patent right can not be divided into parts. 379 It is true

that it can not be divided subjectively, as it were, so that a

part of the invention is controlled by one person and a part

by another, and the statements, in their context, really mean,

though loosely expressed, that the invention can not be di-

vided. 380 This follows obviously from the fact that an inven-

tion is a unity a single idea, existing only as an entirety

although the concrete embodiment of it may consist of many

parts, and although it may have various applications or uses,

378 In Rude v. Westcott, 130 U. S. 152, an assignment was made by an

instrument which the court found to be amply sufficient to convey the

assignor's entire interest in and title to the patent. It contained, however,
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a provision that the net profits were to be shared with the assignor. It

was contended that this so deprived the instrument of effect as an assign-

ment that the complainants the assignees had not title under which to

sue. The court denied this proposition, saying, "The concluding provision,

that the net profits arising from sales, royalties, or settlements, or other

source, are to be divided between the parties to the assignment so as to

give the patentee one fourth thereof, does not, in any respect, modify or

.~~--....:-~he quanti of the iBtere t pa sed a to prevent
~ng in fact an a ignment of the ownerthe transaction
hip of~t right. In such case the trans£ er wou1 not be
· entirefy void, but the assignee could not sue in his own name,
or otherwise act as owner. 37
PARTIAL A IGNMENTS. It i occasionally said by courts, that
the patent right can not be divided into parts. 379 It i true
that it can not be divided subjectively, a it were, so that a
part of the invention is controlled by one person and a part
by another, and the statement , in their cont~xt, really mean.
though loosely expressed, that the invention can not be divided. 3 0 This follows obviously from the fact that an invention is a unity-a single idea, existing only as an entiretyalthough the concrete embodiment of it may consist of many
parts, and although it may have various applications or uses.

limit the absolute transfer of title. It is a provision by which the con-

sideration for the transfer is to be paid to the grantor out of the net

profits made ; it reserves to him no control over the patents or their use

or disposal, or any power to interfere with the management growing out

of their ownership." Boesch v. Graff, 133 U. S. 697; Waterman v. Mac-

kenzie, 138 U. S. 252. In this case the assignment contained a condition

of defeasance upon performance of a condition and was in reality a

mortgage.

379 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 255.

380 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 248; In this case the patentee

had transferred to plaintiff all his right, title and interest in and to a

patent on velocipedes so far as the patent related to the saddle part of

the velocipede. It was contended that the plaintiff had not title on which

to sue and the court upheld this contention on the ground that "the as-

signment was neither of an undivided interest in the whole patent, nor

of an exclusive right within a certain territory."

In Rude v. Westcott, 130 U. S. 152, an assignment was made by an
instrument which the court found to be amply sufficient to convey the
a ignor s entire interest in and title to the patent. It contained, however,
a provision that the net profits were to be hared with the a signor. It
was contended that this so deprived the in trument of effect as an assignment that. the complainants-the as ignee -had not title under which to
sue. The court denied this propo ition, aying, "The con~luding provi ion,
that the net profits arising from sales, royalties, or ~ettlement , or other
source, are to be divided between the parties to the a signment so as to
give the patentee one fourth thereof, does not, in any re pect, modify or
limit the ab olute transfer of title. lt is a provi ion by which the consideration for the transfer is to be paid to the grantor out of the net
profits made; it reserve to him no control over the patents or their use
or di posal, or any power to interfere with the management growing out
of their ownership." Boe ch v. Graff, 133 U. S. 697; Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252. In thi case the a signment contained a condition
of defea ance upon performance of a condition and was in reality a
mortgage.
379 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 255.
3 o Pope ~Hg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 248; In thi case the patentee
had transferred to plaintiff all hi right, title and interest in and to a
patent on velocipedes o far a the patent related to the addle part of
the velocipede. It wa contended that the plaintiff had not title on which
to ue and the court upheld thi contention on the ground that 'the asi nment wa neither of an undivided interest in the whole patent, no
of an exclu ive ri ht within a certain territory."
37
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But the ownership of the patent right may, it is well settled, be

divided in a geographical apportionment. The patentee, can

not^transfer the title to a part of the invention, but he may

transfeF title to a parTof "ffie right which the patent gives him.

assign the rig-ht to the whole invention, to rnake.

a particular territory. TheTrans-

feree of the right acquires by the transfer all the rights and

privileges of the transferor, in the same degree as any assignee

of the entire patent right, subject only to the restriction as to

territory in which they may be exercised. Such assignee of

the right in a particular district may sue as owner and other-

wise comport himself as one having complete title within that

territory. 381

381 Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205 ; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477,

"By the fourteenth section, the patentee may assign his exclusive right

within and throughout a specified part of the United States, and upon

such an assignment the assignee may sue in his own name for an in-

fringement of his rights. But in order to enable Kim to sue, the assign-
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ment must undoubtedly convey to him the entire and unqualified monopoly

which the patentee held in the territory specified, excluding the patentee

himself, as well as others. And any assignment short of this is a mere

But the o
of the atent ri ht may, it is well settled, be
divided in a geographical a ortionment. The patentee can
not transfer the title · to a part of the invention, but he may
trans£ er 1 le to a art of tne ri ht which the patent iv es him.
Th
e may assign the ri
ole invention to ma e,
use and ven 1t t
t particular territor . The transferee of the right acquires by the trans£ er all the rights and
privileges of the transferor, in the same degree as any assignee
of the entire patent right, subject only to the restriction as to
territory in which they may be exercised. Such assignee of
the right in a particular district may stie as owner and otherwise comport himself as one having complete title within that
territory. 381

license. For it was obviously not the intention of the legislature to per-

mit several monopolies to be made out of one, and divided among dif-

ferent persons within the same limits. Such a division would inevitably

lead to fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired to purchase the

use of the improvement, and would subject a party who, under a mistake

as to his rights, used the invention without authority, to be harassed by

a multiplicity of suits instead of one, and to successive recoveries of

damages by different persons holding different portions of the patent

right in the same place. Unquestionably, a contract for the purchase of

any portion of the patent right may be good as between the parties as

license, and enforced as'such in the courts of justice. But the legal right

in the monopoly remains in the patentee, and he alone can maintain an

action against a third party who commits an infringement upon it. This

is the view taken of the subject in the case of Blanchard v. Eldridge,

J. W. Wallace, 337, and we think it the true one. Applying these princi-

ples to the case before us, the action was properly brought by the plaintiff

below, and could not have been maintained by Herring. The agreement is

singularly confused and complicated. It purports to grant to Herring the

exclusive right to make and vend the Salamander safe in the cit.y, county,

and state of New York ; and Herring agrees to pay to the defendant in

error a cent a pound for every pound the safes might weigh, to be paid

Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Gayler v. Wiider, IO How. 477,.
"By the fourteenth section, the patentee may assign his exclusive right
within and throughout a specified part _o f the United States, and upon
such an assignment the assignee may sue in his own name for an infringement of his rights. But in order to enable liim to sue, the assignment must undoubtedly convey to him the entire and unqualified monopoly
which the patentee held in the territory specified,-excluding the patentee
himself, as well as others. And any assignment short of this is a mere
license. For it was obviously not the intention of the legislature to permit several monopolies to be made out of one, and divided among different persons within the same limits. Such a division would inevitably
lead to fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired to purchase the
use of the improvement, and would subject a party :who, under a mistake
as to his rights, used the invention without authority, to be harassed by
a multiplicity of suits instead of one, and to successive recoveries of
damages by different persons holding different ·portions of the patent
right in the· same place. Unquestionably, a contract for the purchase of
any portion of the patent right may be good as between the parties as
license, and enforced as · such in the courts of justice. But the legal right
in the monopoly remains in the patentee, and he alone can maintain an
action against a third party who commits an infringement upon it. This
is the view taken of the subject in the case of Blanchard v. Eldridge,
J. W. Wallace, 337, and we think it the true one. Applying these principles to the case before us, the action was properly brought by the plaintiff
below, and could not have been maintained by Herring. The agreement is
singularly confused and complicated. It purports to grant to Herring the
exclusive right to make and vend the Salamander safe in the ci~, county,
and state of New York; and Herring agrees to pay to the defendant in
error a cent a pound for every pound the safes might weigh, to be paid
3s1
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So, also, the assignment may be of

an undivided interest in the patent right; in which case the

234
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assignee becomes an owner in common with tV^e assignor and

acquires the rights and liabilities of owners in common of

ppr snnalty^ generally. 3S1

There is a very grave danger inherent in joint ownership

of patents which should be well considered before one shares

a title. It lies in the fact that each owner has the right to

use and enjoy the invention to the fullest extent as owner, and,

hence, is not accountable to anyone for such use. One's only

control, therefore, over the acts of his co-owner lies in the

honesty of such owner.

An illustration of what may happen is found in Blackledge

v. Weir and Craig Mfg. Co. 38: The plaintiff, Blackledge,

had been the co-owner of a patent with one Silberhorn. They

two had licensed the defendant to use the invention on a royalty

basis. Later, however, the defendant managed to buy Silber-

horn's half interest. Thereafter it, the defendant, continued
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to use the invention but it no longer paid any royalties to the

plaintiff. Furthermore, it, as an owner of the patent, granted

licenses to other persons for which it got royalties, but for

which the plaintiff got nothing. When the value of these

royalties and this use by the defendant had amounted to

$10,000, the plaintiff sued, as co-ow r ner, to recover half of the

amount. The court rejected the suit. The defendant, it held,

was an owner of the patent right and as such he had a corn-

monthly. But at the same time it reserves to Wilder the right to set

up a manufactory or works for making these safes in the state of New

York, provided it is not within fifty miles of the city, and to sell them in

the state of New York, paying to Herring a cent a pound on each safe so

sold within the state. It is evident that this agreement is not an assign-

ment of an undivided interest in the whole patent, nor the assignment of

an exclusive right to the entire monopoly in the state or city of New

York. It is therefore to be regarded as a license only, and under the act

of Congress does not enable Herring to maintain an action for an in-

fringement of the patent right. The defendant in error continues the

legal owner of the monopoly created by the patent." Paulus v. Buck,

129 Fed. 594.

382 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How.

477, 493-

3 2a 108 Fed. 71 ; Acc'd, Paulus v. Buck Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 594.

UN

So, also, the assignment may be of
interest in the patent right; in which case the
assignee ~becomes an owner i common with the assio-nor and
acquires the rights and liabilities of owner in common of
pe
1t
enerall y. 382
There is a very grave danger inherent in joint ownership
of patents which should be well considered before one shares
a title. It lies in the fact that each owner has the right to
use and enjoy the invention to the fullest extent as owner, and,
hence, is not accountable to anyone for such use. One's only
control, therefore, over the acts of his co-owner lies in the
honesty of such owner.
An illustration of what may happen is found in Blackledge
v. Weir and Craig Mfg. Co. 3 2 a The plaintiff, Blackledge,
had been the co-owner of a patent with one Silberhorn. They
two had licensed the defendant to use the invention on a royalty
basis. Later, however, the defendant managed to buy Silberhorn' s half interest. Thereafter it, the defendant, continued
to use the invention but it no longer paid any royalties to the
plaintiff. Furthermore, it, as an own~r of the patent, granted
licenses ·to other persons for which it got royalties, but for
which the plaintiff got nothing. \i\Then the value of these
royalties and this use by the defendant had amounted to
$lo,ooo, the plaintiff sued, as co-owner, to recover half of the
amount. The court rejected the suit. The defendant, it held.
was an owner of the patent .right ·and as such he had a comEST.

monthly. But at the same time it reserves to Wilder the right to set
up a manufactory or works for making these safes in the state of New
York, provided it 1s not .within fifty miles of the city, and to sell them in
the state of New York, paying to Herring a cent a pound on each safe so
sold within the state. It is evident that this agreement is not an as ignment of an undivided interest in the whole patent, nor the assignment of .
an exclusive right to the entire monopoly in the state or city of New
York. It is therefore to be regarded a a license only, and under the act
of Congress does not enable Herring to maintain an action for an infringement 'of the patent right. The defendant in error continues the
legal owner of the monopoly created by the patent." Paulus v. Buck,
129 Fed. 594.
382 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252; Gayler v. Wilder, IO How.
477, 493.
3 2n 108 Fed. 71 · Acc'd Paulus v. Bue
Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 594.
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he could not exclude the other owner from a similar enjoy-

ment. As owner, he did not have to pay anyone for his use of

the invention; the granting of licenses is part of the enjoyment

and use of a patent right and as the defendant did not have to

pay for his enjoyment, he did not have to account to the plain-

tiff for the royalties received from such licenses. The de-

defendant could not, the court said, keep the plaintiff from

likewise using the device and licensing others to do so, but he

could use it himself or sell his right of use without accounting

to anyone.

So it follows that when a patent is owned jointly, anyone

who wfeliM** <" "Sf^ il h Qg fAxr o pftPGJbilitifE. If the two owners,

expecting to divide the returns, put too high a royalty on the

license, he may, if one of them is susceptible, pay a little more

than half such royalty to that one alone and get almost as val-

uable a license. He _may even buy outright the rigftt to use it

and tojicense othersT and the deceived co-owner will be help-
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less. The only difference in the result to the buyer will be,

that if he had bought from hotfi owners he might haveac-

quired an exclusive right, whereas if he bnvs only from one Tie

carTrTot eclude the other or the other's licenses. 382b

BEFORE EXISTENCE OF THE PATENT. An assignment may

be made of a patent right which has not yet been acquired by

the assignor. This is different from an assignment so made

and recorded that the patent will issue in. the name of the

assignee. The patent will be issued to the inventor, but his

prior assignment of the rights which he is to get, will oper-

ate upon those rights just as though it had been made after

their acquisition. This was declared by the court in the case

of Gayler v. Wilder. 383 The defense was made in this case

plete right of enjoyment of it. The _only limitation was that
he could not exclude the other owner from a similar enjoyment. As owner, he did not have to pay anyone for his use of
the invention; the granting of licenses is part of the enjqyment
and use of a patent right and as the defendant did not have to
pay for his enjoyment, he did not ha.v eto account to the plaintiff for the royalties received from such licenses. The dedef endant could not, the court said, keep the plaintiff from
likewise using the device and licensing others to do so, but he
could use it himself or sell his right of_use without accounting
to .anyone.
So it follows that when a atent is Q
d jointl , an one
1
If the two owners,
who "
expecting to divide the returns, put too high a royalty on the
license, he may, if one of them is susceptible, pay a little more
than half such royalty t_o that one alone and get almost as valuable a license. He may even buy outright the ri ht to use it
and to _license others, an t e · ece1ve co-owner will be helpless. The on y difference in t e result to the
that if he had bo

382b Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling Co., 108 Fed. 77,

one co-owner may sell without consent of other; no sufficient evidence to

show an agreement to account for the proceeds. But one. co-owner's

release will not affect prior accrued damages, Lalance & Grosjean Mfg.

Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 107 Fed. 487; Id., 93 Fed. 197.

The respective rights of the co-owners may be regulated by contract,

as between themselves. Harrison v. Ingersoll, 56 Mich. 36.

383 10 How. 477.

EFORE EXISTENCE OF THE PATENT.
An assignment may
be made of a patent right "\\ hich has not _yet been acquired by
the assignor. This is different from an assignment so made
and recorded that the patent will issue in. the name of the
assignee. The patent will be issued to the inventor, but his
prior assignment of the rights which he is to get, will operate upon those rights just as though it had been made after
their acquisition. This was declared by the court in the case
of Gayler v. Wilder. 383 The defense was made in this case
3s2b Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling Co., 108 Fed. 77,
one co-owner may sell without consent of .o ther; no sufficient evidence to
show an agre_e ment to account for the proceeds. But one. co-owner's
release will not affect prior accrued damages,, Lalance & .Grosjean Mfg.
Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 107 Fed. 487; Id., 93 Fed. 197.
The respective rights of the co-owners may be regulated by contract,
as between themselves. Harrison v. Ingersoll, 56 Mich. 36.
383 10 How. 477.
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that the plaintiff had no legal right to the monopoly, and there-
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fore could not sue in his own name, because the assignment

under which he claimed had been executed before the patent

that the plaintiff had no legal right to the monopoly, and there£ore could not sue in his own name, because the assignment
under which he claimed had been executed before the patent
was in existence. The invention, however, had been perfected
at the time the ttansf er was made. The court upheld the
plaintiff's right to sue, saying, "The inventor of a new and
useful im rovement certainl has no exclu i¥ ight to it, unthe atent, and
til
· s a atent. This ri
no suit can be maintained by the inventor against any one for
using 1t before the patent i i ed. But the discoverer of a
new and useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate
right to its exciusive use, which he may pe'rfect and make absolute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.
Fitzgerald possessed this inchoate right at the time of the
assignment. The discovery had been made, and the specification prepared to obtain a patent. And it appears by the language of the assignment, _that it was intended to operate upon
the perfect legal title which Fitzgerald. then had a lawful right
to obtain, as well as upon the imperfect and inchoate interest
which he actually p9ssessed. The assignment requests that
the patent may issue to the assignee. And there would seem
to be no sound reason for def eating the intention of the parties
by restraining the assignment to the latter interest, and compelling them to execute another transfer, unless the act of Congress makes it necessary. The court thinks it does not. The
act of 1836 declares that every patent shall be assignatrte-in
law, an that the assignment must be in wntmg, and recorded
within the time s ec1fied. But the thing to be assigned is not
the mere parchment on which the grant is written. It is the
monopoly which the grant confers; the right of property which
it creates. And when the party had acquired an inchoate right
to it, and the power to make that right perfect and absolute at
his pleasure, the assignment of his whole interest, whether
executed before or after the patent issued, is equally within the
provisions of the act of Congress. ' 384 Of course, a plaintiff

was in existence. The invention, however, had been perfected

at the time the transfer was made. The court upheld the

plaintiff's right to sue, saying, "The inventor of a new and

useful improvement certainly has no exclusive right to it, un-

til he obtains a patent. This right is created by the patent, and

no suit can be maintained by the inventor against any one for

using it before the patent is issued. But the discoverer of a

new and useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate

right to its exclusive use, which he may perfect and make ab-

solute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.

Fitzgerald possessed this inchoate right at the time of the

assignment. The discovery had been made, and the specifi-

cation prepared to obtain a patent. And it appears by the lan-

guage of the assignment, that it was intended to operate upon

the perfect legal title which Fitzgerald then had a lawful right
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to obtain, as well as upon the imperfect and inchoate interest

which he actually possessed. The assignment requests that

the patent may issue to the assignee. And there would seem

to be no sound reason for defeating the intention of the parties

by restraining the assignment to the latter interest, and com-

pelling them to execute another transfer, unless the act of Con-

gress makes it necessary. The court thinks it does not. The

act of 1836 declares that every patent shall be assignabte-in

law, and that the assignment must be in writing, and recorded

within the time specified. But the thing to be assigned is not

the mere parchment on which the grant is written. It is the

monopoly which the grant confers ; the right of property which

it creates. And when the party had acquired an inchoate right

to it, and the power to make that right perfect and absolute at

his pleasure, the assignment of his whole interest, whether

executed before or after the patent issued, is equally within the

provisions of the act of Congress." 384 Of course, a plaintiff

384 Ace. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Hendrie v. Sayles, 98 U. S.

546; Hammond v. Mason, 92 U. S. 724; Brush Elec. Co. v. California

Acc. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Hendrie v. Sayles, g8 U. S.
546; Hammond v. Ma on, 92 U. S. 724; Bru h Elec. Co. v. California
3 4
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who is not the person named in the patent, must prove his title

237

to it; that is, must prove the assignment, before his suit can

be maiatained.

3. CONTRACTS TO TRANSFER

Even before the invention itself comes into existence a con-

tract to assign it when it shall have been made, may be validly

who is not the person named in the patent, must prove his title
to it; that is, must prove the assignment, before his suit can
be maiutained.

entered into and will be enforced like any other contract. 385

Ther^cannot be an actual transfer of the invention before it

conies into existence, for the evident reason that there is noth-

ing in existence to be transferred. There is not even the right

to a patent, such as was made the subject of a transfer in

Gayler v. Wilder, supra. But a contract to transfer the right

to the patent when the invention does come into existence, or

to transfer the patent which shall have been acquired for an

invention that is to be made, is possible; just as is a contract

to do any act upon the happening of certain events. When

the events have transpired, that is to say, when the invention

has been made, the courts will enforce the contract to transfer
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the patent the right to a patent. 386

Elec. Light Co., 52 Fed. 945 ; Nilsson v. De Haven, 47 N. Y. App. Div.

537; affd. 168 N. Y. 656; Burton v. Burton Stock Car Co., 171 Mass. 437.

Such an assignment will not, however, affect an assignee of the issued

patent without knowledge, even though the first assignment was recorded

in the Patent Office, Nat'l Cash Reg. Co. v. New Columbus Co., 129 Fed.

114.

385 Reece v. Fenwick, 140 Fed. 287; American Brake Beam Co. v. Pungs,

141 Fed. 923 ; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall, 205 ; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co.,

149 U. S. 315.

386 Regan Vapor-Engine Co. v. Pacific Gas Engine Co., 49 Fed. 68 ;

"The agreement of May 15, 1886, .is not the assignment of a patent, though

it contains language 'grant and convey' sufficient for that purpose if

there was anything to assign. It may be good as an agreement to sell

§ 3. CONTRACTS TO TRANSFER
Even before the invention itself comes into existence a contract to assign it when it shall have been made, may be validly
entered into and will be enforced like · any other contract. 385 ,
The can not be an actual trans£ er of the invention before it
or tlie ev1Cient reason ffiat there is nothing me
ransferred. There is not en the right
to a patent, such as was made the subject of a trans£ er in
Gayler v. Wilder, supra. But a contract to transfer the right
to the patent when the invention does come into existence, or
to transfer the patent which shall have been acquired for an
invention that is to be made, is possible; just as is a contract
to do any act upon the happening of certain events. When
the events have transpired, that is to say, when the inve_ntion
has been made, the courts will enforce the contract to transfer
the patent the right to a patent. 3 6

and assign a future invention, but it can not operate as a sale or assign-

ment of such an invention, even when made. No one can sell that which

he hath not."

A court of equity will order an inventor to apply for a patent and to

assign it, in favor of one with whom the inventor has contracted so to

do. Adams v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 185; Runstetler v. Atkinson, Mac-

Arthur & Mackey (D. C.) p. 382.

Elec. Light Co., 52 Fed. 945; Nilsson v. De Haven, 4i N. Y. App. Div.
537; affd. 168 N. Y. 656; Burton v. Burton Stock Car Co., l7I Mass. 437.
Such an assignment w.ill not, however, affect an assignee of the issued
patent without knowledge, even though the first assignment was recorded
in the Patent Office, N at'l Cash Reg. Co. v. New_ Columbus Co., 129 Fed.
II4.
s 5 Reece v. Fenwick, r40 Fed. ?87; American Brake Beam Co. v. Pungs,
l4I Fed. 923; Littlefield v. Perry, 2r Wall, 205; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co.,
149 U. S. 315.
3 8 6 Regan Vapor-Engine Co. v. Pacific Gas Engine Co., 49 Fed. 68;
"The agreement of May rs, r886, .is not the assignment of a patent, though
it contains language-'grant and convey'-sufficient for that purpose if
there was anything to assign. It may be good as an agreement to sell
and assign a future invention, but it can not operate as a sale or assignment of such an invention, even when made. No one can sell that which
he hath not."
A court of equity will order an inventor to apply for a patent and to
assign it, in favor of one with whom the inventor has contracted so to
do. Adams v. Mes inger, 147 Mass. 185; Runstetler v. Atkinson, MacArthur & Mackey (D. C.) p. 382.
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EXPRESS AGREEMENTS. It is JJnt gltngethRT. -infrequent;

employers to insert in the contract of employment an express

course ^of_ the employment shall become the property of the

(/

ernjrlpyer. 387 Such contracts appear to have been uniformly

enforced. In Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 388 Thibodeau had con-

tracted in writing with Hildreth to enter his employ, and to

give him his best services and also the full benefit and enjoy-

ment of any kind and all inventions and improvements which

he had made or might thereafter make relating to machines

or devices pertaining to said Hildreth's business. Suit was

brought involving the conveyance of an invention under the

terms of the contract, and the court said of it, "This contract

is neither unconscionable nor against public policy. Such an

agreement is not uncommonly made by an employee with his

387 Rudyard Kipling notes, in his descriptions of India, that the East

Indian Railway Co. at that time required all employees to sign such a

contract to the great decrease in inventive production.

sss J24 Fed. 892, 63 L. R. A. 480. For an interpretation of this contract
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It is --........,.;........~............__~......~~r..w...~
emplo ers to insert in the contract of emplo ment an ex ress
provision that any invention roduced by the employee in the
..;;....:-_.........._
th
~e~e::.;-m
_c: _nlo ment
ecome the property of the
Such contracts appear to have been uniformly
enforced. In Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 388 Thibodeau had contracted in writing with Hildreth to enter his employ, and to
.. give him his best services and also the full benefit and enjoyment of any kind and all inventions and improvements which
he had made or might thereafter make relating to machines
or devices pertaining to said Hildreth' s business. Suit was
brought involving the conveyance of an invention under the
terms of the contract, and the court said of it, "This contract
is neither unconscionable nor against public policy. Such an
agreement is not uncommonly made by an employee with his
EXPRESS AGREEMENTS.

provision that any invention produced by the employee in the

see Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139. A still broader contract was upheld

in Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Fed. 864. Here Hulse had agreed as

a stated condition precedent to any contract of employment that any in-

ventions he might make in resp'ect to cigarette machines would be "for the

exclusive use of the said company whether they should be made while he

was in the employment of the company, or at any time thereafter." This

387 Rudyard Kipling notes, in his descriptions of India, that the East
Indian Railway Co. at that time required all employees to sign such a
contract-to the great decrease in inventive production.
388 124 Fed. 892, 63 L. R. A. 48o.
For an interpretation of ,this cqntract
see Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. J39· A still broader contract was upheld
in Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Fed. 864. Here Hulse had agreed as
a stated condition precedent to any contract of employment that any inventions he might ma~e in respect to cigarette machines would be "for the
exclusive use of the said company whether they should be made while he
was in the employment of the company, or at any time thereafter." This
contract was enforced despite the contention that, being perpetual, it was
unconscionable, unreasonable and contrary to public policy. On the latter point the court said, "Is the contract void as against public policy?
Does it injure the public? Here we have the case of an ingenious man,
without opportunity of developing his talent, ' and struggling under difficulties, enabled by this contract to secure employment in a large and
prosperous corporation, where he could give his inventive faculties full
play. He in this way was afforded every opportunity of discovering and
removing defects in cigarette machines. He secured this employment by
signing this contract. He could not have obtained it if it had been understood that this contract had no validity. Then, in all human probability, the public would have lost the benefit of his discovery. In this point
of view, a contract of this character cannot be said to be against public
policy." Binney v. Anne.n, 107 Mass. 94; Wright v. Volalion Organ Co., ·
148 Fed. 209, contract that a half interest should appertain to the employer.

contract was enforced despite the contention that, being perpetual, it was

unconscionable, unreasonable and contrary to public policy. On the lat-

ter point the court said, "Is the contract void as against public policy?

Does it injure the public? Here we have the case of an ingenious man,

without opportunity of developing his talent, "and struggling under diffi-

culties, enabled by this contract to secure employment in a large and

prosperous corporation, where he could give his inventive faculties full

play. He in this way was afforded every opportunity of discovering and

removing defects in cigarette machines. He secured this employment by

signing this contract. He could not have obtained it if it had been un-

derstood that this contract had no validity. Then, in all human probabil-

ity, the public would have lost the benefit of his discovery. In this point

of view, a contract of this character cannot be said to be against public

policy." Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94; Wright v. Volalion Organ Co.,

148 Fed. 209, contract that a half interest should appertain to the em-

ployer.
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employer, and it may be necessary for the reasonable protec-

tion of the employer's business."

Such contracts to assign inventions have nothing whatever

to do with the patentability of the invention or the validity

generally of the patent. They do not involve the patent statute,

despite the fact that the property with respect to which they

relate is created by that statute, but, like any contract create

only rights in personam. Their enforcement, therefore, lies

within the normal jurisdiction of the state courts and is not

exclusively the province of the federal courts. 389

The title to inventions not .covered by the terms of the con-

tract is not affected, of course, by the contract. In one case, for

illustration, 390 one I^icecontracted in writing to work for

the company in whatever capacity "pertaining to the manu-

facturing of shellers and powers, and disposing of the

same," the company might direct. He further agreed that all

improvements he might make should belong to the Company.

After the making of this contract, the company took up the
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manufacture of '^heck rowers,^ which had no relation to

"shellers and powers," aTKTEJice was employed at that work

for part of his time. He then invented an improvement in

"check-rowers," for an assignment of which the company

brought this suit. The bill was dismissed on the ground that

Dice had not contracted:" to assign this invention; that the

written contract had reference only to "shellers and powers"

and not to "check rowers." In another case, 391 one Thibodeau

had bound himself by written agreement to allow his employer

the use of all inventions which he might make "relating to

machines or devices pertaining to" the employer's business,

which was that of candy manufacturing. Suit was brought by

389 Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94; American Circular Loom Co. v.

Wilson, 198 Mass. 182; Holt v. Silver, 169 Mass. 435; Keyes v. Eureka

Mining Co., 158 U. S. 150; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co.,

22 L. R. A. 332, 135 Ind. 471 ; title in this case was derived through judg-

ment of another court. Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 18.?, even though state

court has to construe the patent.

390 Joliet Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 111. 649.

391 Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139, affirmed 148 Fed. 676.

employer, and it may be necessary for the reasonable protection of the employers business." .
Such contracts to assign inventions have nothing whatever
to do with the patentability of the invention or the validity
generally of the patent. They do not involve the patent statute,
despite the fact that the property with respect to which they
relate is created by that statute, but, like any contract create
only rights in P'ersonam. Their enforcement, therefore, lies /
within the normal jurisdiction of the state courts and is not
exclusively the province :of the federal courts. 3 8 9
The title to inventions not .covered by the terms of the contract is not affected, of course, by the contract. In one case, for
illustration, 390 one r;>ice contracted in writing to work for
the company in wha1ever capacity "pertaining to the manufacturing of shellers and powers, and disposing of the
same," the company might direc~. He further agreed that all
improvements he might make should belong to the Company.
After the making of this contract, the company took up the
manufacture of '~eek row~s~ which had no relation to
"shellers and powers," ana Dice was employed at that work
for part of his time. He then invented an improvement in
"check-rowers," for an assignment of which the company
brought this suit. The bill was dismissed on the
tha.t
Die~ had not contract
asswn t is invention; that the
written contract had reference only to "shellers and powers"
1 o eau
an no to check rowers.
n another case, one
had bound himsel y written agreement to allow his employer
the use of all inventions which he might make "relating to
machines or devices pertaining to" the employer's business,
which was that of candy manufacturing. Suit was brought by
ss9 Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94; Amer1can Circular Loom Co. v.
Wilson, 198 Mass. 182; Holt v. Silver, 169 Mass. 435; Keyes v. Eureka
Mining Co., 158 U. S. 150; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co.,
22 L. R. A. 332, 135 Ind. 471; title in this case was derived through judgment of another court. Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 1S:.~, even though . state
court has to construe- the patent.
390 Joliet Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 Ill. 649.
3 9 l Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139, affirmed 148 Fed. 676.
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the employer to compel assignment of the patent for a machine

for pulling candy which Thibodeau had invented. This was

refused by the court, which said that by the contract Thibodeau

had been employed to work on "machines for use in the manu-

facture of candy, and especially for sizing, shaping, cutting,

wrapping, and packing, also the pulling of molasses candy."

"At the time the paper was signed," said the court, "machines

for pulling candy, such as that here in question, to take the

place of the men who pulled the candy over hooks to whiten

it, were not known in the art. No such machine was in use

in Hildreth's business nor in course of construction for him.

Under the circumstances, neither Hildreth or Thibodeau could

have contracted with immediate reference to such a machine.

At that time, however, machines performing a different kind

of pulling operation were known to and used in the trade.

The function of that machine was to pull the candy down to

the requisite size to feed the cutting and wrapping machine,

doing the work of a girl who was accustomed to pull the candy
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down to the required size. A pair of such pulling machines

were built for Hildreth in March, 1897, about two months be-

fore the Thibodeau contract was signed. Thibodeau was fa-

miliar with that class of pulling machines, but had no knowl-

edge whatever with respect to any other machine for pulling

candy. Therefore it is well within reasonable belief that he

understood the w r ords 'also for the pulling of molasses candy,'

especially in view of their associated words, to refer to that

class of then known and used pulling machines, as he testifies

he did so understand them.'' "In the recital of the paper in

controversy, which is the key to the meaning of the parties,

it is not machines generally, but 'a certain machine or ma-

chines,' which Hildreth is desirous of having 'perfected and

manufactured,' and it is on such machines that Thibodeau is

to be employed for the purpose of 'constructing, improving

and perfecting.' Now, this recital, in view of its specific ref-

erence to a certain machine or machines, cannot fairly be con-

strued to cover a machine not then known to the art and radi-

cally different from any known machine. The more general

the employer to compel as ignment of the patent for a machine
for pulling candy which Thibodeau had invented. This was
refused by the court, which said that by the contract Thibodeau
had been employed to work on "machines for use in the manufacture of candy, and especially for sizing, shaping, cutting,
wrapping, and packing, also the pulling of molasses candy."
"At the time the paper was signed," said the court, "machines
for pulling candy, such as that here in question, to take the
place of the men who pulled the candy over hooks to whiten
it, were not known in the art. No such machine was in use
in Hildreth' s business nor in course ·of construction for him.
Under the circumstances, neither Hildreth or Thibodeau could
have contracted with immediate reference to such a machine.
At that time, however, machines performing a different kind
of pulling operation were known to and used in the trade.
The function of that machine was to pull the candy down to
the requisite size to feed the cutting and wrapping machine,
doing the work of a girl who was accustomed to pull the candy
down to the required size. A pair of such pulling machines
were built for Hildreth in March, 1897, about two months before the Thibodeau contract was signed. Thibodeau was familiar with that class of pulling machines, but had no knowledge whatever with respect to any other machine for pulling
candy. Therefore it is well within reasonable belief that he
understood the words 'also for the pulling of molas es candy,'
especially in view of their associated words, to ref er to that
class of then known and used pulling machines, as he testifies
he did so understand them.' "In the recital of the paper in
controversy, which is the key to the meaning of the parties,
it is not machines generally, but 'a certain machine or machines,' which Hildreth is desirous of havino- 'perfected and
manufactured' and it is on such machines that Thibodeau is
to be employed for the purpose of 'con tructing, improving
and perfecting. Now this recital, in view of its specific reference to a certain machine or machine , cannot fairly be construed to cover a machine not then known to the art and radically different from any known machine. The more general
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words subsequently employed in the body of the paper ought

not to be held to have a larger scope than the language of the

recital, especially as they expressly relate to machines or de-

vices 'pertaining to said Hildreth's business.' McFarland v.

Stanton Manufacturing Company, 53 N. J. Eq. 649, 650, 33

Atl. 962, 51 Am. St. Rep. 647. Looking at the whole paper,

it seems to me that Thibodeau had a right to understand that

the contract related to Hildreth's business as then conducted,

and that the machines mentioned in the body of the paper were

not other than such as had already been made the subject of

recitation."

IMPLIED AGREEMENTS. A pmmi'c^ tr> fyjw another an in-

IP qr> iti^ntinn tn he pr^iir.<*H r nepH nnt h* in repress

like any other promise, may be implied by circum-

stances. These implied promises are often, loosely, spoken of

as if they arose out of estoppel. Properly speaking they have

nothing in common therewith. Estoppel is essentially a pre-

clusion, for equitable reasons, from denying the existence of
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certain facts, whatever the reality may be. But in the case of

an implied promise there is no preclusion of the truth; there

is an assumption that the promise exists because the evidence

indicates a tacit intent that such should be the result and there

is no countervailing evidence produced. It is a judicial con-

clusion of fact, based upon all the circumstances of the case,

not a fiction of truth imposed out of equity. The implied con-

tract is the reciprocal intent which the court believes must have

actuated the parties as normal men, under the circumstances,

when they do not appear to have had any conscious intent.

An intent that the employer shall have a,n intgre.^ JJL jjljjg.:,,

vention of the employee will not be assumed by the courts from

the mere relation of employer and employee. Every employ-

ment is the result of a contract, of one sort or another, where-

by the employee, in consideration of certain recompense,

agrees to do certain things. The courts_\vill not read into

such contracts an agreement by theTempioyee to make inven-

tions for the benefit of the employer, unless unusual circum-

stances indicating it are present. It is impossible to formu-

words subsequently employed in the body of the paper ought
not to be held to have a larger scope than the language of the
recital, especially as they expressly relate to machines or devices 'pertaining to said Hildreth's bus~ness.' McFarland v.
Stanton Manu·f acturing Company, 53 N. J. Eq. 649, 650, 33
Atl. 962, 51 A1n. St. Rep. 647. Looking at the whole paper,
it seems to me that Thibodeau had a right to understand that
the contract related to Hildreth's business as then conducted,
and that the machines mentioned in the body of the paper were
not other than such as had already been made the subject of
recitation."
IMPLIED AGREEMENTS. A })J;Q~ac@ tq give another an Jn- /
terest ju •m- ii:urentjao to be produced, need not he in exp.r.,ess
WQ.rds. !t like any other promise, may be implied by circumstances. These implied promises are often, loosely, spoken of
as if they arose out of estoppel. Properly speaking they have
nothing in common therewith. Estoppel is essentially a preclusion, for equitable reasons, from denying the existence of
certain facts, whatever the reality may be. But in the case of
an implied promise there is no preclusion of the truth; there
is an assumption that the promise exists because the evidence
indicates a tacit intent that such should be the result and there
is no countervailing evidence produced. It is a judicial conclusion of fact, based upon all the circumstances of the case,
not a fiction of truth imposed out of equity. The implied contract is the reciprocal intent which the court believes must have
actuated the parties as normal men, under the circumstances,
when they do not appear to have had any conscious intent.
An intent that the employer shall have an intg,est. in an invention of the-employl!e will not TJe"aS7umed bx,_tb.e courts from
the mere relation of emQ1oyer and employee. Every employment is the result of a contract, of one sort or another, ·whereby the employee, in consideration of certain recompense,
agrees to do certain things. The courts will .uot read into
such contractSc an agreement-by t-heemployee to .ma!<~ inventions for the benefit of the employer, unless unusual circumstances indicating it are present. It is impossible to formu-
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late any rule of law as to when the circumstances are such as

do indicate an intent that the employer shall have an interest

in the employee's inventions, and when they do not so indicate.

As a broad rule it may be said, that the courts will never

assume a tacit agreement that inventions outside the actual

$cope of the employee s normal occupation shall be for the

benefit of the employer. Neither will an agreement that the

employer shall have the benefit of the employee's inventions be

assumed when the employment is one of merely mechanical

or routine labor. A ditch-digger, inventing a shovel, or a

bookkeeper, inventing an account-book, would not be bound to

allow his employer any interest whatsoever therein.

It may further be said that an agreement to vest the owner-

ship of an invention in the employer will practically never be

deduced from mere tacit circumstances. The most that will

be assumed without express words, is an intent that the em-

ployer shall have a right to use the invention, with or without

f urthe^-payment. 392
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392 American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182. "The plain-

tiff has not established its right to require an assignment of the tubing

machine patent, the letters patent numbered 543,587, and dated July 30,

1895, upon a machine for making tubing. This was the invention of the

defendant himself, made while he was employed by the plaintiff as the

superintendent of its manufacturing department. The machine was de-

signed to turn out the same product, a flexible covering and protection for

electric wires, which the plaintiff was already producing under the Her-

rick patent, so called, for the use of which the plaintiff held an exclusive

license; and it was a material improvement upon the previous mode of

late any rule o{ law as to when the circumstances are such as ·
do indicate an intent that the employer shall have an interest
in the employee's inventions, and when they do not so indicate.
As a broad rule it may be said, that the courts will never
assume a tacit agreement that inventions ou.tside the actual
~cope of the employee's normal occupation shall be for the
benefit o_f the employer. Neither will an agreement that the
employer shall have the benefit of the employee's inventions be
assumed when the employment is one of merely mechanical
or routine labor. A ditch-digger, inventing a shovel, or a
bookkeeper, inventing an account-book, would not be bound to
allow his employer any interest whatsoever therein.
It may further be said that an agreement to vest the ownership of an invention in the employer will practically never be
deduced from mere tacit circumstances. The most that will
be assumed without express words, is an intent that the. emplo~an-tmve
right to use the invention, with or without
392
f urthef..-paym en

obtaining that product. One of the defendant's duties under his employ-

ment was to look after the plaintiff's machinery and to make improvements

therein. The expenses of procuring the patent were paid by the plaintiff.

Many machines embodying the invention and built under the patent have

been constructed under the direction and supervision of the defendant at

the expense of the plaintiff, and have been used by it in its business with

his knowledge and consent ; and the success of its business has largely

depended upon its use of these machines. But these circumstances and

the other facts which have been found do not show that the plaintiff is

entitled to the property right in the invention itself and in the letters

patent which secure that right. The invention and the patent thereon be-

long to the inventor, to whom the patent has been issued, unless he has.

392 American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182.
"The plaintiff has not established its right to require an assignment of the tubing
machine patent, the letters patent numbered 543,587, and dated July 30,
1895, upon a machine for making t_ubing. This was the invention of the
defendant himself, made while he was employed by the plain.tiff as the
superintendent of its manufacturing department. The machine was designed to turn out the same product, a flexible covering and protection for
electric wires, which the plaintiff was already producing under the Herrick patent, so called, for the use of which the plaintiff held an exclusive
license; and it was a material improvement upon the previous mode of
obtaining that product. One of the defendant's duties under his employment was to look after the plaintiff's machinery and to make improvements
therein. The expenses of procuring the patent were paid by the plaintiff.
Many machines embodying the invention and built under the patent have
been constructed under the direction and supervision of the defendant at
the expense of the plaintiff, and have been used by it in its busine s with
his knowledge and consent; and the success of its business has largely
depended upon its use of these machines. But these circumstances and
the other facts which have been found do not show that the plaintiff is.
entitled to the property right in the invention itself and in the letters
patent which secure that right. The invention and the patent thereon belong to the inventor, to whom the patent has been i. sued, unless he has
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When one has been employed for the express purpose of de-

vising means for accomplishing a certain end, the courts gen-

erally assume a tacit agreement that the employer shall have

at least a license to use without further pay any inventions

that may be produced for that purpose. A very clear indica-

tion of such intent is illustrated by the circumstances of Solo-

mons v. United States. 393 The government was seeking a

practicable stamp for use in internal revenue collections. A

committee of Congress was appointed to consider the matter.

One Clark was, at the time, head of the Bureau of Engraving

and Printing. He was directed by the committee, apparently

as part of his employment in the Bureau, to devise a stamp,

with the understanding that the best one he should devise

would be put into use. Nothing whatever was said by either

party in regard to the government's right to use the stamp.

Clark did devise a stamp which was adopted by the govern-

ment. It was subsequently patented by Clark, who brought an

action to recover for its use by the government. The Supreme
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made either an assignment of his right or a valid and enforceable agree-

ment for such an assignment, even though it was his duty to use his

skill and inventive ability to further the interests of his employer by de-

vising improvements generally in the appliances and machinery used in

the employer's business." Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139 ; Hapgood v.

Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315; Joliet

Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 111. 649; Burr v. DeLaVergne, 102 N. Y. 417, "The

proposition asserted in behalf of the defendant, that one partner acquires

no right or interest, legal or equitable, in an invention made by his co-

partner during the existence of the partnership by reason merely of the

When one has been employed for the express purpose of devising means for accomplishing a certain end, the courts generally assume a tacit agreement that the employer shall have
at least a license to use without further pay any inventions
that may be produced for that purpose. A very clear indication of such intent is illustrated by the circumstances of Solomons v. United States. 393 The government was seeking a
practicable stamp for use in internal revenue collections. A
committee -of Congress was appointed to consider the matter.
One Clark was, at the time, head of the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing. He was directed by the committee, apparently
as part of his employment in the Bureau, to devise a stamp,
with the understanding that the best one he should devise
would be put into use. Nothing whatever was said by either
party in regard to the government's right to use the stamp.
Clark did devise a stamp which was adopted by the government. It was subsequently patented by Clark, who brought an
action to recover for its use by the government. The Supreme

copartnership relation, although the invention relates to an improvement

in machinery to facilitate the business carried on by the firm, and al-

though the partner making the invention, uses copartnership articles to

devote his whole time and attention to the firm business, is a doctrine

supported by authority and consonant with reason. Slemmer's Appeal,

58 Penn. St., 155, 164; Belcher v. Whittemore, 134 Mass. 330." Pressed

Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed. 403; Barber v. National Carbon Co.,

129 Fed. 370; But compare Solomon v. U. S. 137 U. S. 342; Pressed

Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 128 Fed. 444, assumption not warranted by mere

fact that the employee has theretofore assigned other inventions to his

employer.

393 137 U. S. 342.

made either an assignment of his right or a valid and enforceable agreement for such an assignment, even though it was his duty to use his
skill and inventive ability to further the interests of his employer by devising improvements generally in the appliances an<l machinery used in
the employer's business." Hildreth v. Duff, 143 Fed. 139; Hapgood v.
Hewitt, II9 U. S. 226; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315; Joliet
Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 Ill. 649; Burr v. DeLaVergne, 102 N. Y. 417, "The
proposition asserted in behalf of the defendant, that one partner acquires
no right or interest, legal or equitable, in an invention made by his copartner during the existence of the partnership by reason merely of the
copartnership relation, altho~gh the inyention relates to an improvement
in machinery to facilitate the business carried on by the firm, and al.though the partner making the invention, uses copartnership articles to
devote his whole time and attention to the firm business, is a doctrine
supported by authority and consonant with reason. Slemmer's Appeal,
· 58 Penn. St., 155, 164; Belcher v. Whittemore, 134 Mass. 330." Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed. 403; Barber v. National Carbon Co.,
129 Fed. 370; But compare Solomon v. U. S. 137 U. S. 342; Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 128 Fed. 444, assumption not warranted by mere
fact that the employee has theretofore assigned other inventions to his
employer. ·
393 137 u. s. 342.
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Court denied his right to recover saying, "An employee, per-
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forming all the duties assigned to him in his department of

service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction

he chooses, with the assurance that whatever invention he may

thus conceive and perfect in his individual property. There

is no difference between the government and any other em-

ployer in this respect. But this general rule is subject to these

limitations. If one is employed to devise or perfect an instru-

ment, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he can-

not, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he

was employed, plead title thereto as against his employer.

That which he has been employed and paid to accomplish be-

comes, when accomplished, the property of his employer.

Whatever rights as an individual he may have had in and to

his inventive powers, and that which they are able to accomp-

lish, he has sold in advance to his employer. So, also, when

one is in the employ of another in a certain line of work, and

devises an improved method or instrument for doing that
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work, and uses the property of his employer and the services

of other employes to develop and put in practicable form his

invention, and explicitly assents to the use by his employer of

such invention, a jury, or a court trying the facts, is war-

ranted in finding that he has so far recognized the obligations

of service flowing from his employment and the benefits re-

sulting from his use of the property, and the assistance of the

coemployees, of his employer, as to have given to such em-

ployer an irrevocable license to use such invention." These

statements of the court are undoubtedly too broad and in their

breadth are in conflict with the actual decisions in other cases,

but the finding of implied intent as to the right of the gov-

ernment to use is quite in accord with other decisions, 394

If the evidence shows that in addition to being employed to

improve known methods of accomplishing a given purpose the

employee has used his employer's materials and machinery in

the development of his invention and has actually permitted

the employer to use it without further agreement, the con-

394 Cf. cases cited supra.

V

Court denied his right to recover saying "An employee, per. forming all the duties assigned to him in his department of
service, may exercise his inventive faculties in any direction
he chooses with the assurance that whatever invention he may
thus conceive and perfect in his individual property. There
· is no difference between the government and any other employer in this respect. But this general rule is subject to these
limitations. If one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument, or a means for accomplishing a prescribed result, he cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he
was employed plead title . thereto as against his employer.
That which he has been emvloyed and paid to accomplish becomes, when ccompli hed the pr.op ·i
hi employer.
Whatever rights as an individual he may have had in and to
his inventive powers, and that which they are able to accomplish, he has sold in advance to his employer. So, also, when
one is in the employ of another in a certain line of work, and
devises an improved method or instrument for doing that
work, and uses the property of his employer and the services
of other emplo~es to develop and put in practicable form his
invention, and explicitly assents to the use by his employer of
such invention, . a jury, o.r a court trying the facts, is warranted in finding that he has so far recognized the obligations
of service :flowing from his employment and the benefits resulting from his use of the property, and the as istance of the
coemployees of his employer, as to have given to such employer an irrevocable license to use such invention.
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statements of the court are undoubtedly too broad and· in their
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elusion that his employment gave his employer a right to use

the invention is particularly clear.

The cases involving the matter are not numerous enough

for any real classification of facts to be made and a rule of

judicial custom founded thereon. The best that can be done

by an attorney is to examine particular cases, seek the closest

analogy, and hope that the force of the analogy will influence

.the court to a similar conclusion. 395

ESTOPPEL. The decision in a number of cases appears to

have been based on a real estoppel. The expressions of the

court rather indefinitely combine tacit contract and estoppel,

but the moving factor of these latter decisions seems to be that

the employee has allowed the employer to change his position,

upon a supposition of a right in the invention, to such an ex-

tent that it would be inequitable to allow the employee to deny

395 An often cited case is that of McClurg v. Kingsland, i How. 202.

Here the inventor was employed at a weekly wage, apparently as a mere

mechanician. After his invention he allowed his employers to use it, and
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his wages were increased in consequence. Eventually he left their employ,

and subsequently brought suit on account of their continued use of the

invention. The trial court charged the jury that these facts would fully

justify the presumption of a license, and that they amounted to a con-

sent and allowance of such use and gave the defendants a right to the

clusion that- his employment gave his employer a right to use
the invention is particularly clear.
The cases involving the matter are not numerous enough
for any real classification of facts to be made and a rule of
judicial custom founded thereon. The best that can be done
by an attorney is to examine particular cases, seek the closest
analogy, and hope that the force of the analogy will influence
. the court to a similar conclusion. 395
EsTOPPEL.
The decision in a number of cases appears to
have been based on a real estoppel. The expressions of the
court rather indefinitely combine tacit contract and estoppel,
but the moving factor of these latter decisions seems to be that
the employee has allowed the employer to change his position,
upon a supposition of a right in the invention, to such an extent that it would be inequitable to allow the employee to deny

continued use of the invention. This charge was sustained by the Su-

preme Court, and approved by it again in Solomon v. U. S. 137 U. S. 342.

In Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193, the inventor had been

employed as a designing engineer and draughtsman to assist in the de-

velopment and construction of elevators and other machinery. He used

his employers' tools and machinery in perfecting his invention of a check

valve for elevators and subsequently allowed them to use the invention

without a claim for compensation. These facts were held to demonstrate

a license to the employers to continue the use of the invention even after

a termination of the contract of employment.

See also, Continental Windmill Co. v. Empire Windmill Co., 8 Blatch.

295, Fed. Cas. No. 3142; Magoun v. New England Glass Co., 3 Bann &

Ard, 114, Fed. Cas. No. 8960; Davis v. U. S. 23 Ct. Cl. 329; Barry v.

Crane Bros. Mfg. Co., 22 Fed. 396; Bensley v. Northwestern Horse-Nail

Co., 26 Fed. 250; Withington-Cooley Mfg. Co. v. Kinney, 68 Fed. 500;

Herman v. Herman, 29 Fed. 92; Jencks v. Langdon Mills, 27 Fed. 622;

Fuller & J. Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 60 Am. Rep. 838; Keyes r.

Eureka Mining Co., 159 U. S. 150.

An often cited case is that of McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202.
Here the inventor was employed at a weekly wage, 2.pparently as a mere
mechanician. After his invention he allow.ed his employers to use it, and
his wages were increased in consequence. Eventually he left their employ,
and subsequently brought suit on account of their continued use of the
invention. The trial court charged the jury that these facts would fully
justify the p~esumption of a license, and that they amounted to a consent and allowance of such use and gave the defendants a right to the
continued ·use of the invention. This charge was sustained by the Supreme Court, and approved by it again in Solomon v. U. S. 137 U. S. 342.
In Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193, the inventor had been
employed as a designing engineer and draughtsman to assist in the development and construction of elevators and other machinery. He used
his employers' tools and machinery in perfecting. his invention of a check
valve for elevators and subsequently allowed · them to use the invention
without a claim for compensation. These facts were held to demonstrate
a license to the employers to continue the use of the invention even after
a termination of the contract' of employment.
See also, Continental Windmill Co. v. Empire Windmill Co., 8 Blatch.
295, Fed. Cas. No. 3142; Magoun v. :N" ew England Glass Co., 3 Bann &
Ard, 114, Fed. Cas. No. 8960; Davis v. U. S. 23 Ct. Cl. 329; Barry v.
Crane Bros. Mfg. Co., 22 Fed. 396; Bensley v. Northwestern Horse-Nail
Co., 26 Fed. 250; Withington-Co~ley Mfg. Co. v. Kinney, 68 Fed. 500;
Herman v. Herman, 29 Fed. 92; Jencks v. Langdon Mills, 27 Fed. 622;
Fuller & ]. Mfg. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 6o Am. Rep. 838; Keyes Y.
Eureka Mining Co., 159 U. S. 150.
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the reality of that right. It is quite impossible, however, to

draw any line between those which turn upon pure estoppel

the reality of that right. It is quite impossible, however, to
draw any line between those which turn upon pure estoppel
and those which base their decision upon a conclusion of an
implied license to a limited use . . An illustrati on is the case of
Barber v. National Carbon Co. 306 Barber ha d been in the employ of the defendants as a mechanical engineer, for the purpose of impro ing their processes of manufacture. \i\Thile so
employed he invented a valuable device which, with the defendant's knowledge, he patented. Six machines embodying
this device were constructed under his direction for the company and used by them witpout any mention of royalty. The
use of the machines by the company had involved the construction of special buildings and necessitated other expensive
arrangements. On suit for infringement brought by Barber,
the court held that there was no indication that he had agreed
to assign title" to his invention to the defendants, as was suggested, but that the defendants were, nevertheless, justified in
the continued use of the machines already constructed. At the
beginning of one paragraph the court says, "We think that the
presumption is that he ( Barber ) intended to .grant to the
Carbon Company the right to use his process in connection
with the machines, for which space in the several factories had
been specifically arranged with his knowledge and under his
direction. " This would indicate a finding of constructive intent, but at the close of the same paragraph the court says,
"By his conduct, Barber has estopped himself from asserting
that the use of his invention to this extent is an infringement
of his right as a patentee." Either doctrine leads to the same
result.
The case of Gill v. U. S. 39 7 was a clear case of estoppel and
was expressed as such. The plaintiff had persuaded the government to defray the cost of embodying and perfecting mechanically an invention which he had made while in government employ, and had allowed the government to use the completed invention without any mention of recompen e. His suit

and those which base their decision upon a conclusion of an

implied license to a limited use. An illustration is the case of

Barber v. National Carbon Co. 396 Barber had been in the em-

ploy of the defendants as a mechanical engineer, for the pur-

pose of improving their processes of manufacture. While so

employed he invented a valuable device which, with the de-

fendant's knowledge, he patented. Six machines embodying

this device were constructed under his direction for the com-

pany and used by them without any mention of royalty. The

use of the machines by the company had involved the con-

struction of special buildings and necessitated other expensive

arrangements. On suit for infringement brought by Barber,

the court held that there was no indication that he had agreed

to assign title to his invention to the defendants, as was sug-

gested, but that the defendants were, nevertheless, justified in

the continued use of the machines already constructed. At the
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beginning of one paragraph the court says, "We think that the

presumption is that he (Barber) intended to .grant to the

Carbon Company the right to use his process in connection

with the machines, for which space in the several factories had

been specifically arranged with his knowledge and under his

direction." This would indicate a finding of constructive in-

tent, but at the close of the same paragraph the court says,

"By his conduct, Barber has estopped himself from asserting

that the use of his invention to this extent is an infringement

of his right as a patentee." Either doctrine leads to the same

result.

The case of Gill v. U. S. 397 was a clear case of estoppel and

was expressed as such. The plaintiff' had persuaded the gov-

ernment to defray the cost of embodying and perfecting me-

chanically an invention which he had made while in govern-

ment employ, and had allowed the government to use the com-

pleted invention without any mention of recompense. His suit

sae I29 Fed. 370.

397 !6o U. S. 426.
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to recover for this use was dismissed. The court said, 'The

principle is really an application or outgrowth of the law of

estoppel in pais, by which a person looking on and assenting

to that which he has power to prevent, is held to be precluded

ever afterwards from maintaining an action for damages. A

familiar instance is that of one who stands by, while a sale is

being made of property in which he has an interest, and makes

no claim thereto, in which case he is held to be estopped from

setting up such claim. The same principle is applied to an

inventor who makes his discovery public, looks on and per-

mits others to use it without objection or assertion of a claim

for a royalty."

An inventor may lose his right of exclusive enjoyment, to

a limited extent, not only through estoppel as just discussed,

but also through the provision of the statute itself which reads,

"Every person who purchases of the inventor or discoverer, or,

with his knowledge and consent, constructs any newly invented

or discovered machine, or other patentable article, prior to the
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application by the inventor or discoverer for a patent, or who

sells or uses one so constructed, shall have the right to use, and

vend to others to be used, the specific thing so made or pur-

chased, without liability therefor." 397 "

A CONTRACT TO ASSIGN WILL BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED.

As a contract gives only a right against the person of the

promissor, and does not create any right in the particular thing

concerning which the contract was made, it follows that no

right in the invention itself vests in the purchaser under such

a contract to transfer. An actual transfer is necessary. 398 If

the inventor refuses to make such a transfer, according to the

terms of his contract, he will be liable in damages just as in

any other case of breach of contract.

Furthermore, equity will step in and compel the inventor to

perform his contract specifically and to make the transfer, un-

less the rights of third parties have intervened or it would for

3978 Wade v. Metcalf, 129 U. S. 204.

398 Milwaukee Carving Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 126 Fed.

171.
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other reasons be inequitable to do so. 39J Equity will not act

other rea ons be inequitable to do so. 399 Equity will not act
to compel such an actual transfer if it would reflect injuriously
upon some other purchaser for value, without notice, from the
inventor. The mere recording of the contract to assign, even
though it be in form a present assignment, is not constructive
notice to any one purchasing the invention or an interest therein, after the invention is in existence. Hence, even. a contract
so recorded does not give the buyer therein named any interest
as against one without actual knowledge of the contract, to
whom the patentee has subsequently conveyed the patent. 400

to compel such an actual transfer if it would reflect injuriously

upon some other purchaser for value, without notice, from the

inventor. The mere recording of the contract to assign, even

though it be in form a present assignment, is not constructive

notice to any one purchasing the invention or an interest there-

in, after the invention is in existence. Hence, even a contract

so recorded does not give the buyer therein named any interest

as against one without actual knowledge of the contract, to

whom the patentee has subsequently conveyed the patent. 40(

4. LICENSES

The name of "assignment" is technically and properly lim-

ited to those transactions by which the ownership of the patent

right is transferred. It includes not only transfers of the ab-

solutely unlimited ownership, but also those which convey an

absolute ownership of the right within a particular geographi-

cal limit and those which convey a joint, but otherwise abso-

§ 4.

lute, ownership. 402 The conveyance of anything less than the

LICENSES
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ownership creates in the person to whom it is conveyed only

The name of "assignment" is technically and properly limited to those transactions by which the ownership of the patent
right is transferred. It indudes not only transfers of the absolutely unlimited ownership, but also those which convey an
absolute ownership of the right within a particular geographical limit and those which convey a joint, but otherwise absolute, ownership. 402 , The conveyance of anything less than the
ownership creates in the person to whom it is conveyed only
a ri ht to do certain things in esp_ec to the inventi ' · thout
inte rence from the w.ner of the patent. Such a transaction
is properly called a "license," and the person in whom the
privilege is created a "licensee." These two relations, i.e. that
of assignee or that of licensee are the only ones which the
patentee can create, although various other names are sometimes given to them. That is to say, a particular person must
be either owner of the patent monopoly, or not owner of it,

a right to do certain things in respect to the invention- without

interference from the owner of the patent. Such a transaction

is properly called a "license," and the person in whom the

privilege is created a "licensee." These two relations, i.e. that

of assignee or that of licensee are the only ones which the

patentee can create, although various other names are some-

times given to them. That is to say, a particular person must

be either owner of the patent monopoly, or not owner of it,

399 Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315.

400 National Cash Reg. Co. v. New Columbus Watch Co., 129 Fed. 114.

An exception to the rule as stated is made in this case as regards future

improvements. Concerning this the court says, "That an assignment of a

patent, together with any future improvements thereon, is recordable and

operative as a notice to subsequent assignees of patents for improvements

may be conceded. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205, 22 L. Ed. 577 ; Aspin-

wall Co. v. Gill et al (C. C.) 32 Fed. 697."

402 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252; Paulus v. Buck Mfg. Co., 129

Fed. 594; Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, etc. Co., 144 U. S. 248.

Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315.
National· Cash Reg. Co. v. New Columbus Watch Co., 129 Fed. u4.
An exception to the rule as stated is made in this case as regards future
improvements. Concerning this the court say , "That an assignment of a
patent, together with any future improvements thereon, is recordable -and
operative as a notice to subsequent as ignees of patents for improvements
may be conceded. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205, 22 L. Ed. 577; Aspinwall Co. v. Gill et al (C. C.) 32 Fed. 6g7."
402 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252; Paulus v. Buck Mfg. Co., 129
Fed. 594; Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, etc. C0., 144 U. S. 248. ·
399

400
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though his position may be given various indicative names.

The same thing is, of course, true of all other forms of per-

sonal property, one is either owner or not owner, as the terms

are employed in their never yet defined legal usage, but it is

necessary to speak of it because confusion on this point is

noticeable in some cases. 40:

If one is not owner, he has-j^lx_such rights in respect to

t.he-mnni3]Toly_ _asjris agreement_wjtJTjJT_nwner^ directly or in-

termediately, gives to him. Towards thircTperson he is not

owner, and can not assume such position, and therefor can

riTJt bring suit against them in his own name. "In equity as

in law, when the transfer amounts to a license only, the title

remains in the o\vner_of_the patent ; and suit must be brought

in his name, and never in the name ofTHe~trcerrsee alone, un-

less that is necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice,

as where the patentee is the infringer, and can not sue him-

self. Any rights of the licensee must be enforced through or

in the name of the owner of the patent, and perhaps, if neces-
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sary to protect the rights of all parties, joining the licensee

with him as a plaintiff.'' 404

CHARACTER OF THE TRANSACTION. The particular name by

which the parties have called the transaction does not determine

its character. It does not amount to a transfer of ownership

merely because it is called an assignment by the parties ; it will

be called an assignment by the courts only if it does transfer

the title. Whether the transaction is a transfer of ownership,

or merely confers a right to make, use or vend the invention

witlf permission of the owner of the monopoly, depends wholly

403 A mortgage amounts to a transfer of the ownership and vests title

in the mortgagee, subject to defeasance upon performance of the condi-

tion. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, Waterman v. Shipman, 55

Fed. 982.

404 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. .252, 255; Paper Bag Cases, 105

U. S. 766; Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U. S. 485; Rice v. Boss, 46 Fed. 195;

Moore Mfg. Co. v. Cronk Hanger Co., 69 Fed. 998; Bogart v. Hinds, 25

Fed. 484; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Suydam v. Day, 2 Blatch. 20,

Whether an assignment needs to be in writing or not, a license, it is

settled, may be created by parole.

though his position may be given various indicative names.
The same thing is, of course true· of all other forms of personal property one is either owner or not owner, as the terms
are employed in their never yet defined legal usage, but it is
necessary to speak of it ·because confusion on this point is
noticeable in some cases. 403
If one is not 0\ ner, he ha
r -such rights in respect to
th~ol as hi
with the owner, irectly or inte mediately, gives to him. Tm\iards third person e is no
owner, an can not .a.SSUIDe such~o ion and therefor can
not bring suit against them in. his own name. "In equity as
in la~ when tne transfer amounts to a -license only, th · e
remains in the owner of the- atent; and suit must be brought
in his name, -and never in the name of t e ·
ee a one, unless that is necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice,
as where the patentee i the infringer, and can not sue himself. Any rights of the licensee must be enforced through or
· in the name of the owner of the patent, and perhaps, if necessary to protect the rights of all parties, joining the licensee
with him as a plaintiff ." 404
CHARACTER OF ';!'HE TRANSACTION. The particular name by
which the parties have called the transaction does not determine
its chara.cter. It does not amount to a transfer of ownership
merely because it is called an assignment by the parties; it will
be called an assignment by the courts only if it does transfer
the title. . \!Vhether the transaction is a transfer of ownership,
or merely confers a right to make, use or vend the invention
witli permission of the owner of the monopoly, depends wholl¥
403 A mortgage amounts to a t~ansfer of the ownership and vest~ · title
in the mortgagee, subject to defeasance upon performance of the condition. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, Waterman v. Shipman, , 55
Fed. 982.
.
4 04 Waterman v. ~fackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 255; Paper Bag Cases, 105
U. S. 7(>6; Birdsell v. Shaliol, n2 U. S. 485; Rice v. B~ss, 46 Fed. 195;
Moore Mfg. Co. v. Cronk Hanger Co., 69 Fed. 998; Bogart v. Hinds; 23
Fed. 484; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Suydam v. Day, 2 Blatch. 20,
Whether an assignment needs to be in writing or not, a license, it is
settled, may be created by parole.
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upon the intention oj[ the parties as determined- by the courts.

~In~caseToT doubt as to this intention the name by which the

parties called their transaction would undoubtedly be of in-

fluence upon the decision, 405 so that it is well to use the terms

in their accepted sense, and in accord with the real intent. The

intention of the parties as to the relations created, the scope

of the rights conveyed, and so forth, will be determined from

the facts and circumstances of the entire transaction under the

same rules of evidence and presumption as apply to the in-

terpretation and construction of other agreements. 406 As in

other cases of .written instruments, the instrument itself con-

trols and will be enforced according to its own terms if its

meaning be clear and indisputable; it can be "interpreted"

from the extrinsic circumstances only when the true meaning

is in doubt. 407

RIGHTS OF LICENSEE. Because a mere license conveys to

the licensee no title to the monopoly itself, but only the right

tctjnvade it without liability, and, in consequence, does not
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invest him with any right to sue as owner of the monopoly,

his power to protect his own rights is, in theory at least, in-

direct only. If a license is so construed as to give the licensee

nothing more than a right himself to invade the monopoly, he

is not entitled to any protection whatever against other per-

sons who may also invade the monopoly. So long as his own

405 Moore Mfg. Co. v. Cronk Hanger Co., 69 Fed. 998.

406 Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Jenkins, 81 U. S. 452, "An assignment of

an interest in an invention secured by letters patent, is a contract, and like

all other contracts, is to be construed so as to carry out the intention of

the parties to it." Illingworth v. Spaulding, 43 Fed. 827 ; In Littlefield v.

Perry, 21 Wall. 205, it was held that a record instrument containing in

unmistakable language an absolute assignment of title to a patent would

not be reduced to a mere license and the assignee precluded from sueing

as owner, by a subsequent oral agreement limiting the assignee's right of

user. The second agreement was said to be in effect a license back to the

assignor from the assignee of the complete ownership.

407 Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367. For the interpretation of

particular licenses on possibly recurrent points see, Pelzer v. City of

upon the intt~ntion _of th~ _part~es as determined by the-courts.
n cases of doubt as to this intention the name by which the
parties called their transaction would undoubtedly be of influence upon the decision, 405 so that it is well to use the terms
in their accepted sense, and in accord with the real intent. The
intention of the parties as to the relations created, the scope
of the rights conveyed, and so forth, will be determined from
the facts and circumstances of the entire transaction under the
same rules of evidence and presumption as apply to the interpretation and construction of other agreements. 406 As in
other cases of . written instruments, the instrument itself controls and will be enforced according to its own terms if its
meaning be clear and indisputable; it can be "interpreted"
from the extrinsic circum.stances only when the true meaning
is in doubt. 407
RIGHTS OF LICENSEE. Because a mere license conveys to
the licensee no tit e to the monopoly itself, but only the right
t invade it without liability, and, in consequence, does not
invest him wit any right to su~ as owner of the monopoly,
his power to protect his own rights is, in theory at least, indirect only. If a license is so construed as to give the licensee
nothing more than a right himself to invade the monopoly, he
is not entitled to any protection whatever against other p·ersons who may also invade the monopoly. So long as his own

Binghamton, 95 Fed. 823 ; Western Elec. Co. v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471 ;

Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Co., 154 Fed. 365.

Moore Mfg. Co. v. Cronk Hanger Co., &) Fed. 998.
Nicholson Pavement ·Co. v. Jenkins, 81 U. S. 452, "An assignment of
an interest in an invention secured by letters patent, is p. contract, and like
all other contracts, is to be construed so as to carry out the intention of
the parties to it." Illingworth v. Spaulding, 43 Fed. 827; In Littlefield v.
Perry, 21 Wall. 205, it was held that a record instrument containing in
unmistakable language an absolute assignment of title to a patent would
not be reduced to a mere license and the ~ssignee precluded from sueing
as owner, by a subsequent oral agreement limiting the assignee's right of
user. The second agreement w~s said to be in effect a license back to the
assignor from the assignee of the complete ownership.
407 Railroad Co. v. Trimble, IO Wal1. 367.
For the interpretation of
particular licenses on possibly recurrent points see, Pelzer v. City of
Binghamton, 95 Fed. 823; Western 'Elec. Co. v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471;
Indiana Mfg. Co. v. ]. I. Case Co., 154 Fed. 365.
40s
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freeetonTof enjoyment isTrotritsetf

lessened, although his profits may be more or less eliminated.

He has no cause for action against the others who make, use

c>r_yend the invention,, nor again^JnVJicensor to^allowing

such others tojdo it

If his license gives him, either expressly or by implication,

an exclusive right to make, use or vend the invention in certain

particulars, the exercise of such privilege by others is obvi-

ously an invasion of his own right. This matter of exclusive-

ness of the right granted must be determined, of course, by the

ordinary rules for construing contracts, before the procedure

of protecting it can become a pertinent issue.

If it is an exclusive right and the assignor himself invades

it, he, the assignor, is undoubtedly liable in an action for

breach of contract. 408 Since the title, however, is still in the/

assignor and he is therefore the only person entitled to sue

because of infringement of the patent monopoly, it is the only

logical conclusion that the licensee can not sue him for in-
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fringement, any more than he could sue a third party, and that

action in breach of contract is the licensee's only remedy. He,

the licensee, acquires no right in rent to the patent monopoly,

but only a right in personam against the owner of the mo-

nopoly, who has agreed to let the licensee, and the licensee

only, invade the monopoly without liability. 409

408 i n N. Y. Phonograph Co. v. Edison, 136 Fed. 600, affd. 144 Fed. 404,

the licensee was allowed to bring action based on contract liability against

the assignee-with-notice of his licensor.

409 Two cases at least have suggested, as matter of more or less loose

dictum, that the licensee could sue the licensor for infringement in such

circumstances. In Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205 that court

held that title to the monopoly had actually passed to the plaintiffs. It

then went on to say, "But even if they (plaintiffs) are not technically

assignees, we think this action is, nevertheless maintainable (against the

infringing grantor) ... A mere licensee can not sue strangers who in-

fringe. In such case redress is obtained through or in the name of the

patentee or his assignee. Here, however, the patentee is the infringer,

and as he can not sue himself, the licensee is powerless, so far as the courts

of the United States are concerned, unless he can sue in his own name. A

court of equity looks to substance raher than form. When it has juris-

diction of parties it grants the appropriate relief without regard to

whether they come as plaintiff or defendant. In this case, the person who

freeCiom of enjoyment is not itsett-restrieted,hs right is not
les_sened, alt~ough his profits may _be mor~ O_!: less eliminated.
He has no cause or action ag!linst the others wlio make, use
or vend the invention nor ~inst his licensor for allowing
such others to do it
-~
If lliSlicense gives him, either expres~ly or by implication,
an exclusive right to make, use or vend the invention in certain
particulars, the exercise of such pri'vilege by others is obviously an invasion of his own right. This matter of exclusiveness of the right granted must be determined, of course, by the
ordinary rules for construing contracts, before the procedure
of protecting it can become a pertinent issue.
If. it is an exclusive right and the assignor himself invades)
it, he, the assignor i und
·
a~ion for
breach of contract. 40 Since the ttfle, howe e , is til · the
,. assignor ana he is there£ ore the only person entitled to sue
because of infringement of the patent monopoly, it is the only
logical conclusion that the licensee can not sue him for infringement, any more than he could sue a third party, and that
action in breach of contract is the licensee's only remedy. He,
the licensee, acquires no right in rem to the patent monopoly,
but only a right in p·ersonam against the owner of the monopoly, who has agreed to let the licensee, and the licensee
only, invade the monopoly without liability. 409
40s In N. Y. Phonograph Co. v. Edison, 136 Fed. 600, affd. 144 Fed. 404,
the licensee was allowed to bring action based on contract liability against
the assignee-with-notice of his licensor.
409 .Two cases at least have suggested, ~s matter of more or less loose
dictum, that the licensee could sue the licensor for infringement in such
circumstances. In Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 205 that court
held that title to the monopoly had actually passed to the plaintiffs. It
then went on to say, "But even if they (plaintiffs) are not technica·lly
assignees, we think this action is, nevertheless maintainable (against the
infringing grantor) . _. . A mere licensee can not sue strangers -wh-0 infringe. In such case redress is obtained through or in the name of the
patentee or his assignee. Here, however, the patentee is the infringer,
and as he can not sue himself, the licensee is powerless, so far as the courts
of the United States are concerned, unless he can sue in his own name. A
court of equity looks to substance raher than form. When it has jurisdiction of parties it grants the appropriate relief without regard to
whe~her they come as plaintiff or defendant. In this case, the person who
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When the invasion of the licensee's right is by a third per-

son, not the licensor or one acting by his authority, it is clear

that the licensee can not sue such invader in his own name, on

the ground of infringement of the patent. The patent is in-

fringed, to be sure, but the licensee does not own it and there-

fore cannot sue to protect it. 410 He may, however, sue in the

name of his licensor, if his license is exclusive.

Under these circumstances, is the licensor bound by his con-

tract himself to sue the invader of the licensee's right? In

other words, did he contract only that the licensee should have

the exclusive right of enjoying the invention, with power to

protect himself in the licensor's name ; or did he further agree

that he would himself, under his right to prevent infringement,

protect the licensee. The question is a material one, because

the financial burden of protecting the licensee from infringe-

ment of the patent might be extremely heavy. To hold that

the licensor, the patentee, does, by granting an exclusive li-

cense, impliedly undertake to protect the licensee against in-
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fringement of the patent by others, is to throw a possibly

heavy burden upon the licensor; a burden for which compen-

sation could not be estimated in advance. If the licensor has

not expressly agreed to protect the licensee against infringe-

ment he is apparently not bound to do so. 411 This has been

said to be the case even where the licensor has agreed "to pro-

tect the patent," as distinct from protecting the licensee. 412

should have protected the plaintiff against all infringements has become

himself the infringer. He held the legal title to his patent in trust for

his licensees. He has been faithless to his trust, and courts of equity

are always open for the redress of such a wrong. This wrong is an in-

fringement. Its redress involves a suit, therefore, arising under the patent

laws, and of that suit the Circuit Court has jurisdiction." It might well

be doubted whether the court would have said invasion of the licensee's

exclusive right by way of contract was an infringement of the patent

monopoly if that question had really been involved. See also, Water-

man v. McKenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 255 ; Waterman v. Shipman, 55 Fed. 982.

410 See authorities supra.

411 In re McLeod, 66 N. Y. S. 253 ; Martin v. New Trinidad Lake As-

phalt Co., 255 Fed. 93, citing authority.

412 Kline v. Garland Co., 135 Mich. 313.

When the invasion of the licensee's right is by a third per- son, not the licensor or one acting by his authority, it is clear
that the licensee can not sue such invader in his own name, on
the ground of infringement of the patent. The patent is infringed, to be sure, but the licensee does -not own it and therefore cannot sue to protect it. 410 He may, however, sue in the
name of his licensor, if his_license is exclusive.
Under these circumstances, is the licensor bound by his contract himself to sue the invader of the licensee's right? In
other words, did he contract only that the licensee should have
the exclusive right of enjoying the invention, with povver to
protect himself in the licensor's name; or did he further agree
that he would hi111rSelf, under his right to prevent infringement,
protect the licensee. The question is a material one, because
the financial burden of protecting the licensee from infringement of the patent might be extremely heavy. To hold that
the licensor, the patentee, does, by granting an exclusive license, impliedly undertake to protect the licensee against infringement of the pate~t by others, is to throw a possibly
heavy burden upon the licensor; a burden for which compensation could not be estimated in advance. If the licensor has
not expressly agreed to rotect the licensee against infringe-ffient h~P- arently not bound .!9 do so. 411 This has been
said to be the case even w ere the licensor has agreed "to protect the patent," as distinct from protecting the licensee. 412
I

should have protected the plaintiff a·g ainst all infringements has become
himself the infringer.
He held the legal title to his patent in trust for
his licensees. He has been faithless to his trust, and courts of equity
are always open for the redress of such a wrong. This wrong is an infringement. Its redress involves ~ suit, therefore, arising under .the patent
laws, and of that suit the Circuit Court has jurisdiction."" It might well
be doubted whether the co·urt would have said invasion of the licensee's
exclu ive right by way of contract was an infringement of the patent
;nonopoly if that question had really been involved. See also, Waterman v. McKenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 255; Waterman v. Shipman, 55 Fed. 982.
410 See authorities supra.
411 In re McLeod, 66 N. Y. S. 253; Martin v. New Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., 255 Fed. 93, citing authority.
412 Kline v. Garland Co., 135 Mich. 313.
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If the licensor has expressly agreed to protect the licensee

againsMrrfrin^emeirHre^ wilf,"of "course, ISe re'quiredjto do so

atjnsjyvvn cost. 4ia

As between" the licensor and licensee, the validity of the

patent should not be capable of becoming an issue in court

proceedings. The agreement of a licensee to pay royalties, or

whatsoever the consideration may be, can be made dependent

on the validity of the patent. In such event, it would be a

proper defense, perhaps, to allege and attempt to prove the in-

validity of the patent. But unless such conditional liability on

the licensee's part is clear from the terms of the license, his

agreement is to pay the consideration named in return for im-

munity from prosecution for infringement by the licensor ; the

validity or invalidity of the patent is not an element in the

mutual considerations, is not a condition precedent, and con-

sequently not a proper defense. 414 Where the evidence is clear

that the acts of a defendant have been done under the pretense

of a license from the patentee, he will be estopped to deny that
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they were in fact so done. 415

413 Foster v. Goldschmidt, 21 Fed. 70 ; Such an agreement is valid,

Virtue v. Creamery Co., 227 U. S. 8, 32; Bailey v. Miller, 45 Ind. Ap. 475;

Clark v. Cyclone, etc. Co., 22 Tex. Civ. Ap. 41 ; Macon Knitting Co. v.

Leicester, etc. Co., 113 Fed. 844, affd. 116 Fed. 196, cost of suit divided by

agreement. The obligation to protect the licensee does not run with the

ownership of the patent, so as to bind an assignee of the licensor, Brad-

ford Belting Co. v. Kisinger Iron Co., 113 Fed. 811.

414 Platt v. Fire-Extinguisher Mfg. Co., 59 Fed. 897; Moore v. National

Water-Tube Boiler Co., 84 Fed. 346 ; Martin v. New Trinidad Asphalt Co.,

255 Fed. 93 ; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 734, dictum. Marston v.

If the licensor has expressly agreed to protect the licensee
·agair!_st infringement-he '''"ill, ·oI -course, berequired to Clo so
a.t..his own cost. 413
As between the licensor and licensee, the validity of the
patent should not be capable of becoming an issue in court .
proceedings. The agreement of a licensee to pay royalties, or
whatsoever the consideration may be, can, be made dependent
on the Yalidity of the patent. In such event, it would be a
proper defense, perhaps, to allege and attempt to prove the invalidity of the patent. But unless such conditional liability on
the licensee~s part is clear from the terms of the license, his
agreement is to pay the consideration named in return for immunity from prosecution for infringement by the licensor; the
validity or invalidity of the patent is not an element in the
mutual considerations, is not a condition precedent, and consequently not a proper defense. 414 \Vhere the evidence is clear
that the acts of a defendant have been done under the pretense
of a license from the patentee, he will be estopped to deny that
they were in fact so done.415

Sweet, 66 N. Y. 206; In re McLeod, 66 N. Y. S. 253; Eureka Co. v. Bailey

Co., ii Wall. 488; Fair v. Shelton, 128 N. C. 105.

415 The Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Ecanbert, 177 111. 587, syll. "One

who has paid fees or royalties to the owner of a patent for the use

thereof, and who has enjoyed the benefits of the patent, is estopped to

set up that he is not a licensee but an infringer, in order to defeat the

jurisdiction of the State court of an action for royalties claimed to be

due and unpaid." Accd. Am. Street Car Advertising- Co. v. Jones, 122

Fed. 803 ; Marston v. Swett, 82 N. Y. 526, dictum; Marston v. Swett, 66

N. Y. 2C6; Holmes v. McGill, 108 Fed. 238.

413 Foster v. Goldschmidt, 21 Fed. 70; Such an agreement is valid,
Virtue v. Creamery Co., 227 U. S. 8, 32; Bailey v. Milier, 45 Ind. Ap. 475;
Clark v. Cyclone, etc. Co., 22 Tex. Civ. Ap. 41; Macon Knitting Co. v.
Leicester, etc. Co., 113 Fed. 844, affd. II6 Fed. 19(), cost of suit divided by
agreement. The obligation to protect the licensee does not run with the
ownership of the patent, so as to bind an assignee of the licensor, Bradford Belting Co. v. Kisinger Iron Co., II3 Fed. 8u.
414 Platt v. Fire-Extinguisher Mfg. Co., 59 Fed. 897; Moore v. National
Water-Tube Boiler Co., 84 Fed. 346; Martin v. New Trinidad Asphalt Co.,
255 Fed. 93; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 734, dictum. Marston v.
Sweet, 66 N. Y. 2o6; In re McLeod, 66 N. Y. S. 253; Eureka Co. v. Bailey
Co., II Wall. 488; Fair v. Shelton, 128 N. C. 105.
415 The Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Ecanbert, 177 Ill. 5871 syll.
"One
who has paid fees or royalties to the owner of a patent for the use
thereof, and who has enjoyed the benefits of the patent, is estopped to
set up that he is not a licensee but an infringer, in order to defeat the
jurisdiction of the State court of an action for royalties claimed to be
due and unpaid." Aced. Aru. Street Car Advertising Co. v. Jones, 122
Fed. 8o3; Marston v. Swett, 82 N. Y. 526, dictimi; Marston v. Swett, 66
N. Y. 206; Holmes v. McGill, 108 Fed. 238.
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If the defendant could show that the contract had been re-

pudiated, or in other ways put an end to before the acts com-

plained of took place, or that such acts were, for any other

reason, not within the purview of a contract, he would then be

free to contest the claim of the plaintiff in the same way that

any alleged infringer could do. 416

A suit to recover royalties due under the contract is purely a

contract action and, although the contract deals with a patent

right, the suit is not one which, because it arises under the

patent laws, gives the Federal courts a jurisdiction which they

Would not otherwise have. 417

The extent to which a licensee can assign his license to

others is purely a matter of contract law, and is essentially the

same in respect to licenses under patents as in respect to any

other contracts of similar type. The mere fact that a licensee

does assign his license, without right to do so, does not give

the patentee any right of action in contract against such as-

signee. In such case the patentee's right is not on contract,
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which does not exist between him and the assignee, but for in-

fringement of the patent, on the ground that such assignee is

using the invention without authority from the patentee. 4174

416 It has been held that the failure of the licensee to pay the royalties

contracted for does not in itself terminate the contract; which is quite in

accord with the law in respect to other contracts, such as those for the

payment of rent. White v. Lee, 3 Fed. 222; Wagner Typewriter Co. v.

Watkins, 84 Fed. 57; Standard Dental Mfg. Co. v. National Tooth Co.,

95 Fed. 291 ; Am. Street Car Advertising Co. v. Jones, 122 Fed. 803. The

fact that a patent had been invalidated by interference proceedings in the

Patent Office was held ipso facto to terminate a contract for the payment

of royalties in Marston v. Swett, 82 N. Y. 526.

Estoppel to deny validity of the patent ceases on termination of the

contract, regardless of the motive in terminating it, Stimpson, etc. Co.,

v. Stimpson, 104 Fed. 893. As to right to sell articles made during life

254
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If the defendant could show that the contract had been repudiated, or in other ways put an end to before the acts complained of took place, or that such acts were, for any other
reason, not within the purview of a contract, he would then be ·
free to contest the claim of the plaintiff in the same way that
any alleged infringer could do. 416
A suit to recover royalties due under the contract is purely a
contract action and, although the contract deals with a patent
right, the suit is not one which, because it arises under the
pat~nt laws, gives the Federal courts a jurisdiction which they
\vould not otherwise have. 417
The extent to which a licensee can assign his license to
others is purely a matter of contract law, and is essentially the
same in respect to license~ under patents as in respect to any
other contracts of similar type. The mere fact that a licensee
does assign his license, without right to do so, does not give
the patentee any right of action in contract against such assignee. In such case the patentee's right is not on contract,
which does not exist between him and the assignee, but for infringement of the patent, on the ground that such assignee is
using the invention without authority from the patentee. 4178

of the contract, compare Pelzer v. City of Binghamton, 95 Fed. 823.

417 Briggs v. United Shoe Co., 239 U. S. 48 ; Even though the State

court has to construe the patent, Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182; Odell v.

Farnsworth Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 516 (June, 1919).

7 a Wilson v. Mechanical, etc. Co., 68 N. Y. S. 173, 170 N. Y. 542 ;

Moore v. Coyne, .etc. Co., 98 N. Y. S. 892; A promise to pay royalties will

not be implied from the mere fact that the defendant has deliberately in-

It has been held that the failure of the licensee to pay the royalties
contracted for does no.t in itself terminate the contract; which is quite in
accord with the law in respect to other contracts, such as those for the
payment of rent. White v. Lee, 3 Fed. 222; Wagner Typewriter Co. v.
Watkins, 84 Fed. 57; Standard Dental Mfg. Co. v. National Tooth Co.,
95 Fed. 291; Am. Street Car Advertising Co. v. Jones, 122 Fed. 8o3. The
fact that a patent had been invalidated by interference proceedings in the
Patent Office was held ipso factO to terminate a contract for the payment
of royalties in Marston v. Swett, 82 N. Y. 526.
Estoppel 't o deny validity of the patent ceases on termination of the
contract, regardless of the motive in terminating it, Stimpson, etc. Co.,
v. Stimpson, 104 Fed. 893. As to right to sell articles made during life
of the contract, compare Pelzer v. City of Binghamton, 95 Fed. 823.
417 Briggs v. United Shoe Co., 239 U. S. 48; Even though \he State
court has to construe the patent, Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182; Odell v.
Farnsworth Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 516 (June, 1919).
~ma Wilson v. Mechanical, etc. Co., 68 N. Y. S. 173, 170 N. Y. 542;
Moore v. Coyne,. etc. Co., 98 N . .Y. S. 892; A promise to pay royalties will
not be implied from the mere fact that the defendant has deliberately in~
416
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In general it may be said, that he can not assign it unless his

contract with the owner of the patent expressly so provides.

He may, however, arrange to enjoy his license through the

use of other persons as employees.

5. RESTRICTIONS IN LICENSES

The statute gives a patentee the exclusive right to make, use

In general it may be said, that he can not assign it unless his
contract with the own.er of the patent expressly. so provides.
He may, however, arrange to enjoy his license through the
·
use of other persons as employees. .

and vend his invention. We have seen that he can transfer

the ownership of this monopoly to another without destroying

it. He need not make any use of the invention himself nor

§ 5.

RESTRICTIONS IN LICENSES

permit others to use it ; he may keep all advantage of it from

the world during the period of his patent, if he so chooses. 422

But if he chooses to put his invention into use he can, as we

have seen, open his monopoly to one or more particular per-

sons; that is to say, he may license certain persons to invade

his monopoly, without thereby throwing it open to the public.

Furthermore, the patentee may limit this permitted invasion

of his monopoly not only to the particular person, but also to

the particular extent. He may limit the invasion permitted to
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enjoyment of the invention in a particular territory or at a

particular place, 423 or for a particular time, 424 or for a particu-

lar purpose only, 425 or to a particular person without right of

transfer. 426 So also the limitation in a permission to use em-

bodiments of the invention but not to make them has been up-

held. 427 All of these restrictions have been recognized as

fringed the patent monopoly, May v. Western Lime Co., 65 Wash. 696,

44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 333-

422 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern, etc. Co., 210 U. S. 405 ;

Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka, etc. Co., 77 Fed. 288.

423 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788.

424 Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544.

425 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 248, Gamewell, etc. Co. v.

Brooklyn, 14 Fed. 255.

426 Waterman v. Shipman, 55 Fed. 982; Oliver v. Rumford Chemical

Works, 109 U. S. 81.

427 Brush Elec. Co. v. California, etc. Co., 52 Fed. 945 ; In Oliver v.

Rumford Chemical Works, 109 U. S. 75, the patent covered the process

of making an acid to be used in the manufacture of certain kinds of flour.

The statute gives a patentee the exclusive right to m_ake, use
and vend his invention. We have. seen that he can trans£ er
the ownership of this monopoly to another without destroying
it. He need riot make any use of the invention himself nor
permit others to use it; he may keep all advantage -of it from
the world during the period of his patent, if he so chooses. 422
But if he chooses to 'put his invention into use he can, as we
have se~n, open his monopoly to one or more particular persons; that is to say, he may license certain persons to invade
his monopoly, without thereby throwing it open to the ·public.
Furthermore, the patentee may limit this permitted invasion
of his monopoly not only to the particular person, but also to
the particular extent. He may limit the invasion permitted to
enjoyment of the invention in a particular territory or at a
particular place, 423 or for a particular time, 424 or for a particu- .
lar purpose only, 425 or to a particular person without right of
trans£ er. 426 So also the limitation in a permission to use embodiments of the invention but not to ma.k e them has been upheld.427 All of these restrictions have been recognized as
fringed the patent monopoly, May v. Western Lime Co., 65 Wash.

696,

44 L. R. A. (N. S.) j33.
+2 2 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern, etc. Co., 210 U. S. 405;
Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka, etc. Co., 77 Fed. 288.
423 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788~
424 Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544.
425 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 248, Gamewell, etc. Co. v.
Brooklyn, 14 Fed. 255.
42 6 Waterman v. Shipman, 55 Fed. 982; Oliver v. Rumford Chemical
Works, 109 U. S. 8I.
427 Brush Elec. Co. v. California, etc. Co., 52 Fed. 945; In Oliver v.
Rumford Chemical Works, 109 U. S. 75, the patent covered the process
of making an acid to be used in the manufacture of certain kinds of flour.
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proper, and the 1 united permission to invade the monopoly and

enjoy the invention did not create in the license a complete

right to use and enjoy the invention.

v RESTRICTIONS ON RESALE, OR USE OF EMBODIMENTS. From

the fact that the patentee can thus limit the extent to which

Others are permitted to invade his monopoly, it would seem

to follow that he could validly limit the licensee in respect to

the profit he might, or must, make and the ways in which he

might use embodiments of the invention. Such is undeniably

the logical proposition, and it is one which was accepted by

the courts until recently. Thus in Benient v. National Harrow

Co. 428 the plaintiff had contracted, forcertairi considerations,

foHet the defendant make and sell embodiments of his inven-

tion, on the agreement of the defendant, however, not to sell

the embodiments at less than a stipulated price. In suit to

recover damages for the defendant's breach of this contiact,

it was claimed that the contract was void as an attempt to re-

strain trade in contravention of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
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The court said, "On looking through these licenses we have

been unable to find any conditions contained therein rendering

the agreement void because of a violation of that act. . . .

The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would

sell the article manufactured under the license was also an

appropriate and reasonable condition. It tended to keep up

the price of the implements manufactured and sold, but that

was only recognizing the nature of the property dealt in, and

providing for its value so far as possible. This the parties

were legally entitled to do. . The owner of a patented article

can, of course, charge such a price as he may choose, and the

the right to manufac-

ture and sell the article jatentedupon trie condition that the

assignee shall charge a certain amount for such article." The

decision is, that a condition on the right to enjoy the patentee's

monopoly, requiring the maintainance of a stipulated sale price,

The restriction of a license to make and sell such flour, but not to sell the

acid itself was upheld.

428 J86 U. S. 70-

Conditions and Restrictions
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is not invalid because of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. There

seems to have been no question, even, but that except for that

act, the condition was perfectly valid and enforcible.

Again, in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 429 the patentee had sold

a mimeograph machine, embodying his invention, upon condi-

tion that the buyer should use it only with ink made by the

seller. The seller sought to enjoin a third party from induc-

ing the buyer toaise other ink in breach of the condition. In

granting the injunction the court not only said that the agree-

ment not to use other inks was valid as a contract, but it held

that inasmuch as the buyer's right to use had been limited to

use with the seller's inks, any other use was an unauthorized

invasion of the seller's exclusive patent right. The opinion

explicitly says, "We repeat. The property right to a patented

machine may pass to a purchaser with no right of use, or with

only the right to use in a specified way, or at a specified place,

or for a specified purpose. The unlimited right of exclusive

use which is possessed by and guaranteed to the patentee will
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be granted if the sale be unconditional. But if the right of

use be confined by specific restriction, the use not permitted is'

necessarily reserved to the patentee. If that reserved control

of use of the machine be violated, the patent is thereby in-

vaded. This right to sever ownership and use is deducible

from the nature of a patent monopoly and is recognized in the

cases." This statement makes a clear distinction between the

ownership of the right to enjoy the invention and the owner-

ship of a chattel embodying the invention. 430 Although it is

obvious from the whole opinion that the court does rather con-

*29 22 4 U. S. I.

43 <> Accord, Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka Co., 77 Fed. 288 ; National

Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed. 733. To the effect that even absolute

ownership of a chattel embodying a patented invention does not save the

owner from liability for infringement if he makes use of his chattel, see

Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U. S. 485. It would not be denied that one who

makes a machine of his own materials is the owner of it, yet it is equally

undeniable that his use of the machine would be infringement of a patent

covering such machines, unless he had permission of a patentee. Dicker-

son v. Sheldon, 98 Fed. 621; Rcdgers v. Torrant, 43 Mich. 113.

is not invalid because of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. There
seems to have been no question, even, but that except for that
act, the condition was perfectly valid and enforcible.
Again, in Henry v. . B. Dick Co., 429 the patentee had sold
a mimeograph machine, embodying his invention, upon condition that the buyer hould use it only with ink made by the
seller. The seller sought to enjoin a third party from inducing the buyer to use other ink in breach of the condition. In
granting the injunction the court not only said that the agreement not to use other inks "'as valid as a contract, but it, held
that inasmuch as the buyer's right to use had been limited to
use with the seller's inks, any , other use was an unauthorized
invasion of the seller's exclusive patent right. The opinion
explicitly says, "We repeat. The property right to a patented
machine may pass to a purchaser with no right of use, or with
only the right to use in a specified way, or at a specified place,
or for a specified purpose. The unlimited right of exclusive
use which is possessed by and guaranteed to the patentee will
be granted if the sale be unconditional. But if the right of
use be confined by specific restriction, the use not permitted isnecessarily reserved to the patentee. If that reserved control
of use of the machine be violated, the patent is thereby in- ·
vaded. This right to sever mvnership and use is deducible
from the nature of a patent monopoly and is recognized in the
cases." This statement makes a clear distinction between the
ownership of the right to enjO)' the invention and the ownership of a chattel embodying the invention. 430, Although it is
obvious from the whole opinion that the court does rather con429 224

u. s.

I.

Accord, Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka Co., 77 Fed. 288; National
Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 12S Fed. 733. To the effect that even absolute
ownership of a chattel embodying a patented invention doe not save the
owner from liability for infringement if he makes use of his chattel, see
Birdsell v. Shaliol, II2 U. S. 485. It would not be deni,ed that one who
makes a machine of his own materials is the owner of it, yet it is equally
undeniable that his use of the machine would be infringement of a patent
covering such machines, unless he had permission of a patentee. Dickerson v. Sheldon, g8 Fed. 621; Rcdgers v. Tarrant, 43 Mich. n3.
430
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fuse the two and think of the tangible machine as being itself

the invention. 431

Thus the law- stood until it was upset by the decision in

Bauer v. Q'Donnell^ 32 The defendant in that case had pur-

chased packages of "Sanatogen,"' a preparation protected by

the plaintiff's patent. On each package was a notification-

knowledge of which the defendant did not deny : to the effect

that no one was authorized to sell such packages at less than a

stated price, and anyone selling at less than that price would

be guilty of infringing the patent monopoly. The defendant

did resell at less than the stated price. The issue in the case

was whether this sale, at a price less than that authorized by

the patentee, constituted infringement. The court held that it

did not. 433 This decision was followed in a few years by that

of The _ Motion_Picture_ Co. v. Universal^Fjliii Co., 434 which

sped ficallv,javer ruled Henry v. Dick Co., supra. The plaintiff,

as patentee oT a device for operating motion picture films, had

given the right to manufacture machines embodying his inven-
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tion to one who in turn sold such a machine to defendant. At-

tached to the machine was a notice that its use was permitted

by the patentee only with certain films also controlled by the

431 So late as 1913, in United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, it was

very strongly implied that a condition that the licensee should use no other

machines than those furnished by the licensor was valid. In the English

case of Incandescent Gas Lt. Co. v. Cantelo, 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262, the

court said, "The patentee has the sole right of using and selling the arti-

cles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all. Inas-

much as he has the right to prevent people from using them or dealing

in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to say, to

impose his own conditions." Accord, British Mutoscope Co. v. Homer,

i Ch. Div, 671 (1901) ; National Phonograph Co. v. Menck (1911), L. R.

36 A. C. 336.

fuse the-two and think of the tangible machine as being itself
the invention. 431
Thu th la s.tood_until it wa up et by the decision in
~uer v. O'Donnell.!32 The defendant in that case had purc\lsed packages of 1Sanatogen,'' a preparation protected by
the plaintiff's patent. On each package was a notificationknowledge of "'.hi ch the defendant did not deny_ to the effect
that no one was authorized to sell such packages at less than a
stated price, and anyone selling at less than that price would
be gqilty of infringing the patent monopoly. The defendant
did resell at less than the stated price. The issue in the case
was whether this sale, at a price less than that authorized by
the patentee, constituted ·infrino-ement. The court held that it
did not. 433 This decisifm as. followed in a few -years qy that
o The -0ti011 Picture Co. v. Universal Filpi Co., 434 which
specificall
erru1*d !jenry v. Dick C2., supra,. The plaintiff,
as patentee of a device for operating motion picture films, had
given the right to manufacture machines embodying his invention to one who in turn sold such a machine to defendant. Attached to the machine was a notice that its use was permitted
by the patentee only with certain films also controlled by the

432 229 U. S. I. The court "distinguishes" this case from that of Henry

v. Dick Co., supra, but the reality of the distinction is illuminated by the

fact that the four judges who constituted the majority in Henry v. Dick

Co. (only seven judges took part) were all opposed to the decision in

Bauer v. O'Donnell, and the majority in that decision included the three

judges who had dissented in the earlier one.

433 Accord, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490.

434 243 U. S. 502.

So late as 1913, in United States v. Win low, 227 U. S. 202, it was
very strongly implied that a condition that the licensee should use no other
machines than those furnished by the licensor was valid. In the English
case of Incandescent Gas Lt. Co. v. Cantelo, 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262, the
court said, 'The patentee has the sole right of using and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with them at all. Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them .or dealing
in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to say, to
impose his own conditions." Accord, British Mutoscope Co. v. Homer,
l Ch. Div, 671 (1901); National Phonograph Co. v. Menck (19u), L
R.
36 A. C. 336.
432 229 U. S. I. The court "distinguishes" this case from that of Henry
v. Dick Co., supra, but the reality of the distinction is illuminated by the
fact that the four judges who constituted the majority in Henry v. Dick
Co. (only seven Judges took part) were a.ll opposed to the d~cision in
Bauer v. O'Donnell, and the majority in that decision included the three
judges who had dissented in the earlier one.
433 Accord, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490.
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plaintiff. The defendant did not deny knowledge of this

restrictive condition, and admitted that he had not conformed

to it. The court did not discuss the validity of a contract be-

tween the patentee and his licensee imposing restrictions on

the licensee's right, saying that such a question was outside

the scope of patent law. This left the issue squarely, whether

the unauthorizedjise of the_dgyjce~witn~other tnan the speci-

fied films constituted an infringement of the patentee's mo-

nopoly; TFeZc^rtlidd that Hjfj^notT

This development of the law may be perfectly sound as a

matter of public policy and economic utility. 435 But the opin-

ion of the court is a most confusing admixture of justification

of its decision upon the strength of its economic effect and

attempt to justify it as a logical development of the existing

law. As is usual when courts override existing law for the

sake of public advantage, without frankly admitting that they

are so doing, the pretense of reasoning given is, to say the

least, irritating.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The real issue is, to use the court's own language, whether,

"since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether from

public use, he must logically and necessarily be permitted to

impose any conditions which he chooses upon any use which

he may allow of it." As the court says, this is not specifically

answered by the patent statute, which in terms merely gives

him the exclusive right to enjoy his invention. It is therefore

purely a question of public policy whether, if he allows others

to invade his monopoly at all, he must allow them to invade it

435 The possible economic harm that might result from a patentee's un-

limited power to restrict the right to use embodiments of his invention is

indicated by the not infrequent cases in which the holder of a valid

patent, covering something essential to a particular trade, has secured a

practical monopoly of profit in lines not covered by his patent. An ex-

cellent presentation of the methods by which patents are used to secure

monopolies wholly unrelated to the patent, is given by Mr. W. H. S.

Stevens in his "Unfair Competition," Chap IV.

On the other hand, the United States Chamber of Commerce has gone on

record as favoring some plan by which resale prices may lawfully be

sustained. See Chicago Herald, May 19, 1916, p. 13.

plaintiff. ·The defendant did not deny knowledge of this
restrictive condition, and admitted that he had not conformed .
to it. The court did not discuss the validity of a contract between the patentee and his licensee imposing restrictions on
the licensee's right, saying that such a question was outside
the scope of patent law. This left the issue squarely, whether
the unauthorized use of the device wit ot er an t e specified films constituted an infringement of the patentee s mo- -no,RO_ .
e co
h
· 1a not.
This development of the law may be perfectly sound as a
matter of public policy and economic utility. 435 But the opinion of the court is a most confusing admixture of justification
of its decision upon the strength of its economic effect and
attempt to justify it as a logical development of the existing
law. As is usual when courts override existing law for · the
sake of public advantage, without frankly admitting that they
are so doing, the pretense of reasoning gi.ven is, to say the
·
least, irritating.
. · The real issue is, to use the c;ourt's own language, whether,
"since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether from
public use, he must logically and necessarily be permitted to
impose any conditions which he chooses upon any use wb1cb
he may allow o~ it." . As the court says, this is not specifically
answered ~by the patent statute, which in terms · merely gives
him the exclusive right to enjoy his invention. It is therefore
purely a question of public polic whether if he allows ot ers
~ · va e 1s monopol at all, he must allow them to mvaae 1t
435

The possible economic harm that might result from a patentee's unlimited power to restrict the right to use embodiments of his invention is
. indicated by the not · infrequent cases in which the holder of a valid
patent, covering something essential to a particular trade, has secured a
practical monopoly of profit in lines not covered by his patent. An excellent presentation of the methods by which patents are used to secure
monopolies wholly unrelated to the patent, is given by Mr. W. H. S.
Stevens in his "Unfair Competition,'' Chap IV.
On the other hand, the United States Chamber of Commerce has gone on
record as favoring some plan by which resale prices may lawfully be
sustained. See Chicago H crald, ~fay 19, 1916, I?· I 3.
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jwvtbnnf restriction/ 3 ' As we have seen, the consistent custom

of the courts, until the case of Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra, had

been to allow the patentee to restrict and limit the extent to

which he would allow others to enjoy his monopoly. But, be-

ginning with that case, the court decided not to permit the

patentee to restrict the extent to which his monopoly might be

invaded by purchasers of chattels embodying his invention.

This is clear enough, and probably satisfactory as a matter

of public policy. The confusion arises because the court has

endeavored to place such purchaser's right to invade the mo-

nopoly on the fact of his ownership of the chattel. This ab-

sence of distinction between the ownership of a chattel em-

bodying an invention, and the owner's right to use it in con-

travention of another's patent was foreshadowed in Henry v.

Dick Co., supra, and carried to an extreme in the subsequent

cases. 437 ^The sum total of the decisions, however, is clearly

that a patentee who, by selling" an embodiment of his invention

authorizes the buyer to invade the monopoly, can not limit
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436 That public policy is the motivating reason for the decisions is indi-

cated by the statement in the Motion Picture Co. case, 243 U. S. 515, that

"The perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression which such a sys-

tem of doing business, if valid, would put into control of the owner of

such a patent should make courts astute, if need be, to defeat its operation."

437 InMotion JPicture Co. v. Universal Film Co.. 243 U. S. 502, for in-

stancet!ie^court^ays, p. 516, "The right to vend is exhausted by a single,

unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the mo-

nopoly of the patent law. . . ." This is true enough; a patentee who has

sold a tangible chattel embodying his invention has given up all control

wi
striction. 436 As we have een, the consistent cu tom
of the courts, until the case of Bauer v. 0 Donnell su.pra, had
been to allow the patentee to restrict and limit the extent to
which he would allow others to enjoy hi monopoly. But, b~
ginning with that case, the court decided not to permit the
patentee to restrict the extent to which his monopoly might be
invaded by purcha ers of chattels embodying his invention.
This is 1clear enough, and probably satisfactory as a matter
of public policy. The confusion arises because the court has
endeavored to place such purchaser s right to invade the monopoly on the fact of his ownership of the cha.ttel. This absence of distinction between the ownership of a chattel embodying an invention, and the owners right to use it in contravention of another's patent was foreshadowe~ in Henry v.
Dick Co., supra., and carried to an extreme in the subsequent
cases. 437 ( The sum total
cisions however, i clearly
that a patentee
elling .an e o · n f his invention
au onzes the buyer to · ade the onopol y can not limit_

--

whatsoever over the ownership and, directly, of the use of that chattel.

But has he given up his monopoly of the use and enjoyment of the

invention? The chattel sold was not the invention, nor was it the pat-

entee's monopoly of the invention ; that still remains in the patentee. The

buyer of the Chattel has no right whatsoever to infringe the patentee's

monopoly of enjoyment of the invention, except such right as the patentee

expressly or impliedly gave him by the sale. The fact that the patentee

sold the chattel is, therefore, in no way whatever a reason for the decis-

ion ; on the contrary it is merely a fact in the case, the effect of which is

the thing to be decided, and in this case the effect of the sale on the

monopoly was expressly limited. See note 430.

That public policy is the motivating rea on for the decision i indicated by the statement in the Motion Picture Co. case, 243 U. S. 515, that
"The perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression ~hich such a ystem of doing business, if valid, would put into control of the owner of
such a patent should make courts astute, if need be, to defeat its operation."
437 In Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, for in- stanc~e court says, p. 516, "The right to vend is exhausted by a si~gle,
unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law. . . ." This is true enough; a patentee who has
sold a tangible chattel embodying his invention has given up all control
whatsoever over the ownership and, directly, of the use of that chattel.
But has he given up his monopoly of the u e and enjoyment of the
invention? The chattel sold was not the invention, nor was it the patentee's monopoly of the invention; that still remains in the patentee. The
buyer of the chattel has no right whatsoever to infringe the patentee's
monopoly of enjoyment of the invention, except such right as the patentee
expressly or impliedly gave him by the sale. The fact that the patentee
sold the chattel is, therefore, in no way whatever a reason for the decision; on the contrary it i merely a fact in the case, the effect of which is
the thing to be decided, and in this case the effect of the sale on the
monopoly was expres ly limited. See note 430.
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that right as to the price at which the embodiment may be re-

sold^ nor as to the way in which it may be used.*** ^

The existing decisions as to the time during which the right

may be exercised, or the place where it must be exercised, have

not yet been overruled.

The question as to whether a patentee, as the price of a li-

cense to enjoy his invention,^ can impose conditions upon the

licencee's conduct in no way connected with the invention

seems not- to have been directly passed on. It was more or

less discussed, however, in United States v. United Shoe Ma-

chinery Co. 439 That was a suit to have the defendant com-

pany dissolved as an illegal combination. Suit was dismissed

on the ground that such combination as existed was not illegal.

One of the ways by which the company was alleged to have

improperly restrained trade was in granting -licenses, to use

machines covered by its patents, only on condition that the

licensee should not use similar machines not covered by the

licensor's patents and also that the licensees should rent from
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the licensors, and from them only, certain entirely different

machines not covered by any patent. It was this "tying'' to

the license of terms which had no relation to the invention at

all that the government objected to as an improper restraint

of trade. The majority of the court held that there was noth-

ing illegal in these "tying clauses" and that the owner of a

patent may license persons to enjoy the invention on such terms

as he sees fit. There was, however, a strong dissenting opin-

ion in which the right of a patentee to restrict the conduct of

a licensee in ways unrelated to the invention was flatly denied.

Logically, if it is sound public policy to preclude a patentee

from putting restrictions upon the buyer of embodiments of

the invention, it should be equally sound to forbid his putting

such restrictions upon the lessee. (As we have seen the buyer

is as truly a licensee in respect to the monopoly as is a lessee

438 For a more extended discussion of this topic see the excellent article

by T. R. Powell in 17 Columbia Law Rev. 663, and that by the author in

15 Michigan Law Rev. 581.

439 247 U. S. 32. It is answered by implication, also in United States

v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202.

that ri ht as to the rice at which the e.wllo ·
nia. be re438
J_old... nor as to the wa. in which it ma be used.
The existing decisions as to the time during which the right
may be exercised, or the place w~ere it must be exercised, have
not yet been overruled.
The que tion as to whether a patentee, as the price of a license to enjoy his invention, can impose conditions upon the
licencee's conduct in no way connected with the invention
seems not· to have been directly passed on. It was more or
less discussed, hovvever, in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 439 That was a suit to have the defendant company dissolved as an illegal combination. Suit was dismissed
on the ground that such combination as existed was not illegal.
One of the ways by which the company was alleged to have
improperly re trained trade was in granting ·licenses, to use
machines covered by its patents, only on condition that the
licensee should not use similar machines not covered by the
licensor's patents and also that the licensees should rent from
the licensors, and fro·m them only, certain entirely different
machines not covered by any patent. It was this "tying'' to
the license of terms which had no relation to the invention at
all that the government objected to as an improper restraint
of trade. The majority of the court held that there was nothing illegal in these "tying clauses'' and that the owner of a
patent may license persons to enjoy the invention OJ) such terms
as he sees fit. There was, however, a strong dissenting opinion in which the right of a patentee to restrict the conduct of
a licensee in ways unrelated to the invention was flatly denied.
Logically if it is sound public policy to preclude a patentee
from putting restrictio~s upon the bu.yer of embod.iments of
the invention, it should be equally sound to forbid his putting
such restrictions upon the lessee. (As we have seen the buyer
is as truly a licensee in respect to the monopoly as is a lessee
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For a more extended discussion of this topic see the excellent article
by T. R. Powell in 17 Columbia Law Rev. 663, and that by the author in
15 Michigan Law Rev. 581.
439
247 U. S. 32. It is answered by implication, also in United States
v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202.
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of the embodiment.) And in view of the tendency of the

of the embodiment.) And in view of the tendency of the
court it is very doubtful if such restrictions would be actually
enforced. ·
RESTRICTIONS BY CONTRACT. Since the patentee, if he opens
his monopoly at all by sale of chattels .embodying the patent,
must open it entirely, at least so far as resale price and use are
concerned, and can not protect himself by virtue of .his patent,
it becomes a very natural question whether he can restrict the
buyer of such chattels by a valid contract.
In Bement v. National Harrow Co.,4 40 the issue was whether
a contract between the patentee and his licensee, whereby the
latter agreed not to sell below a stipulated price the chattels
which he should make embodying the invention, was valid and
enforcible. The court held that it was enforcible and did not
.contrav~ne the .federal ~nti-trust statute, (the Sherman Act).
Likewise in Henry v. Dick Co. 441 it was clearly indicated that
the buyer's agreement to use the machine with the seller's ink
only, would be enforcible as a contract. However, these decisions were so far interwoven with the idea of the patentee's
right to partially release his monopoly, that the basic reason expressed in the opinions has been removed by the -decision in
Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra. The only issue now possible is
whether, regardless of the paJtent monopoly, or, indeed, without any such monopoly, a seller of goods can, by express contract, restrict the buyer's disposal or use of them.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 442 the action
directl mvolyed the validity of a contract whereby one purchasing certain chattels from the plaintiff had agreed that he
would not sell below a stated price. No patent right was involved at all. The contract was one of a great number of
similar ones between the plaintiff and. other dealers, constituting "a system of interlocking restrictions by which. the complainant seeks to control not merely the prices at which its
agents may sell its products, but the prices for all sales by all

court it is very doubtful if such restrictions would be actually

enforced.

RESTRICTIONS BY CONTRACT. Since the patentee, if he opens

his monopoly at all by sale of chattels embodying the patent,

must open it entirely, at least so far as resale price and use are

concerned, and can not protect himself by virtue of his patent,

it becomes a very natural question whether he can restrict the

buyer of such chattels by a valid contract.

In Bement v. National Harrow Co., 440 the issue was whether

a contract between the patentee and his licensee, whereby the

latter agreed not to sell below a stipulated price the chattels

which he should make embodying the invention, was valid and

enforcible. The court held that it was enforcible and did not

contravene the. federal anti-trust statute, (the Sherman Act).

Likewise in Henry v. Dick Co. 441 it was clearly indicated that

the buyer's agreement to use the machine with the seller's ink

only, would be enforcible as a contract. However, these de-
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cisions were so far interwoven with the idea of the patentee's

right to partially release his monopoly, that the basic reason ex-

pressed in the opinions has been removed by the decision in

Bauer v. O'Donnell, supra. The only issue now possible is

whether, regardless of the patent monopoly, or, indeed, with-

out any such monopoly, a seller of goods can, by express con-

tract, restrict the buyer's disposal or use of them.

In Dr.Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons -Co., 442 the action

d i r ectryTnvol ved the validity of a contract whereby one pur-

chasing certain chattels from the plaintiff had agreed that he

would not sell below a stated price. No patent right was in-

volved at all. The contract was one of a great number of

similar ones between the plaintiff and other dealers, constitut-

ing "a system of interlocking restrictions by which the com-

plainant seeks to control not merely the prices at which its

agents may sell its products, but the prices for all sales by all

44 <> 186 U. S. 70.

441 224 U. S. i.

44 2 220 U. S. 373-
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dealers at wholesale or retail, whether purchasers or sub-pur-

chasers, and thus to fix the amount which the consumer shall

pay. eliminating all competition." The court held that the

fact that the articles were made under a "secret process" did

not _affect_the issue; that the secret itself might be protected

agamstf fraud or breach of contract, but this had nothing to

do with protection relating to specific articles made by the

process. Of the contract itself the court said, "General re-

straint in the alienation of articles, things, chattels, except

when a very special kind of property is involved, such as a

slave or an heirloom, have been generally held void. 'If a

man/ says Lord Coke, in Coke on Littleton, section 360, 'be

possessed of a horse or any other chattel, real or personal, and

give his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that

the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void,

because his whole interest and property is out of him, so as

he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and

traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man.' '
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"The present case is not analogous to that of a sale of good

will, or of an interest in a business, or of the grant of a right

to use a process of manufacture. The complainant has not

parted with any interest in its business or instrumentalities of

production. It has conferred no right by virtue of which pur-

chasers of its products may compete w r ith it. It retains com-

plete control over the business in which it is engaged, manu-

facturing what it pleases and fixing such prices for its own

sales as it may desire. Nor are we dealing with a single

transaction, conceivably unrelated to the public interest. The

agreements are designed to maintain prices, after the com-

plainant has parted with the title to the articles, and to pre-

vent competition among those who trade in them." Accord-

ingly the restriction in the contract was declared void.

This case, together with Bauer v. O'Donnell and those sub-

sequent to it, makes it clear that a patentee can not, even by

contract, preclude one who purchases from him from reselling

or using the chattel as he chooses; at least, if the contract is

dealers at wholesale or retail, whether purchasers or sub-purchasers, and thus to fix the amount which the consumer shall
pay eliminating all competition." The court held that the
fact that the articles were maae und~r a " ecret process' did
not affect the issue; that the secret itself might be protected
against fraud or breach of contract, but this had nothing to
do with protection relating to specific articles made by the
process. Of the contract itself the court said "General restraint in the alienation of articles, things, chattels, except
when a very special kind of property is involved, such as a
slave or an heirloom, have been generally held void. 'If a
man, says Lord Coke, in Coke ·on Littleton, section 360, 'be
possessed of a horse or any other chattel, real or personal, and
give his whole interest or property therein upon co~dition that
the donee or vendee shall not alien the same., the same is void,
because his whole interest and property is out of him, so as
he hath no possibility of reverter· and it is against trade and
traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and man.' "
''The present case is not analogous to that of a sale of good
will, or of an interest in a business, or of the grant of a right
to use a process of manufacture. The complainant has not
parted with any interest in its business or instrumentalities of
production. It has conferred no right by virtue of which purchasers of its products may compete with it. It retains complete control over the business in which it is engaged, manufacturing what it pleases and fixing such prices for its own
sales as it may desire. Nor are we dealing with a single
transaction, conceiyably unrelated to the public interest. The · /
agreements are designed to maintain prices, after the com- /
plainant has parted with the tltle to the articles, and to prevent competition among those who trade in them." Accordingly the restriction in the contract was declared void.
This case, together with Bauer v. O'Donnell and those subsequent to it, makes it clear tha
patent can not,
b,,_.;--.....'-==·
contract, preclude one who urchases irom 1iim from reselling
or using the chattel as he chooses· a:t least if the contrac is

Dri

u

E S

Patents and Inventions

264 Patents and Inventions

one of a number whose tendency is unreasonably to restrain

trade?

one of a number whose tendency i unreasonably to restrain

A single contract, not part of an elaborate attempt to 're-

strain trade, is probably valid. Those which are part of a sys-

tem are held invalid because they unreasonably restrain trade.

A single contract restricting resale or use would hardly be an

unreasonable burden on commerce, and such contracts have, in

fact, been held valid by the courts. 444 Even one of a number of

contracts affecting the resale price has been held valid, when

the restriction affected only a small part of the total commerce

in the articles concerned. 445 One state court has even gone so

far, so late as 1917, as to uphold a wide spreading system of

such contracts. In Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne, 446 the issue went

directly to the validity of a contract precluding dealers in In-

gersoll watches from selling at a price of less than $1.35. "On

443 Accord, United States v. Kellogg, etc. Co., 222 Fed. 725 ; Ford Motor

Co. v. Union Motor Co., 244 Fed. 156; Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163

Mich. 12 ; Compare, Ford Motor Co. v. B. E. Bobne Co., 244 Fed. 335 ;
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16 Michigan Law Rev. 127.

- Contra, Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 222, 101 Atl. 1030.

The federal statutes, 38 Stat. 730, make it unlawful for any person en-

gaged in interstate commerce to sell, or contract to sell, or lease, any

goods, whether covered by patent or not, on condition that the buyer or

lessee shall not use goods of a 'competitor, etc.

part of an elaborate attempt to'restrain trade i probably valid. Tho e which are part of a system are held invalid because they unreasonably restrain trade.
A sirigle contract re tricting resale or use would hardly be an
unreasonable burden on commerce, and such contracts have in
fact, been held valid by the court .444 Even one of a number of
contracts affecting the resale price ha been held valid, when
the restriction affected only a mall part of the total commerce
in the articles concerned. 445 One state court has even gone o
far, so late as 1917, as to uphold a wide spreading system of
such contracts. In Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne, 446 the issue went
directly to the validity of a contract precluding dealer in Ingersoll watche from elling at a price of less than $r.35. 'On
"""-"-=_

ntra ,

t

Although such a system of contracts makes them illegal and, hence,

unenforcible, it has been held by a lower court, at least, that it is not a

criminal offense for a manufacturer, not acting in concert with other

manufacturers, to enter into such contracts. United States v. Colgate &

Co. 253 Fed. 522. But see the implied limitation on this in United States

v. Colgate & Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465 (June, 1919).

Since the foregoing was written the Supreme Court, in United States v.

A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 64 Law Ed., has "distinguished" the Colgate case

on the ground that the Colgate Co. did not make contracts that its cus-

tomers would not resell below the stipulated price, but only refused to

sell to those who would not adhere to the fixed price. In the Schrader's

Sons case the making of such contracts was held to be criminal.

444 Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72; Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602;

This distinction between a single contract and a system of contracts was.

indicated in Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12.

445 Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355.

446 88 N. J. Eq. 222.

443 Accord, United States v. Kellogg, etc. Co., 222 Fed. 725; Ford Motor
Co. v. Union Motor Co., 24-t Fed. 156; Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163
Mich. 12; Compare, Ford Motor Co. v. B. E. Boerne Co., 244 Fed. 335;
16 Michigan Law Rev. 127 .
. Contra, Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 222, IOI Atl. 1030.
The federal statutes, 38 Stat. 730, make it unlawful for any person engaged in interstate commerce to sell, or contract to sell, or lea e, any
goods, whether covered by patent or not, on condjtion that the buyer or
lessee shall not use goods of a ·competitor, etc.
Although such a system of contracts makes them illegal and, hencet
unenforcible, it has been held by a lower court, at least, that it is not a
criminal offense for a manufacturer, not acting in concert with other
manufacturers, to enter into such contracts. United States v. Colgate &
Co. 253 Fed. 522. But see the implied limitation on this in United States
v. Colgate & Co., 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465 (June, 1919).
Since the foregoing was written the Supreme Court, in United States v.
A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 64 Law Ed., has "di tinguished'' the Colgate ca e
on the ground that the Colgate Co. did not make contracts that its customers would not re ell below the tipulated price, but only refused to
5ell to those who would not adhere to the fixed price. In the Schrader's
Son case the making of uch contract was held to be criminal.
444 Garst v. Harri , 177 Ma . 72; Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 6o2;
This di tinction between a single contract and a system of contracts was.
indicated in Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12.
445 Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355.
440 88 N. ]. Eq. 222.
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the argument there was, and in counsel's brief there is, a long

discussion as to whether the contract against price cutting,

evidenced by the notice, is contrary to public policy, and de-

fendant relies upon cases in the supreme court of the United

States. I am now considering the public policy of the State

of New Jersey as distinguished from any public policy of the

United States. Unless the article is the subject of interstate

commerce, I am not bound by the opinions of the supreme

court of the United States. They are entitled to great weight

and careful consideration, but it must not be overlooked that

the effect of the case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Uni-

versal Film Co., decided April Qth, 1917, is a complete re-

versal of Henry v. Dick 224 U. S. i. To consider in detail

the reasoning of the court in the very numerous cases which

have been decided bearing upon this question would unduly ex-

tend this opinion. Suffice it to say, that after careful con-

sideration, I have come to the conclusion that upon the general

proposition, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
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Holmes in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co.,

220 U. S. (at p. 411)." Accordingly, the contracts were held

to be valid and enforcible.

the argument there was, and in counsel's brief there is, a long
discu ion as to whether the contract against price cutting,
evidenced by the notice, is contrary to public policy, and defendant relies upon cases in the supreme court of the United
States. I am now considering the public policy of the State
of New Jersey a.s distinguished from any public policy of the
United States. Unless the article is the subject of interstate
commerce, I am not bounsf by the opinions of the supreme
court of the United States. They are entitled to great weight
and care£ ul consideration, but it must not be overlooked that
the effect of the case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., decided April 9th, 1917, is a complete reversal of Henry v. Dick. 224 U. S. I. To consider in detail
the reasoning of the court in the very numerous cases which
have been decided bearing upon this question would unduly extend this opinion. Suffice it to say, that after careful consideration, I have ·Come to the conclusion that upon the general
proposition, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. J ustiCe
Holmes in Dr. Miles l\1edical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co.,
·220 U. S. (at p. 41 l). ' Accordingly, the contracts were held
to be valid and en forcible.

s

CHAPTER IX

PROTECTION OF THE MONOPOLY

i. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

PATENT MONOPOLY WITHIN JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL

COURTS. The rights and privileges conferred by a patent are

protected and enforced by the Federal courts, and these have

jurisdiction that is exclusive of the state courts in such mat-

ters. 447

PATENT RIGHT, AS PROPERTY, is WITHIN JURISDICTION OF

STATE COURTS. This does not deprive the State courts of

jurisdiction of matters which do not determine rights granted

by a patent, even though the ownership of such rights, what-

ever they may be, is involved. Whenever the patent is in-

volved in controversy merely as a piece of property, without

calling into questi orf the errective^vaine. c>i surf] property, the

state" courtsTiave the same jurisdiction that they would have

in any other cases involving the ownership and control of

property. Contracts concerning the patent right are likewise

subject to the same jurisdiction that other contracts are. In
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many instances the owner of a patent who has contracted with

another in regard to its enjoyment has a choice of remedies.

The wrongful act of the defendant may be a branch of the

contract, through a use of the invention which has been clearly

forbidden by the terms of his agreement. This same act, being

done without the patentee's permission, would also be an in-

fringement of the patentee's exclusive right. If the owner

chooses to treat the wrong as a breach of the contract, his

suit is not within the limited jurisdiction of patent law but

must be brought in the courts having proper jurisdiction of

breaches of contract. If however he choosgs-fee-treat the mat-

ter as an unauthorized infringelnenT~oThis patent monopoly,

447 Act of March 3, 1911 (Judicial Code) 247

Jurisdiction of Cowrts

Jurisdiction of Courts 267

actionjnust be_in the Federal .courts. As the court has put

it, 448 "When a contract is made respecting a right under a

patent, and the parties get into litigation, confusion has some-

times arisen over the question whether the cause of action

originates in the contract or in the patent laws. The test is

this: If the plaintiff is seeking a judgment for debt or dam-

ages, or a decree for cancellation or specific performance, on

account of the defendant's breach of his covenants, the cause

of action arises out of the contract ; and, though the determina-

tion of the issue of breach or no breach may involve the in-

terpretation of the patent and of the prior art, the insistence of

the defendant that his device, according to the true construc-

tion of the patent and of the prior art, is not within the patent

right granted him in the contract, cannot change the nature of

the action. Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Leslie, 118 Fed.

557, 55 C. C. A. 323. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is

seeking a judgment for damages, or a decree for an injunction

and an accounting, on account of the defendant's unauthorized
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use of the patent right in making or using or selling the device

without license, the cause of action arises out of the patent

laws; and, though the determination of the issue of infringe-

ment or no infringement may involve the interpretation of the

contract, the insistence of the defendant' that his act was

within his rights under the contract, if properly construed,

cannot change the nature of the action." 449

448 Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424. Accd., Carle-

ton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182.

449 A suit for specific performance of a contract to furnish' money for

development purposes, in consideration of an interest in the profits of an

invention, and for an injunction against claiming title to the patent under

a fraudulent assignment, was held not to give the federal courts any

jurisdiction. Kurtz v. Straus, 106 Fed. 414.

On the other hand, in Henry v. Dick Co., 220 U. S. I, where the licensee

had expressly contracted not to use anything but plaintiff's ink with the

patented mimeograph but had used other ink, it was held that even though

suit might have been brought in the State courts for breach of contract

it might also be brought in the Federal courts for infringement of the

patent. Wilson v. Sanf ord, 10 How. 208 ; Kartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S.

action must be in the Federal courts. As the court has put
it, 448 "When a contract is made respecting a right under a
patent, and the ·parties get into litigation, confusion has sometimes arisen over the question whether the cause of action
originates in the contract or in the patent laws. The test is
this: If the plaintiff is seeking a judgment for debt or damages, or a decree for cancellation or specific performance, on
.account of the def end ant's breach Qf his covenants, the cause
of action arises out of the contract; and, though the determination of the issue of breach or no brea:ch may involve the int~rpretation of the patent and of the prior art, the insistence of
the defendant that his device, according to the true construction of the patent and of the prior art, is not within the patent
rigl).t granted him in the contract, cannot change the nature of
the action. Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Leslie, u8 Fed.
557, 55 C. C. A. 323. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is .
seeking a judgment for damages, or a decree for an injunction
and an accounting, on account of the defendant's unauthorized
use of the patent right in making or using or selling the device
without license, the cause of ~ction arises out of the patent
laws; and, though the determination of the issue of infringement or no infringement may involve the interpretation of the
contract, the insistence of the def endanf that his act was
within his rights under the contract, if properly construed,
cannot change the nature of the action." 449

547; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 613, to recover royalties no invalidity of

448

Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424. Aced., Carleton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182.
~
4_4 9 A suit for specific performance of a contract to furnislf money for
development purposes, in consideration of an interest in the profits of an
invention, and for an injunction against claiming title to the patent under
a fraudulent assignment, was held not to give the federal courts any
jurisdiction. Kurtz v. Straus, 106 Fed. 414.
'
On the other hand, in Henry v. Dick Co., 220 U. S. 1, where the licensee
had expressly contracted not to use anything but plaintiff's ink with the
patented mimeograph but had used other ink, it was held that even though
suit might have been brought in the State courts for breach of contract
it might also be brought in the Federal courts for infringement of the
patent. Wilson v. Sanford, IO How. 2o8; Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S.
547; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 613, to recover royalties-no invalidity of
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Care must be taken to distinguish those cases in which the

remedy is optional from those in which the wrong done is not

something actually precluded by the contract but something

outside of it and not covered by it at all. In this latter type

of case there can be no action on the contract, and the suit

must be in the Federal courts, for infringement.

REMEDIES. The Federal courts have authority; to^ protect

the owner of the patenTby awarding him compensation for the

damages he has suffered by infringement, with a penalty added

in certaTrTTa-5e^r- : tr^^ral : 3Tiim the amount of profit the in-

f ringer has made; and to^preyerrLiurther infringement by in-

junction. 450 The procedure by which these remedies are se-

cured is not discussed in this book. It requires a knowledge

of federal procedure in general, and should properly be stud-

ied as a part of that subject. To separate that part of the

federal procedure which pertains particularly to patents, would

still leave so much of the common fundamentals to be eluci-

dated as to necessitate almost another volume. This treatise is,
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therefore, confined to the substantive part of the patent law.

Whichever remedy the plaintiff may choose to ask for, the

defendant is privileged by the statute 451 to show as a defense

that the patent on which suit is brought was secured by fraud

of some sort and is void on that account ; that it is void because

the right to it had been lost through abandonment, or public

use or sale more than two years prior to the application; that

the patentee was not in fact the first inventor or any inventor

at all and therefore was not entitled to a patent ; and that even

if the patent be valid the defendant has not infringed it. 452 The

patent set up; U. S. v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262; Excelsior Wooden Pipe

Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U. S. 282.

450 The courts can not award the patentee title to the things unlaw-

fully made by an infringer of the patent. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10.

i R. S. 4920.

452 This broad statement covers practically the entire range of patent

law. Since the defendant may attack the validity of the patent, he may

do it on any ground anticipation, public use, fraud, or anything else.

Likewise he may set up anything that supports his defense of non-infringe-

ment. These matters are all discussed under their appropriate headings,

Care must be taken to distinguish those cases in which the
remedy is optional from those in which the wrong done is not
something actually preclud~d by the contract but something
outside of it and not covered by it at all. In this latter type
of case there ~an be no action on the contract, and the suit
must be in the Federal courts, for infringement.
REMEDIES. The Federal courts have authority ;-to protect
the owner of the patent y awar -mg him compensatioi11Qr the
amages he has suffered by infrino-ement, with a penalty added
ar him the amount of profit the inin certain
er ·nfringemeHt by inf ~inger has made; and to prevent
j~n. 450 The proce ure by which these remedies are secured is not discussed in this book. It requires a knowledge
of federal procedure in general, and should propei-ly be studied as a part of that subject. To separate that part of the
federal procedure which pertains particularly to patents, would
still leave so much of the common fundamentals to be elucidated as to necessitate almost another volume. This treatise is,
therefore, confined to the subst~~tive part of the patent law.
Whichever remedy the plaintiff may choose to ask for, the
defendant is privileged by the statute 451 to show as -a defense
that the patent on which suit is brought was secured by fraud
of some sort and is void on that account; that it is void because
the right to it had been lost through abandonment, or public
use or sale more than two years prior to the application; that
the patentee was not in fact the first inventor or any inventor
at all arid therefore was not entitled to a patent; and that even
if the patent be valid the defendant has not infringed it. 452 The
patent set up; U. S. v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262; Excelsior Wooden Pipe
Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U. S. 282.
450 The courts can not award the patentee title to the things unlawfully made by an infringer of the patent. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10.
451 R. s. § 4920.
4 52 This broad statement covers practically the entire range of patent
law. Since the defendant may attack the validity of the patent, he may
do it on any ground-anticipation, public use, fraud, or anything else.
Likewise he may set up anything t?at supports his defense of non-infringement. These matters are all discussed under their appropriate headings,
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defendant is not restricted to any one of these defenses but

may avail himself, so far as his evidence allows, of them all

In short, the defendant may both attack the validity of the

patent and deny infringement of its monopoly.

The patent as evidence. The burdn_of__2rogf in his at-

tack on the patent is thrown upon the defendant, because the

existence o_f_the patent is prima farAe evidence of its own

validity in whatever respect it may be attacked. In the

sence of any evidence to the contrary the legal conclusion is

that it was issued without fraud, to the proper person, for a

real invention. 453 This presumption of validity has been car-

ried in judicial statement to the extent that "every reasonable

doubt should be resolved against" the person attacking the

validity and effectiveness of the patent. 454

Patent not real evidence of invention. But while the patent

is pnrna /aoFevidence of its own validity, the evi3ence~~ts not

stfong^nough to have much real effect on the issue when

countervailing evidence is given. 4 " 5 ' This lack of evidenciary
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f orce-~nr~a~^)atenT ITasTeen a potent cause of the often ex-

pressed opinion, that a patent is never worth much of anything

and the patent statute is a delusion and snare. There can be

no doubt but that the layman believes the fact that a patent

and it is quite unnecessary to repeat that discussion under the title of

"defenses", a's is done by at least one text writer who states, and parti-

ally re-discusses, twenty-nine defenses.

453 Condit v. Bush, 132 U. S. 39; Am. Caramel Co. v. Mills & Bro., 149

Fed. 743 ; Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. 96, "Neither damages nor profits can

be recovered unless the complaining party alleges and proves that he or

the person under whom he claims was the original and first inventor of the

patented improvement, and that the same has been infringed by the party

against whom the suit is brought. Both of those allegations must be

proved to maintain the siiit; but the patent, if introduced in evidence by

the complaining party, affords him prima facie evidence that the patentee

was the original and first inventor. That presumption, in the absence of

any satisfactory proof to the contrary, is sufficient to entitle him to re-

cover if he proves the alleged infringement/' West v. Frank, 149 Fed. 423.

454 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124; Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 689.

455 Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342; Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113

U. S. 59, 7i ; N. Y. Belting Co. v. Sierer, 149 Fed. 756, 770; Warren Bros,

v. Owosso, 166 Fed. 309.

defendant is not restricted to any one of these defenses but
may avail himself, so far as his evidence allows, of them alL
In short, the defendant may both attack the validity of the
patent and deny infringement of its monopoly.
The patent a ~vidence. The bur
of roof in his attack on.____
the patent is thrown u on the defendant, because the
existence of the _patent i pri1w f · v ·dence of its own
validity in whatever respect it may be attacked. In t e a sence of any evidence to the contrary the legal conclusion is
that it was issued without fraud, to the proper person, for a
real invention. 453 This presumption of validity has been carried in judicial statement to the extent that "every reasonable
doubt should be resolved against' the person attacking the
validity and effectiveness of the patent. 454
Pa.tent not real evidence o i111vention. But while the patent
is prirna acie evidence of its own validity, the evidence is not
srrong enough to have much real effect on the issue when
1s ack o ev1 enciary
countervailing evlaence 1s given.
fore · a pa ent as een a potent cause of the often expressed opinion, that a patent is never worth much of anything
and the patent statute is a delusion and snare. There can be
no doubt but that the layman believes the fact that a patent
and it is quite unnecessary to repeat that discussion under the title of
"defenses", a·s is done by at least one text writer who states, and partially re-discusse , twenty-nine defenses.
453 Condit v. Bush, 132 U. S. 39; Am. Caramel Co. v. Mills & Bro., 149
Fed. 743; Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. 96, "Neither damages nor profits can
be recovered; unless the complaining party alleges and prove.s that he or
the person under whom he claims was the original and first inventor of the
patented improvement, and that the same has been infringed by the party
against whom the suit is brought. Both of those allegations must be
proved to maintain the suit; but the patent, if introduced in evidence by
the complaining party, affords _him prima facie evidence that the patentee
was the original and first inventor. That presumption, in the absence of
any satisfactory proof to the contrary, is sufficient to entitle him to recover if he proves the alleged infringement:" West v. Frank, 149 Fed. 423.
454 Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124; Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 68g.
4 5 5 Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342; Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113
U. S. 59, 71; N. Y. Belting Co. v. Sierer, 149 Fed. 756, 770; Warren Bros.
v. Owosso, 166 Fed. 309.
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has been granted is legally supposed to be proof of its valid-

ity, and that a successful defense to an infringement suit

amounts to some sort of an evasion of the law, and of the pro-

tection which the statute intended a patent should give. If it

were the intent of the statute that the granting of a patent

should be anything more than the merest prima facie evidence

of its validity, the feeling that patents are generally undesir-

able, because useless, would be justified by the great number

of them which the courts have declared worthless, in compari-

son with those which have been held valid.

But the statute clearly never intended any such effect of ab-

solute validity to follow the issue of a patent. The procedure

of the Patent Office is necessarily such that the prior art can

not be examined for existing knowledge except as that knowl-

edge has been recorded in the office, and the issue of a patent

can signify nothing whatever as to the novelty of the alleged

invention, except as to such recorded knowledge. A particular

device might have been on sale in every shop in San Francisco,
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or even in Washington, for years and a patent nevertheless be

issuecLjor it, if the prior patents recorde^~nrtEe~Patent Office

did not show it. The Patent Office does not purport to be

omniscient in any respect. Furthermore, since the statute was

not intended to give a monopoly for every bright idea and me-

chanical change in the prior art, and the decision of the Com-

missioner of Patents is not final as to what amounts to such

narrow change from even the recorded art, it is obvious that

the issue of a patent means nothing as to whether the patentee

was really entitled to the monopoly he claimed. The patent

simply gives him the_jrigjit-4o--tt--rnr^^ no one

dis^tS-4t7~aTTdTHeria right to prove the validity of his claim

in court. When one realizes the number of persons who, hav-

ing conceived what appears to be a new and useful idea of

means, immediately ask for a patent on it, without any com-

petent investigation of existing knowledge, the number of

patents found by the courts to be invalid is not in the least de-

rogatory of the protection which the patent law gives to real

and original inventors.

has been granted is legally supposed to be proof of its validity, and that a successful defense to an infringement suit
amounts to some sort of an evasion of the law, and of the protection which the statute intended a patent shouid give. lf it
were the intent of the statute that the granting of a patent
should be anything more than the merest prima. f acie evidence
of its validity, the feeling that patents are generally undesirable, because useless, would be justified by the great number
of them which the courts have declared worthless, in comparison with those which have been held valid.
But the statute dearly never intended any such effect of ab- solute validity to follow the issue of a patent. The procedure
of the Patent Office is ne~essarily such that the prior art can
not be examined for existing knowledge except as that knowledge has been recorded in the office, and the issue of a patent
can signify nothing whatever as to the novelty of the alleged
invention, except as to such recorded knowledge. A particular
device might have been on sale in every shop in San Francisco,
or even in Washington, for years and a patent nevertheless be
issu~r it, if the prior patents recorde m t e Patent Office
did1 not show~it. The Patent Office does not pu~port to be
omniscient in any respect. Furthermore, since the statute was
not intended to give a monopoly for every bright idea and mechanical change in the prior art, and the decision of the Commissioner of Patents. is not final as to what amounts to such
narrow change from even the recorded art, it is obvious that
the issue of a patent means nothing as to whether the patentee
was really entitled to the monopoly he claimed. The atent
simply gives-him the ri
Ion as no one
di~ ,
t en a right to prove the validity of his claim
in ceurt. When one realizes the number of persons who, having conceived what appears to be a new and useful idea of
means, immediately ask for a patent on it, without any competent investigation of existi~g knowledge, the number of
patents found by the courts to be invalid is not in the least derogatory of the protection which the patent law gives to real
and original inventors.
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§ 2 . .PROOF OF INFRINGEMENT

2. PROOF OF INFRINGEMENT

Thus far we have been discussing the various matters relat-

ing to the patent itself and its validity. We come now, as-

suming the existence of a valid patent, to a discussion of in-

fringement of the patent monopoly.

ISSUES WHICH ARISE. This involves two fundamental ques- .

tions in each case; first, what is the invention that is covered

by the patent ; second, has the defendant made, used or vended

anything embodying this particular invention.

THE FORM CLAIMED. The first of these is a question of law,

to be decided by the court, 457 and it involves, in- itself, two dis-

tinct possibilities of issue. The simpler of these inquiries is,

what is the invention literally set out and claimed. In other

words, what is the formal embodiment described in the patent.

It is possible that the patent is so defective in its description as

not to set out anything definite at all. 458 Or there may be well

founded dispute as to the thing actually described in words and

phrases. To determine this seems to be a matter of interpre-

tation of the instrument by the court.

Thus far we have been discussing the various matters relating to the patent it elf and its validity. We come now, assuming the exi tence of a valid patent, to a discussion of infringement of the patent monopoly.
I UES WHICH ARISE. This involves two fundamental ques- V'
tion in each case· first, what i the invention that is -covered
by the patent; second, has the defendant made, used or vended
anything embodying this particular invention.
THE FORM CLAIMED. The fir t of these is a question of law,
to be decided by the court, 457 and it involves, in. itself, two distinct possibilities of issue. The simpler of these inquiries .,is,
what is the invention literally set out and claimed. In other
words what is the formal embodiment described in the patent.
It is possible that the patent is so defective in its description as
not to set out anything definite at all. 458 Or there may be well
founded dispute as to the thing actually described in words and
phrases. To determine this seems to be a matter of interpretation of the instrument by the court.
The ordinary rules for the construction of contracts apply
here. The literal scope of the patent is limited by the claims
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1

The ordinary rules for the construction of contracts apply

here. The literal scope of the patent is limited by the claims

457 Winans v. Dennead, 15 How. 329, 337; Corning v. Burden, 15 How.

252; Parker v. Hulme, I Fish Pat. Cases 44, Fed. Cas. No. 10,740; Coupe

v. Royer, 155 U. S. 565, syll. "In letters patent No. 77,920 granted to

Herman Royer and Louis Royer, May 12, 1868, for "an improved machine

for treating hides," the first claim, viz., for a "vertical shaft," and the

second claim, viz., for a "groved weight," are restricted to a shaft and

crib in a vertical position, and to a weight operating by the force of

gravity aided by pressure ; and they cannot be extended so as to include

shafts and cribs in a horizontal position, and pressure upon the hides by

means of false heads, actuated and controlled by gearing wheels, springs,

and a crank. In jury trials in actions for the infringement of letters

patent, it is the province of the court, when the defense denies that the

invention used by the defendant is identical with that included in the

plaintiff's patent, to define the patented invention, as indicated by the lan-

guage of the claims; and it is the province of the jury to determine whe-

ther the invention so defined covers the art or article employed by the

defendant."

458 This is discussed supra.

457

Winans v. Dennead, IS How. 329, 337; Corning v. Burden, IS How.
252 · Parker v. Hulme, I Fish Pat. Cases 44, Fed. Cas. No. ro,740; Coupe
v. Royer, I55 U. S. 565, syll. "In 1etters patent No. 77,920 granted to
Herman Royer and Louis Royer, May I2, I868, for "an improved machine
for treating hides," the first claim, viz., for a "vertical shaft," and the
second claim, viz., for a "graved weight," are restricted to a shaft and
crib in a vertical position, and to a weight operating by the force of
gravity aided by pressure; and they cannot be extended so as to include
hafts and cribs in a horizontal position, and press.u re upon the hides by
means of false heads, actuated and controlled by gearing wheels, springs,
and a crank. In jury trials in actions for the infringement of letters
patent, it is the province of the court, when the defense denies that the
invention used by the defendant is identical with that included in the
plaintiff' patent, to define the patented invention, as indicated by the language ,o f the claim ; and it is the province of the jury to determine whe ther the invention so defined covers the art or article employed by the
defendant."
45 This is discussed supra.
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and these are to be construed with the interest of both the in-

ventor and the public in mind. 459

The meaning and extent of the claim may be interpreted by

reference to the description and drawings, 460 although it can

not be expanded to include matter described but not claimed.

THE IDEA CLAIMED. But the monopoly of the patent is not

necessarily limited to the device as literally set out in the de-

scription. If it were so limited, the inventor of any device

would be compelled to foresee and describe all the forms in

which his idea might be materially embodied, and anyone who

was able by mere mechanical skill to construct a device dif-

fering in material form from those described in the patent

would not be an infringer. But, as we have said before,

it is not the material device actually described in the patent

that constitutes the invention protected by it. And nowhere

does it more clearly appear, that it is the idea of an art, ma-

chine, etc. that really constitutes the invention, than it does in

decisions upon infringement.
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In a very large proportion of cases one form of material

embodiment is set forth in the patent, and only one; yet the

courts, have held that the patent was infringed by the use of a

material device quite unlike, in substantial form, the one de-

scribed. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 461 for instance, the claim of

the patent was for 'The manufacturing of fat acids and glycer-

ine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temper-

ature and pressure." The only material means of accomplish-

ing this separation pointed out in the description, consisted of

a long- coil of strong iron pipe passing through an oven or

furnace where it was subject for 10 minutes to a temperature

of 612 F., that of melting lead. The defendant accomplished

the same result by an obviously different material means ; he

used a boiler in which the fatty substances were subject for

several hours to a temperature of only 400 F. The same

patent had been considered, on these facts, in the case of

459 Cases supra. O. H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. 340, 343.

460 O. H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. 340.

461 102 U. S. 707.

and these are to be construed with the interest of both the inventor and the public in mind. 459
The meaning and extent of the claim may be interpreted by
reference to the description and drawings,460 although it can
not -be expanded to include matter described but not claimed.
THE IDEA CLAIMED. But the· monopoly of the patent is not
necessarily limited to the device as literally set out in the description. . If it were so limited, the inventor of any device
·would be compelled to foresee and describe all the fo·rms in
which his idea might be materially embodied, and anyone who
was able by mere mechanical skill to cqnstruct a device cliff ering in material form from those described in the patent
would not be an infringer. But, as we have said before,
it is not the material device actually described in the patent
that constitutes the invention protected by ·it. And nowhere
does it more clearly appear, that it is the idea of ~n art machine, etc. that really constitutes the invention, than it does in
decisions upon infringement.
In a very large proportion o.f cases one form of material
embodiment is set forth in the patent, and only one; ) et the
courts,haye held that the patent :was infri~ged by the use. of a
material device quite unlike, in substantial form, ·the one described. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 4 6 1 for instance, the claim of
tl:1:e patent was for "The manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature-and pressure." The only material means of accomplishing this se1)aration pointed out in the description, consisted of
a long coil of strong iron pipe passing through an oven or
furnace \\here it was subject for ro minutes to a temperature
of 612 °, F., that of melting lead. The defendant accomplished
the same result by an obviously different material means; he
used a boiler in which the fatty substances were subject for
several hours to a temperature of only 400° F . . The same
patent had been considered, on these facts, in the case of
459 Cases supra. 0. H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. 340, 343.
4 60 0 . H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. 340.
461 102 u. s. 707.
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Mitchell v. Tilghman, 462 and the court in that case found that

the patent was limited to the means pointed out in the specifi-

cation and that there was no infringement because of this dif-

ference in material means of accomplishing the result. This

decision was overruled in the Proctor case and the court held

that the device used by the defendant was in fact an infringe-

ment of the patent despite its material difference. (^ This de-

cision of the court was based on the ground that the patent was

"for a process, and not for any specific mechanism for carrying-

such process into effect." Exactly what a "process" is the

court does not explain, save that it comes within the meaning

of "art" as used in the patent statute. ) But, whatever the

meaning of the terms employed, it is clear that Tilghman was

given protection beyond the limits of the material embodi-

ment described in his patent. In the case of Expanded Metal

Co. v. Bradford 463 the court went so far as to hold that no

material means need be described at all if what the court called

the "method" of reaching the specified result be so clearly
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set out that anyone skilled in the art could find the substan-

tial means of accomplishing it.

Even where the invention purports to be the concept only

of a machine, in its strict sense, and not an art or a process,

the monopoly of the patent is not restricted to the mere de-

scription given, but the patentee is often protected against the

use of machines quite dissimilar in material form to the one

described. As an illustration is the case of Ives v. Hamilton. 464

The patent w r as for a saw mill, consisting of the combination

of a saw, levers, rods, guides, etc., constituting a machine

which gave to the saw a rocking or rolling motion desirable

for certain purposes. The defendant secured the same rock-

ing motion by using two straight guides set at an angle, where

the plaintiff used a single, curved one, and by reversing the

plaintiff's connections, at two places, so that the ultimate mo-

462 19 Wall. 287.

463 214 U. S. 366.

464 92 U. S. 426.

Mitchell v. Tilghman, 462 and the court in that case found that
the patent was limited to the means pointed out in the specification and that there was no infringement because of this difference in material means of accomplishing the result. This
decision was overruled in the Proctor case and the court held
that the device used by the defendant was in fact a17 infringement of the patent despite its material difference. This decision of the court was based on the ground that the patent was
"for a process, and not for any specific mechanism for carrying
such process into effect." Exactly what a . "process'' is the
court does not explain, 5ave that it come within the meaning
of "art" as used in the patent stat~te. But, whatever the
meaning of the terms employed, it is clear that Tilghman was
given protection beyond the limits of the material embodiment described in his patent. In the case of Expanded Metal
Co. v. Bradford 463 the court went so far as to hold that no
material means need be described at all if what the court called
the "method" of reaching the specified result be so clearly
set <?Ut that anyone skilled in the art could find the substantial means of accomplishing ~t.
Even where the invention purports to be the concept only
of a machine, in its strict sense, and not an art or a process,
the monopoly of the patent is not restricted to the mere description given, but the patentee is often protected against the
use of machines quite dissimilar in material form. to the one
described. As an illustration is the case of Ives v. Hamilton. 4 6 4
The patent was for a saw mill, consisting of the combination
of a sa", levers, rods, guides, etc., constituting a machine
which gave to the saw a rocking or rolling motion desirable
for certain purposes. The defendant secured the same rocking motion by using two straight guides set at an angle, where
the plaintiff used a single, curved one, and by reversing the
plaintiffs connections, at two places, so that the ultimate mo46 2

19 Wall. 287.

463 214
464
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92 U. S. 426.
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tion was the same. This formally and substantially different

device was held to be an infringement of the patent. 465

Neither is the scope of a patent limited to the particular use

described. A patentee is entitled to all uses to which it may be

fiut, which dtTnot themselves ittVolve^ invention:

The changes in form which do not in fact evade the

monopoly of the patent are usually spoken of as "equiva-

lents." Customarily, the proposition set out in the foregoing

paragraphs is reversed, and it is said that the substitution of

equivalents does not constitute invention, nor avoid infringe-

ment. Some writers have even attempted to lay down "rules"

as to what will constitute an "equivalent." But, on examina-

tion, it appears that these rules are only the statements of in-

dividual cases. The truth is that the existence of invention

and non-infringement is not ascertained from the fact that

a change is an equivalent; it is_an equivalent because its sub-\

stitution did not require inventive genius. 'There is no such \

thing as attefinite ^equivalent" from which non-invention may
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be predicated ; its limits and scope can no more be defined

than can the concrete inclusiveness of "invention." The so-

called "doctrine of equivalents" means nothing more than that

the protection of a patent is not limited to the precise ma-

terial embodiment of the invention as described.

It appears, therefore, that whatever the invention may be

called by the inventor or the courts, it may be, in its scope,

something more than the concept literally depicted by the

words of the description Just how much more, if any, the

invention as patented does cover, constitutes the second di-

vision of the first issue referred to above, and is the real issue

in most patent litigation. This question is one to be answered

by the court, and is therefore a question of law, so-called.

465 Ace. Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U. S. 332, "It is equally well

known that if any one of the parts is only formally omitted, and is sup-

plied by a mechanical equivalent, performing the same office and produc-

ing the same result, the patent is infringed" ; Westinghouse v. Boyden

Power Brake Co., 170 U. ' S. 537, 568, "We have repeatedly held that a

charge of infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the

claims be avpided."

tion was the ame. This formally and substantially different
device was held to be an infringement of the patent. 465
Neither is the scope of a patent limited to the particular use
described. A patentee is entitled to all uses to which it may be
~which d no
emse ves in ve=--=-::..;:.....:...-=-'""=--;_:-The changes in form which do not in fact evade the
monopoly of the patent are usually spoken of as "equivalents. ' Customarily, the proposition set out in the foregoing
1Jaragraphs is reversed, and it is said that e sub titution. £
equivalents does not constitute invention, nor avoid infringement. Some writers have even attempted to lay down "rules"
as to what will constitute an "equivalent." But, on examination, it appears that these rules are only the statements of individual cases. The truth is that the existence of invention
and non-infringement is .not ascertained from the fact that
a change is an equivalent; it is an equivalent because its substitution did not require inventive enius. Ther · no such
thillgas a definite 'eqmva ent" from which non-invention may
be · predicated; its limits and scope can no more be defined
than can the concrete inclusiveness of "invention.'.' The so-called "doctrine of equivalents" means nothing more than that
the protection of a patent is not limited to the precise ma-terial ·embodiment of the invention as described.
It appears, therefore, that whatever the invention may be·
called by the inventor or the courts, it may be, in its scope,
something more than the concept literally depicted by the·
words of the description Just how much more, if any, the
invention as patented does cover, constitutes the second di-vision of the first issue referred to above, and is the real issue,
in most patent litigation. This question is one to be answered
by the court, and is therefore a question of law, so-called.
465 Acc. Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U. S. 332, "It is equa1ly well'
known that if any one of the parts is only formally omitted, and is sup-plied by a mechanical equivalent, performing the same office and producing the same result, the patent is infringed"; Westinghouse v. Boyden
Power Brake Co., 170 U. · S. 537, 568, "We have repeatedly held that a
charge of infringement is sometimes made out, though the letter of the ~
claims be avoided."
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It is obvious that the whole actual scope of the invention

can not be decided in any one case. The courts can not forsee

all the formal changes, the substitution of mere equivalents,

which may be made, any more than the inventor himself could.

The only matter, therefore, that can be decided is, whether

the scope of the invention covers the particular device which

is alleged, in the suit, to infringe. The question therefore

takes the true form of an inquiry whether the defendant's

dcince is within the scope of the patent, and not, what is the

scope of the patent. Some courts have made it appear as

though there were two distinct questions, namely, the scope of

the patent and, whether the defendant's device comes within

it. They have said that the first is of law, the second of fact.

Properly, there is no such distinction. As the first question

can not be answered except by reference to the particular in-

stance, its determination settles ipso facto the other question,

and there is nothing left by way of further inquiry. Obvi-

ously, if the scope of the patent is broad enough to include the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

defendant's device, the defendant's device is within the scope

of the patent, and there is nothing further to be decided. It

is important to realize this, in order not to be confused by

the apparently different cases in which the courts are deciding

"the scope of the patent" and those in which they are deciding

"whether the defendant has infringed."

Unless the alleged infringing device is identical with the

description of the patent, this decision, any way it is looked at,

can be nothing else than a matter of opinion. It can not be

treated as a matter that is governed by "rules," for, by the

very nature of the subject, the circumstances of two cases will

never be precisely alike. Even the value of other decisions as

persuasive guides is less than in other branches of substantive

law, because of the essential dissimilarity of facts. The most

that can be said for the value of precedents in affecting this

decision is, that certain circumstances appear to have been

given more weight than others by the courts and should, there-

fore, be of similar effect upon the opinions of later courts.

It is obvious that the whole actual scope of the invention
can not be decided in _a ny one case. The ~ourts can not forsee
all the formal changes, the substitution of mere equivalents,
which may be made, any more than the inventor himself could.
The only matter, therefore, that can be decided is, whether
the ·scope of the invention covers the particular device which
is alleged, in the suit, to infringe. The question therefore
takes the true form of an inquiry whether the def enda.n t' s
evice is within the scope of the patent, and not, what is the
scope o the pa.tent. Some courts have made it appear as
though there were two distinct questions, namely, the scope of
the patent and, whether the defendants device comes within
it. They have said that the first is of law, the second of fact.
Properly, there is no such distinction. As the first question
can not be answered except by reference to the particular instance, its determination settles ipso facto the other question.
and there is nothing left by way of further inquiry. Obviously, if the scope of the patent is broad enough to include the
def end ant's device, the defendant's device is within the scope
of the patent, and there is nothing further to be decided. It
is important to realize this, in order not to be confused by
the apparently different cases in which the ~ourts are deciding
"the scope of the patent" and those in which they are deciding
"whether the defendant has infringed. '
Unless the alleged infringing device is identical with the
description of the patent, this decision, any way it is looked at,
can be nothing else than a matter of opinion. It can not be
treated as a matter that is _governed by "rules, ' for, by the
very nature of the subject, .the circumstances of two cases will
never be precisely alike. Even the value of other decisions as
- persuasive guides is less than in other branches of substantive
law, because of the essential dissimilarity of facts. The most
that can be said for the value of precedents in affecting this
decision is, that certain circumstances appear to have been
given more weight than others by the courts and should, therefore, be of similar effect upon the opinions of later courts:
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Particular cases holding one way or other on particular facts

need not be given here as they can be found, classified, in the

digests.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION. The circumstances

which affect the finding of infringement or non-infringement

are, in theory, the same as those which affect a finding of in-

vention or anticipation. If a production is so like something

that preceded it as to lack the inventive quality, and be antici-

pated, it logically follows that it would be an infringement of

the earlier device were that protected by a patent. Converse-

ly, were a device held not to be anticipated by an earlier one,

it would, theoretically, be held not to be infringed by it were

the suit to come up in that way. Even the courts have said

that "that which infringes, if later, would anticipate if earl-

ier." 466 ^Conversely, it is said, "A device which, if existent be-

fore the making of a patented invention, would not anticipate

it, cannot if made after the issue of the patent, be said to

infringe it." 467 In Cook v. Sandusky Tool Co. 468 the opinion
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of Mr. Chief Justice Waite is short and to the point, being in

its entirety, "If the hoe made by the Tool Company infringes

the patent of the appellant, it was an anticipation of the in-

vention, and the patent is void, for the testimony leaves no

doubt whatever in our minds that the company made and sold

466 Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 221, 228; Peters v.' Active Mfg. Co., 129

U. S. 530, 537; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. 186, 203.

467 Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneu. Tool Co., 135 Fed.

783. In this case a certain tool existent before the patent had been held

not to make it void by anticipation and the court held the defendant's tool

not to be an infringement because it was materially identical with the

prior one. In Peerless Rubber Co. v. White, 118 Fed. 827, the court pro-

ceeded on the assumption that a device which would not have anticipated

an invention could not reasonably be held to infringe it. To the writer

this seems fallacious. It is quite conceivable that a device might be such

an improvement on old ones as to be an invention, while if it had come

first, in its entirety, the faulty one, constructed later, would be merely a

clumsy infringement of the invention.

!'articular cases holding one way or other on particular facts
need not be given here as they can be found, classified, in the
digests.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION.
The circumstance.
which affect the finding of infringement -or non-infringement
are, in theory, the same as tho e which affect a finding of invention or anticipation. If a production is so like something
that preceded· it as to lack the inventive quality, and be anticipated, it logically follows that it would be an_infringement of
the earlier device were that ·protected by a patent. Conversely, were a device heid not to be anticipated by an earlier one,
it would, theoretically, be held not to be infringed by it were
the suit to come up in that way. Even the courts have said
{; that "that which infringes, if later, · would anticipate if earlier."466 Conversely, it is· said, "A device which, if existent before the making of a patented invention, would not anticipate
it, cannot if made af~er the issue of the patent, be said to
infringe it." 467 In Cook v. Sandusky Tool Co. 468 the opinion
of Mr. Chief Justice \Vaite is short and to the point, being in
its entirety, "If the hoe made by the Tool .Company infringes
the patent of the appellant, it was an anticipation of the invention, and the patent is void, for the testimony leaves no
doubt whatever in our minds that the company made and sold

468 28 L. Ed. 124.

466 Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 221, 228; Peters v: Active Mfg. Co., 129
U. S. 530, 537; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. 186, 203.
46 7 Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneu. Tool Co., 135 Fed.
783. In this case a certain tool existent before the patent had been held
not to make it void by anticipation and the court held the defendant's tool
not to be an infringement because it was materially identical with the
prior one. In Peerless Rubber Co. v. White, l 18 Fed. 827, . the court proceeded on the assumption that a device which would not have anticipated
an invention could not reasonably be held to infringe it. To the writer
this seems fallacious. It is quite conceivable that a device might be such
an improvement on old one as to be an invention, while if it had come
first, in its entirety, the faulty one, constructed later \vould be merely a
clumsy infringement of the invention.
468 28 L. Ed. l 24.
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its hoes long before the date of the invention patented. If it

is not an anticipation, it is not an infringement.'' The bill

was therefore dismissed.

It does not appear in this case whether the dismissal was be-

cause there was no infringement, or because the patent was

void for anticipation. The case is unique and it seldom ap-

pears that the alleged infringing device has actually existed

prior to the patented invention. Ordinarily a decision of in-

fringement or non-infringement must be made. Judging from

many of these decisions, one may reasonably doubt, in actual

practice, whatever be the theory, that what would have an-

ticipated if earlier will infringe if later. In a great number

of cases the defendant's device has been found not to be an

infringement, although one is morally certain that it would

have been held sufficient to anticipate the plaintiff's invention

had the case arisen under different circumstances. As a per-

haps extreme illustration may be cited the case of Poirier v.

Clementson. 469 The plaintiff in this case held a patent for an

improvement in pack-straps. One of its claims was for a bag
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having shoulder straps secured to a piece of leather across the

top of the bag and their other ends arranged to fasten, after

passing across the shoulders, to buckles on the lower corners

of the bag. He contended that defendant's pack differed from

his only in the fact that the straps were attached at a some-

what lower point. Defendants insisted that the method of at-

tachment was different and that the load was carried in a dif-

ferent position. The validity of the patent was not disputed

by the defense and the court dismissed the bill on the ground

that there was no infringement. If the validity of the patent

had been attacked and the device of the defendant had been

set up as pre-existing, it seems incredible that the court would

not have held the patent void as exhibiting only mechanical

change from the earlier device. 470

It appears often that the case is determined on a finding of

469 70 Fed. 617.

470 See also Bragg v. Fitch, 121 U. S. 478 ; Crawford v. Heysinger, 123

U. S. 589; Boyd v. Janesville Tool Co., 158 U. S. 260.

its hoes long before the date of the invention patented. If it
is not an anticipation, it is not an infringement. ' The bill
was therefore dismissed.
·
It does not appear in this C9-Se whether the dismissal was because there was no infringement, or because the patent was
void for anticipation. The case is unique and it seldom appears that the alleged infringing device has actually existed
prior to the patented invention. Ordinarily a decision of infringement or non-infringement must be made. Judging from
many of these decisions, one may reasonably doubt, in actual
practice, whatever be the theory, that what would have anticipated if earlier will infringe if later. In a great number \/
of cases the defendant's ·device has been found not to be an
infringement, although one is morally certain that it would
have been held sufficient to anticipate the plaintiff's invention
had the case arisen under different circumstances. As a perhaps extreme illustration may be cited the case of Poirier v.
Clementson. 469 The plaintiff in this case held a patent for an
improvement in pack-straps. One of its claims was for a bag
having shoulder straps secured to a piece of leather across the
top of the bag and their other ends arranged to fasten, after
passing across the shoulders, to buckles on the lower corners
of the bag. He contended that defendant's pack differed from
his only in the fact that the straps were attached at a some:what lower point. Defendants insisted that the method of attachment was different and that the load was carried in a different position. The validity of the patent was not disputed
by the defense and the court dismissed the bill on the ground
that there was no infringement. If the validity of the patent
had been attacked and the device of the defendant had been
set up as pre-existing, it seems incredible that the cqurt would
not have held the patent void as exhibiting only mech~nical
change from the earlier device. 470
It appears often that the case is determined on a finding of
469

70 Fed. 617.

470

See also Bragg v. Fitch, 121 U. S. 478; Crawford v. Heysinger,
U. S. 589; Boyd v. Janesville Tool Co., 158 U. S. 26o.
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non-infringement in order that, by a narrow construction, the

court may evade the actual invalidity of the patent which would

follow a construction broad enough to make the subsequent de-

vice an infringement. 471 Because of this, it is not safe to

rely on cases in which a certain similarity has been held to

constitute anticipation, as precedents for the contention that

the same degree of similarity should be held to constitute in-

fringement.

Another matter that is judicially declared to affect the

court's conclusion as to the scope of a patent is the patentee's

own acquiescence in its delimitation by the Commissioner of

Patents. The courts have "often held that when a patentee,

on the rejection of his application, inserts in his specification,

in consequence, limitations and restrictions for the purpose of

obtaining his patent, he cannot, after he has obtained it, claim

that it shall be construed as it would have been construed if

such limitations and restrictions were not contained in it." 480

"If an applicant, in order to get his patent, accepts one with

a narrower claim than that contained in his original applica-
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tion he is bound by it. If dissatisfied with the decision reject-

ing his application, he should pursue his remedy by appeal." 481

Although these statements are not infrequent, it may fairly be

said that they are not adhered to, except when the court is

471 Scaife & Sons Co. v. Falls City Woolen Mills, 209 Fed. 210; Roemer

v. Peddie, 78 Fed. 117.

480 Roemer v. Peddie, 132 U. S. 313. In this particular case the lower

;,--

court had reached the same conclusion of narrow scope in order to escape

the necessity of holding the patent void, as it would have been if a wider

scope had been ascribed to it. Roemer v. Peddie, 78 Fed. 117. It is not

at all certain that the Supreme Court would have followed the letter of its

own statement had there not been this additional reason.

481 Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. S. 593. Here again it appears that if

the scope claimed had been allowed, the patent would undoubtedly have

been void for lack of novelty. Ace. Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133

U. S. 360; Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U. S. 530; Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock

Co., 114 U. S. 63; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U. S. 265; Computing

Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U. S. 609; Morgan Envelope Co. v.

non-infringement in order that, by a narrow construction, the
court may evade the actual invalidity of the patent which would
follow .a construction broad enough to make the subsequent device an infringement. 471 Because of this it is not safe to
rely on cases in which a certain similarity has been held to
constitute anticipation, as precedents for the contention that
the same degree of similarity should be held to constitute infringement.
·
Another matter that is judicially declared to affect the
court's ·conclusion as to the scope of a patent is the patentee's
own acquiescence in its delimitation by the Commissioner of
Patents. The courts have "often held that when a patentee,
on the rejection of his application, inserts in his specification,
in consequence, limitatio_ns and restrictions for the purpose of
obtaining his patent, he cannot after he has obtained it, claim
that it shall be construed as it would have been construed if
such limitations and restrictions were not contained in it." 480
"If an qpplicant, in order fo get his patent accepts one with
a narrower claim than that contained in his original application he is bound by it. If dissatisfied with the decision rejecting his application, he should pursue his remedy by appeal. 481
Although these statements are· not infrequent, it may -f airly be
said tha~ they are not adhered to, except when the court is

Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425; Ventilated Cush-

411 Scaife & Sons Co. v. Falls City Woolen Mills~ 209 Fed. 210; Roemer
v. Peddie, 78 Fed. 117.
480 Roemer v. Peddie, 1J2 U. S. 313.
In this particular case the lower
. court had reached the same conclusion of narrow scope in order to escape
the necessity of holding the patent void, as it would have been if a wider
scope had been ascribed to it. Roemer v. Peddie, 78 Fed. n7. It is not
at all certain that the Supreme Court would have followed the letter of its
own statement had there not been this additional reason.
4 81' Shepard v. Carrigan, u6 U. S. 593.
Here again it appears that if
the scope claimed had been allowed, the patent would undoubtedly have
been void for lack of novelty. Acc. Phoeni~ Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133
U. S. 36o; Sutter v. Robinson, n9 U. S. 530; Sargent v. Hall .Safe & Lock
Co., II4 U. S. 63; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U. S. 265; Computing
Scale Co. v. Automatic Scale Co., 204 U. S. 6og; Morgan Envelope Co. v.
Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425; Ventilated Cushion & Spring Co. v. D'Arcy, 232 Fed. 468.

ion & Spring Co. v. D'Arcy, 232 Fed. 468.
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influenced toward a narrow construction by other reasons, such

as that a wider scope would invalidate the patent.

Occasional statements are also found to the effect that

"When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct 482

the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it.

He can claim nothing beyond it." 4 "It is his (the paten-

tee's) province to make his own claim and his privilege to re-

strict it. If it be a claim to a combination, and be restricted to

specified elements, all must be regarded as material, leav-

ing open only the question whether an omitted part is sup-

plied by an equivalent device or instrumentality." 484 As

has already been said, the scope of a patent is not limited to

the material form of the embodiment of the invention as de-

scribed. Such statements as these are in general merely loose

expressions of the fact that the particular invention is not de-

serving of a range of equivalents or protection outside of its

literal description. It is not impossible that a patentee who is

ignorant of the principle embodied in his device, or who is

careless in the very precision of his language, may limit him-
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self so expressly to the specific formal embodiment claimed,

that the other forms to which his protection might have been

spread can only be looked upon as dedicated to the public. But

the cases are few, in which a patentee who might have had

greater protection under a proper claim is deprived of it be-

cause of the wording of his actual claim.

Another thing which has materially af-

fected courts in their decisions as to the scope of an invention

is the distance of relationship between it and the knowledge

which preceded it, or, in other words, the length of the step

forward which the inventor has made. The thing patented is

not the substantial thing actually described in the patent, but

the, idea embodied in that substantial form. It appears from

the cases that, in a figurative sense, this idea must be symmetri-

cal ; it can reach so far forward to cover improvements, and

482 As they always should be.

483 Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U. S. 274.

484 Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U. S. 408. The court had already found that

"this patent stands on very narrow ground" in view of the prior art.

influenced toward a narrow construction by other reasons, such
, as that a wider scope would invalidate the patent.
Occasional statements are also found to the effect that
"When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct 482
the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it.
He can claim nothing beyond it.' 4 3 "It is his (the paten- ~
tee's) province to make his own claim and his privilege to restrict it. If it be a claim to a combination, and be restricted to
specified elements, all must be regarded as material, leaving op.en only the question whether an omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality." 484 As
has already been said, the scope of a patent is not limited to
the material form of the embodiment of the invention as described. Such statements as these are in general merely loose
expressions of the fact that the ·particular invention is not de-·
serving of a range of equivalents or protection outside of its
literal description. It is not impossible that a patentee who is
ignorant of the principle embodied in his device, or who is
careless in the very precision of his language, may limit himself so expressly to the specific formal embodiment claimed,
that the other forms to which his protection might have been
spread can only be looked upon as dedicated to the public. But
the cases are few, in which a patentee who might have had
greater protection under a proper claim is deprived of it because of the wording of his actual claim.
z::w..w.i..a.-.......~-""""...........~Ts. Another thing which has materially affected courts in their decisions as to the scope of an invention i-/
is the distance of relationship between it and the knowledge
which preceded it, or, in other words, the length of the step
forward which the inventor has made. The thing patented is
not the substantial thing ·actually described in the patent, but
the. idea embodied in that substantial form. It appears from
the cases that, in a figurative sense, this idea must be symmetrical; it can reach so far forward to cover improvements, and
As they always should be.
Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U. S. 274.
484 Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U. S. 4o8.
The court had already found that
"this patent stands ·on very narrow ground" in view of the prior art.
482

483
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only so far, as it is itself in advance of the prior state of the

art. If it is but a slight improvement upon the known art, it

only so far, as it is itself in advance of the prior state of the
art. If it is but a ~light improvement upon the known art, it
has but a narrow scope of protection against infringements;
if it be a long step forward, its monopoly has a wide scope of
ti: inclusiveness. Such
'n ention far in advance of the known
art, is usually spoke~n~o~f;,...ia~s~,....._,~~--reports are replete with statements of the broad scope
of protection which is to be given to such patents. "If one
inventor precedes all the rest, and strikes out something which
includes and underlies all they produce, he acquires a monopoly,
and subjects them to tribute. But if the adyance toward· the
thing desired is gradual, and proceeds step by step, so that no
one can claim the complete whole, then each is entitled only
to the specific form of device which he produces, and every
other inventor is entitled to his own specific form, so long as
it differs from those of his competitors · and does not include
theirs. These general principles are so obvious, that they need
no argument or illustration to support them." 472 Another
opinion says, "If he (the patentee) be the original inventor
of the device or machine called the divider, he will have a right
to treat as infringers all who make dividers operating on the
same principle, and performing the same functions by the same
or analogous means or equivalent combinations, even though
· the infringing machine may be an improvement of the origiV nal, and patentable as such. But if the invention claimed pe
itself but an improvement on a known machine by a mere
change of form or combination of parts, the patentee can not
treat another as an infringer who has improved the original
machine by use of a different form or combination perform ..

v

has but a narrow scope of protection against infringements;

if it be a long step forward, its monopoly has a wide scope of

inclusiveness. Such an invention, far in advance of th-known

art, is usuallysppkenof.

reports are replete with statements of the broad scope

of protection which is to be given to such patents. "If one

inventor precedes all the rest, and strikes out something which

includes and underlies all they produce, he acquires a monopoly,

and subjects them to tribute. But if the advance toward the

thing desired is gradual, and proceeds step by step, so that no

one can claim the complete whole, then each is entitled only

to the specific form of device which he produces, and every

other inventor is entitled to his own specific form, so long as

it differs from those of his competitors and does not include

theirs. These general principles are so obvious, that they need

no argument or illustration to support them." 472 Another

opinion says, "If he (the patentee) be the original inventor
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of the device or machine called the divider, he will have a right

to treat as infringers all who make dividers operating on the

same principle, and performing the same functions by the same

or analogous means or equivalent combinations, even though

the infringing machine may be an improvement of the origi-

nal, and patentable as such. But if the invention claimed t>e

itself but an improvement on a known machine by a mere

change of form or combination of parts, the patentee can not

treat another as an infringer who has improved the original

machine by use of a different form or combination perform-

472 Railway Co.-V. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 556. The patent in this case was

for a double-acting railway car brake. The plaintiff's invention was of

such excellence as to supersede other types of brakes, but it did not em-

body an unprecedented idea. Other double-brakes had been earlier in-

vented, employing... the same fundamental principle as his. His new idea

of means was therefore only an improvement in the manner of utilizing

that principle. The court restricted him therefore to a range of equiva-

lents limited by the particular novelty of the mere improvement which

he had engrafted upon the known principle.

472

Railway Co.""v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 556. The patent in this case was
for a double-acting railway car brake. The plaintiff's invention ·was of
such exc~llence a to supersede other type of brakes, but it did not embody an unprecedented idea. Other double-brakes had been earlier invented, employin the same fundamental principle as his. His new idea
of means was therefore only an improvement in the manner of utilizing
that principle. The court restricted him therefore to a range of equivalents limited by the particular novelty of the mere improvement which
he had engrafted upon the known principle.
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ing the same functions. The inventor of the first improve-

ment can not invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress

all other improvements which are not mere colorable invasions

of the first" 473

Just what constitutes a pioneer invention is not capable of

precise delimitation. 'This word (pioneer)/' says Mr. Justice

Brown, "although used somewhat loosely, is commonly un-

derstood to denote a patent covering a f unttion never

per4errerlra wnollvnoyel device, or one of such novelty and

importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the

art, as distinguislTerMj^m-ar-ftreFe- -improvement or perfection

of whatjhajijrpne before. Most conspicuous examples of such

patents are : The one to Howe of the sewing machine ; to

Morse of the electric telegraph; and to Bell of the telephone.

The. record in this case would indicate that the same honor-

able appellation might be safely bestowed upon the original

air-brake of Westinghouse, and perhaps also upon his auto-

matic brake." 4733 The inventions referred to, all embodied the

use of a theretofore unrecognized principle of nature, or the
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utilization of a natural force, for a function or purpose not

before conceived of in connection with it. This fact and the

verbiage of all the statements in regard to pioneer patents in-

dicate, that a true pioneer invention is the idea of accomplish-

ing a result by means of a principle which is sufficiently funda-

mental to come within that vaguely limited term "law of na-

ture" and which has never before been thought of as useful

for the particular end desired. Morse used the principle of

electro-magnetism, which while well known in itself had not

been used for the particular purpose. In Bell's invention, the

various electrical actions and reactions had been known, but

the idea of using them to reproduce articulate sounds at a

distance from their place of utterance, was inchoate. Westing-

473 McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. 402, 404 ; Morley Machine Co. v.

Lancaster, 123 U. S. 263; Royer v. Coupe, 146 U. S. 524, Morton v. Jen-

sen, 49 Fed. 859; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. 186, 207; Paper Bag

Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405; Kokomo Fence Machine Co. v. Kitselman,

189 U. S. 8; Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 492.

4739 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S..537, 561.

ing the same functions. The inventor of the first improvement can not invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress
all other improvements which are not mere colorable invasions
of the first." 473
Just what constitutes a pioneer invention is not capable of
precise delimitation. "This word (pioneer Y," says Mr. Justice
Brown, "although used somewhat loosely, is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a fun ion never fore
er
a w o y nove ev1ce or one of
novelt and
importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the
--~--a;,:_;:s distingui
ovement or er£ection
of what h d one before. Most conspicuous ·examples of such
patents are : The one to Howe of the sewing machine; to
Morse of the electric telegraph; and to Bell of the telephone.
The~ record in this case would indicate that the same honorable appellation might be safely bestowed upon the original
air-brake of Westinghouse, and perhaps also upon his auto473
mati~ brake." a The inventions referred to, all embodied the
use of a theretofore unrecognized principle of n~ture, or the
utilization of a natural force, for a function or purpose nbt
before conceived of in connection with it. This fact and the
verbiage of all .the statements in regard to pioneer patents · indicate, that a true pioneer invention is the idea of accomplishing a result by means of a principle which is sufficiently fundamental to come within that vaguely limited term "law of nature" and which 'has never before been thought of as useful
for the particular end desired. Morse used the principle of
electro-magnetism, which while well known in itself had not
been used for the particular purpose. In Bell's invention, the
various electrical actions and reactions had been known, but
the idea of using them to reproduce articulate sounds · at a
distance from their place of utterance, was inchoate. Westing473 McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. 402, 404; Morley Machine Co. v.
Lancaster, 123 P. S. 263; Royer v. Coupe, 146 U. S. 524, Morton v. Jensen, 49 Fed. 859; Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U. S. 186, 207; Paper Bag
Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405; Kokomo Fence , Machine Co. v. Kitselman,
18g U. S. 8; Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 492.
4738
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S .. 537, 561.
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house's application of pneumatic pressure was to produce a

result never practically connected with it. So all other ad-

mittedly pioneer_inventions are found to be such as for the

test time connect a desired result with any definite means of

accmiplilnrig-it. Such connection of means and desideratum

may be imperfect, and later inventions may excel it in utility,

but those more successful ones are not the first to make the

connection; they follow the pioneer. The "result" can not be

patented, its accomplishment is open to other persons by means

of other principles ; neither can the "principle" be patented, it

is said; 474 but the means of utilizing a principle for a result

may, if sufficiently novel, be given a scope of protection prac-

tically equivalent to the principle itself when used for the par-

ticular result.

Not all pioneer patents are given the same scope, of course.

An inventor, like a homesteader, may be a discoverer of the

unknown; may "pioneer" into a known but unexplored land;

or into a merely unsettled territory. And his reward differs in

accord with what he has done. Bell and Morse went into a
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practically unknown land and were given a wide monopoly. 475

Tilghman was the real discoverer of the fact that fatty sub-

stances would separate into their constituent parts under the

action of water at a high temperature and pressure, and he was

accordingly awarded the monopoly of that process. 476 As the

court said, "Had the process been known and used before, and

not been Tilghman's invention, he could not then have claimed

anything more than the particular apparatus described in the

patent; but being the inventor of the process, as we are satis-

fied was the fact, he was entitled to claim it in the manner he

did." But the fact that the ground has been fairly well ex-

plored and its possibilities realized does not deprive an in-

ventor, who first effectuates a utilization of those possibilities,

of a comparative .range of equivalents. In the Paper Bag

474 As in O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, see the explanation of this

case in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 727 ff.

475 The Telephone Cases, 124 U. S. I ; O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62.

476 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707.

~ouse's

application of pneumatic pressure was to produce a
result never practically connected with it. So all other admittedly pi one r inventions are found to b such as for the
~st time · onnect a desired result with an de nite means of
--~~l.!.li:.:Z!h!!..'ing it. Such.connection of means and desideratum
may be imperfect, and· later inventions may excel it in utility,
but those more successful ones are not the ·first to make the
connection; they follow. the pioneer. The ' result ' can not be
patent~d, its accomplishment is open to other persons by means
of other · principles; neither can the "principle" be patented, it
is said ;474 hut -the means of utilizing a principle for a result
may, if sufficiently novel, be given a scope-of protection practically equival~nt tG the pri~ciple itself when used for the particular result. .
-·
- ; Not all pioneer patents· are given the same scope, of course.
2\n Inventor, like a homesteader, may be a discoverer of the
unknown; may "pioneer" into a known but unexplored land;
or into a merely unsettled territory. And his reward differs in
accord with what he has done. Bell and Morse went into a
practically unknown land and were given a wide monopoly. 475
Tilghman was the real discoverer of the fact that fatty substances would separate into their constituent parts under the
action of water at a high temperature and pressure, and he was
accordingly awarded the monopoly of that process. 476 As the
court said, "Hae) the process been known and used before, and
not been Tilghman' s· invention, he could not then have claimed
anything more .than the particular apparatus described in the
patent; but being the inventor of the process, as we are satisfied was the fact, he was entitled to claim it in the manner he
did." But the fact that the ground has been fairly well explored and its possibilities realized does not . deprive an inventor, who first effectuates a utilization of those possibilities ~
of a comparative .range o.f equivalents. In the Paper Bag
474 As in O'Reilly v. Morse, rs How. 62, see the explanation of this
case in Tilghman v. Proctor, IO~ U. S. 707, 727 ff.
475 The Telephone Cases, 124 l!· S. r; O'Reilly v. Morse, is How. 62 . ..
476 Tilghman v. Proctor, · 102 U . S. 707.
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Patent Case 477 it was contended by the defendants that the inr

Yention, not being first in its line, could not be infringed by a

device materially different from the one described in the

patent. The court, however, decided that, in the words of the

syllabus, 'The previous decisions of this court are not to be

construed as holding that only pioneer patents are entitled to

invoke the doctrine of equivalents, but that the range of equiva-

lents depends upon the degree of invention ; and infringement

of a patent not primary is therefore not averted merely because

defendant's machine may be differentiated." "The more meri-

torious the invention, the greater the step in the art, the less

the suggestion of the improvement in the prior art, the more

liberal are the courts in applying in favor of the patentee the

doctrine of equivalents. The narrower the line between the

faculty exercised in inventing a device and mechanical skill,

the stricter are the courts in rejecting the claim of equivalents

by the patentee in respect of alleged infringements." 478

In cases where the invention is scarcely more than a me-

chanical change from the art which preceded it, and is given
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validity at all only by the narrowest margin, its range of

equivalents is so correspondingly narrow as to be practically

nothing. In such cases infringement occurs only when the un-

authorized device corresponds precisely with the formal de-

scription of the patent. 479

SUMMARY. The other factors, extraneous to the patent it-

self, such as the personality of the judge, earlier opinions, etc.,

which were discussed under the head of invention, influence the

findings on infringement just as they do those on invention.

When allowance is made for the influence of these factors,

particularly the tendency to find non-infringement rather than

477 210 U. S. 405.

478 Judge Taf t, in Penfield v. Chambers Bros. Co., 92 Fed. 630, 649, Ace.

Benbow-Brammer Mfg. Co. v. Straus, 166 Fed. 114; Boston & R. Elec. St.

Ry. Co. v. Bemis Car-Box Co., 80 Fed. 287; Roemer v. Peddie, 78 Fed.

117; Mallon v. Wm. C. Gregg & Co., 137 Fed. 68; Diamond Rubber Co. v.

Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 438.

479 Poirier v. Clementson, 70 Fed. 617; Roemer v. Peddie, 78 Fed. 117;

Ball & Socket Fastener Co. v. Ball Glove Fastener Co., 58 Fed. 818.

Patent Case 477 it was contended by the defendants that the in:vention, not being first in its line~ could ·not be infringed by a
device mate.rially different from the one described in the
patent. The court, however, decided that, in. the words of the
'syllabus, "The previous decisions of this court" are not to be .
·c onstrued as holding that only pioneer· patents are entitled to
invoke the doctrine of equivalents; but that the range of.equivalents depends upon the degree of invention; and infringement
of a patent not primary is therefore not averted merely beca_use
defendant's machine may be differentiated." "The more meritorious the invention, the greater the step in the-art, the less
the suggestion of the improverrienf in the prior art, the rrio"re
'liberal are the courts in applyitfg in favor of the patentee the
doctrine of equivalents. The ·narrower the line between the
-fa-culty exercised in inventing a device and mechanical skill,
the stricter are the courts in rejecting the claim of equivalents
by the patentee in respect of alleged infringements. "~
·In cases where the invention is scarcely more th~n a mechanica.l change from the art which preceded it, and is given
validity at all only by the narrowest margin, its range of
equivalents is so correspondingly narrow ' as to be practically
nothing. In such cases infringement occurs only when the unauthorized device corresponds preeisely with the formal description of the patent. 479
SuMMARY.
The other factors, extraneous to the patent itself, such as the personality of the judgej earlier opinions, etc. ,
which were discussed under the hea:d of invention, influence the
findings on infringement ]ust as they do those on invention.
When allowance is made for the influence of these factors.
particularly the tendency to find non-infringement rather than
78

u. s. 405. -

477 210
478 Judge

Taft, in Penfield v. Chambers Bros. Co., 92 Fed. 639, _649, Acc.
Benbow-Brammer Mfg. Co. v. Straus, r66 Fed. II4; Boston & R. Elec .. St.
Ry: Co. v. Bemis Car-Box Co., Bo Fed. 287 ; Roem~r v. Peddie, 78 Fed.
r:i7; Mallon v. Wm. C. Gregg & .Co., 137 Fed. 68; Diamond Rubber Co. v-.
Cons.o lidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 438.
479 Poirier v. Clementson, 70 Fed. 617; Roemer v. Peddie, 78 Fed. u7;
Ball & Socket Faste.ner Co. v. Ball Glove Fastener Co., 58 Fed. 8r8.
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to construe a patent so broadly that it would be void for lack

of novelty, and the desire to reward a pioneer inventor as

completely as possible, then the issue of infringement or non-

infringement is practically the same as that of invention or

anticipation. The answer to both depends upon the opinion of

the court as to whether the apparent difference between the

earlier device and the later one is the result only of mechanical

skill or proceeded from the inspiration of inventive genius

The cases involving infringement can therefore be to a certain

extent grouped according to characteristic material changes

which have or have not been held sufficient to avoid a charge

of infringement. But, again be it said, these cases can not be

analyzed into "rules," because of the intrinsic and inevitable

difference of facts. Thus, it is said in many cases and by some

text writers, that "mere change of form does not avoid in-

fringement."- It can not possibly be said flatly that no change

of form will so amount to invention in itself as not to consti-

tute infringement, and to say that "mere" change of form does

not, still leaves' open the same question in different verbiage
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when is change of form "mere change,'' and when is it "in-

vention" and no infringement? The nearest to any positive

generalization that can be made is ,well expressed by one

court. 487 "Mere changes of form of some of the mechanical

elements of a patented combination do not avoid infringement,

when the principle of the invention is adopted and form is not

its essence. But the rule that changes of form do not avoid

infringement has at least two exceptions when the form of

the mechanical element is the distinguishing characteristic of

the invention, and when the change in the form of the ele-

ment changes the principle or mode of operation of the com-

bination." By these expressed exceptions the question is thus

left as unanswered as before, being merely put into a different

form of expression.

The same impossibility of positive generalization holds true

of all the other types of apparent change, and nothing defi-

nite by way of rule or statement can be deduced as a help in

487 O. H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, 140 Fed. 340, 346.

··

to construe a patent so broadly that it would be void for lack
of novelty, and the desire to reward a pioneer inventor as
completely as possible, 4-hen the issue of infringement or noninfringement is practically the same as that of invention or
anticipation. The answer to both depends upon the ·opinion of
the court a~ to whether the apparent difference between the
earlier device and the later one is the result only of mechanical
skill or proceeded from the inspiration of inventive genius.
The cases involving infringement can therefore be to a certain
extent grouped according to characteristic material changes
which have or have not been held sufficient to avoid a charge
of infringement. But, again be it said, these cases can not be
analyzed into "rules," because of the intrinsic and inevitable
difference of facts. Thus, it is said in many cases and by some
text writers, that "m'ere · change of form does not avoid infringement."- It can not possibly be said flatly that no change
of form will so amount to invention in itself as not to constitute infringement, and to say that "mere" change of form does
not, still leaves ' open the same question in different verbiagewhen is change of form "mere change," and .when is it "invention" and no infringement? The nearest to any positive
generalization that can be made is )Vell expressed by one
court. 487 "Mere changes of form of some df the mechanical
elements of a patented combination do not avoid infringement,
when the principle of the invention is adopted and form is not
its essence. But the rule that changes of · form do not avoid
infringement has at least two exceptions--when the form of
the mechanical element is the distinguishing characteristic of
the invention, and when the change in the form of the element changes the principle or mode of operation of the com-:bination." By these expressed exceptions the question is thus
left as unanswered as before, being merely put into a different
form of expression.
The same impossibility of positive generalization holds true
of all the other types of apparent change, and nothing definite by way of rule or statement can be deduced as a help in
487

0. H. Jewell Filter Co. v. Jackson, r40 Fed. 340, 346.
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deciding an issue of infringement. This can only come from

a fundamental comprehension of the whole subject of inven-

tion and non-invention. Beyond the suggestion of classifica-

tion of cases which is discussed under invention, nothing fur-

ther need be said about them. They stand only as separate

cases and any good digest can present them more usuably than

a work of this kind.

3. WHO MAY BE AN INFRINGER

There is no restriction either by statute or by the courts as

to who may be guilty of infringement. Such a suit stands

upon the same footing as every other type of civil action, and

any person or corporation capable of being sued may be liable

deciding an issue of infringement. This-can only come from
a fundamental comprehension of the whole subject of invention and non-invention. Beyond the suggestion of classification of cases which is discussed under invention, nothing further need be said about them. They stand only as separ~te
cases and any good digest can present them more usuably than
a work of this kind.

to action. The United States government was made liable to

§ 3.

suit for infringement by Act of June 25, iQio. 485 This pro-

WHO MAY BE

AN

INFRINGER

'

'

vides "Whenever an invention described in and covered by a

patent of the United States shall hereafter be used by the

United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful

right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable

compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims :
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Provided, however, That said Court of Claims shall not en-

tertain a suit or reward compensation under the provisions of

this Act where the claim for compensation is based on the use

by the United States of any article heretofore owned, leased,

used by, or in the possession of the United States : Provided

further, That in any such suit the United States may avail

itself of any and all defenses, general or special, which might

be pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement, as

set forth in Title Sixty of the Revised Statutes, or otherwise ;

And provided further, That the benefits of this Act shall not

inure to any patentee, who, when he makes such claim is in the

employment or service of the Government of the United

States; or the assignee of any such patentee; nor shall this

Act apply to any device discovered or invented by such em-

ployee during the time of his employment or -service." 486

* 85 Ch. 423, 36 Statutes at L. 851.

486 As to the liability of the government prior to this act, see Farnham

There is no restriction either by statute or by the courts as
to who may be guilty of infringement. Such a suit stands
upon the same footing as every other type of civil action, and
·any person or corporation capable of being sued may be liable
to action. The United States government was made liable to
suit for infringement by Act of June 25, 1910!85 This provides "Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States shall hereafter be used by the
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful
right to use the same, such owner may recover reasonable
compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims:
Provided, however, That said Court of Claims shall not entertain a ·suit or reward compensation under the provisions of
this Act where the claim for compensation is based on the use
by the United States of any article heretofore owned, leased,
used by, or in the possession of the United States: Provided
further, That in any such suit the United States may avail
itself of any and all defenses, general or special, which might
be pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement, as
set forth in Title Sixty of the Revised Statutes, or otherwise;
And provided further, That the benefits of this Act shall not
inure to any patentee, who, when he makes such claim is in the
employment or service of the Government of the United
States; or the assignee of any such patentee; nor shall this
Act apply to any device discovered or invented by such employee during the time of his employment or ·service." 486
·
48 5
486

Ch. 423, 36 Statutes at L. 851.
As to the liability of · the government prior to this act, see Farnham
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4. WHAT ACTS CONSTITUTE INFRINGEMENT

. . ~ : § 4. _WHAT AcTs CoNsTITUT~ lNFRI~GEMENT
· ·_The second issue· referred to at the beginning ·of the · chap~
ter,: namely, whether the defendant has infringed or not, needs
now to _be considered only briefly. It is dear that a decision
upon the first issue· will have swallowed most 0£ -the possibk
form~ ' of the·_ secand: , If the court has decided that the scope
of the patent is such as to include the particular form of. ·device used by the defendant, ·there is . no question but that the
def end ant's device is an infringement of the patent. The only
further issue possible is, whether or not the defendant did
make, use or vend the device, which he is alleged to have made,
etc. This is a pure issue· of fact, depending wholly upon the
evidence adduced. As. a general rule it would precede the tonsideratfon of the other issue, for if no use of the device alleged
had actually been made ·by the defendant if would be futile to
determine the relation of such a device to the patent. . ln using
for any purpose the cases which make reference to the questiDn
· of whether the defendant has ·infringed, care should be taken
to distinguish between the issue of the infringfrig.. chara.cter o·f
the device, and that of whether' he did use the device ~om~
plained oL · The term "infringement'? is used indi's criminatelj'
of both the acts of ·a defendant and of the ·material device with
which he acts:488
, THE INTENT· with whicli the defendant did th acts alleged
is not material in determining his liability as an infrin er uness the char e be merely-that.he is a contributory infringer.
Real absence of intent ·to infringe may in some circumstances
reduce the· amount of damages recoverable under R. S. § 4919:.
But the fact that the def end ant was ·unaware that any patent
had been issued for the device, or honestly believed that his
own device ,was not an infringement of ·the one patented, does
not prevent an adjudication of infringement. 489 .. .
. .r •

The second issue referred to at the beginning of the chap-

ter, namely, whether the defendant has infringed or not, needs

now to be considered only briefly. It is clear that a decision

upon the first issue will have swallowed most of the possible

forms of the second.. If the court has decided that the scope

of the patent is such as to include the particular form of de-

vice used by the defendant, there is no question but that the

defendant's device is an infringement of the patent. The only

further issue possible is, whether or not the defendant did

make, use or vend the device, which he is alleged to have made,

etc. This is a pure issue of fact, depending wholly upon the

evidence adduced. As a general rule it would precede the con-

sideration of the other issue, for if no use of the device alleged

had actually been made by the defendant it would be futile to

determine the relation of such a device to the patent. In using

for any purpose the cases which make reference to the question

of whether the defendant has infringed, care should be taken

to distinguish between the issue of the infringing character of
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the device, and that of whether he did iise the device com-

plained of. The term "infringement'' is used indiscriminately

of both the acts of a defendant and of the material device with

which he acts. 488

THE INTENT with which the defendant did the acts alleged

is not material in determining his liability as an infringer, un-

less the charge be merely that he is a contributory infringer.

Real absence of intent to infringe may in some circumstances

reduce the amount of damages recoverable under R. S. 4919.

But the fact that the defendant was unaware that any patent

had been issued for the device, or honestly believed that his

own device was not an infringement of the one patented, does

not prevent an adjudication of infringement. 489

v. United States, 240 U. S. 537 ; U. S. v. Societe Anonyme, 224 U. S. 309 ;

Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290; Russell v. U. S. 182 U. S. 516; U. S. v.

Berdan Arms Co., 156 U. S. 552 ; Schillinger v. U. S. 155 U. S. 163 ;

Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10.

488 Haselden v. Ogden, 3 Fish. 378, Fed. Cas. No. 6190.

489 Parker v. Hulme, I Fish Pat. Cases 44, Fed. Cas. No. 10,740; Globe

v~ Uni~ed

·s.

States, ~o
S. ·537; U. S. ~. S~ci~t·e Auonyrrie, 224 U.
~09·;
Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 296; Rus'sell v. U. ·s: 182 tJ. S. 516; U. S.
Berdan Arms Co., 156 U. S. 552; Schilliriger' v. U. S. :.155 U. S. i6J;
Belknap v. Schild, 16! U. S. 10.
488 Haselden v. Ogden, 3 Fish. 378, Fed. Cas. No. · 6190.~
·. .·;. #
.· 489 Parker v. Hufm·e, 1 Fish Pat. Cases :«, Fed. Cas. No: 10,740; Giobe

Di gitizedl b
~NTERINEl
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U.
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The statute 490 provides expressly that no damages shall be

recovered for infringement, when the defendant has not had

due notification before the acts on which suit is predicated, un-

less the plaintiff has given general notice to the public by mark-

ing articles covered by the patent with the word "patented,"

and the date on which the patent was issued. If the article

itself can not be so marked, it is provided that a label may be

affixed to it, or to the package in which it is enclosed, con-

taining the notice. 491 The fact that a defendant had no actual

notice of the patent, and that the articles covered by it had

not been marked "patented" so as to give him constructive

notice, would not preclude the granting of an injunction in

otherwise proper circumstances. The mere fact of notice of

the suit for injunction would in itself 'constitute the notice, that

the device was patented, necessary to render the defendant

liable for all future infringement If he would be liable for

damages in the future, he might properly, so far as the matter

of notice is concerned, be enjoined from causing them. 492 In

one case it was urged by the defendants, that the infringing
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articles had been accidentally made in the course of other

manufacturing and unintentionally sold. The court held an

injunction against any further manufacturing or sale to *be

proper nevertheless. 493

MAKING, USING AND VENDING NOT ALL NECESSARY. The

monopoly given by the patent is the right to exclude others

not only from making things covered by the patent but also

from using or vending such things. One is guilty of infringe-

Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 Fed. 696; Cimiotti Unhairing Co.

v. Bowsky, 143 Fed. 508; It has been held to affect the patentee's right to

an injunction, as distinct from mere damages, Sheridan-Clayton Paper

Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., 232 Fed. 153.

o R. s. 4900.

491 On the subject see Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29; Coupe v^

Royer, 155 U. S. 565, 583.

492 It has been declared that a single unauthorized sale of the patented

article will justify an injunction when the circumstances are sucK as to'

indicate a readiness to make other sales. Hutter v. De Q. Bottle Stopper

Co., 128 Fed. : 283; Johnson v. Foos Mfg. 'Co., 141 Fed. 73.

493 Thompson v. Bushnell, 96 Fed. 238.

The statute 490 provides expressly that no damages shall ·be.
recovered for m rmgerrienf, when· the defen an as not ad
due notification before the acts on which suit is piea1catcd, 'l1tl- ; :
less;the laintiff has given general notice to the public oy marking articles covered by the patent with the woni "patented/'
and the date on which the patent was issued. If the article
itself can not be so marked it is provided that a label may be
affixed to it, or · to the package in . which .i t is endosed, containing the notice~
The fact that a defendant had no actual
notice of the patent, ·and that the articles covered by it had
not been marked "patented'' ·so as to give .him constructive
notice, would ·not preclude the granting of an injunction in
otherwise proper circumstances. The mere fact of notice . of
the suit for injunction would in itself· constitute the notice! ·that
the device was patented, necessary to · render .the def end ant
lictble · for all future infringement. · If he would be liable for·
damages in the future, ·he might properly, so far as .the matter
of notice is concerned, be enjoined from , Cel:using tpem. 4 9 2 In
one case· it 'Wa·s urged _by the defendants~ that the infringing.
articles had . been accidentally made· in the course of other
manufacturing and unintentionally sold. The court held an
injunction against any further manuf~turing . or :sale to ~ be
proper nevertheless. 493
·
MAKING, USING AND VENDING NOT. ALL NECESSARY. .The
monopoly given by the patent is the right to exclude others·
not only ·from making things covered · by the · patent but also"
from using or vending such things. One is guilty ·of infringe....
Wernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., II9 Fed. 6¢; Cimiotti . Unhairing Co.
491

v. Bowsky, 143 Fed. 508; It has been held to affect' the patentee's right to
an injunction, as distinct from mere damages, Sheridan-Clayton Paper
Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., 232 Fed. 153. .
490 R. s. § 4900.
491 On the · subject see Sessions v. Romadka, 14$ U. S. 29 ;· Cotipe v;·
Royer, 155 U. S. 565, 583.
·
4 9 2 It has ' been deelared· that a ~ingle ~authorized sale of the patented
article
justify an injunction when the circumstances are sucH as tci
indicate a readiness to make other sales. Hutter v. De Q. Bottle Stopper
Co., 128 Fed: 283; Johnson v. Foos Mfg. ·co:, 141 Fed: 73.
493 Thompson -v. Bushnell, 96 Fed. 238.
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ment who does any one of these prohibited acts ; it is janneces-

sary that he shall have done them all. 49 '

A more difficult proposition is presented in regard to the

use or sale of the product of a patented device. Is one who

neither makes, uses, or sells the device covered by the patent

guilty of infringement, if he does use or sell something made

by the device, without authority from the patentee? Of course

if he himself makes something with the device, he is guilty of

using the device. But if he merely buys, directly or indirectly,

something that another made unauthorizedly with the patented

device, and uses it without himself having anything to do with

the patented device does that constitute infringement?

There seems to be no direct decision upon this point. Un-

less this product of the device can be considered a part of the

patented invention, the person using it but not himself using

the device, is not logically guilty of making, using, or vending

the invention covered by the patent. At most he would be a

contributory in f ringer. The Supreme Court in referring to

the question "whether, when a machine is designed to manu-
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facture, distribute or serve out to users a certain article, the

article so dealt with can be said to be a part of the combina-

tion of which the machine itself is another part," said, "If this

be so then it would seem to follow that the log which is sawn

in the mill ; the wheat which is ground by the rollers ; the pin

which is produced by the patented machine; the paper which

is folded and delivered by the printing press, may be claimed

as an element of a combination of which the mechanism doing

the work is another element." 495 The question itself the court

does not specifically answer, on the ground that it is not perti-

494 The manufacturing in this country of articles covered by the patent

is an infringement of the monopoly granted thereby even though the

articles are intended for use outside of this country only, Dorsey Revolv-

ing Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 12 Blatch. 202; Fed. Cas.

No. 4015 ; Adriance Platt & Co. v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 55

Fed. 288; Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.,

129 Fed. 105.

495 Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 431.

ment who does any one of these prohibited acts; it is unnecessary that he- shall have done them all. 494
- A more difficult proposition is presented in regard to the
use or sale of the product of a patented device. Is one who
neither makes, uses, or sells the device covered by the patent
guilty of infringement, if he does use or sell something niade
by the device, without authority from the patentee? Of course
if he himself makes something with the device, he is guilty of
using the device. But if he merely buys, directly or indirectly,
something that another made unauthorizedly with the patented
device, and uses it without himself having anything to do with
the patented device does that constitute infringement?
. There seems to be no direct decision upon this point. Unless this product of the device can be considered a part of the
patented invention, the person using it but not himself using
the device, is not logically guilty of making, using, or vending
the invention covered by the patent. At most he would be a
contributory infringer. The Supreme Court in referring to
the<iuestion whether, when a machine is designed to manufacture, distribute or serve out to users a certain article, the
article so dealt with can be said to be a part of the combination of which the machine itself is another part," said, "If this
be so then it would seem to follow that the log which is sawn
in the mill; the wheat which is ground by the rollers; the pin
which is produced by the patented machine; the paper which
is folded and delivered by the printing-press, may be claimed
as an element of a combination of which the mechanism doing
495
~he work rs another element."
The question itself the court
does not specifically answer, on the ground that it is not perti494 The manufacturing in this country of articles covered by the patent
is an infringement of the monopoly granted thereby even. though the
art~cl~s are intended for use outside of this country only, Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 12 Blatch. 202; Fed. Cas.
JN' o. 4015; Adriance Platt & Co. v. McCormick H~rvesting Mach. Co., 55
Fed. 288; Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghou'ie Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
I ..29. Fed. 105.
495 Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 43I.
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nent to the case, but the implication is that the article pro-

duced is not protected by a patent for its means of produc-

tion. 496

The author is not aware of any case in which it has been

held that one who buys articles not themselves covered by a

patent is guilty of contributory infringement merely because

the articles were made by a machine or process whose use was

itself an infringement.

REPAIRS. When a patented device has been sold by the

patentee, or its use a'ffd enjoyment has been licensed, the pur-

chaser or user acquires with the device the implied right to re-

pair it. Such repair, unless expressly restricted by agreement,

does not constitute infringement. As a matter of law, the

proposition is settled. TFfe practical application of the rule is

troublesome, however, and the statements in regard to it are

confused. The difficulty lies in the impossibility of distin-

guishing definitely, and definitively, between "repair" and "re-

placement." While the vendee is entitled to repair the ma-

chine^ or other device, which he has bought, he_has no TigEt
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to mak^ a new- one under the guise of repairing the old one.

It is obvious that the line between repair and remaking is im-

possible of theoretical allocation in advance of the various in-

stances that may arise. Its determination must of necessity

496 So declared in a reference to this case in the later case of Heaton-

Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288,

35 L. R. A. 728, 735. In Merrill v, Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568, it was^held that

a patent for a process for making certain heavy oils was not infringed by

one who did not manufacture but did vend such oils which he had bought

from an unauthorized maker. The case is not so close in point as would

appear from the holding, because the court specifically found that the oil

sold by the defendants was manufactured by a totally different process

from that of the patent. The case might well have been decided on the

simple ground that the oil sold by defendants was not the same oil as

that of the patent, having been made by a different process. A some-

what distant analogy to the questions here suggested is found in the

cases holding that the selling to a licensee of goods which might be put to

nent to the case, but th~ implication is that the article produced is not protected by a patent for its means of production. 496
. The. author -is not aware of any case in which it has been
held that one who buys articles not themselves covered by a
patent is guilty of contributory infringement mere_~y because · the articles were made by a machine or proces~ whose use was
itself an infringement.
REPAIRS.
When a patented
t e pur-·
patentee or its use ru enjoyment .ha
or ser acquires with the device the implied right to recha
Such re air unless ex r l r stricted b a reement,
does not constitute infringement. As a mq.tter of law, the
e practical application of the rule is
propos1tton ts se e .
troublesome, howeyer, and the statements in regard to it are
confused. The difficulty lies in the impossibility of distinguishing definitely, and definitively, between "repair" and "replacement." While the vendee · ntitled to re air the madevice, which he has bought, he has no right
chine, or ot
to make
e gmse
re
o d one.
It is obvious that the line between repair and remaking is impossible of theoretical allocation in advance of the various instances that may arise. Its determination must of necessity
1

infringing use is not of itself contributory infringement. See authorities

cited under that subject; Cf. Sheridan Clayton Paper Co. v. U. S. Enve-

lope Co., 232 Fed. 153.

So declared in a reference to this case in the later case of HeatonPeninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. - 288,
35 L. R. A. 728, 735. In Merrill v_. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 568, it was eld that
a patent for a process for IT_laking certain heavy oils was not infringed by
one who did not manufacture but did vend such oils which he had bought
from an unauthorized maker. The case is not so close in point as would
appear from the ·holding, because the court specifically found that the oil
sold by the defendants was manufactured by a totally different proc~ss
from that of the patent. The case might well have been decided on the
simple ground that the oil sold by defendants was not the same oil as
that o~ the patent, having been made by a different process. A somewhat distant analogy to the questions here suggesttd is found in the
-cases holding that the selling to a licensee of goods which might be put to
infringing use is not of itself contributory infringement. See authorities·
cited under that subject; Cf. Sheridan Clayton Paper Co. v. 'U. S. Enve-:.
lope Co., 232 Fed. 153.
49 6
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follow the fact, not precede it, and be dependent upon the cir-

cumstances. Like so many other issues of the patent law, it

is fundamentally a matter of judicial opinion in the particular

case. It is capable of very little guidance from precedent in-

stances, although an inductive and comparative study of many

eases -in which the issue has been passed upon may serve to

reduce somewhat the width of debatable ground, as is true of

other matters of judicial opinion. 49 ' The whole matter can

not be better discussed than by quoting at length from the

opinion in the case of Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v: Jack-

son. 497 * The defendants in this case were engaged in a small

way in- the business of general machinery repair work. Sev-

eral persons who had purchased from the plaintiff shoe ma-

chines made under the patent, sent their machines to defend-

ants to be ; repaired. -In this work, the defendants replaced a

number of parts by making new ones. The plaintiff contended

that this constituted an infringement of his patent. The court

was of opinion that,; under the particular circumstances which

need not be. set out here; there was no infringement. In the
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course pf the opinion it said,, (v Infringement by the purchaser

of a patented machine consists, in the -substantial rebuilding of

such machine./ A contributory inf ringer necessarily only makes

or sells a part of the patented invention. The purchaser of a

patented machine, in order to infringe, must make or repro-

duce, in substance, the whole patented invention. To prove in-

fringement, in one case, it is only necessary to show a partial

infringement in aid of an unlawful complete infringement,

while in the other case a substantially full and complete in T

fringment must, be established. The rule that a person may

be guilty of contributory infringement by making or selling a

material element of the patented combination has no applica-

tion to infringement by the purchaser of a machine embodying

such patented combination. A purchaser stands in no differ-

_- 497 The cases in point are not cited here for the reason that, the prob-

km .being analyzed and understood, they can be found under appropriate

headings in -a digest- much more satisfactorily and fully than it would be

possible to give them here.

4978 1 12 Fed. 146.

follow the .fact, not precede i.t, _and be dependent upon the circum.stance~. Like so many 0ther issues of the patent law, it
is fundamentally a matter of judicial opinion in the particular
case. . It is capable of -very little guidance from precedent instances, although an inductive and comparative study of many
cas_es .in which the issµe_ has been passed upon may serve to
reduce somewhat :the width of debatable ground, as is tru~ of
other matters of judicial opinion. 497 The wqole matter can
not qe better discussed tha.n by ·quoting at length from the
opinion in the .case of Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v ~ Jackson.497a ·. The. ddendants in this case were engaged in a .sm~H
WC\Y in. t11:e business of gene~al machinery repair work. ·Sev-;
eral persons .who had · purchased from the plaintiff sho~ ma:.
chines made under: the patent, sent their machines to -d.efendants ·_to. be: repair({c;l. -·In this ·work, the defendants replaced ~
number of parts, by making new o~es.-. · The plaintiff contended.
that thi_$. con~tituteq an ·in fringem~nt of his patent_... :r!J_e cour~
was of opin5ori tltiat, . m;ider--the parti~ular circumstances~which
need not be. set out her~ther,e w~s. ~ no infringement. . In the
course pf ._the _- opinic~n it -said,..~ Infringement by.- the pqrchaser
of a pa~enfed - ?1achine consists~ in 1the·-SUbstantial ·' rnbuilding of
such machine. 1 A con_tributoi:-y in£rivget Qecessarily only makes
or s~lls a part of the patep.ted :ir1veption. The purchaser of a
patented machine, in order to infringe, must make or reproduce; in substance,: the whole, patented invention. To prove ·i nfringement, -in one C<:tSe, iCisconly necessary to show a part.ia'f
i_ t\f~i'ngement in aic;-1 of ~n l.1~J~wf ul complete infringemei:it~
wl:iil.~ in t}J~ other .case 'a .subs~antially f_qll and complete in~
friJJgment, AJUSt. be established,. .The rule that ~ a- person may
be guilty o!f contributory infringement by .making or selling ·a
material element of the (patented combination has no application to infiihgementby th~ p~~ch~.ser· o! a mac}l~ne e~Bodying
such p~tented c'ombip;itiop. A purchase_r stands in no ·diffe~~
_.497 Th' ·case in vo:nt . al'e not cited here for the reason that,. the prob.
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lem ,being analyzed and un.~rstood, ·they · can .be ·found under appropriate
headings in ·a digest- mqch more atisfactorily and fully than it would -be
· pussible to give them ·here. , ..
4978 II2 Fed. 146.
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ent- position from an ordinary inf ringer, except in the circum-

stance that he has bought a patented machine, and, conse-

quently, his infringement does : not consist in the construction

of a wholly new machine, but in the reconstruction of such

machine after it is worn out or substantially destroyed. The

essence of the infringement is the same in both cases.

"The ordinary inf ringer makes the entire patented machine;

the infringing purchaser begins with .what remains of the

patented machine, and rebuilds it. To show infringement in

the case of an ordinary infringer, where the patented invention

comprises several elements in combination, it is necessary to

prove that the alleged infringing machine contains all the ele-

ments (or their equivalents) which make up the combination,

although some of the elements may not be -material, or of the

essence of the invention. To show infringement by the pur-

chaser in such a case, the same strictness of .proof is -not re-

quired, for the reason that it may not be necessary for him to

make the immaterial or unessential elements of the patented

combination, because they may not be worn out or destroyed
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in his machine when the w r ork of reconstruction begins, ^ Ax

practical reconstruction of the patented machine, and not nee- ]

essarily a literal reconstruction of the patented combination's /

all that is required to constitute infringement by the purchase.!, )

For example, where the patent is for an improved lamp, and

the whole invention resides in the burner, but the claim is for

the combination of the burner and a chimney, in an ordinary

suit for infringement it must be shown that the defendant

made or used or sold the .patented combination, namely, the

burner and chimney; while in a suit for infringement against

a purchaser of the lamp it would only be necessary to prove

that he replaced the old burner with a new one, because, -mani-

festly, that would constitute a substantial reconstruction of the

patented invention. If a person other than the purchaser

should make or sell the burner with the intent and purpose of

its use by another in combination with the chimney, it would

be a clear case of contributory infringement.

ent. position from an ordinary infringer, except ip the circumstance that he ha bought a patented machine, and, cons~
quently, his infringement does .not col)sist in the construcj:ion
of a wh91ly ·new m2tchine, but in the reconstruc::tion_of su~h
machine after it is worn out or substantially destroyed. The
es ence of the infringement is the same in both cases.
"The ordinary infringer makes the entire patented _machine;
the infringing pqrchaser begins with .what remains of ·the
patented machine, and. rebuilds it. ·To show infri11gement in
the case of an ordinary infringer, where the patented invention
comprises several elements in combination, it is necessary to
prove that the alleged infringing machine contains all the- elements ( or their equivalents) which make up the combination,.
although some of the elements may not be ·material; or o-f . the
essence of _the invention. To show infripgement by t4e pt1r-.
chaser in such a case, the same strictness of .proof is not r~..:
quired for the reason that it may not be n~cessary . for him to
make the immaterial or unessential" elements of the patented
combination, because they may not be worn out or. de's troyed
in his machine when the work of reconstructiGn begins! .
practical reconstruction of the patented machine, and not .~e~sarily a literal reconstruction of the patented com.bina.tio~s
all that is required. to constitute infringement by. the purcha:s.er.
For .example, where the patent is for an improved. lamp~ and
the whole invention resides in the burner, but the claim is for
the combination of the burner and a chimney, in an ordinary
suit for infringement it must be shown that the defendant
made or used or sold the .patentt!d comp~nation, namely, th~
burner and chimney ; while in a suit--for infringement against
a purchaser of the lamp it ·would only be necessary to prove
that he replaced the o~'d burner with a new one, because, ·manifestly, that would constitute a substantial reconstruction of the
patented . invention. If a person other than the· purcliaser
should make or sell the burner with the inten~·. and putpQse 0£
~ts '1Se .by an9ther in ·combination with the· chimney, ·it. would
be a clear case of contributory infringement.
.
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"In approaching the question of infringement by the pur-

j chaser of a patented machine, it is important to bear in mind

what the patentee sold and the purchaser bought. The patentee

has parted with his machine and the monopoly that goes with

it, and the purchaser has bought the machine with the right

to use the patented invention until the machine is worn out

or destroyed. When the machine is worn out, or substantially

destroyed, his right to use the patented invention ceases ; and

when he rebuilds his machine, and thereby makes substantially

a new machine, it becomes subject to the patentee's monopoly,

the same as in the case of any other person who unlawfully

'makes the patented machine./ When the patented machine has

passed outside the monopoly by a sale and purchase, the pat-

entee has no right to impose any restrictions on its use for his

own benefit. He cannot forbid the further use of the machine

because it is out of repair in consequence of the wearing out

or breaking of some of its parts, and so oblige the purchaser

to buy a new machine. The purchased machine has become

the individual property of the purchaser and is like any other
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piece of property which he owns. He may sell it, or he may

use it so long as its usefulness lasts, and then throw it away,

or dispose of it for junk. He may prolong its life and use-

fulness by repairs more or less extensive, so long as its origi-

nal identity is not lost. He is only prohibited from construct-

ing a substantially new machine. He cannot, under the pretext

of repairs, build another machine.

"A purchaser, then, may repair, but not reconstruct or re-

produce, the patented device or machine. Repair is 'restora-

tion to a second, good, or complete state after decay, injury,

dilapidation, or partial destruction.' Reconstruction is 'the act

of constructing again.' Reproduction is 'repetition,' or 'the

act of reproducing.' These definitions are instructive in bring-

ing home to the mind that repair carries with it the idea of

restoration after decay, injury, or partial destruction, and that

reconstruction or reproduction carries with it the idea of a

complete construction or production over again.

"In approaching the question of infringement by the purchaser of a patented machine, it is important to bear in mind
\what the patentee sold and the purchaser bought. The patentee
has parted with his machine and the monopoly that goes with
it, and the purchaser has bought the machine with the right
to use the patented invention until the machine is worn out
or destroyed. When the machine is worn out, or substantially
destroyed, his right to use the patented invention ceases; and
when he rebuilds his machine, and thereby makes substantially
a new machine, it becomes subject to the patentee's monopoly,
the same as in the case of any other person who unlawfully
'makes the patented machine./ When the patented machine has
passed outside the monopoly by a sale and purchase, the patentee has no right to impose any restrictions on its use for his
own benefit. He cannot forbid the further use of the machine
because it is out of repair in consequence of the wearing out
or breaking of some of its parts, and so oblige the purchaser
to buy a new machine. The purchased machine has become
the individual property of the purchaser and is like any other
piece of property which he owns. He may sell it, or he may
use it so long as its usefulness lasts, and then throw it away,
or dispose of it for junk. He may prolong its life and usefulness by repairs more or less extensive, so long as its original identity is not lost. He is only prohibited from constructing a substantially new machine. He cannot, under the pretext
of repairs, build another machine.
"A purchaser, then, may i:epa.ii;..but n.Q! reconstruct or reQroduce, the patented device or machine. Repair is 'restoration to a second, good, or complete state after decay, injury,
dilapidation, or partial destruction.' Reconstruction is 'the act
of constructing again.' Reproduction is 'repetition,' or 'the
act of reproducing.' These definitions are instructive in bringing home to the mind that repair carries with it the idea of
restoration after decay, injury, or partial destruction, and that
reconstruction or reproduction carries with it the idea of a
complete construction or production over again.
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"But the difficult question still remains, what is legitimate

repair, and what is reconstruction or reproduction as applied

to a particular patented device or machine ? When does repair

destroy the identity of such device or machine and encroach

upon invention? At what point does the legitimate repair of

such device or machine end, and illegitimate reconstruction

begin ?

"It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay

down any rule on this subject, owing to the number and in-

finite variety of patented inventions. Each case, as it arises,

must be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances

presented, and with an intelligent comprehension of the scope,

nature, and purpose of the patented invention, and the fair

and reasonable intention of the parties. Having clearly in

mind the specification and claims of the patent, together with

the condition of decay or destruction of the patented device

or machine, the question whether its restoration to a sound

state was legitimate repair, or a substantial reconstruction or

reproduction of the patented invention, should be determined
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less by definitions or technical rules than by the exercise of

sound common sense and an intelligent judgment.

"When the patent is for a single thing, like a knitting

needle, for example, and not for a device or machine com-

posed of several things or elements combined, it is obvious

that the replacement of an old needle by a new one in a knitting

machine is not repair, but a reproduction of the patented tiling.

"When the patent is for a device embracing the combina-

tion of several elements, a purchaser will infringe by recon-

structing the device after it has fulfilled its purpose anr] is sub-

stantially Hpstrny^cL Where, for instance, the patent was for

a cotton-bale tie, consisting of a band and buckle, and licensed

to use once only,' it is manifest that the severance of the band

at the cotton mill was intended to operate as a destruction of

the tie, and that to roll and straighten the pieces of the band

and rivet the ends together, at the same time using the old

buckle, was a reconstruction of the tie, and not repair.

"But the difficult question still remains, what is legitimate
repair, and what is reconstruction or reproduction as applied
to a particular patented device or machine? When does repair
destroy the identity of such device or machine and encroach
upon invention? At what point does the legitimate repair of
such device or machine end, and illegitimate reconstruction
begin?
"It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay
down any rule on this subject, owing to the number and infinite variety of patented inventions. Each case, as it arises,
must be decided in the light of all the facts and circumstances
presented, and with an intelligent comprehension of the scope,
nature, and purpose of the patented invention, and the fair
and reasonable intention of the parties. Having clearly in
mind the specification and claims of the patent, together with
the condition of decay or destruction of the patented device
or machine, the question whether its restoration to a sound
state was legitimate repair, or a substantial reconstruction or
reproduction of the patented invention, should be determined
less by definitions or technical rules than by the exercise of
sound common sense and a11 intelligent judgment.
"When the patent is for a single thing, like a knitting
needle, for example, and not for a device or machine composed of several things or elements combined, it is obvious
that the replacement of an old needle by a new one in a knitting
machine is not repair, but a reproduction of the patented tlling.
"When the patent is for a device embracing the combination of several elements, a purchaser will in fr· - ._onstructin the vice after it has fulfilled its purpa.se and is sub~-~"'j--~.u...L.;~e~d~·- Where, for instance, the patent was for
a cotton-bale tie, consisting of a band and buckle, and 'licensed
to use once only,' it is manifest that the severance 9f the band
at the cotton mill was intended to operate a3 a destruction of
the tie, and that to roll and straighten the pieces of the band
and rivet the ends together, at the same time using the old
buckle, was a reconstruction of the tie, and not repair.
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"Again, where the subject of the patent was an electric lamp,

and the invention resided in the discovery that an attenuated

carbon filament, if operated in a high vacuum/would \vith-

stand disintegration, and the claim was for the combination of

carbon filaments with a receiver made entirely of glass, and

conductors passing through the glass, from which receiver the

air is exhausted, it is plain that, when the filament is destroyed,

and the vacuum is destroyed by making a hole in the receiver,

and nothing remains but a perforated glass bulb and the con-

ductors, the lamp is practically destroyed, and that to replace

the. old filament with a new one, and again exhaust the air in

the receiver, and again seal it, is substantially the making of

a new lamp.

"Where the patent is for a machine, which commonly em-

braces the combination of many constituent elements, the ques-

tion of infringement by the purchaser will turn upon whether

the machine is only partially worn out or partially destroyed,

or is entirely worn out, and so beyond repair in a practical

sense. In the case of a patent for a planing machine composed
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of many parts it was held that the replacement of the rotary

knives, 'the effective ultimate tool' of the machine, was re-

pair, and not reconstruction." 498

If the construction is such as the owner of the machine has

himself a right to perform by way of repair, it is not in-

fringement for some one else to do the work for him. 499

5. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT

It is a settled principle of the Common Law that one who

wrongfully induces another to break a contract with a third

person, or who induces another to commit a tort against a

third person, is himself guilty of a tort and liable to a suit for

damages. We have already seen that a patentee may license

another to invade his monopoly, and utilize his invention, with

a limitation upon the extent or character of the licensee's en-

498 Morrm v. Robert White Engineering Co., 143 Fed. 519. Burguieres

Co. v. Deming Co., 224 Fed. 926. Many cases are cited in the opinion.

See especially, Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109.

499 Morrin v. Robt. White Engr. Co., 143 Fed. 519.

;. ·"Again, where the subject of the patent was a:n electrit lamp,
and the invention · resided in the discovery that ah attenuated
carbon filament, if operated in a high vacuum, would \vithstand disintegration, and the daim was for the combination o"f
carbon filaments with a receiver made entirely of glass, -and
·· _conductors passing through the glass, from which receiver the
air is exhausted, it is plain that, when the filament is destroyed,
and the vacuum is destroyed by making a hole in the receiver,
and nothing · remains but a perforated. glass bulb and the con..:
ductors, the lamp is practically destroyed and that to replace
the.old filament_with a new one, and again exhaust the air in
the receiver, and again seal it, is substantially the making of
a new lamp.
. "Where the patent is for a machine, which commonly embraces the combination of ·many constituent elements, the que tion of infringement by the purchaser will turn upon whether
the machine is only partially worn out or· partially destroyed;
or is entirely worn out, and so beyond repair in a practical
sense. · In the case of a patent for a planing machine composed
6£ many parts it was held that the replacement of the rotary
knives, 'the effective ultimate tool of the machine, was repair, and not reconstruction.' 498
If the construction is such as the owner of the ·machine has
himself a right to perform by way of repair, it is not infringement for some one else to do the work for him.4 99 /
.§ 5. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
.
It is a settled principle of the Common Law that one who
wrong£ ully induces another to break a contract with a third
person, or who .induces another to commit a tort against a
third person, is himself guilty ·of a torf and liable to a suit for
damages. We have already seen that a patentee may license
another to inv:ade his monopoly, and utilize his invention, with
a limitation upon the extent or character of the licensee's en498 Morrin v. Robert White Engineering Co-., 143 Fed. 519.
Burguieres
Co. v. Deming Co., 224 Fed. 926. -Many cases ·are cited in the opinion.
See especially, Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. IO<).
49 9 Morrin v. Robt. White Engr. Co., 143 Fed. 519.
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joyment. The limitation may take the form simply of a limit-

ed license, or it may be considered as a contract by the licensee

not to do certain things, or it may have both forms. If the

licensee exceeds the permission in his license and does what

he has agreed not to do, he is not only guilty of infringing the

patentee's monopoly, but he is also guilty of breach of con-

tract. 500

One who induces the commission of such an infringement: or

the breach of such a contract, or aids therein, is himself liable

in damages to the patentee, under the Common Law. 501 This

tortious conduct, whether it be by way of inducement to in-

fringe, or to break a contract limiting the extent of' use, is

comprehensively called "contributory infringement." No dis-

tinction is made, in terms, of the particular alternative forms

which it takes. It is not material, except as to jurisdiction in

certain cases, whether the act of the principal wrong doer be

Joyment. The limitation may take the form simply of a limited license, or it may be considered as a contract by the licensee
hot to do certain things, or it may have . both· .forms. If the
licensee exceeds the permission in . his Ecense q.nd does ·what
he has agreed not to do, he is not only guilty of infringing the
patentee-'s monopoly, but he is also guilty of breach. of contract. 500
One who induces the commission of such an infringement or
the breach of sue a contract, or aids therein, is himself liable
in slam.ages to the Qatentee, under the Common Law. 501 Thi~
tortious conduct, whether it be by way: of inducement to in
fringe, or to break a contract limiting the extent . of· use, is
comprehensively called "contributory infringement." No distinction is made, in terms, of the particular alternative forms
which it takes. It is not material, except as to jurisdiction in
certain cases, whether the act of the principal wrong doer be
looked ·upon as a true infringement or merely a breach of. the
contract.
· One can
contributory infringer unless
the acts which
. wer in lliem elves wrong ul.
There ore exactly the same questions, and all of them, may
arise in suits against contributory infringers as may come up
in any action for infringement or .breach of contract of license. ·
The validity of the patent, the reality of the alleged infringement, the validity of the contract, the fact ·of its l;>reach, and
the legality of the condition in general, are all as pertinent is4

looked upon as a tru infringement or merely a breach of the

contract.

Onej^m^not-ke held liabk-as^contributory i-nf ringer unless
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the acts which he induced were in themselves wrongful.

Therefore exactly the same questions, and all of them, may

arise in suits against contributory infringers as may come up

in any action for infringement or breach of contract of license.

The validity of the patent, the reality of the alleged infringe-

ment, the validity of the contract, the fact of its breach, and

the legality of the condition in general, are all as pertinent is-

500 F or a discussion of this matter see, ante.

501 "An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or

trespass on the case. From the earliest times, all who take part in a

trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and abetting

it have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury in-

flicted." Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 721.

The opinion explains the case of Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perf.

Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.

Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, syl. i. "An actionable wrong is commit-

ted by one who maliciously interferes with a contract between -two parties

and induces one of them to break the contract to the inj-ury of the other,

and in the absence of an adequate remedy at law equitable relief will be

granted." (Dictum.)

For a discussion of this matter see, ante.
"An infringement of a . patent is a tort analogous · to trespass or
trespass on the case. From the earliest times, all who take part in a
trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and .abetting
it have been held to be jointly and severally liable . for . th~ injury inflicted." Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.,, 8o .Fed. 712, 72r.
The opinion explains the case of Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany ·Per£.
Wrapping Paper Co., ·152 U. S. 425. 'nr. Miles Medic'al Co. v. John D.
Park & ·sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, syl. ·1. "An actiOnaole wrong is committed by one who maliciously interferes with a contract between 1two parties
and induces one of them to break the contract to ·the inj.ury of the other,
and in the absence of an adequate 'remedy
at law : equitable relief
will be
.
•
l
granted." (Dictum.)
500

501

s
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sues in suits against a contributory infringer as they are in
suits against a principle wrong doer. The fact that the defendant is merely contributory _to the- wrong does not affect
the issues respecting the wrong itself, and as they have already been discussed they n~ed · not be reconsidered in this
connection. . .
But when suit is against one who is merely a contributory
infringer, there is the. additional issue as to whether he, as a
contributor only, is liable for the wrongful acts whieh the ·
party has committed. This depends upon the established Common La~ doctrines of contributory wrong doing and not on
any rules appertaining particularly to patent law.
NT NECESSARY. The existence of a wrongful intent is
I
necessary to constitute liabilit or contn utor · mgement,
an its immaterialit in cases of principal infringement must
not be confused with this.
po .
ce of confus10n is
<In the fact that circumstances might arise in which one could
be treated as either a principal infringer or a contributory one.
Suppose, for instance, ohe should so work upon the machine
of another, under the pretense of "repairing" it1 that his work
would be held actually a "replacement." If in such case the·
owner of the machine had been unde.r contract with the patentee not even to repair it, he would be guilty of breach of contract and the one who had done the work might be guilty of
contributing to the breach if it were shown that he intentionally induced it. But certainly; if the machine had been properly marked "patented," his making of a new one, although.
done at the request of the licensee would be, in itself, an in-:
fringement of the patent regardless of hi~ intent. The differ-ence 1n intent requisite to liability in the two grounds of action
must ];le kept clear. It is only when the cause of action is not
the in;ringement ot breach itself, but the i'nducing of the in-,fringen:ient or breach, that the intent is material.
The intent need not have been expressed by the defendant, .
for ·the real · mental intent of a man is not demonstrable. It
will be inferred by the court from the circumstances under·
which the acts complained of took place. "One is legally pre--

sues in suits against a contributory infringer as they are in

suits against a principle wrong doer. The fact that the de-

fendant is merely contributory to the wrong does not affect

the issues respecting the wrong itself, and as they have al-

ready been discussed they need -not be reconsidered in this

connection.

But when suit is against one who is merely a contributory

infringer, there is the additional issue as to whether he, as a

contributor only, is liable for the wrongful acts which the

party has committed. This depends upon the established Com-

mon Law doctrines of contributory wrong doing and not on

any rules appertaining particularly to patent law.

INSCENT NECESSARY. The existence of a wrongful intent is

necessary to constitute liability""ior contributory infringement,

arid~ltsimmateriality in cases of principal infringement must

not be confused with this. A possible suJTc^of contusion is

in the fact that circumstances might arise in which one could

be treated as either a principal infringer or a contributory one.

Suppose, for instance, one should so work upon the machine
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of another, under the pretense of "repairing" it, that his work

would be held actually a "replacement." If in such case the

owner of the machine had been under contract with the paten-

tee not even to repair it, he would be guilty of breach of con-

tract and the one who had done the work might be guilty of

contributing to the breach if it were shown that he intention-

ally induced it. But certainly, if the machine had been prop-

erly marked "patented," his making of a new one, although

done at the request of the licensee would be, in itself, an in-

fringement of the patent regardless of his intent. The differ-

ence in intent requisite to liability in the two grounds of action

must be kept clear. It is only when the cause of action is not

the infringement or breach itself, but the inducing of the in-

fringement or breach, that the intent is material.

The intent need not have been expressed by the defendant,

for the real mental intent of a man is not demonstrable. It

will be inferred by the court from the circumstances under

which the acts complained of took place. "One is legally pre-

D· 1tizeo; by

lN ER

~El

AHCf-HVE

I fr r 1
I J VE

-o. ~A

297

· Infringement

Infringement 297

sumed to intend the natural consequences of his act." 5 It is

therefore the acts themselves and not any verbal expression of

intent to which the courts will look. In the case just quoted

from the court formed its opinion, that the defendant intended

to assist in an infringement, from the fact that the articles he

sold could be used only in such a way as would constitute an

infringement and that, as persons do not ordinarily buy arti-

cles except for normal use, he must have known they would

be used in an infringing way and have intended it. 50 '

But the intent necessary to constitute contributory infringe-

ment will not be deduced merely from the fact that the de-

fendant has sold to an infringer articles which can be used for

infringement, when such articles are not in themselves covered

by the patent and have a recognized use quite unconnected with

any infringement. Some further knowledge on the part of

the defendant of the purpose to which they are to be put by

the purchaser must be shown before a wrongful intent will

in such case be inferred. 50 -

502 Thomson-Houston Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, 721.
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503 Ace. Canda v. Mich. Malleable Iron Co., 124 Fed. 486.

504 Rumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chem. Co., 148 Fed. 862; quot-

ing, Edison Elec. Lt. Co. v. Peninsular Lt.' Co., 95 Fed. 673 ; App'd Leeds

& Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 154 Fed. 58; Cortelyou v. John-

son, 207 U. S. 196; Edison Elec. Lt. Co., v. Peninsular Lt. Co., 101 Fed.

831 ; Sheridan-Clayton Paper Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., 232 Fed. 153.

The purchasing of the various elements that go to make up a patented

combination was said as dictum not in itself to be an infringement in

Seim v. Hurd, 232 U. S. 420.

"What contributory infringement is, and why it should be enjoined, was

clearly shown in Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatch. 65, Fed. Cas. No. 17,100,

the earliest case in this country upon the subject, and upon which the

subsequent cases of contributory infringement rest. The complainant's

patent in that case was for an improved lamp, which consisted of an im-

proved burner, or metallic portion, and a glass chimney. The defendant

made and sold the improved burner, which must be used with a chimney,

and, in order to make sales, exhibited the burners with chimneys to cus-

tomers ; and the circuit judge thought that a concert with others to use

the patented article, as a whole, was a certain inference from the ob-

vious facts in the case, and the efforts of the defendant to solicit sales by

showing the operation of the whole patented article. The willingness of

the defendant in this case to aid other persons in any attempts which

sumed to intend the natural consequences of his act.' 502 It is
therefore the acts themselves and not any verbal expression of
intent to which the courts will look. In the case just quoted
from the court formed it~ opinion, that the defendant intended
to assist in an infringement, from the fact that the articles he
sold could be used only in such a way as would constitute an
infringement and that, as persons do not ordinarily buy articles except for normal use, he must have known they would
be used in .an infringing way and have intended it. 503
But the intent necessary to constitute contributory infringement will not be deduced merely from the fact that the defendant has sold to an in £ringer articles which can be used for
infringement, when such articles are not in themselves covered
by the patent and have a recognized use quite unconnected with
any iufringement. Some further knowledge on the part of
the defendant of the purpose to which they are to be put by
the purchaser must be shown before a wrongful intent will
in such case be inf erred. 504
Thomson-Houston Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., Bo Fed. 712, 721.
503 Acc. Canda v. Mich. Malleable Iron Co., 124 Fed. 486.
504 Rumford Chemical Works v. Hygienic Chem. Co., 148 Fed. 862; quoting, Edison Elec. Lt. Co. v. Peninsular Lt: Co., 95 Fed. 673; App'd Leeds
& Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.", 154 Fed. 58; Cortelyou v. Johnson, 207 U. S. 196; Edison Elec. Lt. Co., v. Peninsu]ar Lt. Co., IOI Fed.
831; Sheridan-Clayton Paper Co. v. U. S. Envelope Co., 232 Fed. 153.
The purchasing of the various elements that go to make up a patented
combination was said as dictum not in itself to b~ an infringement in
Seim v. Hurd, 232 U. S. 420.
"What contributory infringement is, and why it should be enjoined, was
clearly shown in Wa:lla-ce v. Holmes, 9 Blatch. 65, Fed. Cas. No. 17,100,the earliest case in this country upon the subject, and upon which the
subsequent cases of contributory infringement rest. The complainant's
patent in that case was for an improved lamp, which consisted of an improved burner, or metallic portitm, and a glass chimney. The defendant
made and sold the improved burner, wbich must be used with a chimney,
and, in order to make sales, exhibited the burners with chimneys to customers; and the circuit judge thought that
concert with others to use
the patented article, as a whole, was a certain inference from the obvious facts in the case, and the efforts of the defendant to solicit sales by
showing the operation of the whole patented article. The willingness of
the defendant in t4is case to aid other persons in any attempts which
502
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It does not appear to be necessary for the alleged contributor

to have actual knowledge that the action or device to which he

is contributing is covered by a patent. The fact that devices

made under the patent are duly marked "patented" probably

serves as constructive notice to a contributory infringer as

completely as to a direct infringer.

MAKING, USING, ETC. NOT NECESSARY. Sincejhe^ause of

action, against a contributory infringer is his wrong in induc-

in^^not^r^Jnfringe_Qr_tal>reak^a_aDntract, it follows that

the contributor need not himself have done anything at all by

way of making, using or vending the device covered by the

patent. One who should induce another to infringe by mere

verbal incitement and moral encouragement would undoubted-

ly be as fully liable to suit as though he had actively assisted

by mechanical means. There is no lack of cases in which the

defendant has been held liable without having himself directly

infringed in any way. An example notable because of the

amount of popular discussion it evoked is the case of Henry

v. Dick Co. 505 The complainant's patent covered a mimeo-
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graphing device. One of the machines had been sold to Skou

with the express limitation that it might be used only with ink

made by the complainant. The ink itself was not patented.

Defendant Henry sold ink to Skou with the undeniable intent

that it should be used on the machine, in breach of the limita-

tion. The defendant had perfect right to make, use and vend

his ink, unrestricted by any patent monopoly on it. Its use by

Skou, however, in contravention of his agreement with the

they may be disposed to make towards infringement is also apparent.

Its trolley stands are designed to be used in the patented System, and to

be the means of enabling the trailing pole to perform its distinctive and

novel part in the combination. It sufficiently appears from the defendant's

advertisements and affidavits that it was ready to sell to any and all pur-

chasers, irrespective of their character as infringers. A proposed con-

cert of action with infringers, if they presented themselves, is fairly to

be inferred from the obvious facts of the case; and an injunction order is

the proper remedy against wrongful acts which are proposed, or are justly

to be anticipated." Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry.

Spec. Co., 75 Fed. 1005, 1007.

505 224 U. S. i.

It does not appear to be neces ary for the alleged contributor
to have actual knowledge that the action or device to which he
is contributing is covered by a patenf. The fact that devices
made under the patent are duly marked "patented" probably
serves as constructive notice to a contributory infringer as
completely as to a direct infringer.
MAKING, USING, ETC. NOT NECESSARY.
Since the a.use of
ac
against a c ntributory infrino-er is hiS wrong in inducin another to infringi Qr to.. reak a contract, it follows · that
the contributor need not himself have done anything at all by
way of making, using or vending the device covered by the
patent. One who should induce another to infringe by mere
verbal incitement and moral encouragement would undoubtedly be as fully liable to suit as though he had actively assisted
by mechanical means. · There is no lack of cases in which the
defendant has been held liable without having himself directly
infringed in any way. An example-notable because of the
amount of popular discussion it evoked-is the case of Henry
v. Dick Co. 505 The complainant's patent covered a mimeographing device. One of the machines had been sold to Skou
with the express limitation that it might be used only with ink
made by the complainant. The ink itself was not patented.
Defendant Henry sold ink to Skou with the undeniable intent
that it should be used on the machine, in breach of the limitation . . T~e defendant had perfect right to make, use and vend
his ink, unrestricted by any patent monopoly on it. Its use by
Skou, however, in contravention of his agreement with the
they may be disposed to make towards infringement is also apparent.
Its trolley stands are designed to be used in the patented ~ystem, and to
be the means of ·enabling the trailing pole to perform its distinctive and
novel part in the combination. It sufficiently appears from the defendant's
· advertisements and affidavits that it was ready to sell to any and all purcha ers, irrespective of their char~cter as infringers. A propo ed concert of action with infringers, if they pre ented themselves, is fairly to
be inferred from the obvious facts of the case; and an injunction order ·is
the proper remedy against wrongful acts which are proposed, or are justly
to be anticipated." Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry.
Spec. Co., 75 Fed. 1005, 1007.
505 224
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Dick Co., was held by the court to be an infringement of that

company's patent; and the defendant was held liable as a con-

tributor to such infringement on the ground that he had in-

induced it. 506

A somewhat different type of contributory infringement

was the cause of action in Trent v. Risdon Iron & Locomotive

Works. 507 An ore crushing mill had been erected which was

held to be an infringement of complainant's patent. The de-

fendant denied any liability for this infringement on the

ground that he was neither owner nor instigator of it, that his

sole connection with it was as architect and building con-

tractor for hire. It developed on trial, however, that he had

himself furnished the plans and specifications for the crusher.

He was held liable as a contributing inf ringer. Many other

cases may be found in which a defendant has been held guilty

of contributory infringement although he did not himself

actually make, use or vend the patented invention.

In summary of the whole matter of a patentee's rights' un-

der his patent, it may be said that the courts have protected
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him, not narrowly nor half-heartedly, but to the fullest extent

possible under the statute.

6. PRACTICAL VALUE OF VOID PATENTS

Even when an idea is of such character that the courts would

in all probability refuse to hold it an invention, there is, never-

506 The furnishing by defendant of unpatented fasteners for use on a

patented button fastening machine, whose use had been permitted by pat-

entee on condition that it be operated only with fasteners purchased from

him, was held to be contributory infringement, in Heaton-Peninsular

Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 35 L. R. A.

728. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed. 712, furnish-

ing one part of a combination held contributory infringement. "They

have infringed the process of Johnson because they supplied the apparar

Dick Co., was held by the court to be an infringement of that
-company's patent~ and the defendant was held liable as a c.ontributor to such infringement on the gro·u nd that he had · ininduced it. 506 ·
A somewhat different type of contributory infringement
was the cause of action in Trent v. Risdon Iron & Locomotive
Works~ 507 An ore crushing mill hac;l been erected which ·was
held to be an infringement of complainant's patent. The defendant denied any liability for this infringement on the
ground that he was neither owner nor ·i1tstigator of it; that his
sole connection with it was as architett and building contractor for hire. It developed on trial, however, that he had
himself furnished the plans and specifications for the crusher.
He was held liable as a contributing infringer. Many other
cases may be found in which a defendant has been held . gililty
of contributory infringement although he did not himself
actually make, use or vend the patented invention.
I.n summary of the whole matter of a patentee's rights· under his patent, it may be said that the courts have protected
him, nof narrowly nor half-heartedly, but to the fullest exte~t
possible under the statute. .

tus adopted to employ Johnson's process with the ii.-.tent that the plant

should be or would be operated as that put in for the Genessee Fibre Co.

It was therefore guilty of contributing to the infringement of the first

§ 6.

PRACTICAL VALUE OF VOID

p ATENTS

claim of the Johnson patent," Johnson v. Foos Mfg. Co., 141 Fed. 73, 88;

Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 154 Fed. 58.

507 102 Fed. 635.

Even when an idea is of such character-that the courts would
in all probability refuse to hold it an invention, there is, never506 The furnishing by defendant of unpatented fasteners for use on a
patented button fastening machine, whose use had been permitted by pat:entee on condition that it be operated only with fasteners purchased frqm
him, was held to be contributory infri~ge~ent, in Heaton-Peninsular
Button-Fastene~ Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 35 L. R. A.
728. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 8o Fed. 712, furnishing one part of a combination held contributory infringement. "They
have infringed the proct;ss of Johnson because they supplied. the appara~
tus adopted to employ Johnson's process with the ii.·.tent that the plant
should be or would be op,erated as that ·p ut in for the Genessee Fibre Co.
It was therefore guilty of contributing t<? the infringement of the first
claim of the Johnson patent," Johnson v. Foos Mfg. Co., 141 Fed. 73, 88.;
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talkipg Machine Co., 154 Fed. 58.
501 102 Fed. 635.
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theless, an undoubtedly very practical advantage in having it

patented. As has been said, the Patent Office is not in posi-

tion to examine the prior art except to the extent that it is

covered by patents, and even to that extent the policy seems

to have been to allow new patents wherever superficial differ-

ence appears. The Patent Office does not assume the difficult

task of determining when apparent change is merely mechan-

ical. A patent, therefore, of absolutely no legal value what-

ever, is not particularly difficult to secure, and gives the right

to mark articles "patented." The ethics of doing this, unless

the patentee really believes his idea of means to be an inven-

tion, the author does not discuss, but it is seldom that the

most conscientious of would be inventors fails so to believe.

The advantage of the "patented" mark is obvious when one

contemplates the number of manufacturers who are paying

small royalties "rather than stand the trouble and cost of even

a successfully defended suit," and of others who refrain from

manufacturing certain small articles, for the same reason. 508

508 The enormous total of royalties paid by the American League of
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Automobile Manufacturers to the owners of the "Seldon Patent," before

it was declared ineffective in Col. Motor Car Co. v. Duerr, 184 Fed. 893, is

an example. It is common rumor that the owners of the transmission

patents on which the present association of automobile manufacturers is

.founded fear to sue the Ford Co. for infringement lest the patent be

avoided. Yet the others are paying royalties rather than assume the ex-

pense of a fight.

Because our system of legal remedies does not provide for a "declaratory

theless, an undoubtedly very practical advantage in having_it
patented. As has been said, the Patent Office is not in position to examine .the prior art except ~o the extent that it is
covered by patents, and even to that extent the policy seems
to have been to allow new patents wherever superficial difference appears. The Patent Office does not assume the difficult
task of determining when apparent change is merely mechanical. A patent, therefore, of absolutely no legal value whatever, is not particularly difficult to secure, and gives the right
to mark articles "patented." The ethics of doing this, unles
.the patentee really believes his idea of means to be an invention, the author does not discuss but it is seldom that the
most conscientious of would be inventors fails so to believe.
The advantage of the "patented" mark is obvious when one
contemplates the number · of manufacturers who are paying
$mall royalties "rather than stand the trouble and cost of even
a successfully defended suit," and of others who refrai~ from
manufacturing certain small articles, for the same reason. 508

judgment" the owner of patent has not only protection, if his patent be

valid, but he has also an obnoxious means of annoying legitimate business

even if his patent be probably void. The only way other persons, who

desire to use his alleged invention, can find out whether his patent is

valid or not. is to expend enough money in infringing to force him to

bring suit. If his suit is sustained the infringer's loss in invested capital,

to say nothing of damages awarded the patentee, may be tremendous.

Thus the financial risk involved in ascertaining whether a dubious patent

is really good, may make practically effective many an unjust monopoly.

For a discussion of the desirability of some method of securing a decla-

ratory judgment^ see the article by E. R. Sunderland, in 16 Michigan Law

Rev. 69.

. 5o.8 The enormous total of royalties paid by the American League of

Automobile Manufacturers to the owners of the "Seldon _Patent,'; hefo.re
it was declared ineffective in Col. Motor Car Co. v. Duerr, 184 Fed. 893, i
an example. It is common rumor that the owners of the transmission
patents on which the present association of automobile manufacturers is
Jounded fear to sue the Ford Co. for infringement lest the patent be
avoided. Yet the others are paying royalties rather than assume the expense of a fight.
Because our system of legal remedies ~ioes not provide for a "declaratory
judgment" the owner of patent .has not only protection. if h!s patent be
·val~d, but he has also an obnoxious means of annoyin~ legitimate business
even if his patent be probably void. The only way other persons," who
·desire to ~se his alleged invention, can find out whether his patent i
v·a lid or not. is to expend enough money in infringing to force him to
bring suit. If his suit is sustained the infringer's loss in invested capital,
to say nothina of darr.ages awarded the patentee, may be tremendous.
Thus the financial risk involved in ascertaining wh.et:her a dubiou patent
is really good, may make practically effective many an unjust monopoly.
For ·a discus.s ion of . the desirability of some method Gf securing a declabtory judgment: see the article by E. R. Sunderland, in I6 Michigan Law
Rev. 69.

CHAPTER X

DESIGNS
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The statute provides, 50 * "Any person wh$ IfraS invented any

new, original, and ornamental design fo^an article of manu-

facture, not known or used by others in this country before

his invention thereof, and not patented or described in any

CHAPTER X

printed publication in this or any foreign country before his

invention thereof, or more than two years prior to his appli-

cation, and not in public use or on sale in this country for

DESIGNS

more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is

-

proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the

fees required by law and other due proceedings had, the same

as in cases of invention or discoveries covered by 'section forty-

eight hundred and eighty-six, obtain a patent therefor.^ The.

Commissioner may dispense with models^of designs- when the

design can be sufficiently represented by drawings or photo-'

graphsr~Patenls for de^igns.jiia^be_^ranted : for the term of

three years and six months, or for seven years, or for four-

teenjrears, as the applicantTmay, in his application, elect. All
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The regulations and provisions which apply to obtaining or

protecting patents for inventions or discoveries not inconsistent

with the provisions of this title shall apply to patents for de-

signs." "Hereafter, during the term of letters patents for

a design, it shall be unlawful for any person other than the

owner of said letters patent, without the license of such owner,

to apply the design secured by such letters patent, or any color-

able imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the

purpose of sale, or to sell or expose for sale any article of

manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation shall,

without the license of the owner, have been applied, knowing'

that the same has been so applied. Any person violating the

provisions, or either of them, of this section, shall be liable in

509 R. S. 4829-31-33, and "Act of Feb. 4, 1887."

J
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The statute provides, 509 "Any person w
~ Invented ~my
new, original, and ornamental design
an a icle of manufacture, not known or used by others in his country before
his invention thereof, and not patented or described in any
printed publication in this or any foreign country before his
invention thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country for.
more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is
proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the
fees required by law and other due proceedings had, the same
as in cases of invention or discoveries covered by ·section fortyeight hundred and eighty-six, obtain a patent therefor .. - -!1::-H.....
Commissioner may dispense with models of de~s~iii!J..L,~4"""'11......................
design can be sufficient re_pr ented
r .vhoto-'. ·
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· a be ranted for the term of
three years and six months, or for seven year~or . or four- ·
teen _ears, as the applicant may, in his application, elect. All
the regulations and provisions which apply to obt<l:ining or
protecting patents for inventions or d~scoveries not inconsistent
with the provisions of this title shall apply to patents for designs." "Hereafter, during the term of letters patents for
a design, it shall be unlawful for any person other than the
owner of said letters patent without the license of such owriet;
to apply the design secured by such letters patent, or any colotable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the
purpose of sale, or to sell or expose for sale any article · of
manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation sha:ll,:
without the license of the owner, have been applied, knowing
that the same has been so applied. Any person violating th~·
provisions, or either of them, of this section, shall be liable in
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the amount of two hundred and fifty dollars; and in case the

the _a mount of two hundred and fifty dollars; and in case the
total profit made by him from the manufacture or sale, as
aforesaid, of the article or articles to which the design, or
colorable imitation ther~<?f, ·4a~ b~en applied, exceeds the sum
: of two hundred and fifty dollars, he shall be further liable for
the excess of such profit over and' above the sum of two hundred . and. fifty dollars; and, the full amount of such liability
~ay .be recovered by the owner: .of the letters patent, to his .o wn
t;tse, .i~ any c~rcuit court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, either by action at law .or upon a bill in
equity for an_injunction to restrain such infringement."
As the section providing for a patent is in the same phraseology precisely as the section 510 providing for patents for the
invention ·o f an art, machine, etc., it is evident that the .same
iriqui~ie~ and issues m~st ~rise in regard to design patents as
~ome befor:e the courts in other patent cases. I~. follows equally that tpe deci~ion~ should be arrived at upon th~ same principles and by the infi uence <? f the .same factors. .

total profit made by him from the manufacture or sale, as

aforesaid, of the article or articles to which the design, or

colorable imitation thereof, has been applied, exceeds the sum

of two hundred and fifty dollars, he shall be further liable for

the excess of such profit over and above the sum of two hun-

dred and fifty dollars ; and the full amount of such liability

may be recovered by the owner of the letters patent, to his own

use, in any circuit court of the United States having jurisdic-

tion of the parties, either by action at law or upon a bill in

equity for an injunction to restrain such infringement."

As the section providing for a patent is in the same phrase-

ology precisely as the section 510 providing for patents for the

invention of an art, machine, etc., it is evident that the same

inquiries and issues must arise in regard to design patents as

come before the courts in other patent cases. It follows equal-

ly that the decisions should be arrived at upon the same prin-

ciples and by the influence of the same factors.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIGNS AND MANUFACTURES. The
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greatest difficulty in discussion involving designs, so far as the

law and not mere fact is concerned, is to distinguish between

a design and a manufacture or composition of matter. A de-

sign is broadly definable in its patent law use, as well as in com-

mon parlance, as the delineation or configuration of matter.

It depends for its effect, for its distinction from anything else,

upon arrangement of matter. Every design is necessarily con-

stituted by the contour of substance or the relation of various

substances, the relation of ink and paper .for instance. A

design, to be patentable. is undeniably artificial. In a certain

The
greatest dimculty in discussion involving designs, so far as the
law and not trl.ere fact is ·concerned, is to distinguish between
a design and a manufacture or composition of matter. A de.,.
sign is broadly definable in its patent law use, as well as in common par.lance, . as ,t he delineation or configuration of ~atter.
It depends for its effect, for its distinction from anything else,
upon arrangement of matter. Every design is necessarily constituted by·the contour of substance or the relation of various
substances~ · the relation ·of ink and paper J6r instance.
A
design, to be patentable, is undeniably artificial. In a certainsense, and wholly proper use of the terms, a design is therefore both a manufacture and a composition of matter. .In
common parlance, the name of design is probably restricted to
the idea of outline as projected upon a plane surface; the silhouette contoµr or arrangement, of matter. Even the "design of
a church" ·and .similar phrases convey the meaning not of three
dimentional substance, but of planes, of fiat outlines, which
· DI'STINCTION BETWEEN DESIGNS AND MANUFACTURES.

sense, and wholly proper use of the terms, a design is there-

fore both a manufacture and a composition of matter. In

common parlance, the name of design is probably restricted to

the idea of outline as projected upon a plane surface ; the silhou-

ette contour or arrangement, of matter. Even the "design of

a church" and similar phrases convey the meaning not of three

dimentional substance, but of planes, of flat outlines, which
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may however be so arranged dihedrally that the whole forms

a three dimentional body. It is difficult for the average mind

to think of ''design" in any other way. The patent law, how-

ever, extends the scope of the section allowing design patents

to solid as well as to plane contour. 511

One of the comparatively few elements by which one manu-

facture can be distinguished from another is its physical out-

line, its contour. One collar button, for instance, may be of

the same material as another and its static purpose the com-

mon one of holding a collar to the collar band, but its essen-

tial idea of means for accomplishing that purpose may be so

different from that of known collar buttons as to amount in

itself to an invention. Yet its only perceptible difference from

other collar buttons may be its physical contour. More funda-

mentally, its essential difference is in its idea of means and

in the method of manufacturing which gave its peculiar shape.

Both of these elements are considered in determining identity,

but. the only direct impression of difference comes from its

sensible contour. As the effectuation of its peculiar purpose
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is also the result of its peculiar configuration, it might be said

that the configuration of the collar button was the invention,

the essential idea of means. Is this invention then, this con-

figuration, which constitutes an idea of means and which, in

its tangible embodiment, is a new manufacture, to be patented

as a "design," or as a "manufacture" embodying a new idea

of. means. If it be assumed that the design is "ornamental,"

511 Prior to 1902 the statute itself read, "Any person who has invented

any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture,

not known or used by others in this country before his invention thereof,

and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any

foreign country before his invention thereof, or more than two years

prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country

for more than two years prior to his application, unless the same is proved

to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required by law

and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases of invention or dis-

coveries covered by section forty-eight hundred and eighty-six, obtain a

patent therefor." The earlier statutes expressly included with designs,

"any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufac-

ture." The present statute speaks of "models of designs."

may however be so arrangeq dihedrally that the ·whole forms
a three dimentional body. It is difficult for the average mind
to think of "design" in any other way. The patent law, however, extends the scope of the section allowing design patents
to solid as weli as to plane contour. 511
One of the comparatively few elements by which one manufacture can be distinguished from another is its physical outline, its contour. One collar button, for instance, may be of
the same material as another and its static purpo.se the common one .of holding a collar to the collar band, but its essential idea of means for accomplishing that purpose may be so
different from that of known collar buttons as to amount in
itself to an invention. Yet its only perceptible difference from
other collar buttons may be its physical contour. More fundamentally, its essential difference is in its idea of means and
in the method of manufacturing which gave its peculiar shape.
Both of these elements are considered in determining identity,
but. the only direct impression of difference comes from its
sensible contour. As the effectuation of its peculiar purpose
is also the result of its peculiar configuration, it might be said
that the configuration of the collar button was the invention,
the essential idea of means. Is this invention then, this configuration, which constitutes an idea of means and which, in
its tangible embodiment, is a new manufacture, to be patented
as a "design," or as a "manufacture" embodying a new idea
of , means. If it be assumed that the ·design is "ornamental,"
511 Prior to 1902 the statute itself read, "Any person who has invented
any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture,
not known or used by others in this country before his invention thereof,
and not patented or described in any printed publication in this or any
foreign country before his invention thereof, or more than two years
prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this country
for more than two years prior to his application, unle~s the same is proved
to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees required by law
and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases of invention or discoveries covered by section forty-eight hundred and eighty-six, obtain a
patent therefor." The earlier statutes expressly included with designs,
"any new and original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture." The present statute speaks of "models of designs."
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as required by the statute, it might be patented under either

section, in the choice of the patentee. 512

This duplex character of the invention, as a design and a

manufacture, at once gives rise to the possibility of such ques-

tions as the following; Automobile "all-year round" tops have

been known and used for some years; if one should by mere

mechanical skill evolve certain advantages of shape, the im-

proved top would not be patentable as a manufacture because

lacking in invention. This new shape would, however, be in

ordinary sense a design. Could the mechanic secure a design

patent, and thereby preclude others from making or using tops

of that design? If he could, his monopoly would be as effec-

tive as though he had secured the patent for a manufacture

from which lack of invention precluded him. Again, if one

has a design patent for a peculiar shape and contour of a knob

or stud for hanging pictures on walls, can he preclude others

from making, using and selling collar-buttons which happen

to be of that exact contour? An affirmative decision on either

question would be wholly incongruous with the spirit of the
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patent law.

The answer to the first type of issue depends upon whether

a design patent ought to be granted under such circumstances.

If granted, it would seem to preclude the use suggested. In

the second type of case the answer depends on the scope of

protection that a design patent gives.

The first inquiry, then^ is for what designs a design patent

may be issued. It is impossible to make any exact distinction

between those manufactures and compositions of matter which

may be patented as designs only under 4929 and those w r hich

may be patented as nominally manufactures or compositions

of matter under 4886. Broadly it may be said that those

512 Clark v. Bousefield, 10 Wall, (77 U. S.) 133; Williams Calk Co. v.

Nevefslip Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 210; Bradley v. Eccles, 126 Fed. 945; It

should be noted, however, that "ornamental" is synonymous, with "visi-

ble" and nothing, practically speaking, has been refused patentability under

4929, except when, as in the last case cited, where the design was for a

packing for a joint, it is by the nature of its purpose invisible. Dominick

& Haff v. Wallace & Sons Co., 209 Fed. 223.

as requfred by the statute, it might be patented under either
section in the choice of the patentee. 512
This duplex character of the invention, as a design and a
manufacture, at once gives rise to the possibility of such questions as tlie following; Automobile "all-year round" tops have
. been known and used for some years; if one should by mere
mechanical skill evolve certain advantages of shape, the improved top would no be patentable as a manufacture because
lacking in invention. This new shape would, however, be in
ordinary sense a design. Could the mechanic secure a design
-patent, and t4ereby preclude others from making or using tops
of that design? If he could, his monopoly would be as effective as though he had secured the patent for a manufacture
from which lack of invention precluded him. Again, if one
has a design patent for a peculiar shape and contour of a knob
or stud for hanging pictures on walls, can he preclude others
from making, using and selling collar-buttons which happen
.to be of that exact contour? An affirmative decision on either
question would be wholly incongruous with the spirit of the
patent law.
The answer to the first type of issue depends upon whether
a design patent ought to be granted under such circumstances.
If granted, it would seem to preclude the use suggested. In
the second type of case the answer depends on the scope of
protection that a design patent gives.
The first inquiry, then: is for what design5 a design patent
may be issued. It is impossible to make any exact distinction
between those manufactures and compositions of matter whichmay be patented as designs only under § 4929 and those which
may be patented as nominally manufactures or compositions
of matter under § 4886. Broadly it may be said that those

-------

512 Clark v. Bousefield, IO Wall, (77 U. S.) 133; Wi1liams Calk Co. _v.
Never lip Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 210; Bradley v. Eccles, 126 Fed. 945; It
should be noted, however, that "ornamental' is synonymous, with "visible" and nothing, practically speaking, has been refused patentability under
§ 4929, except when, as in the last case cited, where the de ign was for a
packing for a joint, it is by the nature of its purpose invisible. Dominick
& Haff v. Wallace & Sons Co., 209 Fed. 223.
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whose jsole_ p^rpose_js_JH*kase-^

desigrt THs lack of purpose other than pleasure to the eye,

is often loosely and confusingly spoken of as 'lack of util-

ity." 513

As it is impossible to dissociate visual impression from the

composition and configuration of matter out of which it arises,

it is impossible to separate a design from the matter which

gives it concrete existence. It is therefore the peculiar compo-

sition or configuration of matter that is really patented,

whether the thing covered by the patent be looked upon as a

concrete idea of means or the physical embodiment of a con-

crete idea. 514 So, even those creations which, because of their

purpose may be patented as designs, are of the same character

as those whose less esthetic purpose requires them to be pat-

ented under section 4886. It is impossible in the case of a

manufacture or composition of matter to say that it must be

patented under either section.

513 The lack of distinction to be drawn from the use of "ornamental"

is referred to above. The interrelation of patentability is also shown by
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the fact that a design patent will serve to anticipate a mechanical patent

Williams Calk Co. v. Neverslip Mfg. Co., 136 Fed. 210 and a mechani-

cal patent will serve to anticipate a design patent Roberts v. Bennett,

136 Fed. 193.

514 N. Y. Belting Co. v. N. J. Rubber Co., 137 U. 8/445, "There is one

feature of this patent which presents an interesting if not a novel aspect.

We are in the habit of regarding a design as a thing of distinct and

urpose
· eye must be-pat-e·1tt1~;H:i---desi
1s lack of purpose other than pleasure to the eye,
is often loosely and 'c onfusingly -spoken of as "lack of util...
ity. '513
'
s it is impossible to dissociate visual impression from the
composition and configuration of matter.out of which it arises,
it is impossible to separate a design · from the matter which
gives it concrete existence. It is the ref ore the peculiar composition or configuration of matter - that is really ·patentea,
whether the thing covered by -the patent be looked upon as a
concrete idea of means or the physical embodiment of ·a concrete idea. 514 So, even those creations which, because of their
purpose may be patented as designs, are of the same character
as those whose less esthetic purpose requires them to be patented under section 4886. It is impossible in the· case of -a.
manufacture or composition of matter to say that it must be
patented under either -section.

w,

fixed -individuality of appearance a representation, a picture, a delinea-

tion, a device. A design of such a character, of course, addresses itself

to the senses and the taste, and produces pleasure or admiration in its

contemplation. But, in the patent before us, the alleged invention is

claimed to be something more than such a design. It is claimed to have

an active power of producing a physical effect upon the rays of light, so

as to produce different shades and colors according to the direction in

which the various corrugated lines are viewed a sort of kaleidoscope

effect. It is possible that such a peculiar effect, produced by such a par-

ticular design, impressed upon the substance of india-rubber, may consti-

tute a quality of excellence which will give to the design a specific char-

acter and value and distinguish it from other similar -designs that have not

such an effect. As this is a question which it is not necessary now to de-

cide, we express no opinion upon it." Pelouze Scale & Mfg. Co. v. Am.

Cutlery Co., 102 Fed. 916; Hammond v. Stockton, etc. Works, 70 Fed. 716.

513 The lack of distinction to be drawn from the use of ''ornamental"
is referred to above. The interrelation of patentability is also shown by
the fact that a design patent will serye to.. anticipate a mechanical paten.t
-Williams Calk Co. v. Neverslip Mfg. Co .. 136 Fed. 210-and a mechani ..
cal patent will serve to anticipate a design patent-Roberts v. Bennett,
136 Fed. 193· .
.
514 N. Y. Belting Co. v. N. ]. Rubber Co., 137 U. S. 445, "There is one
feature of this patent which presents an interesting if not a novel aspect.
We are in the habit of regarding a design as a thing of distinct and
fixed .. individuality- of appearance-a representation, a picture, a delineat~on, a device. A design of such a character, of course, addresses itself
to the senses and the taste, and produces pleasure or admiration in its
contemplation. But, in the patent before us, the alleged invention is
claimed to be something more than such a design. It is claimed to have
an active power of producing a physical effect" upon the rays of light, so
as to produce different shades and colors according to the direction in
which the various corrugated· lines are viewed-a sort of kaleidoscope
effect. It is possible that such a peculiar effect, produced by such a particular design, impressed upon the substance of india-rubber, may constitute a quality of excellence which will give to the design a specific character and value and distinguish it from other similar .designs that have not
such an effect. As this is a question which it is not ntcessary now to decide, we express no opinion upon it." Pelouze Scale & Mfg. Co. v. Am .
. Cut~e_ry Co., 102 Fed. 916; Hammond _v. Stockton, ~tc. Works, 70 Fed. 716.
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This identity of character is hardly demonstrable by refer-

ence to cases, but it is clearly the implication throughout them.

Assuming it to be the fact, it follows that the same principles

and influencing factions ought to be followed in decisions upon

design patents as upon others. The cases state that the same

ones are followed. 'The law applicable to design patents does

not materially differ from that in cases of mechanical patents,

and all the regulations and provisions which apply to the ob-

taining or protection of patents for inventions or discoveries

shall apply to patents for designs." 515

INVENTIVE QUALITY REQUIRED. It follows, therefore, that,

like all other patentable creations, a design" to be patentable

mjj&t-be-^fcrre piodutt uf mventiyje..getHs-.- M^re^-skt&fiiLadap-

tati5nTreadjustmeiitrg r '^ designs is not

ofTrEse'Ti' sumcienFTowarrant a patent, there must be present

in the_jie3\ij)roduction the same psychological factor of in-

vention that isrequisue for other patents. 516 It sequentially

follows that the same factors are active in determining the

psychological fact, that is to say, in inducing the opinion as
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to the presence or absence of invention. 517

515 Mr. Ch. Justice Fuller in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S.

674, 679, quoting from Northrup v. Adams, 12 O. G. 430, 2 Bann & Ard.

567.

516 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S. 674 ; Foster v. Crossin, 44

Fed. 62; Ripley v. Elsom Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927; N. Y. Belting, etc. Co.

v. N. J. Car Spring Co., 53 Fed. 810; Soehner v. Favorite Stove Qo., 84

Fed. 182; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Triumph Electric Co., 97

Fed. 99, "utility" not necessary; Cary Mfg. Co. v. Neal, 98 Fed. 617; Am.

Elec. Novelty Co., v. Newgold, 113 Fed. 877; Mygatt v. Schaufrer-Flaum

Co., 91 Fed. 836; Chas. Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 Fed. 139;

· This identity of character is hardly demonstrable by reference to cases, but it is clearly the implication throughout them.
Assuming it to be the fact, it follows that the sam~ principles
and influencing factions ought to be followed in decisions upon
design patents as upon others. The cases state that the same
~nes are followed. "The law applicable to design patents does
not materially differ from that in cases of mechanical patents~
and all the regulations and provisions which apply to the obtaining or protection of patents for inventions or discove~ies
shall apply to patents for designs. " 515
INVENTIVE QUALITY ·REQUIRED. It follows, therefore, that,
like all other patentable creations, a es1gn o e pa en able
must be t:he ptoduct of ifW~itt .
·
adapo ment of known des~ns is not
tati,on, rea . JUstmen ,
of 1 se su c1ent to warrant a patent, there must be present
in e new roduction the same psychological factor of inventidn that is reqm · e or ot er patents. 516 It sequentially
follows that the same factors are active in determining the
psychological fa~t, that is to say, in inducing ·the op1mon as
to the presence or absence of invention. 517

Bergner v. Kaufman, 52 Fed. 818, aggregation held not to be invention ;

Post v. Richards Hardware Co., 26 Fed. 618, mere substitution of ma-

terials held not invention ; Dominick & Haff v. Wallace & Sons Co.,

209 Fed. 223.

517 In Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., supra, it was expressly declared that

"where a new or original shape or configuration of an article of manu-

facture is claimed, its utility may be also an element for consideration."

The statute under which this case was determined provided for the pat-

enting not only of "new and original designs" but also of "New, useful

and original shapes." Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S. 94, holding also

that the design patent is, like other patents, "prima facie evidence of both

Mr. Ch. Justice Fulle~ in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S.
674,· 679, quoting from Northrup v. Adams, 12 0. G. 430, 2 Bann & Ard.
567.
516 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S. 674; Foster v. Crossin, 44
Fed. 62; Ripley v. Elsom Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927; N. Y. Belting, etc. Co.
v. N. J. Car Spring Co., 53 Fed. 810; .Soehner v. Favorite Stove· Co., 84
Fed. 182; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Triumph Electric Co., 97
Fed. 99, "utility" not necessary; Cary Mfg. Co .. v. Neal, 98 Fed. 617; Am.
Elec. Novelty Co., v. N ewgold, n3 Fed. 877; Mygatt v. Schauffer-Flaum
_ Co~, 91 Fed. 836; Cha·s. Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., 199 Fed. 139;
Bergner v. Kaufman, 52 Fed. 818, aggregation held not to be invention;
Post v. Richards Hardware Co., 26 Fed. 618, mere substitution of materials held not invention; Dominick & Haff v. Wallace & .Sons Co.,
209 Fed. 223.
517 In Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., supra, it was expressly declared that
·" where a new or original shape or configuration of an article of manufacture is claimed, its util~ty may be also an element for consideration."
The statute under w'hich this case was determined provided for the patenting not only of "new and original designs" but ajso of "New, useful
and original shapes." Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S. 94, holding also
that the design patent is, like other patents, "Prima facie evidence of both
515
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To revert to the possible questions suggested, it would ap-

pear that whether the design for an automobile top could be

patented or not would depend on whether it was the product

of inventive genius or merely the result of mechanical skill.

The issue would be precisely the same as if the patent had

been sought under 4886 instead of the section allowing pat-

ents for designs. If it did not involve invention to produce

the new shape it could not be patented. If it had been pat-

ented, its use by another for purposes other than pleasure to

the eye would be merely the usual question of infringement.

Such would be the issue, also, in the suggested case of a collar-

button made in the configuration of a picture-knob whose de-

sign had been patented. The patentee of the design would be

entitled to all analogous uses for which matter revealing his

design might be used, just as a patentee under 4886 is en-

titled to all analogous uses to which the matter embodying his

idea of means may be put. But in any case, one is not pre-

cluded, by another's patent for one idea of means, from using

the precise substantial embodiment of that idea for an un-
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^.nalogous purpose. It is the concept, as we have said before,

that is patented, not the particular form of matter. So the

fact that matter of a certain design is used for a purpose not

ascriptable to the design itself might take the use out from

the preclusion of the design patent. The actual decision in

any particular case depends upon the opinion of the particular

court, but the law itself is definite enough, if the distinction

between the concept and the matter upon which it is impressed

be kept in mind. The question of whether a design patent has

been infringed is also the same as the question of infringe-

ment in other cases.

OBJECTIVE DESIGNS. As a design patent covers, theoretic-

ally, an idea of means for pleasing the eye, and those out of

novelty and utility.'' In accord on point that patent is prima facie evi-

dence of novelty is Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927. Scofield v.

Browne, 158 Fed. 305, reception of the improvement by the public may

aid in determining its inventive quality; Chas. Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros.

Co., 199 Fed. 139, public reception may be considered in determining pres-

ence of invention.

To revert to the possible questions suggested, it would. appear that whether the design for an automobile top could be
patented or not wou1~ depend on wh.e ther it was the pr~duct
of. inventive genius or merely the result of mechanical .skill.
The issue would be precisely the same as if the_patent had
been sought under § 488t? instead of the section allowing patents for designs. If it did not involve invention to produce
the new shape it could not be patented. If it had been pat. ented, its use by another for purposes other than pleasure to
the eye would be m.ereJy the usual question of in~ringement.
Such would be the issue, also, in the suggested case of a collarbutton made in the configuration of a picture-knob whose de- ·
sign had been patented. The patentee of the design would be
entitled to all analogous uses for which ,matter revealing his
design might be used, just as a patentee under § 4886 is entitled to all analogous uses to which the matter embodying his
idea of means may be put. J?ut in any case, one is not precluded, by another's patent for one idea of means, from using
the precise substantial embodiment of that idea for an un-analogous purpose. It is the concept, as we have said before,
that is patented, not the particular form of matter. So the
fact that matter of a certain design is used for a purpose not
ascriptable to the design itself might take the use out from
the preclusion of the design patent. The actual decision in
any particular case depends upon the opinion of the particular
court, but the law itself is definite enough, if the distinction
between the concept and the matter upon which it is impressed
be kept in mind. The question of whether a design patent has
been infringed ·is also the same as the question of infringement in other cases.
OBJECTIVE DESIGNS.
As a design patent covers. theoretically, an idea of means for pleasing the eye; and those out of
novelty and utility.'' In accord on point that patent is prima facie evidence of novelty is Ripley ·v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927. Scofield v.
Browne, 158 Fed. 305, reception of the improvement by the public may
aid in determining its inventive quality; Chas. Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros.
Co., lW Fed. 139, public reception may be considered in determining presence of invention.
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which litigation most frequently arises are actually of this

sort, all factors determinative of the presence of invention or

the fact of infringement are usually omitted from considera-

tion except that of the effect on the eye. Other factors may

be considered, but the cases in which they do not appear and

could not have a part are so frequent that they are usually

ignored in judicial expression. In very many cases, there-

fore, the inventive quality of a design seems to have depended,

and probably did depend, solely upon its visible similarity to

those already known, or its difference from them. So also

the infringement of a later design seems to have been decided

wholly by the distinction between them which could be per-

ceived through the eyes.

In regard to this identity of visible characteristics the rule

is probably that laid down in Gorham Co. v. White; 518 "the

thing invented or produced, for which a (design) patent is

given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance

to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or

to which it gives form. ... It is the appearance itself, there-
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fore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes main-

ly, if not entirely, the contribution to the public which the

law deems worthy of recompense." 519 It must be remembered

that the court is here expressing itself in regard to a design

whose sole purpose was its effect upon the eye. It was defi-

nitely stated by the later case of Smith v. Whitman Saddle

Co., 520 in direct reference to the statement of rule just quoted,

that appearance is not the only criterion, but that such ele-

ments as the more material usefulness of a design, or its effect

upon other senses, than sight, may be considered if they enter

into its character. But to the extent that visible character is

the test of invention or infringement, the court held that it is

the appearance to the eye of "an ordinary observer," It said,

"The court below was of the opinion that the test of a patent

for a design is not the eye of an ordinary observer. The

5 * 8 14 Wall. 511.

519 Accd. Dobson v. Dorman, 118 U. S. 10; Braddock Glass Co. v. Mac-

beth, 64 Fed. 118.

520 148 U. S. 674.

which litigation mo t frequently arises are actually of this
sort, all factor determinative of the presence of invention or
the fact of infringement are usually omitted from consideration except that of the effect on the eye. Other factors may
be considered, but the cases in which they do not appear and
- could not have a part are so frequent that they are usually
ignored in judicial expression. In very many cases, therefore, the inventive quality of a design seems to have depended,
and probably did depend, solely upon its visible similarity to
those already known, or its difference from them. So aLo
the infringement of a later design seems to have been decided
wholly by the distinction between them which could be perceived through the eyes.
In regard to this identity of visible characteristics the rule
is probably that laid down in Gorham Co. v. White ;518 'the
thing invented or produced, for which a (design) patent is
given, is that which gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance
to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or
to which it gives form . . . . It is the appearance itself, therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if . not entirely the contribution to the public ~hich the
law deems worthy of recompense." 519 It must be remembered
that the court is here expressing itself in regard to a design
whose sole purpose was its effect upon the eye. It was definitely stated by the later case of Smith v. Whitman Saddle
Co., 520 in direct reference to the statement of rule just quoted,
that appearance is not the only criterion, but · that such elements as the more material usefulness of a design, or its effect
upon other senses, than . sight, may be considered if they enter
into its character. But to the extent that visible character is
the test of invention or infringement, the court held that it is:
the appearance to the eye of "an ordinary observer." It said,
"The court below was of the opinion that the test of a patent
for a design is not the eye of an ordinary observer. The
sis 14 Wall. 511.
519 Aced. Dobson v. Dorman, n8 U. S. ro; Braddock Glass
beth, 64 Fed. I 18.
520

148

Co~

v. Mac-

u. s. 674.
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learned judge thought there could be no infringement unless

there was substantial identity 4 in view of the observation of

a person versed in designs in the particular trade in question

of a person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles

containing such designs of a person accustomed to compare

such designs one with another, and who sees and examines

the articles containing them side by side.' There must, he

thought, be a comparison of the features which make up the

two designs. With this we cannot concur. Such a test would

destroy all the protection which the act of Congress intended

to give. There never could be piracy of a patented design,

for human ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in all

its details, exactly like another, so like, that an expert could

not distinguish them. No counterfeit bank note is so identical

in appearance with the true that an experienced artist cannot

discern a difference. It is said an engraver distinguishes im-

pressions made by the same plate. Experts, therefore, are

not the persons to be deceived. Much less than that which

would be substantial identity in their eyes would be undistin-
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guishable in the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordi-

nary acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article upon

which the design has been placed that degree of observation

which men of ordinary intelligence give. It is persons of the

latter class who are the principal purchasers of the articles to

which designs have given novel appearances, and if they are

misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article they

supposed it to be, if, for example, they are led to purchase

forks or spoons, deceived by an apparent resemblance into the

belief that they, bear the 'cottage' design, and, therefore, are

the production of the holders of the Gorham, Thurber, and

Dexter patent, when in fact they are not, the patentees are

injured, and that advantage of a market which the patent was

granted to secure is destroyed. The purpose of the law must

be effected if possible; but, plainly, it cannot be if, while the

general appearance of the design is preserved, minor differ-

ences of detail in the manner in which the appearance is pro-

duced, observable by experts, but not .noticed by ordinary ob-

learned judge thought there could be no infringement unless
there was substantial identity 'in view of the observation of
a person versed in designs in the particular trade in question..-of a person engaged in the manufacture or sale of articles
containing such designs-of. a person accustomed to compare
such designs one with another, and who sees and examines
the articles containing them side by side.' There must, he
thought, be a comparisort of the features which make up the
two designs. With this we cannot concur~ Such a test would
destroy all the protection which the act of Congress intended
to give. There never could be piracy of a patented design,
for human ingenuity has never yet produced a design, in all
its details, exactly like another, so like, that an expert could
not distinguish them. No counterfeit bank note is so identical
in app<:arance with the true that an experienced artist cannot
discern a difference. It is said an engraver distinguishes impressions made by the same plate. Experts, therefore, are
not the persons to be deceived. Much less than that which
would be substantial identity ~~ their eyes would be undistinguishable ill: the eyes of men generally, of observers of ordi:nary acuteness, bringing to the examination of the article u_pon
which the design has · ~een placed that degree of observation
which men of ordinary intelligence give. It is persons of the
latter -class who are the prinCipal purchasers of the articles to
which designs have given novel appearances, and if they are
misled, and induced to purchase what is not the article they
supposed it to be, if, for example, they are led to purchase
for ks or spoons, deceived by an apparent resemblance into the
belief that they_bear the 'cottage' design, and, therefore, are
the production of the holders of the Gorham, Thurber, and
Dexter patent, when in fact they are not, the patente~s are
injured, and that advantage of a market which the patent was
granted to secure is destroyed. The purpose of the law must
be effected if possible; but, plainly, it cannot be if, while the
general appearance of the design is preserved, minor differences of detail in the manner in which the appearance is pro-duced, observable by experts, but not .noticed by ordinary ob-
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servers, by those who buy and use, are sufficient to relieve an

imitating design from condemnation as an infringement. We

hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer,

giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two de-

signs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as

to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one

supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed

by the other." 521

As the principles which apply to design patents are identical

with those which have already been discussed throughout the

book nothing further need be said of them in this connection.

521 Accord. Jennings v. Kibbie, 10 Fed. 669, holding that testimony of

witnesses as to apparent identity is not necessary, and that the trial judge

may properly reach a decision as a result of the impression on his own

visual senses only.

The very slight difference of appearance necessary to constitute novelty

servers, by those who buy and use, are sufficient to relieve an
imitating design from condemnation as an infringement. We
hold, therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer,
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially .the same, if the resemblance is such as
to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the 0th.er, the first one patented is infringed
by the other.'' 521
As the principles which apply to design patents are identical
with those which have already been discussed throughout the
book nothing further need be said of them in this connection.

in some cases where the appearance is the real purpose of the invention

is illustrated by the case of Pelouze Scale & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Cutlery Co.,

102 Fed. 916.
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Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927 Byram v. Friedberger, 100 Fed.

963; Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Rdsenbaum Co., 199 Fed. 154, the eye

of the ordinary observer decides the question.

52 1 Accord. Jennings v. Kibbie, IO Fed. 669, holdi:1g that testimony of
witnesses as to apparent identity is not necessary, and that the trial judge
may properly reach a decision as a result of the impression on his own
visual senses only.
The very slight difference of appearance necessary to constitute novelty
in some cases where the appearance is the real purpose of the invention
is illustrated by the case of Pelouze Scale & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Cutlery Co.,
102 Fed. 916.
.
Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927 Byram v. Friedberger, 100 Fed.
963; Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Rosenbaum Co., 199 Fed. 154, the eye
of the ordinary observer decides the question.

CHAPTER XI

EPILOGUE

Aaron Burr is reputed to have defined "law" as "whatever

is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained." However in-

correct this definition may be, it is more nearly true of the law

respecting patents than of any other branch. In all litigation

it is seldom the law itself that is in dispute. It does occasion-

ally happen that the substance of a rule is in doubt and must

CHAPTER XI

be ascertained by the court. But in the overwhelming ma-

jority of cases, it is the proper application of undisputed rules

EPILOGUE

to the particular facts, or, in other form of expression, it is

the choice of the rule- proper to the particular facts, on which

attorneys and, often, the judges can not agree.

In patent law, however, the essential dissimilarity of sensible

circumstance precludes the possibility of rules and the influ-

ence of other precedent cases. All of the characteristic issues

are those of judicial opinion only. By the statute the de-

fendant may attempt to show in answer to the suit both that

the plaintiff's patent is invalid and that his own device does

not in fact infringe it.
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The complainant in a case is, therefore, ever attempting to

convince the court that his idea of means is unlike anything

that has preceded it, but that it is so like the defendant's device

as to make the latter an infringement. Conversely, the de-

fendant bends all his energies to demonstrating the essential

similarity of the plaintiff's invention to prior knowledge and

the real dissimilarity of his own device to that of the plantiff.

For this, a "knowledge of the law" is not enough. He who

would succeed in patent practice must, more than in any other

branch of law, be able to analyze his case. He must see not

only the presence of facts on which rules of law have already

been predicated, but also the actual issues on which personal

opinion may be divided, and the most forceful relationship of

Aaron Burr is reputed to have defined "law" as "whatever
is boldly asserted and plausibly maintained." However incorrect this definition may be, it is more nearly true of the law
respecting patents than of any other branch. In all litigation
it is seldom the law itself that is in dispute. It does occasionally happen that the substance of a rule is in doubt and must
be ascertained by the court. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is the proper application of undisputed rules
to the particular facts, or, in other form of expression, it is
the choice of the rule. proper to the particul~r facts, on which
attorneys and, often, th~ judges can not agree.
In patent law, however, the essential dissimilarity of sensible
circumstance precludes the possibility of rules and the influence of 9ther precedent cases. All of the characteristic issues
are those of judicial opinion only. By the statute the defendant may attempt to show in answer to the suit both that
the plaintiff's patent is invalid and that his own device does
not in fact infringe it.
The complain~nt in a case is, therefore, ever attempting to
convince the court that his idea of means is unli~e anything
that has preceded it, but that it is so like the defendant's device
as to make the latter an infringement. Conversely, the defendant bends all his energies to demonstrating the essential
similarity of the plaintiff's invention to prior knowledge and
the real dissimilarity of. his own device to that of the plantiff.
For this, a "knowledge of the law" is not enough. He who
would succeed in patent practice must, more than in any other
branch of law, be able to analyze his case. He must see not
only the presence of facts on which rules of law have already
been predicated, but also the actual issues on which personal
opinion may be divided, and the most forceful relationship of
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his facts thereto. If he has the ability of a detective in feiv

reting out facts and in construing their true bearing upon

the proposition he would like to demonstrate, so much the

better. As even judicial opinion can not be wholly removed

from the influence of personality, it is peculiarly well 'for the

patent practitioner if to his knowledge of law and of fact he

adjoins a power in persuasive argument and a magnetic per-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:36 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3cz3366n
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

sonality.

his facts thereto. If he has the ability of a detective in fer=reting out facts and in construing their true bearing upon
the proposition he would like to demonstrate, so much the
better. As even judicial opinion can not be wholly removed
from the influence of personality, it is peculiarly well 'for the
patent practitioner if to his knowledge of law and of fact he
adjoins a power in persuasive argument and a magne.tic personality . .
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